DOMINICO FOS AND DINO DIVA, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES RODEL ROBERT AND CONSOLACION SERVAÑEZ, ESTRELLA F. DIVA, AND ERLINDA F. MARTINEZ, REPRESENTED BY CONSOLACION SERVAÑEZ AND / …

Fos versus Servañez

The Case

This is a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, brought by Dominico Fos and Dino Diva against the spouses Rodel Robert and Consolacion Servañez, Estrella F. Diva, and Erlinda F. Martinez, represented by Consolacion Servañez. The respondents sued the petitioners for forcible entry and damages over a parcel of land in Mayha, Odiongan, Romblon. The case matters because the Supreme Court draws a sharp line between possession in the concept of an owner, which tax declarations and realty tax payments may suggest, and the actual physical possession that a forcible entry action protects. It is a compact lesson on the nature of possession in ejectment and on the burden of proof borne by a plaintiff.

Procedural History

The respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry and damages before the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Odiongan-Ferrol in Odiongan, Romblon. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondents, ordering the petitioners to vacate and surrender possession, to respect the respondents' possession, to remove improvements, and to pay attorney's fees and costs, and it made the preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunctions permanent. The petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82, which affirmed the trial court's decision in full. The petitioners then filed the present petition for review under Rule 42, assigning as errors the findings of prior physical possession in the respondents and the award of attorney's fees.

Facts

The land in dispute is a two thousand six hundred six square meter lot designated as Lot Number 2985-P of the Odiongan Cadastre, situated in Barangay Mayha, Odiongan, Romblon. The trial court traced its ownership to Pedro Fadrigore, from whom it descended by inheritance to Rosario Fadrigore and then to her children, among them Estrella Fadrigore Fontamillas-Diva and Erlinda Fadrigore Fontamillas-Martinez, both respondents. On April 1, 2001, their brother Eduardo executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights and a deed of absolute sale over his share in favor of the respondent spouses Servañez. The lot was later subdivided into Lot Numbers 10479-A, 10479-B, and 10479-C, assigned respectively to the spouses Servañez, Estrella, and Erlinda.

The spouses Servañez applied for a free patent over Lot Number 10479-A with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The petitioner Dominico Fos protested. In its order of April 5, 2011, the Department denied the application for failure to comply with the requirement of actual possession and cultivation, among others. Finding that Dominico Fos was the one actually occupying the lot and had introduced minimal improvements, the Department directed him to file the appropriate public land application. The respondents' motion for reconsideration of that order remains unresolved.

Before the trial court, the respondents presented tax declarations in the names of Pedro Fadrigore and the Heirs of Rosario Fadrigore, and realty tax payments made in the name of the heirs. They also showed that the lot declared in the name of Severo Fos, from whom Dominico Fos traced his title, was Lot Number 2992, a different lot. The petitioners presented no evidence against these. On these records the trial court and the Regional Trial Court found prior possession in the respondents and ruled for them.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondents were in prior physical possession of the subject property and therefore had a better right to possess it as against the petitioners.
• Whether or not the respondents are entitled to an award of attorney's fees.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 42, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is the provision under which the petition was brought, and it fixes the mode of review from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court:

Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of the said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be appealed or of the resolution denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by a certified true copy of the decision or resolution appealed from, and the original or certified true copy of the record on appeal.

This provision governs the procedural vehicle by which the petitioners brought the case to the Supreme Court, and the Court entertained the petition and decided it on the merits.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the petition is meritorious. It held that in ejectment cases, possession means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law, and that prior physical possession is the primary consideration in a forcible entry case. A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself, and the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror.

The Court rejected the lower courts' reliance on tax declarations and realty tax payments. It held that a tax declaration or a real property tax payment may constitute proof of a claim of title over, but not necessarily of actual possession of, the property so declared or for which the realty tax was paid. They are merely good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, but not necessarily of the actual possession required in forcible entry cases. Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession, and not possession flowing out of ownership.

The Court stressed that the respondents, as plaintiffs, bore the burden of proof and had to establish their case by a preponderance of evidence, which simply means evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. Plaintiffs must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not on the weakness of the defendant's. Aside from the tax documents, the respondents showed no other evidence of prior physical possession.

The Court found the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ocular inspection telling. The investigation report of June 19, 2007 noted that Lot Number 10479-A is an open area with minimal improvements thereon, which improvement was found to have been introduced by Dominico Fos. One reason the free patent application was denied was the respondents' failure to prove actual possession and cultivation, either by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest. The Court added that the respondents' own witnesses, Willy Flores and Danilo Sumagingsing, stated in their joint affidavit that the respondents let other persons occupy the lot from 2000 to 2003, and after 2003 nothing was mentioned about their possession. This showed that since 2003 the respondents had not exercised actual possession.

Finally, the Court held that the trial court's finding that the lot claimed by the petitioners seems different from the subject lot is of no moment. In forcible entry, it does not even matter if the party's title to the property is questionable. Regardless of the actual condition of the title, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror, and neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession. On the second issue, since the respondents failed to establish their cause of action, the award of attorney's fees cannot stand, and the forcible entry case with damages must be dismissed.

Doctrine

In forcible entry, the only possession that matters is possession de facto, or actual or material physical possession, not legal possession flowing from ownership. Prior physical possession is the primary consideration, and a party who proves it may recover possession even against the owner himself, for the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror.

Tax declarations and realty tax payments are merely good indicia of possession in the concept of owner. They may prove a claim of title, but they do not necessarily prove the actual possession required in forcible entry cases.

The plaintiff in a forcible entry case bears the burden of proving prior physical possession by a preponderance of evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the defendant's. The question of title is immaterial; even a questionable title does not defeat the right of the party in prior peaceable possession to remain until lawfully ejected.

Disposition

The petition was granted, the decision of the Regional Trial Court was reversed and set aside, and the forcible entry case with damages filed by the respondents against the petitioners was dismissed.

Remember This

Memorize the line that tax declarations and realty tax payments are indicia of possession in the concept of owner, not of the actual physical possession protected in forcible entry. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between possession de facto and possession de jure, and the rule that the plaintiff in ejectment must stand on the strength of his own evidence.