G.R. No. L-24435. August 26, 1977
CARMEN DEL ROSARIO ILACAD, IN HER OWN RIGHT AND AS GUARDIAN OF THE MINORS ORLANDO, JOSE, JR., EDUARDO, RAMONCITO, ENRICO AND ARTURO, ALL SURNAMED ILACAD, AS THE INTESTATE HEIRS …
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking to
annul the amendatory decision[1]
and a subsequent amendatory resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals (Special
Fifth Division with Justice Edmundo S. Piccio, Chairman, ponente, and Justice Gregorio S. Narvasa and Justice Hermogenes Concepcion Jr., members) of its original decision
promulgated on May 25, 1964, in CA-G. R. No. 23988-R, entitled
“Prudential Bank & Trust Co., vs.
Lanuza Bay Lumber Co., Inc. et al.,[3],
which had become final and executory,[4]
and the resolution denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
amendatory decision and resolution with the alternative prayer that in the
event that the first relief is untenable, to consider the petition as a review
by certiorari of the original decision as amended.[5]
The records disclose that a complaint dated January 10, 1957 for
the recovery of a sum of money based on an actionable document, a promissory
note, was filed by private respondent, Prudential Bank & Trust Company,
hereinafter referred to as Respondent Bank for short, against Lanuza Bay Lumber Co. Inc.[6]
When the answer of the defendant company alleged, among others, that its
President, Jose N. Ilacad who executed the actionable
document was not authorized by the Board of Directors of the said corporation,[7]
the plaintiff therein, respondent bank herein, with leave of court, amended its
complaint to include as party defendant Jose N. Ilacad.[8]
The plaintiff, private respondent herein, adduced its
evidence. On June 3, 1958, the date set for hearing of the
defendants’ evidence, both defendants and their counsel failed to appear. The trial court granted the motion of the
plaintiff, private respondent herein, that
the case be decided on the evidence of the plaintiff.[9]
The trial court, in its decision dated August 13, 1958, dismissed the case with costs
against the plaintiff therein, respondent bank herein.[10]
The plaintiff appealed the decision dismissing its complaint to
the Respondent Court of Appeals which promulgated a decision on May 25, 1964,[11]
the dispositive part of which reads:
“x
x x Accordingly,
defendant Jose Ilacad either exceeded his authority in executing said promissory note, or
was not so authorized, so much so that he should be as he is hereby held
personally liable for the payment of P1,5000.00 (sic) with 8% interests
annually from October 20, 1956, till fully paid, in favor of plaintiff bank.
The appealed judgment is reversed, with costs against
defendants.”
In June 1964, the prevailing party, respondent bank herein, filed
a motion to correct a clerical error[12]
with the Respondent Court of Appeals. It
sought to correct merely the proper place of the comma in the principal amount
by placing said comma between the digits 5 and 0 so that the principal debt
will read P15,000.00
On August 10, 1964,
the Respondent Court of Appeals granted the said motion for correction of
clerical error in its resolution[13]
of August 10, 1964.
There is no controversy that the original decision of the
Respondent Court of Appeals had already become final and executory.[14]
It is a fact that an entry of judgment was issued by the Clerk of Court of the
Respondent Court of Appeals on June
26, 1964. The record of the
case was remanded to the court of origin on September 14, 1964.[15]
The plaintiff filed with the trial court a motion for a writ of
execution. The motion was granted. However, the Clerk of Court of Manila refused
to place in the writ of execution the amount of “P15,000.00 with 8%
interest annually from October 20, 1956”, contending that the Entry of
Judgment of the Respondent Court of Appeals merely stated that “The
appealed judgment is reversed, with the costs against the defendants”.
Respondent Bank, to obviate any further delay in the execution of
the judgment, filed on November
11, 1964 a motion for clarification with the Respondent Court of Appeals
praying that the dispositive portion of its decision
be amended to make “it unmistakably clear and state that defendant Jose Ilacad is held liable to plaintiff for the payment of
P15,000.00, with 8% interest annually from October 20, 1956.”[16]
The Respondent Court its
said motion for clarification by issuing amendatory decision[17]
on November 23, 1964 by
making the dispositive part read as follows:
“The appealed judgment is hereby reversed, with the costs
against defendants, requiring the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00) with 8% interests annually from October 20, 1956,
till fully paid.”
By the foregoing, the Respondent Court of Appeals had varied the
import of its judgment. While under its
original judgment it was only defendant Jose Ilacad
who was held liable for the payment of the P15,000.00 with 8% interest annually
from October 20, 1956, the
above-quoted amendatory decision held that the defendants are liable. Upon another motion filed by Respondent Bank,
the Respondent Court of Appeals rectified the patent variation of its original
judgment by rendering another amendatory resolution[18]
on November 28, 1964, the dispositive part of which reads:
“The appealed judgment is hereby reversed, with costs against
defendant Jose Ilacad, requiring the latter to pay
plaintiff the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) with 8% interests
annually from October 20, 1956,
till fully paid.”
On December 14, 1964 petitioners herein, through counsel of
record of their predecessor, Jose Ilacad, received the said amendatory resolution of November
28, 1964 and through new counsel filed on December 29, 1964 a motion for
substitution of the parties herein in lieu of the original defendant Jose Ilacad who
had since died allegedly on February 28, 1962 and for an extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration. The
said motion[19]
was filed on January 27, 1965. (Brief for the Petitioners, pp. 8-9)
On February 8, 1965
the Respondent Court of Appeals granted the prayer for substitution of parties
sought by the petitioners herein but denied the motion to set aside the amended
decision. The resolution of denial[20]
was received by petitioner’s counsel on March
30, 1965. Hence, this
petition was filed on April 14, 1965.
The legal issues to be resolved in this case are: (1) Whether or not the alleged amendatory decision
and resolution of the Respondent Court of Appeals were issued without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and (2) whether
or not a final and executory judgment of the
Respondent Court of Appeals can still be the subject of a review by certiorari
by this Court.
The records of this case show that the filing of the motion to
amend the decision of the Court of Appeals was brought about by the error of
omission committed by the Clerk of Court of the Respondent Court of
Appeals. In making the Entry of Judgment
in CA-G. R. No. 23988-R, on June
26, 1964, the Clerk of Court, instead of reproducing the entire dispositive portion of the decision rendered therein,
merely quoted the last sentence thereof – “The appealed judgment is
reversed, with costs against defendants.” – leaving the preceding portion
which resolved the issues pertaining to the rights and obligations brought on
appeal by the contending parties therein.
The omitted decretal portion states that
“Accordingly, defendant Jose Ilacad either exceeded his authority in executing said
promissory note, or was not so authorized, so much so that he should be, as he
is hereby held personally liable for the payment of P15,000.00 with 8%
interests annually from October 20, 1956, till fully paid, in favor of
plaintiff bank.” It was this particular omission that snarled the proceedings incident to the execution
of said judgment. The Clerk of Court of the
court of origin refused to embody in the writ of execution to be issued the
said omitted portion of the decretal part of the
decision, contending that the dispositive part
consisted merely of what is stated in the Entry of Judgment. Respondent bank, to avoid further delay in
the execution of the judgment, filed with the Respondent Court of Appeals the
Motion for Clarification that resulted in the issuance of an amendatory
decision varying the original dispositive portion of
the original decision. The amendatory
resolution dated November 28, 1964
last issued by the Respondent Court of Appeals, merely corrected the error of
making the defendants liable instead of Jose Ilacad
only. The Respondent Court of Appeals,
in correcting the position of the comma to make the amount appear as P15,000.00
and rectifying the mistake in the formulation of the dispositive
portion of the first amendatory decision may not be said to have committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or in excess of its
jurisdiction.
As held by this
Court in the case of Filipino Legion
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[21]
a judgment, even after it had become final, where there is an ambiguity caused
by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion,
the court may clarify such ambiguity, mistake or omission by an amendment and
in so doing it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the court’s
findings of facts and conclusions of law as expressed in the body of the
decision. The pertinent portion of the
decision reads:
“This Court in various instances stated the rule that the dispositive part of a decision contains the judgment of
the court which is to be the subject of execution, irrespective of all
seemingly contrary statements in the body of the decision itself, and in case
of any omission, or discrepancy between the opinion set forth in the decision
proper and the dispositive part, the latter prevails.
Equally true, however, are the following principles also enunciated
by the Court, viz: that the dispositive
part of a decision must find support from the decision’s ratio decidendi (Morelos
vs. Go Chin Ling, et al., 105 Phil. 814, 817) because
‘While the opinion of the court is not part of the judgment, it
may, in case of uncertainty or ambiguity, be referred to for the purpose of
construing the Judgment particularly where the law require the judge to state
the reason for the judgment as in case of an opinion by an appellate court or
where the judgment itself refers to the opinion in such a way as to make it
part of the record.’
that where there is ambiguity caused by an
omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of a decision the court may clarify
such ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment had become final, and
for this purpose it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the
court’s findings of facts and
conclusions of law as expressed in the body of the decision.”[22]
Equally applicable is the case of Padua vs. Robles,[23]
where this Court, through Associate Justice now Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro,
said:
“The sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by
its substance rather than its form. In
construing a judgment, its legal effects including such effects that
necessarily follow because of legal implications, rather than the language
used, govern. Also, its meaning,
operation, and consequences must be ascertained like any other written
instrument. Thus, a judgment rests on
the intention of the court as gathered from every part thereof, including the
situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances.
x x x x x x x
x x
There is indeed much to be desired in the formulation by Judge Amores of that part of the decretal
portion of the judgment in Criminal Case 1158-0 referring to the civil
liability of Punzalan resulting from his criminal
conviction. The judge could have been
forthright and direct instead of
circuitous and ambiguous. But, as we
have above explained, the statement on the civil liability of Punzalan must surely have a meaning, and even if the
statement were reasonably susceptible of two or more interpretations, that
which achieves moral justice should be adopted, eschewing the other
interpretations which in effect would negate
moral justice.
It is not amiss at this juncture to emphasize to all magistrates in
all levels of the Judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of care should be
exercised in the formulation of the dispositive portion
of a decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the
decision becomes final. The adjudication
of the rights and obligations of the parties, and the dispositions made as well
as the directions and instructions given by the court in the premises in
conformity with the body of the decision, must all be spelled out clearly,
distinctly and unequivocably leaving absolutely no
room for dispute, debate or interpretation.”[24]
We will now come to the alternative relief prayed for by petitioners herein to review
belatedly by way of certiorari the judgment of the Respondent Court of
Appeals which they admitted had already become final and executory.
It is a settled
rule that the office of a writ of certiorari is to correct defects in
jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other purpose. It is not intended to correct errors of procedure
or mistakes in the judge’s findings or conclusions.[25] Equally settled is the rule that once
a court renders a final
judgment, all the issues between
or among the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial function as
regards matters related to the controversy
litigated comes to an end, and the same cannot be relitigated
on its merits in the lower court as well as the appellate courts.[26]
As clearly explained in the case of Macabingkil vs. PHHC, et al.,
supra, there are only three (3) ways by which a final and executory judgment may be set aside, thus:
“Under existing rules, there are three (3) ways by which a
final and executory judgment may be set aside. The first if by petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court, when judgment has been
taken against the party through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, in which case the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days
after the petitioner learns of the judgment, but not more than six (6) months
after which judgment was entered. The
second is by direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the
judgment. This remedy presupposes that the challenged judgment is not void
upon its face, but is entirely regular in form, and the alleged defect is one
which is not apparent upon its face or from the recitals contained in the judgment. As explained in Banco
Español-Filipino v. Palanca,
(37 Phil. 291,) under accepted principles of law and practice, long recognized
in American courts, the proper remedy in such case, after the time for appeal
or review has passed, is for the aggrieved party to bring an action enjoining
the judgment, if not already
carried into effect; or if the property has already been disposed of, he may
institute suit to recover it. The third
is either a direct action, as certiorari,
or by a collateral attack against the challenged judgment (which) is
void upon its face, or that the nullity of the judgment is apparent by virtue
of its own recitals.”[27]
Since the judgment rendered by the Respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. No. 23988-R, which had become final and executory,
is not void upon its face and as a matter of fact its original decretal portion has only been clarified without any legal
right or obligation originally adjudicated to the contending parties taken out
or added therein, the same can only be annulled or set aside by direct action
on the ground of extrinsic fraud.
And speaking of extrinsic fraud, it is that fraudulent scheme of
the prevailing litigant which prevents a party from having his day in court or
from presenting his case. Fraud has been
regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule,
“where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial,
or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by which it was
procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed
outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party has been prevented
from presenting fully his side
of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.”[28]
The petitioners herein can not complain that their
predecessor-in-interest was prevented from presenting fully his case because of
any fraudulent scheme employed by the Respondent Bank outside of the trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Martin, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
[1]
Annex “D” of Petition, Rollo p. 32
[2]
Annex “E” of Petition, Rollo p. 33
[3]
Annex “A” of Petition, Rollo pp.
24-28
[4]
Entry of Judgment, Annex “B” of Petition, Rollo
p. 29
[5]
Petition, Rollo pp. 21-22
[6]
Record on Appeal, pp. 1-4, Rollo p. 51
[7] Id.,
pp. 11-13
[8] Id.,
pp. 27-29
[9] Id.,
pp. 50-51
[10]
Record on Appeal, pp. 51-53
[11]
Annex “A” to Petition, Rollo p. 28
[12]
Appendix “A” Brief for the Respondents, pp. 22-24
[13]
Annex “C” to Petition, Rollo p. 30
[14]
See footnote No. 4
[15]
Brief for the Petitioner, p. 7
[16]
Brief for the Petitioner, p. 7
[17]
Annex “D” to Petition, Rollo p. 32
[18]
Annex “E” to Petition, Rollo p. 33
[19]
Annex “F” of Petition
[20]
Annex “G” of Petition
[21]
G. R. L-22364 & L-28330, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 674, 690-691, citing the
cases Locsin vs. Paredes,
et al. 63 Phil. 87, 91, also Republic et al., vs. Hon. de los Angeles L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422.
[22] Ibid.,
pp. 690-691
[23]
G. R. L-40486, August 29, 1975,
66 SCRA 485.
[24] Ibid.,
pp. 488-490
[25] Macabingkil vs. PHHC, et al., L-29080, August 12, 1976, 72 SCRA 326,
339-340.
[26] Ibid.,
p. 341
[27] loc
cit footnote No. 23, 72 SCRA 343.
[28] Libudan vs. Gil, 45 SCRA 17, 28-29; Cruz vs.
Navarro, 54 SCRA 109, 117; Macabingkil vs.
PHHC, et al., 72 SCRA 326, 343-345.