G.R. No. L-22314. May 29, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF PEH LAY BEN ALIAS LIAO KAY CHAY TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. PEH LAY BEN ALIAS LIAO KAY CHAY, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC …
DIZON, J.:
Appeal taken by the State from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila granting appellee’s,
application for citizenship and ordering the issuance of the corresponding
certificate of naturalization in his favor upon compliance by him of the
requisites imposed by Republic Act No. 530.
Appellee Peh
Lay Ben, alias Liao Kay Chay,
filed his application for naturalization in the lower court on July 19, 1960. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the
State, filed an opposition thereto, and subsequently appellee
filed a reply. Thereafter, the
publication required by law having been accomplished, the case was heard. After the last hearing, appellee
filed a motion for the re-opening of the case to enable him to present additional
evidence. This motion was granted. After the hearing held on February 8, 1962, the parties were
required to submit memoranda on whether the additional income reflected in appellee’s Income Tax Return for 1961 may be considered for
the purpose of meeting the requirement of lucrative employment. After the parties had done so, the trial
court rendered the decision mentioned heretofore. Thereafter, the State took the steps required
for appeal purposes. Pending approval of
the State’s record on appeal, appellee filed another
motion, to re-open the case to afford him — and the State, if the latter so
desired — an opportunity to produce additional evidence on his income for
1961. Again, appellee’s
motion was granted, and after the presentation of such additional evidence, the
court issued its order of February 3,
1963 affirming its original decision of February 14, 1962.
The evidence shows the following:
that appellee was born in Amoy, China on June
30, 1929 and arrived at the Port of Manila on December 29, 1937 as son of a merchant;
since then he resided at Nueva Street, Manila until
1941; from 1941 up to 1945 he resided at Dapitan
Street, Sampaloc, Manila; he moved to Alvarado
Street, the same city, sometime in 1945 and stayed there up to 1946; from 1946
up to March 14, 1961, he returned to and
stayed at 473 Nueva Street, Manila, from where he
transferred to 3013 Int. 85, Nagtahan Street, Manila,
where he had been living up to the time of the hearing; he left for China in
December 1946 and there married Kee Suat Ping on March 20, 1947, in Amoy, Province of Fukien, and returned to the Philippines in July 1947; left
again for China in April 1948 returning to the Philippines only in March 1949;
left again for Hongkong either in October or November
1953, returning to the Philippines two or three months thereafter; he left
again for Hongkong in November or December 1954,
returning after two months; he went again to Hongkong
either in September or October 1955, returning to the Philippines in December
of the same year; left again for Hongkong in
September or October 1957, returning to the Philippines in December of the same
year; left again in September or October 1958, returning to the Philippines in
December of the same year; left again for Hongkong in
November 1959 and returned only in February 1960, this trip having been his
last to visit some members of his family in China or in Hongkong;
he has four children with his wife bearing the names of Liao
Ket Hai, born on January
28, 1949, in China; Liao We Lip, born on December
26, 1949, in China; Liao Giok
Lip, born on July 28, 1955, in Hongkong, and Liao Siy Chin, born on November
8, 1956, in Hongkong; at the time he filed his
petition for naturalization, all his four children were residing in Hongkong and they came to the Philippines only on December
18, 1960, having been admitted as temporary visitors for a period of three
months; upon their arrival appellee enrolled Liao Ket Hai,
then eleven years old, and Liao We Lip, age ten, in
Grade Four with the Crusaders’ School in Ongpin,
Manila; although they were admitted only as temporary visitors, the four
children as well as appellee’s wife had been living
with him in his residence in Nagtahan Street since
their arrival.
Appellee’s evidence further shows that
he was employed at the time of the filing of his application, with the Hong Moh Tea
Firm located at 473 Nueva Street, Manila, at a
monthly salary of P380.00.
Urging Us to reverse the appealed
decision, the Solicitor General contends that the lower court erred in granting
appellee Philippine citizenship in spite of the fact
that:
1)
He had not alleged in his petition
all his former places of residence;
2)
He had no lucrative occupation or
income;
3)
He had not sent his children of
school age to recognized Philippine schools; and
4)
He is not a person of
irreproachable character, and lacks sincerety in his
desire to embrace Philippine way of life.
To resolve this appeal, We need resolve
only the first and second of the above enumerated issues.
On the matter of appellee’s places of
residence, paragraph 2 of his petition for naturalization alleges the
following:
“2. My present
place of residence is at No. 473 Nueva
St., Manila formerly No.
423 Nueva St. and my
former place of residence during the Japanese occupation was
at Dapitan St., Quezon City.”
The evidence shows, however, that aside from 473 (formerly 423) Nueva Street, Manila,
and Dapitan Street,
Quezon City, appellee also lived at Alvarado
Street, Manila. He claims, however, that his failure to
include and mention this place in his petition was due to the fact that he
stayed there for a period of only twenty-five days. As against this, however, the State claims
that the evidence of record shows that appellee
stayed at that place from sometime in the year 1945 up to the year 1946.
It will be noticed that, cross-examined on the matter of his
places of residence, appellee testified that he had
not resided in any other place except 473 Nueva
Street, and 3013 Interior 85, Nagtahan Street, both
of the City of Manila (t.s.n., pp. 99-100, August 31,
1961). Upon being questioned further,
however, he disclosed that he had also resided at Dapitan Street, Quezon City from 1941 to 1945
and that in 1945 he moved to Alvarado Street
(t.s,n., p. 102, August 31, 1961. His residence at Alvarado Street, Manila —
which he did not disclose in his petition for naturalization — was formally
admitted by him in his answers given to the Confidential Questionnaire on
Naturalization before the Manila Police Department on May 5, 1961 (Exh. 2, Government, pp. 68-74, Folder of Exhibits) where he
made of record that he had stayed thereat “from 1945 to 1946.”
As stated heretofore, appellee claims —
and in this he was sustained by the trial court — that his residence at Alvarado
Street was temporary in character. We believe, however, that residing in a
particular place from 1945 to 1946 cannot be considered as “temporary
residence” in the eyes of our laws on naturalization. In De Pek
Long vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-18758, May
30, 1964, We reversed the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte admitting
the therein petitioner to Philippine citizenship, because of his failure to disclose
in his petition his stay in Manila
in the year 1956 although it was only preparatory for his departure for the United
States. From this it may be
clearly inferred that the temporary character of petitioner’s residence at a
particular place does not excuse him from alleging that place as one of his
former places of residence, particularly in a case like the present where,
upon the evidence before Us; appellee’s stay could
have been for a period of months. This
view is in consonance with that expressed in Keng Giok vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-13347, August 31, 1961 and in Go Bok
vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-16813, December
27, 1963. In Go Bok We held that the failure of the therein petitioner to
disclose in his petition the fact of his residence at Tres
de Abril and C. Padilla Streets, Cebu
City, was fatal to his case in spite of his explanation to the effect that he
honestly believed that it was not necessary for him to make such disclosure in
view of the fact that he had already stated in his petition that he resided in Comercio Street which was very near the two streets
omitted. It is clear, therefore, that We
have consistently held that the petitioner in a naturalization case must
strictly comply with the law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act 473) requiring the
statement or disclosure of all his former places of residence because it is
intended to give the State an opportunity to make such inquiries as may be necessary regarding his character
and moral fitness (Keng Giok,
supra; Lo vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-15919, May 19, 1961).
On the matter of appellees lucrative
employment, paragraph 3 of his petition for naturalization gives the sum of P3,500.00 to be, more or less, his average annual income
during the three years preceding the filing of said petition. Testifying during the hearing held on August 31, 1961, appellee
said that in 1961 his average income was P380.00 monthly in the form of salary
as employee of Hong Moh Tea Firm (t.s.n., pp. 67-68, August
31, 1961). On
cross-examination, he not only reiterated this statement but said further that,
aside from said salary, he had no other source of income (Idem, pp. 103-104, August 31, 1961; t.s.n.,
pp. 139-141, September 20, 1961). This
testimony finds confirmation in appellee’s sworn
application for clearance with the NBI dated April 4, 1961 (Exh. 1,
Government, pp. 64-65, Folder of Exhibits), and in the answers given by him in
the Confidential Questionnaire on Naturalization (Exh.
2, Government, pp. 68, 74, Folder of Exhibits) executed on May 5, 1961.
Quite obvious is the fact that the additional evidence which the
trial court allowed appellee to introduce during the
re-opening of the case was intended to prove that, for the year 1961, aside
from his annual income already referred to, he had received representation
allowance from Cortez Transportation Inc. in the amount of P2,000.00
and another allowance from People’s Trading in the amount of P1,500.00. Such evidence, including the testimony of his
supposed two other employers is, to say the least, of a highly suspicious character. It was clearly intended to cure the
insufficiency of appellee’s evidence presented prior
to the re-opening of the case, which was not sufficient to show that he had a
lucrative employment considering the fact that he had a wife and four children
to support. That such evidence is of a highly suspicious nature is shown by the
absence of readily acceptable explanation in the record of how, being a
full time employee of Hong Moh Tea Firm who was
paying a monthly salary of P380.00, appellee could
still do or perform sufficiently important work to merit representation allowances
from two other alleged employers. Then
again, if it were true that appellee was also employed by Cortez Transportation Inc.
and the People’s Trading during the year 1961, why did he fail to mention this important fact in
his original testimony and in his sworn statement before the NBI and the Manila
Police Department?
Moreover, with particular reference to the sum of P1,500.00 allegedly received by appellee
from the People’s Trading, there is the particular circumstance that, according
to his alleged employer, Li Ban Hok, the amount was
“paid to him as a sort of gift”
(t.s.n., pp. 35-37, August 24, 1962).
If so, it could be considered good — if at all — only for the year 1961
and would be immaterial to show appellee’s alleged
lucrative employment after that year in the absence of definite assurance that
he would continue to receive the same generous “gift” from his alleged
employer in the years to follow.
Relevant to the matter under discussion are our decisions in Justo Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-6013, March 30, 1963 and Keng Giok vs. Republic, supra,
where We held that even the yearly income of P6,300.00
and P8,687.00 were not lucrative income where the petitioner in a
naturalization case had a wife and four children to support.
In view of the foregoing, We no longer
deem it necessary to consider the other issues raised by the State in its
brief, the foregoing being sufficient for a reversal of the appealed decision.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed
and set aside, with costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Ruiz Castro, J., no part.