THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FELIX GARCIA AND PASTOR MINDAROZA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

Before Us for automatic review is the Joint Decision Rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, 8th Judicial District,
Branch III, in Criminal Cases Nos. 708-SP and 709-SP, imposing the death
penalty on Felix Garcia y Mindaroza and Pastor Mindaroza y Tiquiz.

The complaint in Criminal Case No. 708-SP charged herein
appellants with the crime of rape committed as follows:

“That on or about June 1, 1975, in the City of San Pablo,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused above-named, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation and
with the use of a deadly weapon, raped complainant LYDIA CATIBOG in the
following manner to wit:  both accused
dragged the complainant towards a secluded area and once there the accused
Felix Garcia violently tore and removed the dress of complainant, while his
co-accused Pastor Mindaroza removed her panty, forcing her to lie down, placing
himself on top of her while Pastor Mindaroza held her feet, and did then and
there wilfully, unlaw­fully and feloniously had carnal know­ledge of her
against her will.”

The complaint in Criminal Case No. 709-SP charges:

“That on or about June 1, 1975, in the City of San Pablo,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused above-named, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation and
with the use of a deadly weapon, raped complainant LYDIA CATIBOG in the
following manner, to wit:  both accused
dragged the complainant towards a secluded place and after accused Felix Garcia
has raped her, he held the feet of the complainant while the accused Pastor
Mindaroza placed himself on top of her, and did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and felo­niously had carnal knowledge of her against her will.”

Both complaints were signed by the complainant and her mother,
Julia Montalbo, who assisted her.  The
charges in the two criminal cases having been founded upon the same facts, the
lower Court tried both cases jointly.

The prosecution’s version of the incident is as follows:  On June 1, 1975, at about 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, the fourteen-year old complainant Lydia Catibog was in her
stepfather’s coconut plantation untying one of their cows tethered to a coconut
tree about 100 meters from their house. 
It was then that the two accused Felix Garcia and Pastor Mindaroza,
complainant’s barriomates and both well-known to her, took hold of her, covered
her mouth, threatened her with a knife, and dragged her to a banana plantation
about seven meters away.  There, both
accused forced complainant to lie down and took turns in raping her.  It was Felix who did it first while Pastor
held com­plainant’s feet.  Felix tore her
dress, slashed her panty with a knife and pulled it down, took off his
trousers, placed himself on top of complainant, kissed her, touched her breasts
and inserted his penis into her vagina. 
Complainant felt pain in her female organ.  When it was Pastor’s turn, Felix held
complainant’s legs.  Pastor kissed
complainant, touched her breasts, and inserted her penis into complainant’s
vagina.  All this time, complainant tried
to free herself and was crying.  After
the accused had satisfied their carnal desires, Felix made a remark to the
effect that he had already avenged his brother (“naipaghiganti na raw ang
kanyang kapatid”) and warned complainant not to tell anyone of what
happened, otherwise she would be killed. 
Both accused left.  Complainant
then raised her panty and pulled down her dress, both torn and blood-stained
and walked towards her home.  On the way,
she met Danilo Diamante.

Complainant did not reveal immediately the matter to her mother
or stepfather.  Her mother came to know
of the incident only thirteen (13) days later, or on June 14, 1975.  Complainant’s mother immediately called a
family conference and it was decided that charges would be filed.  On the very same day, the rape was reported
to the authorities, to the Barrio Captain and Police, and complainant was
internally examined at the San Pablo City Hospital.  The Medico-Legal Certificate, which is on
record, contains the following findings:

“Healed laceration at 3:00 o’clock position.

Hymen – ruptured.

Vaginal opening admits one finger freely.

Smear for spermatozoa – Negative.”^[1]

As for the accused Felix Garcia’s remark above-mentioned, he was
referring to an incident that took place on February 3, 1975 when his brother
Raymundo Garcia embraced complainant, which resulted in the filing of charges
against said Raymundo at the City Hall. 
The case was amicably settled later when Raymundo asked complainant’s
mother for forgiveness and executed a statement (Exhibit “A”) wherein
he acknowledged his misdeed and promised that he would not repeat the same.

The defense had quite a different story to tell, that accused
Felix Garcia and complainant had been sweethearts more or less one year prior
to the incident in question.  They had
love trysts in the banana planta­tion where they had met for about fifteen (15)
times and complainant allowed Felix to kiss her and have sexual intercourse
with her.  However, because complainant
always insisted that the act should be done in a stand­ing position to avoid
pregnancy, there was never any penetration. 
One such rendezvous took place four days before June 1, 1975 when Felix
met complainant again in the banana plantation to make love.  Complainant took off her panty and pulled her
dress up while Felix unzipped his pants. 
They were embracing each other and trying to have sexual intercourse in
a standing position when they heard someone laugh.  It turned out that accused Pastor Mindaroza,
first cousin of Felix Garcia, was watching them.  Pastor ran away, but complainant was angry at
Felix, pushed him and said, “Walanghiya ka, bakit mo ibinibilad ako!”
She also said that she would bring a complaint against Felix.  It was only four days later, or on June 1,
1975, when Pastor and Felix saw each other again, this time at the house of
their grand­father, but they did not converse.

The trial Court accorded full credence to the testimony of the
offended party and rendered the joint decision now under review, the
dispositive portion of which is hereinbelow quoted:

“WHEREFORE, the court finds both accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged in the aforesaid two informations.

In Crim. Case No. 708-SP: 
the accused Felix Garcia and Pastor Mindaroza are charged with rape with
the qualifying circumstance of ‘with the use of a deadly weapon,’ defined and
penalized under Art. 335, par. 3, Rev. Penal Code as amended by R.A. 2632 and
R.A. 4111, with reclusion perpetua to death.  This is borne out by the facts on the
record.  The evidence also shows that
after Felix Garcia had raped the victim with the help of his co-accused Pastor
Mindaroza, the latter in turn with the help of Felix Garcia, abused the
girl.  In accordance with settled
jurisprudence, this circumstance, although not alleged in the information, may
be considered as a generic aggra­vating circumstance which would call for the
imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period, which in accordance
with Art. 63, par. 2, No. 2, Rev. Penal Code, should be the greater penalty of
death.  Since also it is settled that
once conspiracy is shown, each is guilty as principal not only of the rape
committed by an accused but also of that committed by his co-defendant (People
vs. Villa, 81 Phil. 193; People vs. Alfaro, 91 Phil. 404; People vs. Soriano,
L-29057, Oct. 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 450; People vs. Cañete, No. L-30491, Jan. 21,
1972, 43 SCRA 14) each of the two accused Felix Garcia as principal by direct
par­ticipation and Pastor Mindaroza as prin­cipal by indispensable cooperation
should each be sentenced in criminal case No. 708-SP to suffer the penalty of
death, jointly and severally to indemnify the offended party in the sum of
P12,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.

In Crim. Case No. 709-SP, the two accused are charged with rape
with the use of a deadly weapon and the allegation that after accused Felix
Garcia has raped the victim, the other accused Pastor Mindaroza with the help
of Felix Garcia abused the girl, another circumstance which according to Art.
335, Par. 3, Rev. Penal Code qualifies the crime.  This latter circumstance will be appreciated
against the accused only as a generic aggravating circumstance which as ob­served
in the preceding paragraph raised the imposable penalty to greater penalty
which is death.  Also as observed above,
defendant Felix Garcia is liable for the rape committed by Pastor
Mindaroza.  Hence, the accused Pastor
Mindaroza as principal by direct participation and Felix Garcia, as principal
by indispen­sable cooperation, should each be sen­tenced in crim. case No.
709-SP to suffer the penalty of death, jointly and seve­rally to indemnify the
offended party in the sum of P12,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

However, in view of the provision of PD 603 (The Child and Youth
Welfare Code) Art. 192 thereof, the proceedings herein are suspended and the
accused Felix Garcia, born May 2, 1956, and Pastor Mindaroza, born August 6,
1955, are hereby committed to the National Training School for Boys (Vicente
Madrigal Rehabilitation Center) Tanay, Rizal, until they shall have reached
twenty-one (21) years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem
proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the said govern­ment
agency.  In view of the seriousness of
the crimes committed and the severity of the imposable penalty, the Director of
the aforenamed institution is hereby directed to exercise utmost caution in the
safekeeping of the herein accused to forestall possible escape.  They should be brought before this Court at
the latest upon their reaching the age of 21 to be dealt with in accordance
with Art. 197 of said PD 603.

SO ORDERED.

City of San Pablo, February 11, 1976.”^[2]

Pursuant to the foregoing judgment, Felix and Pastor were committed
to the National Training School for Boys (Vicente Madrigal Rehabilitation
Center) in Sampaloc, Tanay, Metro Manila. 
On June 21, 1976, the Court a quo was informed by the
Officer-In-Charge of the said rehabilitation center, Mrs. Constancia G. Bolinao,
in a letter dated June 4, 1976, that Felix “left the institution without
permission on May 29, 1976 at about 2:00 p.m.”^[3]

On the other hand, Pastor Mindaroza reached the age of twenty-one
(21) years on August 6, 1976, and on September 8, 1976, the Department of
Social Welfare, through the above-named Officer-In-Charge of the Vicente
Madrigal Rehabilitation Center, submitted to the lower Court a Final Report
dated September 4, 1976 as follows:

“PASTOR MINDAROZA, who was 21 years of
age, last August 6, 1976, accused in the above-entitled was admitted to the
National Training School for Boys (Vicente Madrigal Rehabilitation Center),
Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal on March 5, 1976 as per order of this Honorable Court
dated February 24, 1976 pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
603.

As per institutional procedure minor upon
admission was placed at the Reception Cottage where he was oriented with the
rules and regulations of the center as well as the programs and services
provided for him towards his total rehabilitation.  The importance of the privileges given as
provided for by the Presidential Decree 603 were clearly stressed to enable him
to have aspiration to make good to merit his early release from the
center.  During sessions with minor he
verbalized his willingness to undergo such process and promised to cooperate.

We are glad to inform this Honorable Court
that minor has maintained his exemplary behavior since his admission.  He has acted remarkably in accordance with
the rules and regulations we have in the center.  Members of the Rehabili­tation Team concurred
that he is coopera­tive, trustworthy, obedient, hardworking and industrious in
the performance of his task thereby making him likeable to almost
everyone.  Aside from his task in the
cottage and in the field minor was involved in different activities last summer
such as recreational activities like basketball, monthly social and also
outings at the different historical spots.

Having availed of the services of the
National Training School for Boys Rehabi­litation Team geared towards his total
rehabilitation he gradually reacted positively to all of the therapeutic prog­rams
given him.

Regarding his spiritual development, Pastor
was observed to be a devoted Catholic. 
He attended masses every Sunday and Holidays of Obligation.

He is presently engaged in tailoring as his
chosen vocational course wherein he acquired skills and shows marked interest
in it.

Record shows that he was visited occa­sionally
by his parents and siblings for which he was so happy and thankful.  Such visits had encouraged him to behave pro­perly.  Inquiries regarding the plans of his parents
revealed that they expressed their intense desire to have minor with them and
will be working in a construction which job is now waiting for him.  The parents promised to give the love, care
and attention due him.

Frequent session with minor revealed his
eagerness and desire to rejoin his family and is amenable to his parents’
plans.  He has the determination to leave
behind the dubious pasts and do what is right and honest in order to live
peacefully with dignity and res­pect in the community where he properly
belongs.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to the provisions of Presi­dential
Decree No. 603, it is respect­fully recommended that the case handed down by
this Honorable Court against herein accused, PASTOR MINDAROZA, be dismissed and
definitely terminated and that he be discharged from the National Training
School for Boys (Vicente Madrigal Rehabilitation Center), Sampaloc, Tanay,
Rizal to the care and custody of his parents, Mr. & Mrs. Apolinario
Mindaroza of Bo. San Pedro, San Pablo City.

It is also requested that for its information and guidance this
office be advised of whatever action this Honorable Court may deem proper
regarding this matter.”^[4]

The foregoing favorable recommendation
notwithstanding, the Court a quo on November 4, 1976 pronounced
the judgment of conviction insofar as Pastor Mindaroza was concerned.  Pertinent portions of the “Promulgation
of Judgment (on Pastor Mindaroza)” are quoted hereinbelow:

“Under Section 197 of PD 603 the court is given the authority
either to dismiss the case or to pronounce the judgment of conviction.  It is the pain­ful task of the court to
decide on the latter course and to pronounce the judgment of conviction.  It is impelled by the following
considerations (a) the seriousness of the offenses committed (b) the degree of
perversity demons­trated by the herein accused in the commission of the crimes
as narrated in the decision (c) the herein accused was 19 years, 9 months and
25 days when he abused the victim, age 14. 
The court therefore is pronouncing judgment on the herein accused
Pastor Mindaroza by the reading of the position in the presence of the
accused.

“In view of the death penalty imposed in each of these cases,
let the records of these case be for­warded to the Supreme Court for
review.”^[5]

Thereafter, Pastor Mindaroza was
committed to the National Bilibid Prisons at Muntinlupa, Rizal.^[6]

At the outset, the first question arises as to whether the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, was correctly applied by the trial court to the
accused-appellants.  Said Code, which was
approved on December 10, 1974, took effect six months after its approval,^[7]
or on June 8, 1975.^[8]
Before the cut­-off date, the law in force was Article 80 of the Revised Penal
Code under which a minor “under sixteen years of age at the date of the
commission of a grave or less grave felony” was entitled to the benefit of
suspended sentence.  On the other hand,
P.D. 603 granted the benefit of suspended sentence to a youthful offender
defined in the first paragraph of its Article 189 as one “who is over nine
years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of
the offense.”

The records show that at the time the alleged crime was committed
on June 1, 1975, appellants were both nineteen (19) years old, the accused
Garcia having been born on May 2, 1956 and Mindaroza on August 6, 1955.  A week after the commission of the crime on
June 1, 1975, P.D. 603 took effect on June 8, 1975.  On the question whether P.D. 603 may be given
retro­activity, We rule that since P.D. 603 is more favor­able to the accused
in that the sentence against them may be suspended, said Decree may be given
retroactive effect, not only with the end in view of giving force and effect to
the laudable policies for which the P.D. otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code was promulgated, one of which is that of exerting every effort to
promote the child’s welfare and enhance his opportunities for a happy and
useful life,^[9]
but also in the light of the provisions of Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code, as follows:

Retroactive effect of penal laws. 
– Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict
is serving the same.

The trial court was therefore correct in applying P.D. 603,
suspending the sentence on the two accused and committing them to the National
Training School for boys (Vicente Madrigal Rehabilitation Center) Tanay, Rizal,
until they shall have reached twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period
as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations
of the said government agency.  The
Director of the aforenamed institution was also directed to exercise utmost
caution in the safekeeping of the herein accused to forestall possible escape
in view of the seriousness of the crimes committed and the severity of the
imposable penalty.

As indicated earlier the accused Felix Garcia left the
institution without permission on May 29, 1976 but he was apprehended three
years later by the police of San Pablo City on December 13, 1979 and brought
before the Court on January 8, 1980 and the judgment of conviction was read and
promulgated to said accused Felix Garcia, imposing upon him the penalty of
death and to indemnify the offended party jointly and severally with the
accused Pastor Mindaroza the sum of P12,000 as moral damages and to pay the
costs.^[10]
He was likewise committed to the National Penitentiary on January 8, 1980.

The promulgation of judgment on the accused Pastor Mindaroza^[11]
is assailed by the defense counsel as illegal and a complete nullity,
contending that pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 603, said
accused is entitled to the dismissal of the case insofar as he is concerned and
to be finally discharged, on the basis of the Final Report of the Department of
Social Welfare dated September 4, 1976.

The contention is meritorious.

P.D. No. 603 took effect six months after December 10, 1974.  Since then, most of the provisions in its
Chapter III on Youthful Offenders have been amended by Presidential Decrees
Nos. 1179 and 1210, which became effective on August 15, 1977 and October 11,
1977, respectively.  The pertinent
provisions of P.D. 603, prior to the subsequent amendments, are the following:

Art. 196.  Dismissal
of the case.  ? If it is shown to
the satisfaction of the court that the youthful offender whose sentence has
been suspended, has behaved properly and has shown his capability to be a
useful member of the community, even before reaching the age of majority, upon
recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare, it shall dismiss the case
and order his final discharge

Art. 197.  Return of
the Youthful Offender to Court.  –
Whenever the youth­ful offender has been found incorrigible or has wilfully
failed to comply with the conditions of his rehabilitation programs, or should
his continued stay in the training institution be inad­visable, he shall be
returned to the committing court for the pronouncement of judgment.

When the youthful offender has reached the age of twenty-one while
in commitment, the court shall determine whether to dismiss the case in
accordance with the next preceding article or to pro­nounce the judgment of
conviction.

In any case covered by this article the youthful offender shall be
credited in the service of his sentence with the full time spent in actual
commitment and detention effected under the provi­sions of this Chapter.^[12]

There is no doubt as to the applicability of the foregoing
provisions to appellant Pastor Mindaroza. 
Amending Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, the first paragraph of
Article 189 of P.D. 603, prior to its amendment by P.D. 1179, defined a
youthful offender as one who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of
age at the time of the commission of the offense.^[13]
Having been born on August 6, 1955,^[14]
appellant Mindaroza was nineteen years and ten months old at the time he was
supposed to have committed the crime for which he was found guilty by the trial
Court.

We find that the Court a quo erred in failing to
comprehend the implications of the second paragraph of Article 197 of P.D.
603.  It is clear from said provision
that the trial court has two alternative courses of action with respect to a
youthful offender whose sentence it had suspended and who is returned to the
court upon his reaching the age of majority, and these are:  (1) to dismiss the case and order the final
discharge of said offender, or (2) to pronounce the judgment of
conviction.  In plain and simple
language, it is either dismissal or sentence. 
As to the first course of action, the second paragraph of Article 197
makes an explicit referral to Article 196. 
Thus, when the offender has reached twenty-one, the Court should dismiss
the case and discharge the offender if:

(1)      
he has behaved properly and has shown his
capability to be a useful member of the community; and

(2)      
the dismissal and discharge is recommended by
the Department of Social Welfare.

For pronouncement of judgment, however,
Article 197 makes no reference to any particular provision, hence at first
blush it would appear that the authority of the court to pronounce the sentence
is absolute.  It was probably for this
reason that the Court a quo proceeded, despite Article 196, to
promulgate its sentence on appellant Mindaroza, apparently under the notion
that the same could be done provided the Court could give its own grounds or
justifications.  Herein lies the error of
the trial Court.  The very application of
Article 196 to cases of dismissal and discharge necessarily implies that if
Article 196 does not apply, i.e., if the requi­sites for its application are
not fulfilled, the court should proceed to pronounce the sentence.  In the last analysis, therefore, the final
disposition of the case as far as the trial court is concerned, which as stated
earlier involves the matter of deciding between dismissal and sentence, rests
on how the provisions of Article 196 apply to the case at hand.

Article 196 speaks of facts, circumstances or events obtaining after
the court has issued the order of commit­ment of the youthful offender or, in
other words, after the criminal case has been tried and the minor found
guilty.  In effect, from the time the trial
court issues such order of commitment, it is as if the past is tem­porarily set
aside and the youthful offender is given a new lease in life, so that with
proper help and guidance, he may yet prove himself to be a useful member of
society.  What solely becomes of material
consequence to the court is what transpired during the period of the youthful
offender’s commitment.  Antecedent
matters such as those mentioned by the Court a quo in the instant
case, namely, the seriousness of the offenses committed, the degree of
perversity demonstrated by the accused in the com­mission of the crimes, and
the age of the accused at the time the offenses were perpetrated, do not have
any bearing at all in the determination of whether the case is to be dismissed
or sentence is to be pronounced on the defendant.

In the case at bar, that the requisites of Article 196 have been
satisfied as to appellant Mindaroza needs no lengthy discussion.  A mere perusal of the detailed and complete
Final Report of the Department of Social Welfare (now the Ministry of Social
Services and Deve­lopment) through the Officer-In-Charge of the Vicente
Madrigal Rehabilitation Center where Mindaroza was com­mitted, suffices to
convince Us that under the law, said appellant should now be finally discharged
and the case against him dismissed.  The
Report contains nothing which may, in the slightest, be deemed as adverse or
prejudicial to Mindaroza.  On the
contrary, the language used therein could not have been more favorable and
commendatory.

Notwithstanding what has been said above, however, Our task is
not concluded by the finding that herein appellant Pastor Mindaroza should be
discharged pursuant to Article 197 in relation to Article 196 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, for the same Code explicitly provides:

Art. 198.  The final release
of a child pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter shall not obliterate his
civil liability for damages.  Such
release shall be without prejudice to the right for a writ of execution for the
recovery of civil damages.

The civil liability for damages referred
to is apparently that obligation created by or arising from the crime,
otherwise known as ex delicto,^[15]
the imposition of which is mandated by Articles 100, 104(3), 107 and 345(1) of
the Revised Penal Code,^[16]
and is based upon a finding of the guilt of the accused.  For the purpose, therefore, of deciding the
imposability of the civil liability on said appellant under Article 198
above-quoted, We must review the trial Court decision, particularly that aspect
thereof finding Mindaroza guilty of the crime charged.

The appeal centers on the alleged existence of reasonable doubt
warranting the acquittal of the appel­lants in that:  (1) there was undue delay in reporting the
alleged rape, and (2) the evidence for the prose­cution is improbable,
incredible and inconsistent, especially on the force and violence allegedly
employed.

After carefully going over the records, however, We find
that We are in accord with and, therefore, affirm the trial Court’s evaluation
of the evidence, to wit:

“The court has carefully examined the testimony of complaining
witness and has not found a single detail in her story that runs counter to
human nature and experience.  On the
contrary, her entire version of the incident – locale, occasion, opportunity
and the manner the act was committed – is inherently credible.  The court also had opportunity to observe
that the complaining witness was a young, innocent-looking girl who testified
shyly and in a soft voice in a very straightforward manner.  The court therefore accords full credence to
the testimony.

“The motive that the accused would attribute to the
complaining witness for filing the complaint against them -revenge against
Felix Garcia for allegedly exposing her to embarrassment before Pastor
Mindaroza – is hardly persuasive for it is contrary to human nature that a
young girl would expose her sorry plight with all the embarrassment that it
entails for a relatively minor thing as self-satisfaction of revenge.  The defense though ingenious is puerile in
that while suggesting that complaining witness resorted to this charge to save
face, it overlooked the fact that a resort to this device was costlier in terms
of besmirched reputation and hu­miliation.

“Now let us analyze defendant Garcia’s version.  According to Felix Garcia, he did not have to
rape Lydia Catibog because she was his sweetheart.  In fact, according to him, he had love trysts
with Lydia on no less than 15 occasions and during those times he tried to have
sexual intercourse with her but was unable to insert his penis into the girl’s
vagina because they were doing it in a standing position.  Granting that Lydia was a young virgin, the
chances still are that Felix Garcia, being a young man, would have made a
penetration out of so many attempts. 
Besides, it stands to reason that after so many failures in the standing
position, Felix would not be lacking in imagination to suggest and resort to
the more conventional position of lying down.

“Felix Garcia also testified that it was not on June 1, 1975
but four (4) days before that date that Lydia and he had a love tryst at the
banana plantation, and that it was on this occasion that his co-accused Pastor
Mindaroza chanced upon them (Sess. Oct. 30 & Nov. 11, 1975).  Now, in his statement Exh. C, taken June 14,
1975, he stated that they were sweet­hearts for almost a year (Q. No. 10); that
one week after they became sweet­hearts, he and Lydia petted (Q. No. 11) the
second week, she gave her body to him (Q. No. 11) by having sexual inter­course
in standing position (Q. No. 12), and it was on the second outing that
Pastor Mindaroza surprised them (Q. 15, marked Exh. C-1).  Now, if these were true, they were surprised
by Pastor Mindaroza about the end of June, 1974, not 4 days before June 1, 1975
as testi­fied to by Felix Garcia on the witness stand.

“On the other hand, the accused Pastor Mindaroza claimed that
he sur­prised them (Felix Garcia and Lydia Cati­bog) in a compromising
situation about the end of May, 1975 (Sess. Nov. 11, 1975).  This coincides with Felix Garcia’s testi­mony,
4 days before June 1, 1975.  Yet, Pastor
Mindaroza in his statement, Exh. D, declared that he saw Felix and Lydia
embracing each other in the month of March (Q. No. 13, marked Exh. D-1).

“Defendants’ version of the incident is not only inherently
unbelievable but categorically belied by Lydia Catibog when she declared that
nobody has ever courted her nor had she ever a sweetheart (Sess. Sept. 9, 1975)
that before June 1, 1975 she never had any love tryst with the accused Felix
Garcia (Sess. Oct. 7, 1975).  Defendants’
testimonies are also pockmarked with contradictions by their written statements
given to the police as shown above.”^[17]

It is, nevertheless, contended in the Joint Brief for Appellants
that the unusual silence of the offended party for thirteen (13) days following
the alleged incident negates the probability of the commission of rape against
her, and that if there was any threat at all to complainant’s life, it had
ceased to be imminent as she was able to go home to avail of the protection and
sympathy of her mother, stepfather, brothers and sisters.  It is argued that if it were true that com­plainant
had been raped by appellants, she should have lost not time in seeking justice
and retribution.  Instead, she admitted
that these rape cases were filed only after she learned that appellants were
allegedly spreading the news that she was no longer a virgin.

We agree with counsel for appellants that “the conduct of
the woman immediately following the alleged assault is of utmost importance as
tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge of rape.” This
Tribunal has so held in U.S. vs. Flores.^[18]
Thus, it was stressed in the case of People vs. Ordonio^[19]
that “(t)he course of conduct followed by the party aggrieved from the
time of the alleged perpetration of the deed must be carefully
scrutinized.” In People vs. Savellano,^[20]
it was held that “(t)he conduct of (complainant) in reporting immediately to
the barrio captain that she had been ravised negates appellant’s claim that she
had voluntary sexual intercourse with him.” And in People vs. Ilagan,
et al.,^[21]
also a rape case, the accused were acquitted by this Court with the following
ob­servations:

“x x x if the complainant had really been raped in the early
morning of March 28, 1967, she would have shown that same morning
manifestations of the outrage per­petrated against her.  It is strange that she showed no signs of
agitation or dis­turbance.  She remained
calm and silent.  She did not complain to
the two municipal policement who were present thereat.  She did not even confide to her close lady
friends and companions her trouble or pre­dicament.  This is not the normal behavior of a woman
who had just been violated it indeed she had.”

Nevertheless, the silence of the offended party in a case for
rape, or her failure to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons
close to her and to report the matter to the authorities, does not perforce warrant
the conclusion that she was not sexually molested and that her charges against
the accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated.  Other relevant facts and circumstances must
likewise be considered to determine the veracity of the accusations.

Thus, as correctly stated by the Solicitor General in his
well-written Brief for the People, it is not unusual for a rape victim to
prefer to suffer in silence and keep to herself the shocking and embarrassing
expe­rience of her defloration, rather than report the crime and subject
herself to public ridicule and contempt and additional shame and humiliation in
having to recall and testify on the manner in which her honor was
desecrated.  Indeed, this is especially
true and to be expected of a young provinciana like the fourteen-year
old complain­ant.  Due regard must also
be given to the testimony of complainant that the accused made threats on her
life.  We have no reason to disbelieve
complainant, who testi­fied thus:

“Q   Again,
what did he say?

 A    That I must not tell anyone, sir.  ‘Huag daw akong magsumbong’ because I would
be killed.”^[22]

 Q   Did you tell your mother or your step-father
what happened to you?

 A    I did not, sir.

 Q   Why?

 A    I was afraid of Felix and Pastor, sir.

 Q   Why were you afraid of Pastor and Felix?

 A    Because I was threatened by Felix and
Pastor. “^[23]

 Q   After this incident happened, what did you
feel or how did you react on this incident (sic)?

 A    I could not eat and I have sleepless nights,
I could not work and I felt ashamed in facing people and I became a frightened
person.

ATTY. LINATO

Q    You
stated that you became ashamed to the people, why?

A     Because
of what happened to me, sir.

Q    You
likewise mentioned that you are always frightened, why do you have to be
frightened always?

A     Because
I was threatened by Felix and Pastor.

Q    In
the previous hearing of this case, you testified that you are taking care of
three (3) cows and you used to herd the same cows to the coconut plantation
everyday, now, are you still doing the same chore everyday from the time this
crime was committed by the accused?

A     Not
anymore, sir.

ATTY. LINATO

Q    Why?

A     Because
I am afraid to go out to the coco­nut plantation.

Q    Whom
are you afraid of?

A     Felix
and Pastor, sir.”^[24]

The fear engendered by the threats and
the desire to avoid further shame were more than sufficient to res­train the
young girl from exposing her gruesome expe­rience, and her family would not
have come to know of the outrage committed against her had she not learned
later that the accused, adding insult to injury, told complainant’s cousin, one
Guillermo Bunsol, that she was no longer a virgin (laspag na).^[25]
This prompted her to confide in her mother,^[26]
telling her that she did not do so earlier for fear of the threats on her life.^[27]
Complainant’s mother immediately summoned her other children for a family
conference and they all decided to file charges.^[28]

Considering the foregoing, the interval of thir­teen days from
the time of the incident to the time it was reported to the barrio captain on
June 14, 1975 does not, to Our mind, constitute undue delay which could render
the rape charges against herein accused doubtful.  The explanation of complainant is not only
completely credible, but is likewise corroborated by other evidence on record.

Julia Montalvo testified during the direct examination that her
daughter, the complainant Lydia Catibog, had become “always lonely”
and “could not eat very well at home.” On June 14, 1975, Lydia
finally unburdened herself and told her (Julia) of how she was raped by the two
accused thirteen (13) days before.  Julia
asked Lydia why she did not confide earlier and the latter answered that she
was afraid of the accused because of their threats to kill her.  Immediately, Julia called all her other
children – Willy, Jose, Erlinda and Pepito, all surnamed Catibog – to talk
about the matter and decide upon what action to take.  They all agreed that a complaint should be
filed against the offenders.  They all
went to the barrio captain, then to the police headquarters where Lydia was
asked to give a statement.  On the same
day, too, Lydia was examined by a doctor.^[29]

On the alleged improbability, incredibility and inconsistency in
the evidence for the prosecution, the defense points to a discrepancy in the
Affidavit of complainant and her testimony in Court as to who held the knife
when she was dragged by the accused to the banana plantation.  In the Affidavit, complainant stated that
“si Felix ay may hawak na lansita,”^[30]
while in Court she testified that Pastor was pointing a knife at her.^[31]
It appears from the record, however, that com­plainant has adequately explained
away this seeming inconsistency.  An
examination of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that during her
cross-examina­tion, complainant was asked:

“Q   In
this Exhibit ‘1’ you stated Felix was the one provided with a knife, now at the
hearing on August 26, 1975, page 16, transcript of record you made an answer
like this:  ‘No, sir, Pastor was holding
a knife (lanseta).’ Which is true, the one you stated in this Exhibit ‘1’ that
Felix to be the one (sic) holding the knife or Felix (should be Pastor) as you
alleged during the hearing dated August 26?”^[32]

to which she answered:

“A    They
were alternately holding it, sir. 
(Halili po sila ng hawak).”^[33]

Complainant’s explanation is entirely
probable.  More­over, We do not deem the
discrepancy to be of such serious nature that could impair the testimony of
complainant.  What is material is that
force was applied on her and she was intimidated by the accused with the use of
a knife, a deadly weapon.  Furthermore,
and We quote from the recently decided case of People vs. Gonzales, et al.:^[34]

“x x x the affidavits were not pre­pared by the witnesses and
could contain certain inaccuracies in the interpretation of their
declarations.  ‘An affidavit pre­pared
for a man to swear to will not always disclose the whole facts, and will often­times
and without design incorrectly describe, without the deponent detecting it,
some of the occurrences narrated.’ (2 Moore on Facts, p. 1098).  ‘Being taken ex parte, it is al­most
always incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and
sometimes from the want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which
the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances
necessary for the correction of the first suggestions of his memory, and for
his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject.’ (Id., pp.
1094-95).”

The defense likewise seeks to destroy the credibi­lity of
prosecution witness Danilo Diamante. 
This wit­ness testified that in the afternoon of June 1, 1975, on his
way home from gathering firewood in the land of Cresenciano Exconde,
complainant’s stepfather, he met the two accused who were “walking
briskly”; that he greeted them and asked where they had been, and Felix
answered, “diyan lang”; that he asked the accused why they were
hurrying, but neither gave a reply; that proceeding on his way home, he saw
complainant from a distance of about 10 meters, and observed that her hair was
disheveled and she was crying; that he asked com­plainant why she was crying
but the latter did not answer, so he went on his way.^[35]
Witness Diamante is the brother-in-law of complainant’s brother, Pepito
Catibog.

Diamante’s relation to complainant, aside from being a remote
one, does not necessarily render his testimony unreliable as one emanating from
a biased source.  We have held in the
case of People vs. Padiernos^[36]
that:  “While witnesses may be said
to be interested by reason of their relationship with one of the parties, their
declarations should not be disregarded or rejected capriciously on the ground
of bias alone where – as in the present case – they are reasonable, consistent
and supported by the facts and circumstances.” Such is Diamante’s
testimony in the case at bar.

It is true, as the defense points out, that there is an
inconsistency in the testimony of witness Diamante.  Records show that during cross-examination,
the trial Judge asked Diamante if he noticed anything unusual in complainant’s
dress when he saw her on June 1, 1975 and he replied:  “None, your Honor.”^[37]
He was asked again by the defense counsel:

“Q   Her
dress (was) not torn?

 A    It had a tear, sir (witness pointing at the
level of the upper breast).

 Q   A while ago when you were asked by the Court
about the condition of her clothing x x x, you said x x x that there was
nothing unusual at all x x x in her dress, will you please explain to the Court
why now you said that the upper portion of the dress was torn?  x x x

 A    What is correct is that it had a tear on the
breast area, sir, upper breast area.”^[38]

We rule that the contradictory statements
are not of such a magnitude as to destroy the credibility of Diamante or the
veracity of his declarations.

The defense finds it improbable that, coming upon complainant in
tears, witness Diamante did not do any­thing to help her.  We do not agree.  In the first place, Diamante testified that
he asked complainant why she was crying, but got no reply.^[39]
Complainant her­self, in her testimony, stated that Diamante “greeted me
but I did not understand what he said.”^[40]
It cannot, therefore, be said that Diamante did not show any concern at all
towards complainant.  In the second
place, it is very probable that Diamante did not do anything to help her
because she did not tell him what happened to her.

The defense further complains that the alleged knife, and the
dress and panty of complainant, were not presented in evidence.  The non-presentation of the knife, however,
does not negate the existence of intimidation. 
As We stated in another prosecution for rape where a bolo was used by
therein accused to inti­midate his victim, “(c)onsidering that the bolo
was in the hands of appellant and presumably belonged to him, it should not be
a cause for wonder why complainant could not present it in evidence.  It was not likely that appellant would just
leave it at the scene of the crime.” Likewise, the non-presentation of the
torn and blook-stained dress and underwear of complainant does not destroy the
case for the prosecution, there being sufficient and convincing evidence to
prove the rape charges beyond reasonable doubt.

The fact that no spermatozoa was found on com­plainant when she
was medically examined hardly comes as a surprise.  Thirteen (13) days had already elapsed from
the time of the rape to the time Dr. Aleli Eubinag conducted the examination of
the genital area of com­plainant on June 14, 1975.  This Tribunal has ruled that the absence of
spermatozoa does not render doubtful the commission of rape where several hours
had elapsed before the offended party was examined.^[41]

The evidence on record does not support the contention of the
defense that the description of the manner by which complainant was raped makes
the commission of rape impossible especially considering that complainant was a
virgin.  Complainant, who was just a
young girl of fourteen at the time of the incident, could easily have been
overpowered by two adult males.  With one
of the assailants holding complainant’s legs, the other would not have a
difficult time consummating the act of sexual intercourse.  If one man can succeed in having carnal
knowledge of a woman against her wishes, with more reason can two men do the
same.

In fine, the accused Pastor Mindaroza should and must be released
immediately from the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal to ensure and
enable his fullest development physically, mentally, emotionally, morally and
socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and
dignity as a rehabili­tated and useful citizen of society.

As to the other accused Felix Garcia who escaped from the
Rehabilitation Center barely three months from the time he and his co-accused
Pastor Mindaroza were received at the said Center, and was finally arrested by
the Police after three years, it is clear that he has wilfully failed to comply
with the conditions of his rehabilitation program, and the provisions of
Article 197, par. 1 of P.D. 603 cited earlier must govern his case.

In promulgating the judgment of conviction against the accused
Felix Garcia, imposing upon him death penalty in each of the two cases,
Criminal Case No. 708-SP and Criminal Case No. 1309-SP, the Court was impelled
to do so on the following considerations; (a) the seriousness of the offense
committed (b) the degree of perversity demonstrated by the herein accused in
the commission of the crimes as narrated in the decision (c) the herein accused
19 years, when he abused the victim, age 14. 
We reiterate Our holding indicated and explained earlier that such
antecedent matters do not have any bearing at all in the determination of
whether the case is to be dismissed or sentence is to be pronounced on the
defendant.  We rule that the trial court
erred in considering the above considerations. 
The only con­siderations according to Article 197 cited above for the
return of the youthful offender to the com­miting court for the pronouncement
of judgment are that the said offender has been found incorrigible or has
wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his rehabilitation programs or
should his con­tinued stay in the training institution be in­advisable.

The next point to consider is whether the penalty of death
imposed upon the accused Felix Garcia in each of the two criminal cases for
rape is correct.  The judgment under
review sentenced said accused in Criminal Case No. 708-SP to the penalty of
death, applying Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, considering the circumstance of “with the use
of a deadly weapon” as qualifying and the fact that the rape was committed
by two persons as a generic aggravating circumstance, which in accordance with
Article 63, paragraph 2, No. (1) of the Revised Penal Code raises the penalty
to the maximum period which is death. 
And in Criminal Case No. 709-SP wherein the accused were also charged
with rape with the use of a deadly weapon, the lower court considered the fact
that after accused Garcia raped the victim, the other accused Mindaroza abused
the girl with the help of accused Garcia also as a generic aggravating
circumstance which raises the imposable penalty to the greater penalty of
death.

As amended by Republic Act 2632 approved June 18, 1960 and
Republic Act No. 4111 on June 20, 1964, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
reads as follows:

“Art. 335.  When and how
rape committed.  – Penalties.  Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the follow­ing circumstances:

1.   By using force or intimidation;

2.   When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and

3.   When the woman is under twelve years of age,
even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding
paragraphs shall be present.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua
to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be death.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise
death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.”

In the prosecution of the cases at bar, two circumstances are
present, namely:  1.  use of deadly weapon and 2.  that two persons committed the rapes.  The first was alleged in the information
while the second was proved at the trial. 
In both cases, the Court appreciated the first as a qualifying circums­tance
and the second as a generic aggravating circumstance, in accordance with
settled jurisprudence according to the trial court.

We do not agree.  Under the
law above quoted, either circumstance is qualifying.  Where the two circumstances are present,
there is no legal basis to consider the remaining circumstance as a generic
aggravating circumstance for either is not considered as such under Article 14
of the Revised Penal Code enumerating what are aggravating circumstances.  Hence, the correct penalty is the lesser
penalty, which is reclusion perpetua there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2,
No. 2, Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the sentence of
death imposed upon the accused Pastor Mindaroza is hereby SET ASIDE and he is
hereby discharged and released immediately from confinement.  The judgment of conviction against the
accused Felix Garcia is hereby AFFIRMED but modified in that the penalty of
death in each of the two rape cases is reduced to reclusion perpetua
in both cases.  The remaining portions of
the decision under review shall stand and are hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Fernandez, Abad
Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., see dissent.

Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.

---

^[1]
Exhibit “B”, Folder of Exhibits.

^[2]
Joint Decision, pp. 17-20; Record of Criminal Case No. 708-SP, pp. 38-41.  Articles 192 and 197 of P.D. 603 referred to
in the Joint Decision have been amended by P.D. 1179 and P.D. 1210 which became
effective on Aug. 15, 1977 and October 11, 1977, respectively.

^[3]
Record of Criminal Case No’ 708-SP, p. 44

^[4] Ibid.,
pp. 52-54.

^[5]
Promulgation of Judgment (on Pastor Mindaroza), pp. 4-5, underscoring supplied;
Record of Criminal Case No. 708-SP, pp. 68-69.

^[6]
Record of Criminal Case No. 708-SP, p. 70.

^[7]
Article 213, P.D. 603.

^[8]
People vs. Casiguran, 94 SCRA 244, 248

^[9] Article
1, par. 1, P.D. 603.

^[10] Rollo,
pp. 174-180

^[11]
Records of Criminal Case No. 708-SP, pp. 64-69.

^[12]
Underscoring supplied.  The second
paragraph of Article 197 has been amended by P.D. 1179 to add the following
sentence:  “In the latter case, the
convicted offender may apply for probation under the provisions of Presidential
Decree Numbered Nine Hundred and Sixty-Eight.”

^[13]
As amended, the first paragraph of Article 189 now reads as follows:  “A youthful offender is a child, minor
or youth, including one who is emancipated in accordance with law who is over
nine years but under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense.”

^[14]
Birth Certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Pablo City,
Exhibit 3, Folder of Exhibits.

^[15]
See Article 1157, No. 4, and Article 1161, New Civil Code of the Philippines;
and Article 100, et seq., Revised Penal Code.

^[16]
People vs. Peña, L-36435, December 20, 1977, 80 SCRA 589, 599.

^[17]
Decision, pp. 13-16.

^[18]
26 Phil. 262; quoted in People vs. Hayag, L-38635, Nov. 17, 1980.

^[19]
L-33829, Dec. 19, 1975, 68 SCRA 397, 399.

^[20]
L-31227, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 320, 328.

^[21]
L-36560, May 28, 1975, 64 SCRA 170, 176-177.

^[22]
t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1975, p. 12.

^[23]
t.s.n., Ibid., p. 20.

^[24]
t.s.n., Ibid., pp. 25-28.

^[25] t.s.n.,
August 4, 1975, pp. 6-7; Sept. 9, 1975, p. 21.

^[26] Ibid.

^[27]
t.s.n., August 4, 1975, p. 15.

^[28] Ibid.,
p. 8; t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1975, p. 22.

^[29]
t.s.n., August 4, 1975, pp. 4-14.

^[30]
Exhibit “1”, Folder of Exhibits, p. 7.

^[31]
t.s.n., August 26, 1975, pp. 24-25.

^[32]
t.s.n., October 7, 1975, p. 6.

^[33] Ibid.,
p. 8.

^[34]
L-40727, September 11, 1980.

^[35]
t.s.n., August 26, 1975, pp. 3-15.

^[36]
L-37284, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 484, 491.

^[37]
t.s.n., August 26, 1975, p. 11.

^[38] Ibid.,
p. 15.

^[39] Ibid.,
p. 9.

^[40] t.s.n.,
September 9, 1975, p. 18.

^[41]
People vs. Carandang, L-31012, Aug. 15, 1973, 52 SCRA 259; People vs.
Jaime Jose, et al., L-28232, Feb. 6, 1971, 37 SCRA 450.

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