INOCENCIO TAN Y CONCEPCION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

 Plaintiff-appellant Inocencio Tan and one Antonio Conejero
were accused of estafa committed by means of false it
pretenses in an information filed on October 10, 1958 the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch VI, dockeyed as Criminal
Case No. 45905.  After due proceedings,
the trial court, on October 27, 1959, acquitted Antonio Conejero
but convicted plaintiff-appellant for consummated estafa.

Appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals.  On August
31, 1963, the judgment of Branch VI of the Court of First Instance
of Manila was modified, the appellate court convicting plaintiff-appellant of
attempted estafa only.  The latter still endeavoured
to have the Supreme Court totally reverse the modified judgment but his
petition for review was not given due course since the issues raised were
factual and there was no merit in the petition.^[1]

On August 31, 1964,
plaintiff-appellant instituted Civil Case No. 58158 before Branch XXI of the
Court of First Instance of Manila to annul the judgment of convic­tion rendered
in the criminal proceedings.  His ground
was that the information therein was so totally defective that criminal
jurisdiction did not attach, thereby vitiating the resulting judgment of
conviction.

Meanwhile, in the criminal proceedings, plaintiff-appellant was
able to have the promulgation of the judg­ment of conviction for attempted estafa suspended pending tee outcome of the civil case.

On December 1, 1964,
the State filed its answer in the civil case. 
The issues having been joined, and after a pre-trial resulting in a stipulation
of the facts as stated above, the lower court rendered
judgment on August 31, 1965
which dismissed the complaint.

Plaintiff-appellant now comes again to this Court on a pure
question of law.

Basically, what plaintiff-appellant seeks is to have Branch XXI
of the Court of First Instance of Manila annul a judgment originating from
Branch VI of the same court, as modified, with finality, by the appellate
courts.  This simply cannot be done.  Just very recently,^[2] We reaffirmed the rule that “x x
x the jurisdiction to annul a judgment of a branch of
the Court of First Instance belongs solely to the very same branch which
rendered the judgment.” For the lower court to have acceded to
plaintiff-appellants prayer would have been for it to have exceeded its juris­diction
or to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.  For this reason alone, the
appeal should be dismissed.

But even on the merits, the appeal cannot prosper.  The offense for which plaintiff was indicted
is prescribed by Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal
Code in the follow­ing language:

“2. By means of any of the following false
pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud:

“(a)  By using a fictitious name, or false­ly
pretending to possess power, in­fluence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imagi­nary
transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.’ (Stress sup­plied)

The information filed against plaintiff
averred:^[3]

“That on or about and during the period covered from September
11, 1958 to October 9, 1958, both dates inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused Inocencio Tan y Concepcion and Antonio Conejero y
Navo, the latter being then an employee of the Phi­lippine
National Bank, conspiring and confede­rating together and mutually helping each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
Fernando E. Ricafort, As­sistant General Manager of
the Laureano Bro­thers Co., Inc., in the following
manner:  The said accused, during the
above-mentioned period of time falsely pretending to possess influence on
His Excellency, President Carlos P. Garcia and Executive Secretary Pajo, and by means of  false representations and fraudulent
manifesta­tions which they made to said Fernando E. Ricafort
to the effect that the accused being in­fluential to His Excellency, President
Carlos  P. Garcia and Executive Secretary
Pajo, they 
could facilitate the release of the loan ap­plied for by Fernando E.
Ricafort with the Phi­lippine National Bank in the
sum of P250,000.00, provided that the said Fernando E. Ricafort
would give the accused 10% of the said sum of P250,000.00 or the amount of
P25,000.00; that the sum of P25,000.00 would be given to Execu­tive Secretary Pajo as bribe money for the said purpose of facilitating
the release of the afore-mentioned loan, and by means of other  similar deceits, succeeded in inducing
the  said Fernando E. Ricafort
to give and deliver  to the accused the
sum of P2,000.00 (supposedly amounting to P25,000.00), both the said ac­cused
knowing fully well that their aforestated Pretenses,
representations and manifestations 
were false and fraudulent and that the same were only made for the sole
purpose of obtain­ing, as they in fact obtained from Fernando E. Ricafort the said sum of P2,000.00, which amount
they willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to defraud, misappropriated,
mis­applied and converted to their own personal  use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice
of said Fernando E. Ricafort in the aforesaid sum of
P2,000.00. Philippine currency.

“Contrary to law.” (Stress
supplied)

The underscored portions of the
above-quoted information clearly refute the claim that some of the supposed
essen­tial elements of estafa by means of false
pretenses were not alleged.  The element
of false pretenses is alleged by the averment that the accused manifested and
represen­ted to the injured party that they were influential to the President
and his Executive Secretary, Which they knew fully well to be false and which
they made only to obtain P2,000.00 from the injured
party.  The averment that the accused
“succeeded in inducing the injured party to part with his P2,000.00 is sufficient allegation of the ele­ment that the
offended party relied upon such false pre­tenses.  Lastly, the phrase “to the damage and
prejudice of said Fernando E. Ricafort in the
aforesaid sum of P2,000.00 x x
x” constitutes the averment of damages. There is
no basis therefore for the charge that plaintiff-appellant’s constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation was violated.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is, as it is here­by,
affirmed.  Treble costs against
plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

 Castro, J., took no part.

Concepcion, C.J., on leave.

^[1] In G.R. No. L-22450 (Inocencio
Tan v. People), resolution of March 16, 1964.

^[2] J.M. Tuason v. Torres, G.R. No.
L-24717, Dec. 4, 1967.

^[3] Record
on Appeal, pp. 2-4.