LAMBERTO RAMOS AND CASIMIRA RAMOS, PETITIONERS, VS. ROSITA RAMOS AND ROMEO RAMOS, RESPONDENTS.

Petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, in its case
No. CA-G.R. No. 32379-R, affirming
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
in its Civil Case No. 14159-I.

The petitioners-spouses, Lamberto Ramos
and Casimira Ramos, al­lege that the Court of
Appeals, in negligence of duty, and contrary to and in violation of Section 33
of the Judiciary Act and Section 4 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court, completely
ignored an assignment of error raised be­fore it on appeal, contrary to Section
33 of the Judiciary Act that provides:

“SEC. 33.      x          x          x          x.

“Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete
findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it.

“X      x          x          x          x          x.”

Section 4, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court
is similarly worded, as above.

Rosita Ramos and Romeo Ramos had instituted an action in the Pangasinan Court against Lamberto
and Casimira Ramos, for reconveyance
of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso
of a parcel of land with an area of 25,330 square meters, located in Binmaley, Pangasinan.

After trial, the court found that the land formerly belonged to Placido Ramos and Maria Zarate,
the deceased parents of defendant below, Lam­berto
Ramos; that, against the denial of Lamberto, the
father of both plain­tiffs, Rosita and Romeo Ramos, named Emilio Victorio Ramos, was Lam­berto‘ s deceased brother. 
While Lamberto claimed that the heirs of Placido and Maria agreed that the land in question should
pertain exclusively to him, just as other parcels of land would belong
exclusively to the other heirs, in accordance with a document, marked Exhibit
“1”, the court found that Lamberto had
agreed with the plaintiffs’ mother, Balbina de
Guzman, that the land in question would be held in common — one-half (1/2) to Lamberto and the other half to Rosita and Romeo; that it
would be registered under the Land Registration Act and converted from a riceland to a fishpond; that, in breach of trust, Lamberto registered the land and secured Original
Certificate of Title No. 15763 in the name of the conjugal partner­ship of the
spouses Lamberto Ramos and Casimira
B. Ramos, now petition­ers-appellants .

Upon the foregoing findings, the trial court ordered the
cancellation of certificate of title No. 15763; the execution by defendants of
a deed of reconveyance of one-half (1/2) of the land
to the plaintiffs; the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in
accordance with the trust agreement and the payment of damages and attorneys’
fees.

The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning the
following errors:

“(1) In holding that the heirs of the deceased Placido
Ramos had agreed in the partition they made of his prop­erties to give one-half
(1/2) of the land in question to the plaintiffs and the other 1/2 to the
defendant Lamberto Ramos, when in fact the agreement was to give the whole parcel to the
said defendant, as it clearly appears in the documentary evidence, Exhibit 1.

“(2) In declaring that defendant Lamberto
Ramos agreed to register 1/2 of said land in question in a registration case in
favor of the plaintiffs, and ordering the defendants, as a consequence thereof,
to reconvey this 1/2 portion to the plaintiffs and to
pay to them damages and attorney’s fees.

“(3) In giving credit to the testimony of Balbina de Conchita de Guzman
that the promissory note, Exh. K, for P1,342.00 was for payment of her children’s alleged
1/2 share of the expenses for the survey and registration of said land and for
its conversion into a fishpond.

” (4) In not dismissing the complaint
and in not ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendants a reason­able
amount of attorney’s fees.”

After the foregoing assignment of errors, the defendants-appellants
stated in their brief that the only remaining issue is “whether or not the
defendants committed a breach of trust in registering the land in ques­tion
entirely in their names.”

In its decision, the Court of Appeals defined the nature of the
ac­tion, narrated the factual background of the case and, without mentioning
Exhibit 1, which was referred to in the first assignment of error, resolved the
particular issue, aforequoted, by stating that
“the findings of the trial court are substantially in accordance with the
evidence and we agree in the same” and,
thereafter, quoted about two (2) pages of the trial court’s decision that had a
bearing on the said issue.

The petitioners’ dissatisfaction over the appellate court’s
decision lies in their belief that, as nothing was said about Exhibit 1 in the
decision, the court did not at all consider the document in weighing the evi­dence,
and, for such failure, they claim that the Court of Appeals failed to perform
its duty under Section 33 of the Judiciary Act (ante.)

The contention is untenable. 
The issue in the appeal was defined by the petitioners themselves, and,
on their own definition, the Court of Appeals resolved the issue by confirming
the findings of the trial court.  The
appellate court need not expressly state in its decision that exhibit 1 does
not suffice to overcome the verbal testimony of the appellee’s
wit­nesses.  And its giving credence to
the latter necessarily implies a re­fusal to accord to said
Exhibit the importance and probative value claimed for it by defendants
appellants, petitioners herein.

Note that even Section 33 of the Judiciary Act does not impose on
the Court of Appeals the duty of stating complete findings of fact on all
assigned errors, but merely on all issues properly raised before the
Court of Appeals.  And, the said court
did just what was called for.  It would
have been much better, of course, for that Court to have expressly stated its
opinion on the probative value of the Exhibit, but failure to do so is not a
violation of the Judiciary Act.

Even on the merits, Exhibit 1 does not help petitioners’ case to
constitute the failure to mention it a reversible error.  The copy of Exhibit 1, which was attached
to the instant petition for review, does not say or imply that it is a deed of
partition.  It is just a tabulation of
properties with horizontal dividing lines, and sets the names of indivi­dual
heirs after a summary and sketchy description of certain proper­ties.  Although it was signed, it was undated, and
the signatures appear at the upper right-hand corner, at the end of a list of
properties which are not involved in the present case. Nor is there
anything in it to indicate whether the heirs’ names set opposite each property
represents the distributees or the actual possessors
merely.  Standing alone as a documentary evidence, Exhibit 1 is not a deed of
partition; hence, the trial and appellate courts were justified in not relying
upon it.

Finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the same is hereby affirmed.  Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., concur.