ISIDRO G. ARENAS, PETITIONER, VS. CITY OF SAN CARLOS (PANGASINAN), CITY COUNCIL OF SAN CARLOS CITY, JUAN C. LOMIBAO, BENJAMIN POSADAS, DOUGLAS D. SORIANO, BASILIO BULATAO, CATAL…

Arenas versus City of San Carlos

The Case

This is Isidro Arenas versus the City of San Carlos in Pangasinan and its city officials. Arenas, the incumbent city judge, brought a petition for mandamus to compel the city to pay him the salary differential he claimed was owed under the law fixing the salaries of city judges. The case matters because it turns on a single question of statutory construction: when a general provision fixing a salary conflicts with a proviso that limits it, which one controls? The Supreme Court's answer gives Bar candidates a clean rule on the office of a proviso.

Procedural History

In January 1971, Arenas filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan at San Carlos City. The trial court, in a decision dated May 31, 1971, dismissed the petition, without pronouncement as to costs. Arenas then brought the matter to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari to review that dismissal. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for review and affirmed the decision appealed from.

Facts

When Republic Act Number 5967 took effect on June 21, 1969, San Carlos City in Pangasinan was a third class city. Arenas was its city judge, receiving an annual salary of 12,000 pesos. The city mayor of San Carlos City received an annual salary of 13,200 pesos, which was exactly 100 pesos a month more than the salary of the city judge.

Arenas claimed that Republic Act Number 5967 fixed the basic salary of city judges of second and third class cities at 18,000 pesos per annum, and that the difference between what he actually received and that basic salary was payable by the city government. He computed a salary differential of 9,500 pesos from June 21, 1969 up to the filing of his petition. He alleged that he had repeatedly requested the respondents to enact the necessary budget and pay the differential, but they refused.

The respondents answered that the same law provided that the salary of a city judge shall be at least 100 pesos per month less than that of the city mayor. Since the city judge received 12,000 pesos yearly and the mayor 13,200 pesos yearly, the condition was already satisfied. They added that payment of any difference was subject to implementation by the city government, which was discretionary, and that the city faced financial difficulties.

Issues

• Whether or not the proviso in Section 7 of Republic Act Number 5967, that the salary of a city judge shall be at least 100 pesos per month less than that of the city mayor, controls over the earlier provision fixing the basic salary of city judges in second and third class cities at 18,000 pesos per annum.
• Whether or not the respondents can be compelled by mandamus to provide for an annual salary of 18,000 pesos for the petitioner as city judge of San Carlos City.

Applicable Provisions

Section 7 of Republic Act Number 5967 provides:

Unless the City Charter or any special law provides higher salary, the city judge in chartered cities shall receive a basic salary which shall not be lower than the sums as provided herein below: For second and third class cities, eighteen thousand pesos per annum; For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and other first class cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand pesos less than that fixed for the district judge, and for second and third class cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand five hundred pesos less than that fixed for the district judge, and for other cities, the city judge shall receive two thousand pesos less than that fixed for the district judge: Provided, however, That the salary of a city judge shall be at least one hundred pesos per month less than that of the city mayor.

This is the very provision the Court construes, and its last clause is the proviso that decides the case.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the proviso controls. It examined the Senate deliberations on the bill that became Republic Act Number 5967 and found it clear that the intention of Congress was that the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city mayor. The saving clause, that the salary of a city judge shall be at least 100 pesos per month less than that of the city mayor, qualifies the earlier provision fixing the salary of city judges for second and third class cities at 18,000 pesos per annum. The Court laid down the rule on provisos:

The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute.

It added that when there is irreconcilable repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the statute, the former is given precedence over the latter, on the ground that it is the latest expression of the intent of the legislature.

On the second issue, the Court held that since the city mayor of San Carlos City was receiving an annual salary of 13,200 pesos, the respondents cannot be compelled to provide for an annual salary of 18,000 pesos for the petitioner as city judge. The petition therefore failed.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute. Second, when there is irreconcilable repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the statute, the proviso is given precedence over the body, because it is the latest expression of the intent of the legislature. Applied to Section 7 of Republic Act Number 5967, the proviso that the salary of a city judge shall be at least 100 pesos per month less than that of the city mayor limits the general fixing of the basic salary at 18,000 pesos per annum for second and third class cities. Hence, where the city mayor's salary is lower, the city judge cannot demand the higher basic salary, and mandamus will not lie to compel the city to provide it.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for review and affirmed the decision of the trial court, without pronouncement as to costs. The City of San Carlos and its officials prevailed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute, and when it irreconcilably conflicts with the body, the proviso prevails as the latest expression of legislative intent. Examiners use this case to test statutory construction, specifically the office and precedence of a proviso over the general provision it qualifies.