GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (GSISEA), GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM SUPERVISORS’ UNION (GSISSU), CONFEDERATION OF UNIONS IN GOVERNMENT CORPOR…

Government Service Insurance System Employees Association versus Government Service Insurance System

The Case

This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction brought by the Government Service Insurance System Employees Association, the Government Service Insurance System Supervisors Union, and their parent federations against the Court of Industrial Relations. The unions sought to stop the Industrial Court from hearing and adjudicating their labor controversy with the Government Service Insurance System over the implementation of salary standardization provisions in their collective bargaining agreement. The case matters because it settles who may certify an industrial dispute to the Industrial Court, and in what form, under the Industrial Peace Act.

Procedural History

The unions filed the present action directly in the Supreme Court, praying that the Court of Industrial Relations be prohibited and enjoined from hearing and adjudicating the labor controversy, which had been docketed there as an industrial peace act case. The Supreme Court heard the parties in oral argument on October 6, 1961, and on the same date dismissed the petition by resolution, without prejudice to a more extended decision. The Court thereafter issued its full written decision explaining the dismissal.

Facts

The Government Service Insurance System Employees Association and the Government Service Insurance System Supervisors Union, affiliates of the other petitioner groups, had a labor dispute with the management of the Government Service Insurance System concerning the implementation of certain provisions on salary standardization contained in their collective bargaining agreement. Officials of the Department of Labor tried to conciliate the disputants but failed.

On August 15, 1961, the then Executive Secretary, Natalio P. Castillo, wrote a letter signed by him by authority of the President, officially referring the controversy to the Court of Industrial Relations. The letter stated that, considering the importance of continued operations of the System to government employees and to the Government, and the consequences that would ensue should a strike develop, the dispute was believed to be one in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and it certified the dispute to the Industrial Court pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act Number 875, the Magna Charta of Labor.

The unions questioned the letter. They argued that the President was in the Visayas on the date of the letter and arrived only on the night of August 17, and that there was no proof the Executive Secretary was authorized to act for the President. They also argued that the President's powers under Section 10 cannot be delegated to a Cabinet member. A strike was declared two days after the certification. The respondents showed that the Chief Executive had approved, over his own signature, the request of the Manager of the Government Service Insurance System, made in a letter of August 11, to have the dispute certified to the Industrial Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the letter of the Executive Secretary of August 15, 1961 constitutes a valid certification of the industrial dispute to the Court of Industrial Relations.
• Whether or not the powers of the President under Section 10 of the Industrial Peace Act may be delegated to a Cabinet member.
• Whether or not the certification is invalid because it was made two days before the strike was declared.

Applicable Provisions

Section 10 of Republic Act Number 875, the Industrial Peace Act, provides:

Pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Magna Charta of Labor, the President hereby certifies the dispute between the management of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Government Service Insurance System Employees' Association (GSISEA) and the Government Service Insurance System Supervisors' Union (GSISSU) to the Court of Industrial Relations and requests the Court to take immediate appropriate steps in the exercise of its powers under the law.

This is the very language of the certification letter, and the case turns on whether that certification validly invoked the President's power to send an industrial dispute to the Industrial Court.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Executive Secretary's letter is not a certification by the Executive Secretary but an attestation that the President had ordered the dispute certified to the Industrial Court, as the law requires. The statute does not prescribe in what form the Chief Executive should certify an industrial controversy. The President's absence from Manila on the date of the letter does not preclude his having ordered the reference, since the facilities of communication contradict any impossibility of such an order. The presumption of performance of official duty on the part of the Executive Secretary is not rebutted by mere conjectures, for to state officially in writing that the President had made or authorized the certification when in fact he had not would constitute falsification of an official document, and the commission of such an offense cannot be lightly inferred.

On the second issue, the Court found that no delegation of power was involved. The Chief Executive had approved, over his signature, the request of the Manager of the Government Service Insurance System to have the dispute certified to the Court of Industrial Relations.

On the third issue, the Court held that the timing of the certification is immaterial, since Section 10 does not require the existence of a strike, but only of an industrial dispute, and it was not denied that such a dispute existed and that conciliation had failed.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the statute does not prescribe the form of the President's certification of an industrial dispute to the Court of Industrial Relations; a letter of the Executive Secretary attesting that the President ordered the certification is a valid act of the Chief Executive, not a delegation of power. Second, the presumption of regular performance of official duty sustains such a certification, and it is not rebutted by the President's absence from a given locality or by silence in the Official Gazette, since falsification of an official document cannot be lightly inferred. Third, Section 10 requires only the existence of an industrial dispute, not a strike, so a certification made before a strike is timely.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, denied the writs sought, and taxed the costs against the petitioners, leaving the Industrial Court free to hear and adjudicate the dispute.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the law does not prescribe the form of the President's certification of an industrial dispute, and the Executive Secretary's letter attesting to it enjoys the presumption of regular official duty. Examiners use this case to test the non-delegation argument against presidential certifications and the rule that Section 10 requires only an industrial dispute, not a strike.