NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. PRISCO WORKERS UNION, ET AL., AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review by writ of certiorari of an order of
the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) dated March 30, 1962, affirmed by the
court en banc on June 18, 1962, extending the benefits of the order of
the said court of May 20, 1960, issued in CIR Case 840-V, to a number of
employees of the National Marketing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the
NAMARCO) whose names are listed in Annex A-l of the petition dated January 10,
1961, for the reason that the said employees are similarly situated to the
beneficiaries of the aforementioned order of May 20, 1960.

The background antecedents are found in the decisions of this Court in three
previous cases, namely, Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, L-9834, November 29, 1957; Price Stabilization Corporation
vs. Prisco Workers’ Union et al., L-9268, December 29, 1956; and
National Marketing Corporation and Price Stabilization Workers’ Union, etc. vs.
CIR, Prisco Board of Liquidators and NAMARCO, L-17804, January 31, 1963. On
March 18, 1953, 58 workers, represented by the Prisco Workers Union, filed a
petition with the CIR (Case 840-7) to enforce certain demands made upon their
employer, the Price Stabilization Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the
PRISCO). On August 25, 1953 the CIR rendered a partial decision ordering the
PRISCO to pay 25% additional compensation for unpaid overtime work and for
Sunday and legal holiday service rendered from June 8, 1951. On May 9, 1955 the
CIR extended the benefits of the said partial decision to other workers of the
PRISCO who are similarly situated. This order was affirmed by this Court in
L-9288, supra, for the reason that the “workers involved in a dispute
include other workers, unionist or not, who are presumed interested in the
outcome of the demands or strike one way or another.” And on the merits of the
other demands of the union in CIR Case 846-V, this Court likewise upheld the
CIR’s ruling that the PRISCO is a government-owned corporation run and operated
like an ordinary business corporation, and that “when the Government engages in
business it becomes subject to the laws and regulations governing the relations
of labor and management,” and is therefore not exempt from the provisions of the
Eight-Hour Labor Law (C.A. 444) (L-9834, supra). On June 17, 1955 the
PRISCO was abolished by R.A. 1345 which at the same time created the NAMARCO and
transferred the employees and fixed assets of the former the latter, and its
other choses in action, obligations and liabilities to the PRISCO Board of
Liquidators. Thereafter, both the NAMARCO and the PRISCO Board of Liquidators
were impleaded as respondents in the CIR, when, on March 20, 1958, 202 other
employees and workers of the PRISCO, among them 45 employees of the General
Auditing Office (GAO) assigned thereto, filed a petition for payment of
overtime, Sunday and legal holiday work rendered from June d, 1951 to June 30,
1953, based on the partial decision of the CIR of August 25, 1953. On April 2,
1956 the PRISCO opposed this claim on the grounds that the partial decision
aforesaid covers only the 58 original petitioners; that the claim had already
prescribed under section 7-A, C.A. 444, as amended by R.A. 1993; and that some
45 employees among the claimants therein were, and some still are, employees of
the GAO and not of the PRISCO. Notwithstanding the opposition, the CIR on June
10, I960 granted the petition, and ordered the payment of their claims after a
computation thereof to b e made by the CIR examiner or his duly authorized
representative. The motion for reconsideration of the last named order was
denied by the CIR en banc, and the PRISCO appealed to this Court
(L-17804, supra). We affirmed on January 31, 1963 the decision subject
of review with the sole modification that the 45 GAO employees, not being
employees of the PRISCO, are not entitled to compensation for overtime, Sunday
and legal holiday service.

It will be noted that the CIR order of May 20, 1960 was an offshoot of a
petition filed by the petitioning union for contempt of court against the
NAMARCO. This petition alleged, among other things, that the PRISCO was
succeeded by the NAMARCO, hence, the inclusion of the latter as party respondent
in all the cases by the PRISCO Workers’ Union against the PRISCO (Cases 840-V,
840-V-1, 840-V-2, 840-V-3, 840-V-4, 840-V-5 and 840-V-6); that the NAMARCO
violated the decision of the CIR of August 25, 1953 in not paying its employees
and laborers for work done on Sundays and legal holidays, as well as the
decision of June 10, 1955 in not paying its employees and workers for night
service from January 1, 1956. The respondents therein demanded a bill of
particulars which would enumerate the names of the employees and laborers of the
NAMARCO and specify the period covered by their claims. The petitioners then
filed annex A which lists the names of the employees and laborers so affected
and specifies the period covered by their claims. The CIR then Issued the order
of May 20, I960, which states in part:

“Considering the decision of this Court of August 25, 1953 ordering the
respondent to ‘pay all its.em-playees and workers involved herein 25% additional
compensation for unpaid overtime and legal holidays work rendered beginning June
8, 1951’; the decision of June 10, 1955 ordering the respondent to ‘pay
additional compensation of at least 25% to its security guards and other
employees performing night work, that is, from 6:30 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., as shown
above, effective August, 1946; the order dated January 15, 1957 and also the
decision of this Court dated February 4, 1957 wherein the NAMARCO was included
as party respondent in Cases Nos. 840-V; 840-v(1); 840-v(2); 840-v(3); 840-v(5);
840-v(61) and the fact that respondents did not deny-the allegations of the
petitioners that the list mentioned in Annex A of petitioners’ reply to motion
for bill of particulars, rendered work on Sundays and legal holidays and night
work from January 1, 1956, respondent NAMARCO is hereby ordered to pay those
mentioned in said Annex A their unpaid additional compensation for work
performed on Sundays and legal holidays and night work from January 1, 1956, in
accordance with the above-cited decisions dated August 25, 1953 and June 10,
1955.

“Accordingly, the Court examiner or his duly authorized representative is
hereby directed to compute the amount due said workers as appearing on said
Annex A, and thereafter to submit his report to the Court for further
disposition thereof.”

The above constitutes a narration of the antecedent facts.

Now to the petition at hand.

Prior to the rendition of our decision in L-17804, or on the previous January
10, 1961, the aforesaid union (present respondent) filed a petition with the
CIR, docketed as Case S40-V(9), entitled PRISCO WORKERS UNION, et al.
vs. PRISCO Board of Liquidators and NAMARCO, praying that the benefits
of the CIR order of May 20, 1960, affirmed by the CIR en banc
resolution of July 11, 1960, now final and executory, be extended to “some
employees and laborers of the NAMARCO who also rendered Sundays, legal holidays
and night work services from January 1, 1956 up (to) the present but who were
not included therein and their names, designations, departments or offices where
they work, and the period covered by their claims, are enumerated in a list
which is attached to this petition as Annex A-l;^[1] and that the said employees and laborers
be adjudged entitled to the benefits of said order of May 20, 1960 and their
claims be included in the computation then being undertaken by the examiner duly
designated by the CIR.

The petitioner herein opposed the petition upon the grounds that the claims
have already prescribed pursuant to R.A. 1993; that there is no
employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the claimants who are
GAO employees; and that the decisions of the CIR of August 25, 1953 and June 10,
1955 can no longer be enforced because more than five years had elapsed from the
entry of said judgments when the instant petition was presented on January 10,
1961.

On March 30, 1962 the CIR issued an order of the following tenor:

“The present petition has not yet prescribed. Although more than three years
have elapsed after the present action was instituted and more than five years
have elapsed after the proposed enforcement of the present action, the same
defenses are untenable for the present action is a continuation of the original
case as well as an implementation of the decision of the Court dated August 25,
1953.

“The employees who were not working at the time the present petition was
filed are also entitled to overtime pay and night time work pay. This is so,
because even if they were no longer working with the firm when the present
petition was instituted, the Court had already acquired jurisdiction over the
questioned persons when the original case was filed. Since the Court had already
acquired jurisdiction over the same persons, it should not now be divested of
the same.

“The employees who are GAO personnel are not entitled to additional
compensation from the PRISCO for there is no employee-employer relationship
existing between them and the respondents. Since this is the state of affairs
existing between the union and these employees, the employer incurs no legal
obligation to pay them their additional compensation.”

Both parties moved to reconsider the above order, and the CIR en banc,
by resolution of June Id, 1962, ruled in effect that the claims of the
additional claimants have not yet prescribed as their petition merely seeks the
implementation of the August 25, 1953 and June 10, I960 decisions; that the
aforesaid decisions can still be enforced although more than five years have
elapsed from the dates of entry of said judgments; and that the GAO employees
are “similarly circumstanced” to those embraced by the order of June 10, 1960,
and are, therefore, entitled to overtime compensation.

Hence the present recourse by the NAMARCO.

The two issues tendered for resolution are: (1) are the employees embraced in
the instant petition entitled to the benefits granted by the CIR decisions of
August 25, 1953 and June 10, 1960?; and (2) have their claims for overtime and
Sunday and legal holiday work prescribed?

The petitioner contends that the claimants in the present petition (Case
340-V-[9]) are different from the claimants in the main case (Case 840-V), for
whose benefit the decisions of August 25, 1953 and June 10, 1955 were rendered;
that for this reason the instant petition is not a continuation of the original
case nor an implementation of the aforesaid decisions, but should be considered
a “new cause;” that the benefits in the aforesaid decisions were intended only
for the petitioners whose names appear in the record as original parties in the
main case; that because R.A. 1993, amending section 7-A of the Eight-Hour Labor
Law (C.A. 444), prescribes the period of three years for the filing of an action
thereunder, the present petition has already prescribed having been filed only
on January 10, 1961, or more than three years from June 10, 1955; and that
therefore the CIR is without power to extend the benefits of Its decisions of
August 25, 1953 and June 10, 1955 to the employees of the NAMARCO listed in
Annex A-l of the instant petition.

The CIR order of March 30, 1962 treats of two different sets of employees and
workers, namely, (1) employees of the NAMARCO; and (2) employees of the GAO who
receive their salaries from, and work with, the NAMARCO. The employees
constituting the first set ask for the extension to them of the benefits of the
CIR order of May 20, I960, affirmed by the CIR en banc resolution of July
11, I960,^[2] for their services rendered
on “Sundays, legal holidays and night work service from January 1, 1956 up to
the present but who were not included therein * * *.” This quoted portion of
the petition undoubtedly shows that these employees are similarly situated to
the petitioners embraced in the order of May 20, I960, because the latter also
sought unpaid additional compensation for services performed on Sundays and
legal holidays and night work from January 1, 1956, up to the filing of their
petition on March 20, 1958. This Court considered the petition of March 20, 1958
not to be a new petition but one for the execution of the partial CIR decision
of August 25, 1953, with regard to the other workers and employees who had not
been paid for overtime and Sunday and legal holiday services (L-17804,
supra).^[3] The present petition is one
for the execution of the partial decision of May 20, I960, to affect the
employees of the NAMARCO who have not yet been paid their overtime and Sunday
and legal holiday services rendered from January 1, 1956. May 20, I960 is the
date of the latest execution of the partial decisions of August 25, 1953 and
June 10, 1955. The present petition was filed on January 10, 1961, less than
eight months from the said last date of execution. The petitioner’s contention
that the present claims have already prescribed is therefore patently
untenable.

The case of the GAO employees presents a different problem. These employees
serve in, and are paid by, the NAMARCO. Are they entitled to compensation for
overtime service?

The respondents maintain that these GAO employees are so entitled. They cite
Republic of the Philippines vs. Hemando, et al. 99 Phil. 637; San Miguel Brewery
vs. CIR, 83 Phil. 663; and Manila Terminal Co., Inc. vs. CIR, 83 Phil. 559, as
well as Opinion 223 of the Secretary of Justice of Sept. 10, 1954.

The Hernando case is not in point. The vital issue there was, who is the real
party in interest in an action affecting government employees and laborers
employed in public works, concerning a claim for death benefits. The San Miguel
Brewery and the Manila Terminal Co., Inc. cases are likewise not pertinent. The
employees concerned were each “policia especial no es funcionario publico.” Nor
has Opinion 223 of the Secretary of Justice any relevance. It speaks of
gratuity, which is different from overtime pay. The former concept
signifies a gift, reward, present, or something that is given and received by
lucrative title (see Mendoza vs. Dizon, 77 Phil. 533, 537), while the
latter means compensation for work performed beyond eight hours a day (C.A. 444,
sec. 3).

We uphold the contention, of the petitioner that the GAO employees and
officials are not entitled to recover overtime compensation from the NAMARCO, as
there is no employer-employee relationship between them. In three previous
occasions we held that the GAO employees assigned to the National Development
Company (NDG), the PRISCO, and the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
(NAWASA), even if their salaries are paid by those entities, are not their
corporate employees, as they are agents of the Government, appointed and
supervised by the Auditor General, have an independent tenure, and perform their
work subject to orders and instructions of the Auditor General and not to those
of the management of the said entities (Batungbakal vs. National
Development Co., 93 Phil. 162; National Marketing Corporation, et al. vs.
CIR, et al., L-17804, Jan. 31, 1963; Nawasa vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions,
et al., L-1893S, Aug. 31, 1964).

Moreover, in the last mentioned case, we explicitly declared that these
employees are “not covered by the 8-Hour Labor Law, but by other pertinent
laws on the matter“, more specifically sections 566 and 259 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Section 566 provides that “When the interest of the public
so requires, the head of any Department, Bureau, or Office may extend the daily
hours of work, in what manner soever fixed, for any or all of the employees
under him, and may likewise require any or all of them to do overtime work not
only on work days but also on holidays.” Section 259 declares that “In the
absence of special provision, persons regularly and permanently appointed under
the Civil Service Law or whose salary, wages, or emoluments are fixed by law or
regulation shall not, for any service rendered or labor done by them on holiday
or for other overtime work, receive or be paid additional compensation.”
(Italics ours)

ACCORDINGLY, we affirm the CIR order of March 30, 1962 as well as the
CIR resolution en banc of June 18, 1962, insofar as they extend the
benefits of the CIR order of May 20, 1960 to the employees and workers of the
NAMARCO, but reverse and set aside the same with respect to the GAO employees
who work in and with the said entity. No pronouncement as to
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

^[2] The petition for
certiorari filed by the same petitioner from the said order and resolution
(National Marketing Corporation vs. CIR, et al., L-17196) was dismissed by this
Court’s resolution of August 30, 1960.

^[3] See also National Shipyards and Steel
Corp. vs. Artoz, et al., L-17349, April 23, 1962.