DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. LELITA JUGADO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, INTERVENOR AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental dismissing a petition for the cancellation of a homestead patent.

There is no dispute as to the main facts. It appears that on November 26,
1956, the Director of Lands filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition seeking to annul and cancel Homestead Patent No. V-28407
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2644, portion of Lot No. 2290 of
the Himamaylan Cadastre, that province. Named respondent in the petition was
Lelita Jugado to whom the homestead patent was issued on May 4, 1954, and the
ground relied upon was that the patent aforesaid was fraudulently issued in
favor of said respondent because the land is covered by a prior and subsisting
approved homestead application of one Conrada Villavera.

On October 25, 1957, the Philippine National Bank, claiming to be a mortgagee
in good faith of the property subject of the petition, moved to intervene in the
proceedings, and after its motion was granted, the said entity filed an answer.
This was soon followed by a motion to dismiss filed by the same intervenor,
alleging as ground therefor that inasmuch as the petition to cancel was filed on
December 5, 1956, more than one year had already elapsed since the issuance of
the patent and the certificate of title in favor of respondent, and that,
therefore, the said title had already become perfect, absolute and
indefeasible.

After the usual responsive pleadings had been filed by both parties, the
trial court, finding merit in the intervenor’s motion, issued an order
dismissing the petition. From the order of dismissal, the Director of Lands has
appealed to this Court insisting that the provision of law (section 38 of Act
496), which limits to only one year the period within which to contest the
validity of a certificate of title, is inapplicable in the instant case where a
homestead patent is involved.

The main issue to be determined is whether or not the appellant’s petition to
cancel or annul Homestead Patent No. V-28407 issued to Lelita Jugado could
prosper under the circumstances.

It has already been laid down as a doctrine in this jurisdiction that after
the registration and issuance of the certificate and owner’s duplicate
certificate of title of a public land patent, the land covered thereby
automatically comes under the operation of Act 496 and subject to all the
safeguards provided therein (See El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga, 60 Phil.,
17; Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 850; Manalo vs. Lukban
and Liwanag, 48 Phil., 973). Section 38 of Act 496, otherwise called the Land
Registration Act, prohibits the raising of any question concerning the validity
of a certificate of title after one year from entry of the decree of
registration. And the period of one year has been construed, in the case of
public land grants, to begin from the issuance of the patent (Sumail vs.
C.F.I. of Cotabato, infra; Nelayan vs. Nelayan, 109 Phil., 183).
It is not disputed that the patent in this case was issued way back in May,
1954, and that the petition to have it annulled was filed only on December 5,
1956, more than two years thereafter. Under the circumstances, therefore, the
Director of Lands has no longer any right to contest the validity of the patent
issued to Lelita Jugado. It may be well, in this connection, to quote the
opinion of this Court in a similar case to wit:

“Well settled is the rule that once the patent is registered and the
corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the
public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has
neither control nor jurisdiction. (Sumail vs. Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato, et al., 96 Phil., 946; 51 Off. Gaz., [5] 2413; Republic
vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, 105 Phil., 1231. And a public land patent
when registered, is a veritable torrens title (Dagdag vs. Nepomuceno, 105
Phil., 216) and becomes indefeasible as a Torrens title (Ramoso vs.
Obligado, 70 Phil., 86), upon the expiration of one year from the date of the
issuance thereof (Lucas vs. Durian, G. R. No. L-7886, Sept. 23, 1957). As
such it can no longer be cancelled and annulled.” (Dir. of Lands vs. De
Luna, G. R. No. L-14641, November 23, 1960).

There is, however, a section in the Public Land Law (sec. 101 of Commonwealth
Act 141), which affords a remedy whereby lands of the public domain fraudulently
awarded may be recovered or reverted back to its original owner, the Government.
But the provision requires that all such actions for reversion shall be
instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the
proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines (See Director of
Lands vs. De Luna, supra). As the party in interest in this case
is the Director of Lands and not the Republic of the Philippines, the action
cannot prosper in favor of the appellant.

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, but
without prejudice to the Government’s right to institute the proper action for
reversion. Without special pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J.,
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes,
Dizon, and Natividad, JJ., concur.