MOISES LLANTERO, REPRESENTED BY HIS SON, TRANQUILINO LLANTERO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., RESPONDENTS.

This Petition for Certiorari seeks to set aside the Court
of Appeals’ Resolution, dated November 11, 1967, denying petitioner’s Motion to
Set Aside Entry of Judgment in CA-G.R. No. 27311-R.

From the records before us, we gather that respondent J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., a domestic corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines (hereinafter simply called
Corporation), is the registered owner of a parcel of land known as the Sta.
Mesa Heights Subdivision, situated in Quezon City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1267 (37686-Rizal) issued in its
name by the Registry of Deeds of said City.^[1]
Title over the said tract of land was originally registered under the Torrens
system as far back as July 8, 1914.^[2]

On January 7, 1959,
the Corporation instituted an action for recovery of possession against
petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-3697.  It
alleged that on March 23, 1957,
petitioner, through force, strategy and stealth, and without its consent,
entered into, occupied and subsequently constructed his house on a
200-square-meter-portion of the land at Barrio North, Tatalon,
Quezon City,
covered by the title of the Corporation.^[3]

Petitioner, in his Answer, claimed that he bought the land on October 29, 1956 from Felicidad Campos, whose title thereto could be traced back
to Telesforo Deudor, the
first known “owner” of the property.

On June 21, 1959,
the trial Court rendered judgment ordering petitioner or any person claiming
under him, to remove his house and other constructions from the property in
question; to surrender possession thereof to the Corporation; to pay P20.00 a
month from April 23, 1957
until possession is restored; and to pay the costs.^[4]

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27311-R).  On May
11, 1967, that Court affirmed the Decision of the trial Court.  Petitioner received a copy of the same on May 30, 1967.  Through counsel, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on June 14, 1967 by registered mail, but erroneously placed as
docket number thereof, CA-G.R. No. 26772-R (J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc., vs. Paciencia P. Bayang),
instead of CA-G.R. No. 27311-R.  The
Motion was attached to the expediente of the
former case.  There being no Motion for
Reconsideration of record in CA-G.R. No. 27311-R, the judgment against
petitioner became final, an entry of judgment was made, and the records of the
case were remanded to the lower Court for execution.

Before the Appellate Court, petitioner moved to set aside the
entry of judgment on the ground that, except for the mistake in docket number,
reconsideration was timely filed so that the Decision had not yet become
final.  On November 11, 1967, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion
stating:

“Acting on the urgent motion of counsel for defendant-appellant
praying, on the grounds therein stated, that the entry of judgment in this case
be set aside and that the court a quo be ordered to set aside its
order, dated September 30, 1967 granting the execution of the judgment; the
Court RESOLVED to DENY the motion.”

The present Petition was filed by petitioner assigning the
following errors to respondent Court:

“1.  The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not
resolving that the date of mailing is the date of filing.

“2.  That the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
entering the judgment in CA-G.R. No. 27311-R as final and executory.

“3.  That the respondent Court erred in not setting
aside the entry of judgment in CA-G.R. No. 27311-R.”

Petitioner maintains that the judgment of the Court of Appeals
did not become final and executory because his Motion
for Reconsideration was filed within the reglementary
period, the date of mailing being the date of filing; that said Court failed to
act on said Motion; and that the entry of judgment was erroneous.

In refutation, the Corporation asserts that the placing of the
wrong docket number on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was due to his
counsel’s fault; that said pleading was merely intended for delay as the Motion
for Reconsideration in the Bayang case, which was allegedly
being prepared at the time the Motion in the present case was under way, was
filed a month before the Llantero case was decided;
that the Court of Appeals acted on the Motion for Reconsideration when it
denied the Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment; and that the arguments
set forth in said Motion are the same arguments repeatedly overruled by this
Court and the Court of Appeals in several other cases involving the
Corporation.

The records of Civil Case No. Q-3697 were remanded to the Court
of origin by the Appellate Court for execution on August 4, 1967 and the rollo
disposed of.* There is no showing whether
execution of judgment had been stayed by the trial Court or not pending the
resolution of this Petition. 
Nonetheless, it is best that the Petition be resolved on the merits to
set the controversy conclusively at rest.

We find the Petition groundless.

It is an established rule that the date of mailing of a motion,
pleading or any other paper, as shown by the post office registry receipt, shall
be considered as the date of their filing in Court.^[5]
Nevertheless, this is not the issue at bar. 
Petitioner’s Motion, although seasonably presented from the foregoing
standpoint, bore an erroneous docket number. 
For this reason, it could not be attached to the expediente
of the correct case.  To all intents and
purposes, the Motion was legally inexistent. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no error in remanding the case to
the Court of origin for execution of the judgment.

Petitioner’s counsel’s oversight can not be considered
excusable.  As claimed by the
Corporation, petitioner’s counsel, who was also the lawyer in the Bayang case, had prepared the Motion for Reconsideration in
the latter suit a month before.  Both
Motions were not being prepared at approximately the same time, as contended,
such that a mistake could have been committed, and if it had been, it was
inexcusable for having been sheer negligence. 
This is one case where petitioner has to bear the adverse consequences
of his counsel’s act, for, it has been held, a client is bound by his lawyer’s
inexcusable negligence.^[6]
No abuse of discretion, therefore, can be laid at the door of respondent Court
when it declared its judgment final.

Moreover, petitioner’s claim to the property in question is based
on a document of sale of possessory rights executed
by Felicidad Campos in favor of his son Tranquilino Llantero, and on the
Compromise Agreements in Civil Cases Nos. Q-135, Q-139 and Q-174.  On this score, respondent Court ruled that
the trial Court aptly rejected these evidences, as it had been clearly
established that the Corporation is the registered owner of the large tract of
land, of which the controverted portion forms part,
since July 8, 1914, and that neither Felicidad
Campos, nor her predecessor-in-interest Eustaquio Alquiros, had been authorized to convey the portion in
question.  It further held that the
Compromise Agreement upon which petitioner predicated his right, had already
been rescinded and set aside by this Court in Deudor, et al. vs. J.M. Tuason &Co., Inc., 2 SCRA 129 (1961).  Petitioner’s arguments in his Motion for
Reconsideration were a mere reiteration of his evidence presented to the trial
Court.  Clearly then, the Motion for
Reconsideration, even if correctly numbered, was pro forma, filed
to gain time, and could not toll the running of the period of appeal.^[7]

All the foregoing considered, the entry of judgment made by
respondent Appellate Court must be upheld.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby dismissed.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.

^[1]
p. 2, Rec. on Appeal, p. 17, Rollo.

^[2]
p. 4, Decision of the Court of Appeals.

^[3]
p. 25, Rec. on Appeal, p. 17, Rollo

^[4]
p. 27, Rec. on Appeal, ibid.

* Letter from the Chief, Archives
Section, Court of Appeals, dated April
1, 1981.

^[5]
Faicol vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 811, (1979).

^[6]
Rivera vs. Vda. de Cruz, 26 SCRA 58 (1968);
Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. CA, 61 SCRA 87 (1974)

^[7]
Cruz vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 76 SCRA
543 (1977).