G.R. No. L-24887. April 22, 1968
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MANILA PORT SERVICE AND/OR MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, NIPPON YUSEN KAISHA AND/OR ELIZALDE & CO.,…
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal taken by defendants Manila Port Service and Manila
Railroad Company from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dated June 9, 1965.
It appears that on August 21, 1962 the vessel “SS Hoeisan Meru“, owned and
operated by Nippon Yusen Kaitha, took on board at
Copenhagen, Denmark 1,188 packages of cheese, meat preserves, butter oil and
salami sausages consigned to Ed. A. Keller & Co. Ltd., Manila, said goods
having been insured with herein plaintiff against all risks and damages. On September
25, 1962 said vessel arrived at the port
of Manila and began discharging its
cargoes, including the aforesaid shipment, into the custody of the Manila Port
Service, the arrastre
operator acting as a subsidiary of the Manila Railroad Company. When the shipment was delivered to the
consignee, it was short by fifteen (15) packages.
Plaintiff, as subrogee of the rights of the consignee, filed a claim
against all the defendants herein for the amount of the loss and/or
damage. Upon failure to collect,
plaintiff, on September 25, 1963, sued in the alternative the owner of
the carrying vessel and its agent in the Philippines, Elizalde
& Co., Inc., on the one hand, and the arrastre
operator and its principal on the other, alleging that it was uncertain as to
who was the party responsible for the loss of or damage to the shipment in
question. All the defendants other than
Nippon Yusen Kaisha filed their respective answers. Defendant arrastre
operator and its principal subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit, to which motion plaintiff filed a written opposition. The motion to dismiss was denied and after
trial on the merits the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering defendant Elizalde & Co., Inc. to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P264.53; ordering defendants Manila Port Service and Manila Railroad Company
jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,601.34;
ordering the said defendants to pay the costs in equal shares.”
From the above-quoted
decision, defendants Manila Port Service and Manila Railroad Company appealed
to this Court on questions of law. The other defendant did not appeal.
Appellant avers that the lower court erred: (1) in holding that it had jurisdiction aver
the subject-matter of the instant suit; (2) in holding that the provisional
claim filed one day before the actual discharge of the last package from the
carrying vessel was in substantial compliance with the provisions of the
management contract; and (3) in holding that defendants-appellants are liable
for the C.I.F. value of the alleged loss and/or damage and not the invoice
value thereof.
On the first question it is contended that the lower court had no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the instant case insofar as the
appellants were concerned because appellee’s suit
against them was based on a contract of deposit (Macondray
& Co. vs. Delgado Brothers, et al., 28 O.G. 899) and therefore the total
amount demanded in the complaint lodged jurisdiction in the City Court.
It
is further contended that the rule on joinder of
causes of action did not apply, for it is subject to the fundamental limitation
that each and every cause of action must be within the original jurisdiction of
the court in which the complaint is filed.
This question has been
settled by this Court in Rizal Surety & Insurance
Co. vs. Manila Railroad, et al., G. R. No. L-20875, April 30, 1966, and
reiterated in Hanover Insurance Co. vs. Manila Port Service and Manila Railroad
Co., G. R. No. L-20976, January 23, 1967, where we said:
“At the time the complaint was filed, plaintiff did not know
at what precise stage of transactions the loss complained of occurred. If the loss took place in transit, C.F. Sharp
& Co., Inc. would be liable therefor; but if the
loss occurred after the goods were landed and discharged from the carrying
vessel, the Manila Port Service would bear such loss. Hence, the joinder
of causes of action and parties defendants in the alternative which is
permitted by Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, quoted hereunder:
x x x
“And since one of the causes of action is cognizable by the Court of First Instance the suit should be
filed, as was correctly done by the plaintiff, in said court, notwithstanding
that the other cause of action – if standing
alone – would fall within the jurisdiction of the municipal court, by reason
of the amount of the demand. (Sapico v. Manila Oceanic Lines, L-18776,
January 30, 1964). In
International Harvester Co. of the Philippines v. Judge Aragon, (supra, note
1) where a similar action was filed with the municipal court, we held that the
municipal court lacked jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as one of the
alternative causes of action, against the shipping firm, was an action in
admiralty, cognizable by the Court of First Instance.”
Appellants contend that the provisional claim filed one day
before the complete discharge of the shipment from the carrying vessel was
speculative and premature and not in substantial compliance with Section 15 of
the management contract. The fact,
however, is that when the provisional claim was filed on September 25, 1962,
part of the shipment had already been discharged and a number of packages had
been noted to have been landed in bad order, As shown by Exhibits “H”,
“H-1” and “H-2”, all Bad Order Tally Sheets
signed by the carrier’s agent and a representative of appellants and
dated September 25, 1962.
In Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. vs. Compañia
General de Tabacos de Filipinas and Manila Port
Service, et al., G. R. No. L-20230, July
30, 1965, we held:
“x x x
that paragraph 15 of the management contract clearly and specifically requires
the claim to be filed ‘within fifteen (15) days from date of discharge of the
last package from the carrying vessel.’ Quite obviously therefore such claim
should be filed after discharge of the goods from the vessel. A claim filed before such discharge is
premature and speculative.”
However, the above rule was qualified in New Hampshire Fire
Insurance Co. vs. Manila Port Service, et al., G.R. No. L-20938, August 9, 1966,
where this Court made a distinction between two situations, namely: (1) where
the provisional claim is filed ahead of the date of the discharge of the last
package from the carrying vessel and the consignee has not yet examined or is
not yet informed of the condition of the shipment, in which case the provisional claim
is held to be speculative and premature; and (2) where the claim is filed also
before the date of the discharge of the last package from the carrying vessel,
but the consignee has in fact discovered or is already informed of a shortage
or damage to the goods before the discharge of the last package, or during the
unloading, in which case the provisional claim is deemed to have been properly
presented.
The instant case falls squarely under the second category
above-mentioned. When the provisional
claim was filed on September 25, 1962,
appellee was already aware of the bad order condition
of some of the goods. It was therefore
neither premature nor speculative, but was based on facts already within the
consignee’s knowledge.
As regards the last issue, appellants claim that if at all they
should be liable only for the invoice value of the lost or damaged goods, and
not for their C.I.F. value. Appellee does not dispute
this, since it is what the management contract says. However, there is no showing that the lower
court based its award on the C.I.F. value of the lost and/or damaged
goods. The point is raised for the first
time in this appeal, and how much was the invoice value is even now disputed by
the parties. Since the appeal has been
taken directly to this Court the facts may no longer be reviewed, including the
finding of the lower court as to the actual amount of appellants’ liability in
this case.
Wherefore,
the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Reyes, J.B.L., (Acting C.J.), Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.