BERNARDO P. BETOY, SR.[], COMPLAINANT, JUDGE MAMERTO Y. COLIFLORES, PROMULGATED: RESPONDENT.

Betoy versus Coliflores

The Case

This is an administrative case filed by Bernardo Betoy, Senior, against Judge Mamerto Coliflores. The complainant charges the respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion and authority, conduct unbecoming of a judge, and gross negligence resulting in procedural lapses, all arising from the judge's issuance of a search warrant and his subsequent handling of it. The case matters because it fixes the standard of judicial competence in the delicate area of search warrants: how deeply a judge must probe before finding probable cause, and what he must do after the warrant is issued. It is a case about the continuing duty of the issuing magistrate.

Procedural History

The complainant filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator, attaching an affidavit executed by his wife. The respondent judge filed his comment, defending both the issuance of the warrant and his conduct afterward. The Supreme Court referred the matter to the Executive Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City for investigation, report, and recommendation. The investigating judge found the respondent not guilty of the charges relative to the issuance of the search warrant. Meanwhile, the respondent judge compulsorily retired. The Office of the Court Administrator then submitted a memorandum finding that probable cause had been established for the issuance of the warrant, but that the judge was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for failing to conduct a judicial inquiry into the whereabouts of the seized firearms. The Office recommended a fine of 20,000 pesos, to be deducted from his retirement benefits. The case reached the Supreme Court as an administrative matter, and the Court rendered its own evaluation of the findings.

Facts

On September 17, 1999, Judge Coliflores issued a search and seizure order upon the application of Police Inspector Cesar Arquillano, supported by the affidavits of two police officers, SPO2 Rex Cabrera and SPO1 Jesus Rojas. The application alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition by the complainant and his companions. Before issuing the warrant, the judge personally examined the applicant and his two witnesses through questions and answers in writing, sworn to before him.

The police officers testified that an asset reported persons armed with short and long firearms going in and out of the complainant's house, and that they conducted surveillance and rented a room nearby, from which they saw the firearms. The judge was satisfied with these answers and issued the warrant. During the search, the officers seized several items, but no proof was offered that the complainant and his companions lacked a license to possess them. In fact, one seized firearm, a twelve-gauge shotgun, turned out to be duly licensed, and the judge later ordered its release, together with ammunition, upon motion of counsel.

Almost nine months passed, and the judge never inquired from the implementing officers where the seized firearms were, nor did he require a return or an inventory. The complainant then filed this administrative complaint, and the matter was investigated and elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge established probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant through a probing and exhaustive examination of the applicant and his witnesses.
• Whether or not the respondent judge was remiss in his duty, after issuing the warrant, to ascertain whether a return had been made and to require the implementing officers to explain the absence of a return and to account for the seized property.
• Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, and what penalty should be imposed.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

Rule 1.01. A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.

This is the competence standard the respondent judge fell short of in his examination of the applicant and witnesses.

Rule 3.01 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

Rule 3.01. A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

This duty of fidelity and competence extends to the rules on search warrants, both at issuance and after.

Guideline Number 5, paragraph g, of Administrative Circular Number 13, issued on October 1, 1985, provides:

The search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of issuance, and after which the issuing judge should ascertain if the return has been made, and if there was none, should summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge should ascertain from the officer who seized the property under the warrant if a detailed receipt of the property seized was left with the lawful occupants of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupants, whether he left a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, and should require that the property seized by virtue of the warrant shall be delivered to the judge who issued the warrant. The judge should see to it that an accurate and true inventory of the property seized duly verified under oath is attached to the return and filed with the court.

This is the provision actually violated, because the warrant was issued in 1999, before the 2000 amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge failed to thoroughly examine the applicant and his witnesses in a manner that would sufficiently establish probable cause. Probable cause for a search warrant means such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought are in the place to be searched. It must rest on the personal knowledge of the complainant or his witnesses, not on mere hearsay, and the examining magistrate must make a probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma, examination. Here, the offense was illegal possession of firearms, whose elements include the absence of a license. The applicant and his witnesses never showed personal knowledge that the complainant and his companions had no license. Their statement that they saw the firearms illegally possessed amounted only to personal belief, not personal knowledge. This belief was partly proven wrong when one seized shotgun turned out to be licensed. The judge should have asked whether they had personal knowledge of the lack of a license, or whether a certification from the proper government agency had been secured, which is the best evidence obtainable on that point.

On the second issue, the Court agreed with the Office of the Court Administrator that the judge was remiss in ascertaining whether a return had been made and, if none, in summoning the person to whom the warrant was issued to explain why no return was made. The Court clarified, however, that the violated rule was not Section 12 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, since the warrant was issued in 1999 and those amendments took effect only on December 1, 2000. The applicable rule was Guideline Number 5, paragraph g, of Administrative Circular Number 13. The judge's duty does not end with the issuance of the warrant. He did not refute the allegation that he failed to inquire into the whereabouts of the seized firearms, and there was no evidence that he required an accurate and complete inventory.

On the third issue, the Court held that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law excuses no one, least of all a judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it, and anything less is gross ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, punishable by a fine of more than 20,000 pesos but not more than 40,000 pesos, suspension, or dismissal. The Court found the recommended fine of 20,000 pesos just and reasonable.

Doctrine

First, probable cause for a search warrant must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce, and not based on mere hearsay. The examining magistrate must make a probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma, examination of the applicant and the witnesses. Second, in a warrant for illegal possession of firearms, probable cause requires facts showing both possession of the firearm and the absence of a license, and a certification from the proper government agency is the best evidence of the lack of license. Third, the issuing judge's duty does not end with the issuance of the warrant. Under Guideline Number 5, paragraph g, of Administrative Circular Number 13, he must ascertain whether a return has been made, summon the person to whom the warrant was issued if there is none, and see to it that an accurate and true inventory is attached to the return. Fourth, failure to observe these rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law or procedure, a serious charge under Rule 140, and a judge is presumed to know the law.

Disposition

The Court found retired Judge Mamerto Coliflores guilty of gross ignorance of the law and fined him 20,000 pesos, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

Remember This

The single line to memorize is that the issuing judge's duty does not end with the issuance of the search warrant; he must probe exhaustively for probable cause and then police the return and inventory. Examiners use this case to test the personal knowledge requirement for probable cause in illegal possession of firearms, and the continuing post-issuance duties of the magistrate under Administrative Circular Number 13.