BERNARDO CORDA, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. EUGENIO MAGLINTI, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Bernardo
Gorda, et al. filed on October 26, 1948 a complaint before the Court of
First Instance of Misamis Occidental against Eugenio M. Maglinti to
recover two parcels of land and damages for all the fruits received by
the latter during his occupation thereof from December, 1939 up to the
time of the filing of the complaint in 1948. After trial on the merits,
the court a quo rendered decision dismissing the complaint. Plaintiffs
having appealed from the decision, the Court of Appeals modified it in
the sense of declaring plaintiffs the owners of five-seventh (5/7) of
the property in question while defendant the owner of two-seventh (2/7)
thereof, affirming the decision of the court a quo in all other respects

When
the case was returned to the court of origin plaintiffs filed a motion
for receivership in order that the property may be placed under his
administration during the time it is undivided which motion was readily
granted and so the property remained under receivership from February
17, 1953 to August 17, 1957. Immediately thereafter, plaintiffs filed
in the same case a petition for partition based on the decision of the
Court of Appeals, but this petition was denied on the ground that the
same should be made the subject of a separate action. Whereupon,
plaintiffs commenced the present action of partition against Eugenio M.
Maglinti on April 23, 1955.

Instead of presenting evidence,
the parties submitted a written stipulation in the form of an amicable
settlement wherein they agreed that plaintiffs be declared owners of
the first parcel of land and defendant of the greater portion of the
second parcel of land excluding the portions belonging to Tranquilina
Tamarong and Gregoria Corda, but including a reservation that whatever
claims the parties may have against each other will be the subject of
determination by the court. On the face of this stipulation, the court a quo
rendered decision approving the same and enjoining the parties to
comply with its terms and conditions. The court further ordered that
pending the delivery of the shares corresponding to each party, the
produce of the land be delivered to the receiver appointed in the
former case, requiring in this connection the receiver to submit a
written report on his work within 15 days from receipt of the decision.

On
September 22, 1958, the case was called for hearing to determine what
other steps should be taken relative to its termination and it was then
that plaintiffs asked that they be allowed to present evidence relative
to their claims for damages. Because of the opportune objection of
defendant, the court a quo denied the request. And as it appears that
the properties adjudicated in the partition had already been delivered
to parties as stated in the report submitted by the commissioner of
partition the court considered the case closed and terminated. Hence
the present appeal which was certified to this Court by the Court of
Appeals because it involves purely questions of law.

The main theme of appellants is that the court a quo
erred in not permitting them to introduce evidence to prove their claim
for damages resulting from their unlawful deprivation of their shares
in the property in litigation considering that in the written
stipulation submitted by the parties relative to its partition there is
a reservation that “whatever claims the parties have against each other
will be reserved for further determination of this Court.” They contend
that, availing themselves of this reservation, they asked the trial
court to give them an opportunity to present evidence, but their
request was denied. This claim for damages, they intimated, is but a
sequel to the finding of the Court of Appeals that they are the owners
of 5/7 of the property in litigation and it is but just that they be
indemnified of the fruits they failed to enjoy during the period of
their dispossession. But this claim was resisted by appellee on the
ground of res judicata, which contention was upheld by the trial court.

We
are inclined to uphold the ruling on the basis of the facts appearing
in the record. It appears that in the complaint filed by appellants in
original case No. 1142 they alleged two causes of action, one to
recover two parcels of land and the other to recover damages for the
fruits unlawfully enjoyed by appellee from December, 1939 up to the
filing of this case in 1948. When the case was tried on the merits
appellants presented evidence not only on their main claim but likewise
on their claim for damages but that both claims were rejected because
the court found that the properties in litigation belonged to appellee.
In fact, the court a quo dismissed their complaint. And while
it is true that this decision was partly modified by the Court of
Appeals, it said nothing of appellants’ claim for damages although it
may be gleaned that its dismissal by the court a quo has been
implicitly affirmed. Indeed, as restated by the Court of Appeals, one
of the errors assigned by appellants to the court a quo was
“in not awarding them damages for the use and possession of their
portions of land by Maglinti,” but this notwithstanding, the Court of
Appeals passed up the matter sub-silencio. And this decision
has become final because of appellants’ failure to file a petition for
reconsideration. This matter, therefore, is now closed and the same can
no longer be revived without doing violence to the principle of res judicata.

It
is true that in the new complaint for partition appellants reiterated
the same claim for damages and that in the written stipulation
submitted by the parties they included a clause stating “that whatever
claims the parties have against each other will be reserved for further
determination of this Court,” but this is now of no moment considering
the objection interposed thereto by counsel for appellee based on res judicata.
The above reservation may not necessarily refer to the claim for
damages which had already been litigated in the former case, but to
others not included therein, such as those that are covered by the
receivership established in civil case No. 1142. Indeed, the fruits of
the properties which were placed under receivership are matters that
should still be clarified in view of the pendency of the partition
proceeding. But this matter cannot now be looked into but should be
threshed out in the aforesaid case.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B, L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.