JOCELYN C. TALENS-DABON, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE HERMIN E. ARCEO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, RESPONDENT.

Talens-Dabon versus Arceo

The Case

This is an administrative matter that returns to the Court years after it was first decided. The complainant, Atty. Jocelyn C. Talens-Dabon, charged Judge Hermin E. Arceo of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 43, with lewd and lustful acts. The Court dismissed him from the service in 1996 and forfeited all his retirement benefits. What is now before the Court is not the original complaint but the judge's later petition asking that his forfeited retirement benefits be released to him on humanitarian grounds. The case matters because it tests the limits of judicial clemency: whether a judge who was once extended mercy may come back a second time and ask for more.

Procedural History

The case began as an administrative complaint against Judge Arceo. In a decision dated July 25, 1996, the Court found him guilty of gross misconduct and immorality prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissed him from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.

In 2012, Arceo filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency. In a resolution dated November 20, 2012, the Court granted the petition, lifting the ban against his re-employment in the government service and allowing him to receive his accrued leave credits. The clemency then extended was limited to the lifting of his disqualification from re-employment, because he did not then pray for the release of his retirement benefits.

In 2018, Arceo filed the present Petition for Payment of Retirement Benefits, asking for the release of his retirement benefits for humanitarian consideration. The Office of the Chief Attorney submitted a report dated March 14, 2019, and the matter was resolved by the Court in this decision.

Facts

In October 1995, a few months after the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 came into effect, complainant Atty. Jocelyn C. Talens-Dabon was in the office of Judge Arceo. After she placed a poem he had given her in the pocket of her blazer and asked permission to leave, she found the door of the outer room closed and barricaded by a chair, with the knob locked. The judge walked to her in big strides and asked her for a kiss. He embraced her and tried to kiss her. She evaded, struggled, and pushed him away, then ran toward the filing cabinets. He caught up with her, embraced her again, pinned her against the filing cabinets, and pressed the lower part of his body against hers. She screamed for help while resisting. She ran for the open windows of the inner room, but he caught her again. In the struggle she slipped and fell on the floor. He bent his knees in a squatting position, placed his palms on either side of her head, and kissed her on the mouth with his mouth open and his tongue sticking out. When she continued to struggle, he suddenly stopped and sat on the nearest chair, his face red and breathing heavily. She shouted at him, and he kept muttering that he loved her and was very apologetic. When she entered the Maple Room, two persons observed that her face was flushed and her hair disheveled.

For these acts, the Court in 1996 found Arceo guilty of gross misconduct and immorality and dismissed him from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government.

In 2012, the Court granted him judicial clemency, but only to the extent of lifting his disqualification from re-employment and allowing his accrued leave credits. In 2018, then seventy-seven years old, he asked for the release of his retirement benefits, citing his medical expenses and the basic necessities of life. He anchored his claim on the last portion of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6683, which speaks of an appointive official or employee previously found guilty in an administrative proceeding whose rank or salary has been reduced.

Issues

• Whether or not Arceo is qualified to claim retirement benefits under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6683.
• Whether or not the Court should release Arceo's forfeited retirement benefits pursuant to its power to grant judicial clemency.

Applicable Provisions

Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 11. Sanctions. — A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits.

This is the provision under which the Court forfeited Arceo's retirement benefits in 1996, and it is the provision that governs whether those benefits may now be released.

Section 57 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides:

The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, bar from taking civil service examinations, and forfeiture of retirement benefits.

This confirms that forfeiture of retirement benefits is the consistent accessory penalty of dismissal for a serious administrative charge.

Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6683 provides:

Officials and employees who were previously separated from the government service not for cause but as a result of the reorganization.

This limits the law to separation not for cause, which is why it cannot cover a judge dismissed for gross misconduct and immorality.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Arceo is not qualified to claim benefits under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6683. He was not merely reduced in salary or rank; he was dismissed from the service. The law applies only in cases of early retirement, voluntary separation, and involuntary separation due to government reorganization. As the Office of the Chief Attorney correctly pointed out, Arceo was separated for cause, having been dismissed for gross misconduct and immorality prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The petition may be dismissed on this ground alone.

On the second issue, the Court nevertheless examined whether it should release the benefits pursuant to its power to grant clemency, and it refused. Judicial clemency is an act of mercy removing any disqualification from the erring judge, and its grant, including its parameters and extent, rests on the sound discretion of the Court. The Court noted that Arceo had already been extended clemency eight years earlier, which enabled him to earn and save enough for his retirement. Releasing the forfeited benefits would be too much leniency considering the severity of the infraction. The Court stressed that judicial clemency, as an act of mercy, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. It also recalled the gravity of the offense, which happened a few months after the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 took effect, and noted that the framework on sexual harassment cases has since been strengthened both within and outside the judiciary.

Doctrine

First, forfeiture of retirement benefits is one of the sanctions that may be imposed on a judge found guilty of a serious charge, and under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court the Court may forfeit the benefits in whole or in part, depending on the circumstances, provided that the forfeiture shall in no case include accrued leave credits. This is consistent with Section 57 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, under which dismissal carries forfeiture of retirement benefits.

Second, judicial clemency is an act of mercy removing any disqualification from the erring judge. Its grant, including its parameters and extent, rests exclusively within the sound discretion of the Court, and it must be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. Clemency already extended does not entitle the erring judge to a second act of mercy; each plea is weighed on the unique circumstances of the case.

Third, Republic Act No. 6683 does not apply to an official separated for cause. By its Section 11, it covers only officials and employees previously separated from the government service not for cause but as a result of reorganization.

Disposition

The Court denied Arceo's Petition for Payment of Retirement Benefits, so the forfeiture of his retirement benefits stands.

Remember This

The line worth memorizing is that judicial clemency is an act of mercy that rests on the sound discretion of the Court and must be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. Examiners like to use this case on the forfeiture of retirement benefits as a sanction for a serious charge, on the limits of judicial clemency, and on the inapplicability of Republic Act No. 6683 to an official separated for cause.