OCA CIRCULAR NO. 155-2003, November 11, 2003

For the information and guidance of all
concerned, quoted hereunder is the Decision of the Court En Bane dated
July 1, 2003 in Adm. Case No. 5916, to wit:

“The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may b e
sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law.

The Case and the Facts

This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit^[1]
filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Selwyn F. Lao. Arty. Robert W. Medel was charged
therein with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming an
attorney.

The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD in this wise:

“The Complaint arose from the. [respondent’s]
persistent refusal to make good on four (4) RCBC checks totaling
[t]wenty [t]wo [thousand (P22 000 00) [p]esos. These dishonored checks
were issued by defendant in replacement for previous checks issued to
the complainant. Based on the exchange o f 1etters between t he parties, i t appears that [respondent], in a letter dated June 19, 2001,
had committed to forthwith effect immediate settlement of my outstanding
obligation of P22,000.00 with Engr. Lao, at the earliest possible time,
preferably, on or before the end of June 2000. Again, in a letter dated
July 3, 2000, the [respondent] made a request for a final extension of
ten (10) days from June 30, 2000 (or not later than July 10, 2000),
within which to effect payment of P22,000.00 to Engr. Lao. Needless to
say, the initiation of this present complaint proves that contrary to
his written promises, Atty. Medel never made good on his dishonored
checks. Neither has he paid his indebtedness.^[2]

In his Answer^[3]
dated July 30, 2001, Atty. Medel reasons that because all of his
proposals to settle his obligation were rejected, he was unable to
comply with his promise to pay complainant. Respondent maintains that
the Complaint did not constitute a valid ground for disciplinary action
because of the following:

‘(a). Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, a
member of the Bar, may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wil[l]ful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wil[l]fully appearing as an attorney
for a party to case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

‘(a.l). Applying the afore-cited legal
provision to the facts obtaining in the present case, it is clear that
the offense with which the respondent is being charged by the
complainant, is merely a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22,
for brevity), which is a special law, and is not punishable under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC, for brevity). It is self-evident therefore,
that the offense is not in the same category as a violation of Article
315, paragraph 2, (d) RPC which is issuing a post-dated check or a check
in payment of an obligation, with insufficient funds in the drawee
bank, through false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, which is a crime
involving moral turpitude;

‘(b). If the respondent is to be disciplined by
the Supreme Court, under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, for the
issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, for payment of a
pre-existing obligation to the complainant, then, verily, the said Rule
138, Sec. 27, would be a cruel and an unjust law, which the Honorable
Supreme Court would not countenance.

‘(c). A careful examination of the specific
grounds enumerated, for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar,
under Sec. ’27 of Rule 138 of the Rules, clearly shows beyond a shadow
of doubt that the alleged issuance of a worthless check, in violation of
B.P. 22, is NOT one of the grounds for disciplinary action against a
member of the Bar, to warrant his disbarment or suspension from his
office as attorney, by the Supreme Court; and

‘(d). The issuance of a worthless check by a
member of the Bar, in violation of B.P. 22, does NOT constitute
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, under Canon 2 and Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. This is because, the door to
the law profession swings on reluctant hinges, Stated otherwise, unless
there is a clear, palpable and unmitigated immoral or deceitful conduct,
of a member of the Bar, in violation of his oath as an attorney, by the
mere issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, the
Supreme Court is inclined to the give the said attorney, the benefit of
the doubt.”^[4]

On August 22, 2001, complainant submitted his Reply^[5]
Thereafter, IBP-CBD Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan, to whom the case
was assigned by the IBP for investigation and report, scheduled the case
for hearing on October 4, 2001. After several cancellations, the
parties finally met on May 29, 2002. In that hearing, respondent
acknowledged his obligation and committed himself to pay a total of
P42,000 (P22,000 for his principal debt and P20,000 for attorney’s
fees). Complainant agreed to give him until July 4, 2002 to settle the
principal debt and to discuss the plan of payment for attorney’s fees in
the next hearing.

On July 4, 2002, both parties appeared before the
IBP-CBD for their scheduled hearing. But, while waiting for the case to
be called, respondent suddenly insisted on leaving, supposedly to
attend to a family emergency. Complainant’s counsel objected and
Commissioner Cunanan, who was still conducting a hearing in another
case, ordered him to wait. He, however, retorted in a loud voice, “It’s
up to you, this is only disbarment, my family is more important.”^[6]
And, despite the objection and the warning, he arrogantly left. He made
no effort to comply with his undertaking to settle his indebtedness
before leaving.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In his September 19, 2002 Report, Commissioner
Cunanan found respondent guilty of violating the attorney’s oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The former explained that,
contrary to the latter’s claim, violation of BP 22 was a crime that
involved moral turpitude. Further, he observed that “[w]hile no criminal
case may have been instituted against [respondent], it is beyond cavil
that indeed, [the latter] committed not one (1) but four counts of
violation of BP 22.”^[8] The
“refusal [by respondent] to pay his indebtedness, his broken promises,
his arrogant attitude towards complainant’s counsel and the [commission
sufficiently] warrant the imposition of sanctions against him.”9^[9] Thus, the investigating commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law.

In Resolution No. XV-2002-598,^[10]
the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation
of Commissioner Cunanan and resolved to suspend respondent from the
practice of law for two years. The Resolution, together with the records
of the case, was transmitted to this court for final action, pursuant
to Rule 139-B Sec. 12(b).

The Court’s ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, but reduce the period of suspension to one year.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

Lawyers are instruments for the administration of
justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.^[11] In so doing, the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.

Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their
clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial
obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend
lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor— or to be
unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.^[12]

It is equally disturbing that respondent
remorselessly issued a series of worthless checks, unmindful of the
deleterious effects of such act to public interest and public order.^[13]
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members
of the bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law.
Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically provides that “[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.” In (Co v. Bernardino),^[14]
the Court considered t he issuance of worthless checks as a
violation of this Rule and an act constituting gross misconduct. It
explained thus:

‘The general rule is that a lawyer may not be
suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume
jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or
private capacity (in Re Pelaez, 44 Phil 8589 [1923]). Where, however,
the misconduct outside of the lawyer’s professional dealings is so gross
a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court
may be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of
attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]).

‘The evidence on record clearly shows respondent’s propensity to issue bad checks. This gross misconduct on
his part, though not related to ” his professional duties as a member
of the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt. The Commission,
however, does not find him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that
he ‘While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship
between complainant and respondent as the transaction between them did
not require the professional legal services of respondent, nevertheless
respondent’s abject conduct merits condemnation from, this Court.

As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down
in re: Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil 567 (1923)] the principle that it can
exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve
the relationship of an attorney and client x x x In disciplining the
respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said, x x x As a general rule, a court
will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for
misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But
this is a general rule with many exceptions x x x. The nature of the
office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client as
well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rules prescribing
the qualifications o f attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney
shall be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a
condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice
of title law, it would seem to be equally essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is
held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
confer upon him x x x.

‘Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo where the
erring lawyer was suspended for one year from the practice of law for
attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm reiterated that
an attorney may be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
his profession, but also for gross misconduct not related to his
professional duties which show him to be an unfit and unworthy lawyer
The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time
the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their
character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good
character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, when the attorney’s character is bad in such respects as to
show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an
attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him x x x Of all
classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the
law x x x and to that doctrine we give our unqualified supports.’

We likewise take notice of the high-handed manner
in which respondent dealt with Commissioner Cunanan during the July 4,
2002 hearing, when the former was expected to settle his obligation with
complainant. We cannot countenance the discourtesy of respondent. He
should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by
virtue of his membership therein.^[15]

Thus, it was imperative for him to respect the
authority of the officer assigned to investigate his case. Assuming that
he had a very important personal matter to attend to, he could have
politely explained his predicament to the investigating commissioner and
asked permission to leave immediately.

Unfortunately, the former showed dismal behavior
by raising his voice and leaving without the consent of complainant and
the investigating commissioner.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege.^[16]
It demands a high degree of good moral character, riot only as a c
ondition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement
for the practice of law.^[17] In this case, respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice.^[18]

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted
by his gross misconduct. The IBP Board of Governors recommended that he
be suspended from the practice of law for two years. However, in line
with Co v. Bernardino,^[19]Ducat Jr. v. Villalon Jr^[20] and Saburdino v. Madrono^[21]— which also involved gross

misconduct of lawyers -we find the suspension of one year sufficient in this case.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found guilty
of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one year from the
practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is
warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with
more severely.

x x x.”

The Decision was served upon respondent on July
1, 2003. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this decision was
denied with finality on September 16,2003.

__11__ November 2003.

^[2] Report of the EBP-CBD, p. 1, rollo, p.

^[3] Rollo, pp. 37-43

^[4] Answer, pp. 3-5; id, pp. 39-41

^[5] Rollo, pp. 44-46

^[6] Report of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, p. 2, id. P. 78

^[8] IBP-CBD’s Report, p. 2, rollo, p. 78

^[9] Ibid.

^[10] Resolution No. XV-2002-598, rollo, p. 76

^[11] Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting, 338 Phil 912, May 14,1997

^[12] Ibid; Co v.
Bernardino, AC No. 3919, January 28, 1998, Nakpil vs. Valdes, 286 SCRA
758, March 4, 1998; Calub v. Suller, 323 SCRA 556, January 28, 2002;
Cruz v. Jacinto, 328 SCRA 636, March 22,2000

^[13] People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692, January 30, 11990, citing Lazano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 324,338 & 340, December 18, 1996.

^[14] Supra, per Bellowillo, J.

^[15] Toledo v. Abalos, 315 SCRA 419, September 29, 1999

^[16]
Dumadag v. Lumaya, 334 SCRA 513, June 29, 2000, Arrieta v. Llosa, 346
Phil 932, November 28, 1997; NBI v. Reyes, 326 SCRA 109, February 21,
2000

^[17] Nakpil v. Valdes,
supra; Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93, January 28, 1998, Co v.
Bernardino, supra; Igual v. Javier, 324 Phil 698, March 7, 1996.

^[18] Radjaie v. Alovera, 337 SCRA 244, August 4, 2000

^[19] Supra

^[20] 337 SCRA 622, August 14, 2000

^[21] 366 SCRA 1, September 26, 2001