NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTO, IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND AS JUDICIAL GUARDIAN OF THE MINOR ANTONIO ALBERTO, JR. AND LOURDES ALBERTO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT…

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the August 31,
1968 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34750-R* entitled
“Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., thru his mother as his natural guardian, Andrea Jongco, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Natividad
del Rosario Vda. de Alberto,
in her individual capacity and as judicial guardian of the
minors, Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr., defendants-appellees“, reversing the August 10, 1964 Decision** of the then Court of First Instance of
Manila.

The case originated from a complaint for acknowledgment and
partition filed on September 8, 1960 with the then Court of First Instance of
Manila by the herein private respondent, a minor, 18 years of age, assisted by
his mother, Andrea Jongco, as his natural guardian,
against the herein petitioners (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-8).  In the said Complaint, private respondent
alleged, in substance, that in 1941 his alleged father, Antonio C. Alberto, and
his mother, Andrea Jongco, lived together as husband
and wife and as a result of which, he was born on September 10, 1942; that
during the time that his alleged father and mother lived together as husband
and wife and up to the time of his birth, both were single and had no legal
impediment to marry each other; that after his birth, his father and mother
continued living together as husband and wife, his father supporting them and
introducing him to the public as his natural child; that even the family of his
father recognized him as such; that on or about the year 1944, his father and
mother separated, and subsequently, his father married herein petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a result of the marriage,
two (2) children were born – herein petitioners Lourdes Alberto and Antonio
Alberto, Jr.; that although his father was separated from his mother, he
continued to support him and recognized him as his own child; that on July 3,
1949, his father died, and without notice to him, petitioner Natividad del Rosario Vda. de
Alberto, on July 17, 1949, instituted before the then Court of First Instance
of Manila an intestate proceedings for the estate of his deceased father,
docketed therein as Special Proceedings No. 9092; that in the said intestate
proceedings, petitioners deliberately omitted him as one of the heirs and for
this reason they succeeded in having the properties of his deceased father adjudicated and partitioned among themselves; that the said intestate
proceedings were terminated on November 9, 1953; that his father left
properties valued at P74,963.81, and accordingly, as a natural child of his
father, he is entitled to at least P18,000.00; and that he had absolutely no
previous knowledge of the intestate proceedings and came to know about it only
recently and thereupon made a demand from the petitioners who refused to give him his share.  Accordingly, he prays that the petitioners be
ordered to acknowledge him as the natural child of Antonio C. Alberto; that his
one-fourth share be turned over to him; and that petitioners be sentenced to
pay him the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fee and the cost of suit (Record
on Appeals, pp. 2-9).

On September 21, 1960, petitioners filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the cause of action is barred by
prior judgment; and (2) that the cause of action is also barred by the statute
of limitation (Ibid, pp. 9-19).  To this
motion, private respondents filed an opposition on October 22, 1960 (Ibid, pp. 20-58).

On November 11, 1960,
the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss
(Ibid, pp. 97-98).

On November 18, 1964,
petitioners filed their Answer to the Complaint (Ibid, pp. 98-102).

On November
23, 1964, private
respondent filed his Answer to Defendants’ Counterclaim (Ibid, pp.
102-104).  On August 10, 1964, the trial court rendered a decision in
favor of the petitioners (Ibid, pp. 104-123). 
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

“Considering all the foregoing, the Court orders the dismissal
of the complaint without pronouncement as to the costs.  The counterclaim is also dismissed.

SO ORDERED.”

Private respondent, not
satisfied with the decision, appealed to respondent Court, and in a Decision
promulgated on August 31, 1968 (Ibid, pp. 61-75), respondent Court reversed
the decision of the trial court.  The dispositive portion of the said Decision, reads:

“Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
set aside and another rendered declaring plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., an acknowledged Natural Child
of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto; declaring said plaintiff the owner pro indiviso of one-fifth (1/5) of the hereditary estate
of Antonio C. Alberto; and ordering the defendants to deliver to plaintiff
Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., his one-fifth (1/5) share in said estate, subject to
the usufructuary rights of defendants Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto pursuant to Articles 834 of the Old Civil Code,
and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.”

On September
24, 1968, petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was
denied in a Resolution dated October 14, 1968 (Rollo, p.
77).  Hence, the
instant petition.

This Court, in a
resolution dated November 27, 1968, resolved to give due course to the petition
(Rollo, p. 91).

Petitioners assigned the
following errors:

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (TRIAL COURT) HAD NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE.

II

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.’S CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.

III

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.’S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD NOT YET PRESCRIBED.

IV

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., IN
NOT BRINGING THE INSTANT ACTION FOR AN UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME, WAS GUILTY
OF LACHES.

V

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN
REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT BY BASING ITS JUDGMENT ON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF ANDREA JONGCO
AND OTHER WITNESSES OF RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., DESPITE THE SERIOUS
CONTRADICTIONS, INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES AS
FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT AND CATEGORICALLY STATED IN ITS DECISION.

VI

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GROSS ERROR OF LAW AND A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY DISREGARDED PETITIONERS’ EVIDENCE.

VII

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT
ALBERTO, JR., WAS AN ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF THE DECEASED ALBERTO AND IN
DECLARING HIM OWNER PRO-INDIVISO OF ONE-FIFTH OF THE HEREDITARY ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED.

I.

It is the contention of
petitioners that inasmuch as the instant case was filed on September 8, 1960,
almost five (5) years after the enactment of R.A. No. 1401 – creating the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the questions of paternity and
acknowledgment fall beyond the jurisdictional pale of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and instead comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. 
While petitioners admitted that this objection to lack of jurisdiction by the Court of First Instance of Manila over the
subject matter of the present action had not been raised either in the said
court or in the Court of Appeals and is brought to this Court for resolution
for the first time on appeal, they contend that a party may object
to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action at any
stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal since lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter cannot be waived.  Such contention is untenable.

This Court has already
ruled that the question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court cannot be
raised on appeal (Dalman vs. City Court of Dipolog City, Branch II, 134 SCRA 243 [1985]).  Besides, a party who had voluntarily
participated in the trial, like the herein petitioners, cannot later on raise
the issue of the court’s lack of jurisdiction (Philippine
National Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 299 [1986]; Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470 [1984];
Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy,
23 SCRA 29 [1968]).  Moreover, there are
no more Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts today.  Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the functions of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court have been transferred to the Regional Trial Courts (Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo, 143
SCRA 356 [1986]).

II.

Petitioners alleged that
the intestate proceedings for the settlement of estate of the deceased Antonio
C. Alberto (Special Proceedings No. 9092) had already been terminated on
November 9, 1953 by the order of distribution directing the delivery of the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto and that in said
proceedings the court also declared who are the heirs of the deceased.  Consequently, the instant case which seeks to
secure the recognition of Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. as an acknowledged natural
child of the deceased in order to establish his rights to the inheritance is
already barred by prior judgment (Petitioners’ Brief, p. 47) despite private
respondent’s insistence that he had no knowledge or notice of the intestate
proceedings of his alleged natural father (Record on Appeal, p. 21).

Petitioners’ submission
is impressed with merit.

This Court has invariably
ruled that insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent’s estate are both proceedings in rem
which are binding against the whole world. 
All persons having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they
were notified or not, are equally bound (Philippine Savings Bank vs. Lantin, 124 SCRA 483 [1983]).  The court acquires jurisdiction over all
persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed x x x and any order that may be entered therein is
binding against all of them (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, 89
Phil. 741 [1951] citing in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156).  It was ruled further that a final order of
distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees;
and that the only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may
have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable
to negligence.  Even then, the better
practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within
the reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of which, if
successful, would be, as in the instant case,
for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and
executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramon
vs. Ortuzar, supra; Santos vs. Roman Catholic
Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45
Phil. 895).

III.

As to the issue of prescription, the Civil Code
of the Philippines clearly provides:

“Art. 1100. 
The action for rescission on account of lesion shall prescribe
after four years from the time the partition was made.”

Intestate proceedings
were terminated as alleged in the complaint itself on November
9, 1953 so that said
four years prescriptive period expired on November 9, 1957. 
Hence, the present action filed on September 8, 1960 and which has for one of its objects the
rescission of the agreement of partition among the petitioners, as approved by
the intestate court, is already barred by prescription.

That an action for
rescission is also the proper action in case of an alleged preterition
of a compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith or fraud of the other
persons interested, which is what the complaint in this case alleges in
substance, is indicated in Article 1104 of the Civil Code as follows:

“Art. 1104. 
A partition made with preterition of
any of the compulsory heirs shall not
be rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part
of the other persons interested; x x x.”

It has also been ruled by this Court that the four years period
provided in Article 1100 of the Civil Code (formerly Art. 1076 of the old Civil
Code) should commence to run from the approval of the agreement of partition by
the Court (Samson vs. Araneta, 60 Phil. 27, 36).  Thus, in the case at bar, it is evident that the action to rescind the Agreement of
Partition which was approved by the Court on November 9, 1953, had already
prescribed when respondent filed the complaint in the case at bar on September
8, 1960.

While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners
does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized (Art.
494, Civil Code), petitioners herein had never recognized respondent as a
co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly.  Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of
action for partition of property owned in common (Art. 494) does not apply to
the case at bar.

Moreover, private respondent cannot claim exemption from the
effects of prescription on the
plea of minority under the New Civil Code which provides:

“Art. 1108. 
Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against:

(1)  Minors and other
incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or other legal
representatives;

x x x                 x x x                 x x x“

Respondent Alberto, Jr.
who has a living parent, his mother, Andrea Jongco,
who in fact filed the complaint in the case at bar for him, falls squarely under the above-cited provision.

Granting arguendo that
respondent is a natural child of the deceased Antonio
Alberto, Sr., the action for recognition of natural child may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parent. 
And if the presumed father or mother died during the minority of the
child, the latter may file the action within four (4) years from the attainment
of majority (Art. 285 [1]).  However, if
the minor has a guardian as in this case, prescription runs against him even
during minority (Wenzel, etc., et al. vs. Surigao
Consolidated Mining, Inc., 108 Phil. 530 [1960]).  In such case, the action for recognition must
be instituted within four (4) years after the death of the natural father (Magallanes, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 95 Phil. 795 [1954]).  Antonio C.
Alberto, Sr., the alleged father, died on July 3, 1949.  The
complaint for acknowledgment and partition was filed eleven (11) years later,
on September 8, 1960.  Hence, prescription had set
in.

Neither can it be claimed
that the present action is in substance one for recovery of property in order to avoid the consequences
of prescription, for as correctly stated by the petitioners, to be entitled to
the recovery of the property from the estate. 
Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the partition and distribution approved by the intestate proceedings,
otherwise, the recovery of any property from the petitioners is not
possible.  Be that as it may, such
partition can no longer be rescinded having been already barred by the Statute
of Limitations.

Furthermore, even
granting that Article 1104 of the Civil Code does not apply and there is an injury to the rights of plaintiff, this action would
still not prosper under Articles 1146 and 1149 of the same Code
which provide that the action must be brought within four
and five years, respectively, from the time the right of action
accrues.

IV.

Petitioners’ claim of laches is likewise tenable. 
The trial court in its findings clearly and
unmistakably declared that respondent Alberto, Jr. is guilty of laches as follows:

“About 1944, Andrea Jongco said she
learned of Antonio Alberto’s marriage to Natividad del Rosario.  Yet, she
took no steps to protect the
interests of her child, Antonio, although she was already confronted with the incontrovertible proof of Antonio’s
infidelity and the hallowness of his promises.

“It might be that Andrea Jongco was
then relying on Antonio Alberto’s not denying that Alberto, Jr. was his child,
if such was the case.  If
this was so, however, how can we explain
her inaction even after the death of Antonio Alberto in 1949, or until September 8, 1960, when she filed this action, Andrea kept silent, took
no action to have her child recognized as the son of the alleged father.  Her laches, as well
as the inherent improbabilities in her testimony
rendered it unworthy of belief.

“x x x It
is evident that the plaintiff’s case is adversely affected by his long delay in bringing this
action.  ‘Undue delay in the separate enforcement of a right is
strongly persuasive of lack of merit in this claim, since it is human nature
for a person to assert his rights most strongly when they are threatened or
invaded.’ (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435-440).” (Record on Appeal, pp. 108-109).

This Court has
consistently declared that laches is the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.  The negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warrants a
presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 [1985]; Tejido
vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78 [1985]; De Castro vs. Tan,
129 SCRA 85 [1984]; Medija vs. Patcho, 132 SCRA 540 [1984]; Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Phil.,
133 SCRA 800 [1984]; Gumonpin vs. CA, 120 SCRA 687 [1983]).

As pointed out by the trial court, there appears to be no
explanation for the surprising delay in the filing of the complaint in the case
at bar except perhaps, the fact that during the lifetime of the deceased
Antonio Alberto, private respondents were receiving support until the latter
died in 1949; but thereafter, they allowed more than ten years to elapse or
until September 8, 1960 before they filed the present action to assert their
rights despite Andrea Jongco’s allegation that they
stopped receiving support after Alberto, Sr.’s death.

On the other hand, there is merit in petitioners’ allegations
that such delay is prejudicial to
them.  Private respondents could have
filed the action in 1944 when Andrea Jongco learned
of the marriage of the deceased with petitioner Natividad
del Rosario instead of waiting for 16 years when the
supposed father’s lips had been sealed by death and possible witnesses like Antonio Alberto, Sr.’s mother had
become too old to give coherent testimony.

On this point, the Supreme Court ruled:

“The assertion of doubtful claims, after long delay, cannot be favored by the
courts.  Time inevitably tends to obliterate occurrences from the memory
of witnesses, and even where the recollection appears to be entirely clear, the true clue to the solution
of a case may be hopelessly lost. 
These considerations
constitute one of the pillars of the doctrine long familiar in equity
jurisprudence to the effect that laches or
unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is
not only persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances,
be destructive of the right itself.  Vigilantibus non dormientibus
equites subvenit.“ (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435, reiterated in Edralin
vs. Edralin, 1 SCRA 227 [1961]).

The other explanation
might have been the minority of Antonio Alberto, Jr. at the time of his
supposed father’s death.  But
such explanation as discussed earlier is unavailing even in case of
prescription under Article 1108 of the Civil Code where minority does not stop
the running of the prescriptive period for minors who have parents, guardians
or legal representatives.

Thus, it is well
established that “The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and
not those who sleep when the law requires them to act (Cui and Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil. 606, 610; Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co. vs. Villaluz, Sept. 29, 1951, 90 Phil.
154).  “The law does not encourage laches, indifference, negligence or ignorance.  On the contrary, for a party to deserve the
considerations of the courts, he x x x
must show that he is not guilty
of any of the aforesaid failings (Samson vs. Yatco,
August 28, 1958; 104 Phil. 378).

V.

Finally on the merits of
this case, petitioners would have this Court review and reverse the conclusions
of fact of the Court of Appeals.  As a general rule, this is a function this Court does not undertake. 
The established principle is that the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are final and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court; except:  (1) when the conclusion is grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
Court in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case, and the same
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (6) when the findings of the Appellate Court are
contrary to those of the trial court; (7) when the findings are without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Manlapaz
vs. C.A., 147 SCRA 238-239 [1987]; Guita vs. C.A.,
139 SCRA 576 [1985]; Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan,
147 SCRA 593 [1986]).

It is readily evident
that this case falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the
rule, specifically that the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to
those of the trial court.

At the trial, the lower
court in evaluating the evidence presented by the complainants is of the view
that the testimony alone of Andrea Jongco is
sufficient to totally discredit not only her testimony but also her entire
case.  Aside from being inherently
improbable and the merit of her claim being adversely affected by her testimony and her long delay in bringing action, her
testimony is contradicted by the testimonies of Jose, Zoilo
and Pilar who are brothers and sister of the deceased
Antonio Alberto and who have no pecuniary interest whatsoever in the outcome of
the controversy.  They testified that
during the period Andrea Jongco claimed that Antonio
Alberto, Sr. lived with her, the deceased in fact lived with his mother and
brothers at the family residence except for his brief stint with the
army (Decision, Civil Case No. 44164; Record on appeal, pp. 111-112).

More than that, the trial court found among others, that Andrea Jongco has had five children (aside from her son Antonio)
with four different men.  The assumption,
therefore, is that she lived with at least four different men without being
married to any of them.  Thus, the trial court aptly ruled that
“This propensity to promiscuous relationship with different men, render it
unjust to state with definiteness that any particular person is the father of any one of her children.” (Ibid,
p. 121).

Other witnesses are Eufracia Cailan who allegedly
took care of Antonio, the father, since the latter was a child and then of
Antonio, the alleged son, and Encarnacion Peralta, an
alleged former lessor of Andrea Jongco
and Antonio Alberto.  Their testimonies
were, however, found by the trial court to be inherently improbable,
inconsistent with human experience and deliberately invented to conform with the testimony of Andrea Jongco
(Ibid, pp. 109-117).

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in its decision gave more
credence to the testimonies of Eufracia Cailan and Encarnacion Peralta
and declared that their testimonies have sufficiently established the fact that
Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. is the son of the late Antonio C. Alberto and Andrea Jongco which finds further proof in the birth certificate
and the baptismal certificate of Alberto, Jr., (Rollo,
pp. 6-11).

In this connection, it must be stated that in the case of Reyes
vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 (1985), this Court, citing the cases of Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53; People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349; Cid vs. Burnaman, 24
SCRA 434; Vudaurrazaga vs. C.A., 91 Phil. 492; and
Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135, ruled that a
birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in
the instant case, is not competent evidence of paternity.

In casting doubt upon the
credibility of petitioner Natividad’s testimony, the
Court of Appeals pointed out her
serious inconsistency on material points such as her claim that she was married
to the deceased in 1941 and her later admission in the answer that they were
married in 1944.

The record shows,
however, that both admissions were correct, the first marriage was a
secret civil marriage celebrated in Pililla, Rizal while the second was a religious ratification of the
former.  The lack of marriage certificate
as evidence was also considered by the Court of Appeals as an impairment of credibility
despite a certification to the effect that all pre-war records in the Municipality
of Pililla Rizal
were destroyed during the last war.  Said
Appellate Court is of the view that if they did plan to marry secretly at that
time, they could have chosen a city or municipality near Manila and that Pililla must have been chosen as the place of the supposed
marriage so that petitioners could have an apparent good reason for the
non-presentation of the marriage certificate.

As aptly argued by the
petitioners, such conclusion is purely
conjectural.  Besides petitioners’
reasons for the choice of that place,
the celebration of the marriage was positively confirmed by Damaso Herrera, one
of the sponsors thereof.

In any event, it is a fundamental rule that conclusions and
findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and
should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial
court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case (People vs.
Pimentel, 147 SCRA 29, 30 [1987]; People vs. Grefiel,
125 SCRA 108 [1983]; Chase vs. Buencamino, 136 SCRA
381 [1985]; People vs. Fernandez, 124 SCRA 248 [1983]; Olangco
vs. C.F.I. of Misamis Oriental, 121 SCRA 338 [1983]; Minuchechi vs. C.A., 129 SCRA 479 [1984]).

After a careful review of the records and the evidence presented
by the contending parties, no cogent reasons could be found to justify the
reversal of the findings of the trial court.

In view of the foregoing, there appears to be no need to discuss
the last two assignments of errors.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby Reversed and the decision of the trial court is Reinstated.  No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Gutierrez,
Jr., Feliciano, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

* Penned by Justice Carmelino J. Alvendia and concurred in by Justices Julio Villamor and Ruperto G. Martin.

** Penned by
Judge Francisco Arca.