DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE (PHILIPPINES), INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND JERSON R. VISTAL, RESPONDENTS.
SANTOS, J.:[1]
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, a new judgment is rendered declaring the dismissal from employment of complainant Jerson R. Vistal illegal and thus ordering respondent Del Monte Fresh Produce (Phil.), Inc. to immediately reinstate complainant Vistal to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to pay him backwages from the date he was dismissed on April 1, 2011 until his actual reinstatement plus ten percent (10%) of the amount thereof as attorney’s fees, subject to computation by the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin during the execution proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[6]
A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the NLRC in the assailed Resolution.
The Antecedents
Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines and an affiliate of Del Monte International GmbH (DMI GmbH). Petitioner is engaged in the business of providing coordination services for DMI GmbH and technical assistance and inspection services to the latter’s exclusive fruit growers. Specifically, petitioner administers the supply of packaging materials, including IFCO crates, pursuant to the exclusive production agreements between DMI GmbH and its growers.
Private respondent Jerson R. Vistal worked for petitioner as Logistics Assistant from 13 April 2009 until he was dismissed on 1 April 2011.
As Logistics Assistant, private respondent was tasked to perform the following functions as outlined in his job description:
- Receives and reviews Packaging Materials delivery requests of growers;
- Prepares Loading Guides as basis for the Forklift Operator in loading Packaging Materials for issuance to the farms;
- Coordinates and Monitors the delivery of KDs and OPMs to the different farms and prepares Confirmation Reports upon receipt;
- Prepares Monthly Summary of PMIS, Plastic Crates Monitoring, and the QMS reports on the timeliness and accuracy of Delivery of PMs;
- Gathers the balances per farm for the weekly balance report;
- Implements related operational control procedures as defined in the QMS Documentation.[7]
On 22 February 2011, petitioner issued a Notice to Explain with Notice of Preventive Suspension8 directing private respondent to submit his written explanation regarding the alleged loss of IFCO crates withdrawn from San Vicente Terminal and Brokerage Services, Inc. (SVT) located at Panabo Wharf. In response to the 22 February 2011 Notice, private respondent submitted his written explanation9 on 28 February 2011.
On 21 March 2011, an administrative hearing was conducted whereby private respondent was given the opportunity to further explain his side.[10]
Then, on 24 March 2011, petitioner placed private respondent on payroll reinstatement pending the resolution of the administrative investigation.[11]
On 29 March 2011, petitioner issued another Notice to Explain in Writing[12] directing private respondent to submit an explanation regarding the following acts allegedly committed by the latter:
1. Removal and destruction of SVT D.R. Nos. 36118 and 36124 from the October 2010 SVT D.R booklet on November 2, 2010;
2. Giving false information on the nature of purchase of [respondent’s] Motorcycle – Suzuki Raider 150 R acquired last October 11, 2010 and which [respondent] allegedly bought via installment plan.
3. Releasing a loading guide to Ranny Ando and his helper in the evening of October 1, 2010 without corresponding PMIS for said withdrawal.[13]
On 31 March 2011, private respondent submitted his written explanation[14] in response to the 29 March 2011 Notice.
Subsequently, on 1 April 2011, petitioner issued a Notice of Disciplinary Action[15] dismissing private respondent from his employment on the ground of serious misconduct.
Thus, on 10 May 2011, private respondent filed a Complaint[16] for illegal dismissal, money claims for unpaid wages during reinstatement period, damages, and attorney’s fees against petitioner Del Monte and/or its General Manager, Guido Bellavita, before the Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI, Davao City.
After the parties submitted their respective position papers and documentary evidence, the case was submitted for decision by the Labor Arbiter.
Thereafter, on 27 October 2011, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing private respondent’s Complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that private respondent was accorded ample opportunity to defend himself against the charges against him.[17] The Labor Arbiter then ruled that private respondent was legally dismissed by petitioner, to wit:
In the case at bar, complainant was not able to convincingly explain the loss of at least 13,000 IFCO crates and the removal of delivery receipts resulting in the falsification of his reports. As Logistic[s] Assistant, his position is imbued with trust and confidence as he is entrusted with the custody of packaging materials used in the transport of bananas. It should be noted that complainant’s main task is to issue loading guides which are necessary for the release of such crates. The investigation conducted ultimately resulted to the findings that complainant was involved in the pilferage of 4,500 crates withdrawn on October 1, 2010 which loading guide was issued to Ranny Ando, duly entered in the security logbook but not received by any personnel in the Del Monte warehouse. Likewise, records show that he deliberately removed from the booklet of SVT Delivery Receipt No. 36118 and 36124 which involved withdrawal of 4,500 and 4,000 IFCO crates which resulted to a cover-up in his reports x x x. Hence there was sufficient basis or substantial evidence for respondent to dismiss complainant from service due to serious misconduct.[18]
Aggrieved with the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, petitioner filed an appeal before the NLRC.
After due proceedings, the NLRC rendered the assailed Decision dated 29 June 2012 setting aside the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and finding private respondent to have been illegally dismissed by petitioner. The NLRC ratiocinated as follows:
From the preceding discussion, the dearth of convincing evidence on record constitutes serious doubt as to the factual basis of the charge that complainant committed serious misconduct through stealing of the IFCO crates. This doubt is resolved in favor of complainant in line with the policy under the labor (sic) and construe doubts in favor of labor. The consistent rule is that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the [employer] and the employee, the scales of justice must be titled in favor of the latter. For having failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that complainant committed the offense constitutive of serious misconduct, we find that respondent company dismissed complainant without just cause. Consequently, the termination of his employment was illegal.[19]
Petitioner now comes before this Court in this petition for certiorari.
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues in this petition:
I.
Whether or not public respondent gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision by disregarding crucial evidence presented by Del Monte to support Vistal’s dismissal and by seeing more to the evidence presented by Vistal.
II.
Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the Decision of the Labor Arbiter by requiring “clear and convincing evidence” to justify the dismissal of Vistal.
III.
Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Del Monte’s Motion for Reconsideration without touching upon the grounds raised therein.[20]
This Court’s Ruling
This Court shall first deal with the procedural issue raised by private respondent in his Comment.[21] Private respondent argues that the instant Petition for certiorari is unauthorized for lack of a board resolution authorizing Rossana C. Calingin, the Senior Manager for Human Resources of petitioner, to sign the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping attached in the petition.[22]
There is no question that where the petitioner is a corporation, the certification against forum shopping should be signed by its duly authorized director or representative.[23]
In this case, attached in the petition is the Secretary’s Certificate[24] showing that Rossana C. Calingin has been appointed as the duly authorized representative of petitioner.
Contrary to the unfounded assertion of private respondent, the Secretary’s Certificate constitutes sufficient proof that Rossana C. Calingin was duly authorized to represent petitioner and to sign the verification and certification in its behalf.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that certain officials or employees of a corporation can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution, such as: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.[25]
This Court finds that Rossana C. Calingin, in her capacity as the Senior Manager for Human Resources of petitioner, clearly falls under the above class of officers and, as such, is deemed to be in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition. Thus, the submission of a Board Resolution authorizing Ms. Calingin to sign the verification and certification is no longer necessary in this case.
That issue having been settled, this Court shall now proceed with the merits of the petition.
In illegal dismissal cases, the fundamental rule is that the employer must comply with both substantive and procedural due process.[26]
Procedural due process means that the employer must observe the twin requirements of notice and hearing before a dismissal can be effected.[27] The Supreme Court has ruled:
Procedural due process in dismissal cases consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second notice informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. Before the issuance of the second notice, the requirement of a hearing must be complied with by giving the worker an opportunity to be heard. It is not necessary that an actual hearing be conducted.[28]
In this case, petitioner issued a Notice to Explain with Notice of Preventive Suspension[29] dated 22 February 2011, informing the private respondent of the charges against him and directing him to submit his written explanation regarding the said charges. Thereafter, an administrative hearing was conducted on 21 March 2011 where private respondent was able to present his defense.[30] On 29 March 2011, petitioner issued another Notice to Explain in Writing[31] which informed private respondent of the additional charges against him and again directing private respondent to submit his written explanation thereto. After the investigation, petitioner issued a Notice of Disciplinary Action[32] dated 1 April 2011 dismissing private respondent from his employment on the ground of serious misconduct.
As regards private respondents claim that petitioner refused to reveal the identity of its witness, this Court finds nothing in the records to show that private respondent demanded the same from petitioner.
Based on the foregoing, there can be no doubt that private respondent was given ample opportunity to defend himself. It is clear, therefore, that petitioner sufficiently complied with the requirements of procedural due process in the case at bar.
This Court shall now determine whether petitioner complied with the requirements of substantive due process in dismissing private respondent.
Substantive due process requires that the dismissal must be pursuant to either a just or an authorized cause under Articles 282, 283, or 284 of the Labor Code.[33]
At the onset, it is worth noting that in illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer to show that the dismissal of the employee is for a just and valid cause.[34] As the Supreme Court has ruled, “the employer’s case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not the weakness of that adduced by the employee, in keeping with the principle that the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the latter in case of doubt in the evidence presented by them.”[35]
It must be stressed, however, that the quantum of proof required in determining the legality of the employee’s dismissal is only substantial evidence.[36] Substantial evidence has been described has more than a mere scintilla of evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.[37]
In the case at bar, the NLRC ruled:
x x x For having failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that complainant committed the offense constitutive of serious misconduct, we find that respondent company dismissed complainant without just cause. Consequently, the termination of his employment was illegal.[38]
Clearly, the NLRC erred when it used the standard of “clear and convincing evidence” in determining the legality of private respondent’s dismissal.
In the case of Sps. Manalo v. Hon. Nieves Roldan-Confesor,[39] the Supreme Court discussed the difference between “clear and convincing evidence” and “substantial evidence” in this wise:
Clear and convincing proof is “… more than mere preponderance, but not to extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases …” while substantial evidence “… consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance….” Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, We find proof beyond reasonable doubt at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that order.[40]
Further, in the case of PAL v. Tongson,[41] the Supreme Court ruled:
Well-entrenched is the rule that “substantial proof, and not clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient as basis for the imposition of any disciplinary action upon the employee. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his position.”[42]
Thus, the question to be resolved is whether petitioner was able to prove the charges against private respondent by substantial evidence.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
Article 282 of the Labor Code provides for the just causes for termination of an employee, to wit:
Article 282. Termination by employer.- An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
In the instant case, private respondent was dismissed on the ground of serious misconduct for his alleged participation in the loss of at least 13,000 IFCO crates withdrawn from the SVT Wharf and his act of removing delivery receipts from the SVT booklet of receipts which resulted in the falsification of his reports.
The Supreme Court has defined the ground of serious misconduct as follows:
x x x Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. Such misconduct, however serious, must nevertheless be in connection with the employee’s work to constitute just cause for his separation. Thus, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and (c) it must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.[43]
This Court finds that there is substantial evidence to establish the loss of at least 13,000 IFCO crates withdrawn from SVT on the month of October 2010 and private respondent’s involvement therein which justifies his dismissal on the ground of serious misconduct.
The missing IFCO crates were covered by the following Delivery Receipts:
1. DR No. 35962 – 4,500 IFCO crates[44]
2. DR No. 36118 – 4,000 IFCO crates[45]
3. DR No. 36124 – 4,500 IFCO crates[46]
The evidence on record shows that on 1 October 2010, private respondent issued two (2) Loading Guides, one for the withdrawal of 4,000 IFCO crates covered by DR No. 35961[47] and another for the withdrawal of 4,500 IFCO crates covered by DR No. 35962. Truck driver Ranie Ando confirmed the issuance to him of the Loading Guide for the withdrawal of the 4,500 IFCO crates covered under DR No. 35962 from SVT.[48] However, private respondent only accounted for or recorded the delivery of the 4,000 IFCO crates covered by DR No. 35961. Thus, it appears that the said 4,500 IFCO crates withdrawn from SVT under DR No. 35962 were not delivered to petitioner’s warehouse.[49] Private respondent’s Report[50] for the month of October 2010 shows that no delivery of 4,500 IFCO crates was made on 1 October 2010 in accordance with Delivery Receipt No. 35962.
With respect to DR No. 36118 and 36124, private respondent Vistal issued Loading Guides to drivers Ranie Ando[51] and Dante Impuesto[52] to withdraw a total of 8,500 IFCO crates from SVT. The said delivery receipts were then issued by SVT upon the withdrawal of the IFCO crates. However, the evidence submitted by petitioner shows that said 8,500 IFCO crates were not delivered to petitioner’s warehouse after they were withdrawn from SVT.[53] This is confirmed by the fact that the said deliveries were likewise excluded from private respondent’s October 2010 Report.[54]
Private respondent further posits that the reason for the exclusion of the said transactions from his October 2010 Report is due to the fact that the corresponding delivery receipts were in the possession of Arnel Matais, the forklift operator of petitioner.
Such allegation fails to convince this Court.
For one, this claim by private respondent is uncorroborated by any other evidence. Also, it must be noted that part of private respondent’s duties as Logistics Assistant was to coordinate and monitor the supply and delivery of packaging materials to petitioner’s growers.[55] In other words, it was private respondent’s duty to ensure that the IFCO crates withdrawn pursuant to the Loading Guides he issued would be properly delivered to petitioner’s warehouse and eventually to the growers. After private respondent issued the Loading Guides for the withdrawal of the 13,000 IFCO crates, it was his subsequent duty to ensure that the delivery of the said IFCO crates were properly recorded and to ensure that the said IFCO crates were all accounted for. Thus, it is hard to believe that the deliveries made on October 1, 27, and 28, 2010 were simply excluded by private respondent from his Report because the delivery receipts were in the possession of the forklift operator.
Lastly, the Affidavits of Arthur C. Tangkilan[56] and Arnel C. Matais[57] categorically established private respondent’s act of removing DR Nos. 36118 and 36124 from the SVT booklet. Private respondent’s act of removing the delivery receipts suggests that he attempted to conceal the fact that IFCO crates were withdrawn from SVT on the aforementioned dates but were not thereafter delivered to petitioner’s warehouse.
The aforementioned pieces of evidence show that a total of 13,000 IFCO crates withdrawn from SVT on the month of October 2010 in accordance with loading guides issued by private respondent remained unaccounted for.
To this Court’s mind, the circumstances surrounding the loss of the IFCO crates and the act of private respondent in attempting to conceal the same by deliberately removing the corresponding delivery receipts clearly show that private respondent was guilty of serious misconduct in the performance of his duties which justifies his dismissal from employment. Taking into consideration private respondent’s duties and functions as Logistics Assistant, there can be no doubt that his acts rendered him unfit to continue working for petitioner.
All told, this Court finds that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in setting aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and ruling that private respondent was illegally dismissed by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 29 June 2012 and the assailed Resolution dated 29 November 2012 issued by the NLRC are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 27 October 2011 rendered by the Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI, Davao City in NLRC RAB XI-05-00286-11 finding private respondent to have been validly dismissed by petitioner is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[*]Borja, J., Acting Ch., and Contreras, JJ., concur.
[*] vice J. Lloren per raffle dated 04 February 2015.
[1] The case was unloaded to the undersigned ponente pursuant to Office Order No. 03-14-SMBP dated April 1, 2014 as part of his initial caseload.
[2] Rollo, pp. 2-54.
[3] Rollo, pp. 62-68.
[4] Rollo, pp. 70-71.
[5] Rollo, pp. 208-211.
[6] Rollo, p. 67.
[7] Rollo, p. 100.
[8] Rollo, pp. 103-104.
[9] Rollo, pp. 105-106.
[10] Rollo, pp. 108-111.
[11] Rollo, p. 113.
[12] Rollo, pp. 114.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Rollo, p. 115.
[15] Rollo, pp. 116-118.
[16] Rollo, p. 72.
[17] Rollo, pp. 209-210.
[18] Rollo, p. 210.
[19] Rollo, pp. 66-67.
[20] Rollo, p. 19.
[21] Rollo, pp. 282-291.
[22] Rollo, p. 55.
[23] Art Fuentebella and Rolling Hills Memorial Park, Inc. v. Darlica Castro, G.R. No. 150865, 30 June 2006.
[24] Rollo, pp. 58-59.
[25] Cebu Metro Pharmacy, Inc. v. Euro-Med Laboratories, Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 164757, 18 October 2010.
[26] Jonathan I. Sang-an v. Equator Knights Detective and Security Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 173189, 13 February 2013.
[27] Pono v. NLRC, 341 Phil. 615, 620-621 (1997).
[28] Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and Skippers Maritime Services, Inc., Ltd. v. Nathaniel Doza, et al., G.R. No. 175558, 8 February 2012.
[29] Rollo, pp. 103-104.
[30] Rollo, pp. 108-111.
[31] Rollo, pp. 114.
[32] Rollo, pp. 116-118.
[33] ALPS Transportation and/or Alfredo E. Perez v. Elpidio M. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 186732, 13 June 2013 citing Pascua v. NLRC, 351 Phil. 48, 62 (1998).
[34] Functional, Inc. v. Samuel C. Granfil, G.R. No. 176377, 16 November 2011.
[35] Ibid.
[36] PLDT v. Tiamson, G.R. Nos. 164684-85, 11 November 2005.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Rollo, p. 67.
[39] G.R. No. 102358, 19 November 1992.
[40] Ibid.
[41] G.R. No. 153157, 14 October 2003.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Nissan Motors Phils., Inc., v. Victorino Angelo, G.R. No. 164181, 14 September 2011.
[44] Rollo, p. 119.
[45] Rollo, p. 132.
[46] Rollo, p. 133.
[47] Private Respondent’s Summary of Growers Return for the month of October 2010, Rollo, p. 123.
[48] Interview of Rannie Ando, Rollo, p. 156; Affidavit of Rony N. Bejel, Rollo, p. 120.
[49] Joint-Affidavit of Rony M. Bejel, Jochim C. Palapan, and Reynaldo R. Galvadores, Rollo, p. 179.
[50] Rollo, pp. 123-127.
[51] Affidavit of Ranie R. Ando, Rollo, p. 157.
[52] Affidavit of Dante V. Impuesto, Rollo, p. 158.
[53] Supra, note 49.
[54] Supra, note 50.
[55] Rollo, p. 100.
[56] Rollo, p. 128.
[57] Rollo, p. 129.