MAMERTO IRIOLA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. SILVERIO FELICES, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

This is an appeal by the above-named plaintiff-appellant, Mamerto Iriola, from an order of
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch I, in a suit for the declaration of ownership
and reconveyance of a parcel of land against the
defendant-appellee, Silverio
Felices, and docketed as Civil Case No. 2667,
ordering the said plaintiff-appellant to stop, in the course of a trial, from
presenting evidence of ownership over the contested land on the ground of estoppel.

The complaint that the plaintiff-appellant filed with the court a
quo on 2 June 1954 alleges ownership and actual, quiet, peaceful,
public, continuous and adverse possession for more than ten years by him and
his predecessors-in-interest of a parcel of land, which is described in
paragraph 2 of the complaint, as follows:

“A parcel of land located in the Barrio of Bagong
Sirang, Pili, Camarines Sur, bounded on the
North, before, Fulgencio Moreno now, Mariano
Rodriguez; on the East by Himaano River; on the South
by Silverio Polices before, now Mamerto
Iriola; and on the West by Silverio
Felices before, now Teodora
Casano or Igmidio Casano.  Area:  2 has., 11 ares and 50 centares.  Declared wider Tax No. 3937
in the name of Mamerto Iriola.” (R. A., page 2);

that “on or about 25 February
1949” the defendant obtained a home­stead patent, covered by Certificate
of Title No. 104 of the Province of Camarines Sur, for an 8-hectare-and-28-are parcel of land, which
parcel of land included the first-described parcel of land; and that the
defendant, after having fraudulently secured the said certificate of title, is
now attempting to assert ownership over the said first-described smaller
parcel, “the same being on the northwestern part of the land covered by
the patent”.  Plaintiff prayed for
judgment, declaring him as the owner of the first-described smaller parcel of
land and ordering the defendant to execute a deed of reconveyance.

The defendant filed, on 23
June 1954, his answer to the complaint, with affirmative defenses
and counterclaim.  He denied the
plaintiff’s allegations of ownership and possession and alleged, among several
other allegations, that he is the registered owner of the whole parcel of land
which includes the smaller one as an integral part; that the defendant
“was in the exclusive possession of the parcel of land covered by the said
O. C. T. No. 104, including the portion thereof described under paragraph 2 of
the complaint, until 24 February 1949 when the defendant conditionally sold to
the plaintiff a portion of the aforesaid property covered by the said O. C. T.
No. 104 but instead of taking possession of the portion thus conditionally sold
to him, the plaintiff unlawfully took possession also of the parcel of land
described in the complaint”; that his title is incontrovertible; that
“plaintiff is estopped from asserting
title” to the contested portion of land” as he knew that such portion
forms part of the registered bigger parcel of land” and the defendant
“delivered to the plaintiff the owner’s dupli­cate of said O. C. T. No.
104”; that although on 24 February 1949 the defendant sold to the plaintiff,
subject to the defendant’s right to repurchase, only a portion of four and
one-fourth (4 1/4) hectares of the land covered by the title, the plaintiff
took possession of more than seven hectares and thus deprived the defendant of
the possession of more than 3 hectares. 
This 3-hectare portion is described in the answer with counterclaim, as
follows:

“North –  the remainder of the property of the de­fendant,
Silverio Felices;

East   –  by
the Himaano river;

South –  by the property of the heirs of Felipe Felices; and

West
–   by the Lagundi
Creek.” (R. A., page 9)

The defendant prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint and for the plaintiff to vacate the portion of 3 hectares.

Plaintiff Iriola answered, on 26 June 1954, the counterclaim with
denials and alleged that the portion of 3 hectares that the defendant claims to
have been deprived of is the very land which is the subject-matter of his
complaint.

About a year after the defendant had filed his answer and counterclaim,
he filed, on 20 June 1955,
a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of cause of action and
estoppel by the plaintiff from claiming ownership (R.
A., page 15).  The plaintiff objected to
the motion, to which the defendant interposed a reply, filed on 9 July 1955.  Annexed to this reply was a “Deed of Conditional
Sale”, purportedly executed on 24 February 1949 by the defendant in favor
of the plaintiff, of a parcel of land with an area of four and one-fourth (4
1/4) hectares which is an integral part of the land described in Homestead
Patent No. V2117, issued on 26 January 1949.  One of the
paragraphs of this deed states that the vendor has been in continuous
possession of the land “since 1921 up to the present”; another
paragraph states that the vendee, Mamerto Iriola, agrees to all and every stipulation or condition
stated in the deed.  Both vendor and
vendee signed the deed.

On 18 July 1955,
plaintiff Iriola filed an “Answer to
Reply”.  In this pleading, he
admitted that the title of the land is in the name of the defendant and that
the land in question is included in the titled land; that although he was in
possession of the certificate of title on 24 February 1949 he denied “actual knowledge that the
land in question was in­cluded in the title”.  (R. A., pages 44-45)

On 19 July 1955,
the lower court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss (R. A., pages
45-46).

On 11 February 1957, defendant Felices,
together with a certain Cecilia Nelayan, who does not
appear to be a party in the case
(Civil Case No. 2667), again filed a motion to dismiss, asking for the recon­sideration
of the denial of his previous motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause
of action and lack of jurisdiction for the court to annul the Certificate of
Title.  Plaintiff Iriola
again filed an objection.  The court
denied the motion.

Trial at last started,
but, in the course of the initial hearing, counsel for the defendant moved to
strike out the tes­timony of the first witness for the plaintiff on the ground
that the plaintiff is estopped from proving ownership
of the contested land (R. A., page 60).

On 5 July 1963,
the court issued the order that the plaintiff has elevated, by way of appeal,
to this Supreme Court.  In the appealed
order, the plaintiff was held in estoppel from
proving ownership because he had recognized that the land in question forms an
integral part of titled land and also, in the conditional sale, that the land
in question, which was north of the portion that he bought, is the property of
the defendant.  The order did not order
the dismissal of the complaint.

It is true that the plaintiff-appellant should be deemed to have
ad­mitted the genuineness and due execution of the deed of conditional
sale:  the defendant-appellee
alleged the deed and its recitals and annexed a copy thereto in his “reply
to objection”, but the plaintiff-appellant did not deny it under oath
(Answer to Reply, R. A., pages 40- 45). 
The genuineness and due execution of a written instrument copied in or
attached to a pleading should be denied specifically under oath, otherwise they
are deemed admitted (Section 8, Rule 8, Rules of Court; Songco
vs. Sellner, 37 Phil. 254).  The deed is not merely evidentiary, as it is
not a collateral matter, for it is the basis of the affirmative defense of estoppel of the defendant-appellee,
as set forth in his answer (R. A., page 8).

Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the import of the
alleged admissions of appellant Iriola made in the
1949 deed of sale a retro, Exhibit “A” (R. A., page
37), are not sufficiently precise and specific to predicate an estoppel thereon.  By
the aforecited deed the appellant agreed to the
following:

“. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . have
sold, conveyed and transferred and by these presents, do sell, convey and transfer
unto said Mamerto Iriola,
his heirs, successors and assigns, subject to the terms and conditions
stipulated below, a parcel of riceland described as
follows:

‘ A parcel of irrigated rice land covering four (4) and one-fourth
hectares situated in barrio Curry, municipality of Pili,
province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, bounded on the North, by the property of Silverio
Felices; on the East, by the Himaano
River and the South, by the property of the Hrs. of Felipe Felices, and West, by the Lagundi Creek.

This parcel of land is an integral part of the land described under
Homestead Patent No. V2117 issued on January
26, 1949, and declared for taxation under Tax Dec. No. 2820,
assessed at P3,105.00 in the name of Silverio Felices.’

“That since 1921 up to the present, I have been in the
continuous and peaceful possession of the above -described parcel of land,
first in my own initiative and in concept of an owner, and later on by virtue
of a home­stead application.”

It will be noticed that there are three pertinent statements of
fact made in the deed:

(1)  That the parcel of land sold (4-1/4 hectares)
was bounded on the north by the property of Silverio
Felices (the vendor), appellee
herein;

(2)  That said parcel is an integral part of the
land described in the Homestead Patent No. V-2117 issued on 26 January 1949, declared and
assessed for taxation in the name of Silverio Felices;

(3)  That since 1921 up to the present (1949, when
the deed was executed) Felices had been in continuous
possession of the above-described parcel of land.

None of these propositions are incompatible with the present
claims of appellant herein, to the effect that he and his causantes
owned the northwestern (not northern) portion of the land covered by the
homestead patent of Felices, and that the latter
fraudulently included that part in his homestead application, for which reason
he filed the action for reconveyance.  The latter suit is precisely predicated upon
the fact that this disputed portion was included in Felices‘
homestead patent.

It is claimed that in the deed aforementioned Iriola
admitted that Felices had been in possession as owner
of the “above described parcel of land” since 1921.  But it is not definite whether the parcel of
land “above described” refers to the 4-1/4 hectares covered by the
deed of sale (and which lay southeast of the parcel claimed by Iriola) or to the entirety of the land included in the
homestead patent of Felices.  In truth, the probabilities are that
“above-described parcel of land” refers only to the 4-1/4-hectare
portion sold a retro to herein appellant, for it is the
boundaries of that land which are specified in the deed.  The limits of the entire area covered by the
patent are not specified.

Considering that –

“To constitute an estoppel by deed,
a distinct and precise assertion of a fact is necessary . . . . . . Such estoppel should be certain to every intent” (Van
Rensselaer vs. Kearney, 13 Law Ed.
703; 19 Am. Jur. 603),

and that, as ruled in Gilmer vs.
Poindexter, 13 L. Ed. 411, estoppel by deed can not
prevent the denial of an equitable title which is not identical with the legal
title, we conclude that no estoppel can be predicated on the 1949 deed of sale a
retro executed by both parties.

It is also claimed that appellant is estopped
by his admission in paragraph 2 of his reply to appellee’s
Counterclaim in the court below (R. A., pages 9 and 14).  This claim is likewise untenable.  Paragraph I of the counterclaim is as follows
(R. A., page 9):

“That although on February 24, 1949, the defendant sold to the
plaintiff, subject to the de­fendant’s right to repurchase, only a portion of
four and one fourth (4-1/4) hectares of a bigger parcel of land belonging to
the defendant and covered by O. C. T.
No. 104, the said plaintiff unlawfully took possession of more than seven
hectares thereby wrongfully depriving the defend­ant of the possession of more
than three (3) hectares of land and the products thereof.”

Appellant replied to the preceding charge in the following terms
(R. A., page 14):

“1.  That plaintiff denies generally and specifically
all of the allegations of the counterclaim and has no knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8 and 9 of the said counterclaim;

“2.  That the portion of land of three (3) hectares
which is mentioned in paragraph 1 of the counterclaim is the very land which is
the subject-matter of the complaint and the truth of the matter is what appears
in said complaint;”

Clearly, defendant-appellant merely pleaded that the three
hectares lay outside of the parcel purchased by hire a retro
from the appellee. 
Nowhere did he admit that these 3 hectares were a part of the parcel he
had previously purchased, and, therefore, never recognized that the same was
owned or possessed by Felices.  This conduct of appellant is perfectly
consistent with the theory of his complaint that Felices
improperly included these three hectares in his homestead applica­tion, for
which reason appellant demands its reconveyance.

The rule that a grantee is estopped to
deny the title of his grantor is correct only if limited to the property
actually conveyed and to the time of the conveyance in this case, as the
property subject of the complaint was not the parcel bought by Iriola under the deed, Exhibit “A”, estoppel does not apply.

WHEREFORE, the order under review, declaring Mamerto Iriola estopped from proving his title to the land claimed in his
complaint, is reversed and set aside; and the case is remanded to the court below
for further proceedings, hearing and resolution.  Costs against defendant-appellee.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.