AGENSI PEKERJAAN PHILIMORE SDN. BHD., PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, ACTING THROUGH UNDERSECRETARY HON. DANILO P. CRUZ, THE HON. ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE OV…

Decisions / Signed Resolutions May 28, 2009 SIXTEENTH DIVISION BATO, JR., J.:


BATO, JR., J.:


Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the 02 May 2013 Order[2] and 16 July 2013 Resolution[3] of Undersecretary Danilo P. Cruz of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), by authority of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, in OS-POEA-0148-0725-2012.

Petitioner Agensi Pekerjaan Philimore SDN. BHD. (“Agensi” for brevity) alleged that it is a foreign principal/recruitment agency based in Malaysia and duly accredited by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Its local recruitment agent in the Philippines is Non-Stop Overseas Employment Corporation (“Non-Stop” for brevity).

On 16 February 2007, private respondent Cirila A. Primor (“Primor” for brevity) executed a Sworn Statement[4] before the POEA, charging Non-Stop for violation of Sections 2(b) and (e), Rule I, Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers. Primor alleged that sometime in January 2006, she applied for a job with Non-Stop and was promised a job in Malaysia. She was made to pay a placement fee equivalent to four (4) months of her salary. On 22 May 2006, she signed an employment contract as a domestic helper with a monthly salary of 750RM. She departed for Malaysia on 24 May 2006 using a tourist visa and returned to the Philippines on 18 October 2006.

In its Order[5] dated 28 May 2009, the POEA dismissed Primor’s complaint against Non-Stop for lack of substantial evidence. It ruled that Primor’s claim that she used a tourist visa to work in Malaysia is unfounded since her deployment was duly processed and approved by the POEA. It further ruled that as evidenced by the promissory note signed by Primor, she was only required to pay a placement fee equivalent to her one month salary by way of salary deduction. Even assuming that the amount equivalent to her four (4)–month salaries was collected by her employer, she failed to specifically present evidence other than her unsubstantiated averments that Non-Stop benefited from it. The alleged deduction from her salaries may, however, be a ground for disciplinary action against Primor’s foreign employer for the latter’s failure to comply with its contractual obligation to a migrant worker. It thus ordered that a complaint be motu proprio initiated against Primor’s foreign employer for default of its contractual obligation to a migrant worker. Hence, the dispositive portion of the said Order reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of substantial evidence.

Initiate a disciplinary action against the employer for default in its contractual obligation to the migrant worker.

SO ORDERED.”

Pursuant to the above-mentioned Order, a complaint was motu proprio initiated by the POEA on 15 June 2009 against Agensi, as the foreign principal of Non-Stop, and Tan Tse Kuan, the direct employer of Primor, for violation of Sections 1(a) and (d) of Rule II, Part VII of the 2002 POEA Rules. Upon the POEA’s directive, Primor submitted her Sinumpaang Salaysay,[6] wherein she alleged the following: when she arrived in Malaysia, an employee of Agensi fetched her from the airport and she started her 5-day training the following day; on 30 May 2006, her employer, Tan Tse Kuan fetched her from the office of Agensi and brought her to his house; thereat, she found out the family of Tan Tse Kuan has 14 members including a 3-year-old boy and a 9-month old baby; included in her duties were taking care of the two children, doing the laundry, ironing clothes and cleaning the house; she had to work 18 hours but she was not paid her salaries; on 07 October 2006, Tan Tse Kuan terminated her employment and brought her back to Agensi; she was detained in Agensi’s office for eleven (11) days; while at the office of Agensi, she saw a piece of paper signed by Tan Tse Kuan indicating that she had asked to leave and wanted to go back to the Philippines; she was forced to sign an agreement that she will not file any case against Tan Tse Kuan, Agensi and Non-Stop; and on 18 October 2006, she was repatriated back to the Philippines.

For its part, Agensi alleged that when Primor arrived in Malaysia on 24 May 2006, she began to work for Tan Tse Kuan as a Household Service Worker (HSW). After a while, Primor demanded from Tan Tse Kuan that she be permitted to go home because she was homesick. Tan Tse Kuan refused since to allow Primor to return to the Philippines within the duration of their 2-year contract would be a breach thereof. After working for four (4) months, Primor ran away from Tan Tse Kuan’s residence and proceeded to the Philippine Embassy. The Philippine Embassy contacted Agensi and the latter, in turn, contacted Non-Stop. Upon arriving at the Embassy, Agensi’s representative asked Primor why she ran away and whether she was subjected to ill-treatment. Primor replied that she was never subjected to ill-treatment, the real reason why she ran away was because of her severe homesickness. Due to the persistent demands of Primor that she be sent home to the Philippines, Agensi had no choice but to repatriate her on 18 October 2006.

As for Tan Tse Kuan, the POEA archived the case against him since there was no indication that he received the summons that it had sent to him.

By Order[7] dated 19 June 2012, the POEA found Agensi guilty of grave misconduct for detaining Primor at its office for eleven (11) days and for forcing her to sign a document to the effect that she will not file a case against her employer, local recruitment agency and its foreign principal. The POEA likewise found that Agensi defaulted on its contractual obligation, premised on the NLRC’s finding in a separate case involving the same parties that Agensi should be made liable for not paying the salaries of Primor for four (4) months. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, for the established violation of Section 1(a) and (d) of Rule II, Part VII of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers, respondent Agensi Pekerjaan Philimore SDN BHD is hereby disqualified to participate in the overseas employment program.

Include the name of respondent Agensi Philimore SDN BHD in the list of foreign principals/employers disqualified from participating in the overseas employment program of this Administration.

x x x          x x x          x x x

SO ORDERED.”

Aggrieved, Agensi elevated the matter to the Secretary of Labor wherein it pointed out that it carried out to the letter its duty to deploy Primor to Malaysia and to a valid employer. It was Primor who could not finish her contract for her own personal reasons.

On 02 May 2013, the Secretary of Labor, through Undersecretary Danilo P. Cruz, issued an Order[8] affirming the ruling of the POEA in the following manner:

“The respondent-petitioner’s liability for grave misconduct is not without basis. The averments made by Primor in her Sinumpaang Salaysay provided a detailed account of the circumstances of her detention in the office of the respondent-petitioner and the purported signing of an agreement not to file any complaint. In addition, as earlier stated, the POEA Administrator considered the decision of the NLRC in finding the respondent-petitioner liable for the unpaid salaries of Primor for four (4) months. All these circumstances, taken together, constitute substantial evidence sufficient to hold the respondent-petitioner liable for grave misconduct and default on its contractual obligation to the worker.

x x x          x x x          x x x

WHEREFORE, the Appeal with Motion for Reinvestigation, treated as Petition for Review, filed by Agensi Pekerjaan Philimore SDN BHD, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Order of the POEA Administrator dated 19 June 2012 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.”

Agensi moved for a reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Secretary of Labor via the assailed 16 July 2013 Resolution.[9]

Hence, this petition with the following lone issue for the Court’s resolution:

“WHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY OF LABOR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE POEA ADMINISTRATOR DISQUALIFYING PETITIONER FROM PARTICIPATION IN THE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM DESPITE THE UTTER ABSENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AGAINST THE PETITIONER AND CONSIDERING THAT THE LATTER HAD PROVEN ITS INNOCENCE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST IT.”

Agensi avers that the POEA’s finding, as affirmed by the Secretary of Labor, is not based on substantial evidence. Said tribunals relied merely on Primor’s pro-forma complaint and her supposed unsubstantiated sworn statement, which are not entitled to any probative value.

By way of Comment,[10] Primor alleges, among others, that the issues raised in Agensi’s petition are mere rehash and reiterations of the issues that were already resolved and squarely passed upon by the POEA and the Secretary of Labor.

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment as is equivalent, in the eyes of the law, to lack of jurisdiction.[11] There is grave abuse of discretion where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[12] Through time, the meaning of grave abuse of discretion has been expanded to include any action done contrary to the constitution, the law or jurisprudence.[13] In particular, the Court of Appeals can grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the public respondent in the assailed decision or resolution made a factual finding not supported by substantial evidence.[14]

Premised on the foregoing, the petition must fail.

Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies (like the POEA), a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Thus, in Spouses Manalo vs. Hon. Nieves Roldan-Confesor, in her capacity as Undersecretary of Labor and Employment,[15] the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

“In the administrative proceedings for cancellation, revocation or suspension of Authority or License, no rule requires that testimonies of complainants be corroborated by documentary evidence, if the charge of unlawful exaction is substantially proven. All administrative determinations require only substantial proof and not clear and convincing evidence as erroneously contended by pubic respondents.

Clear and convincing proof is ‘. . . more than mere preponderance, but not to extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases . . .’ while substantial evidence ‘. . . consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance . . . .’ Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, We find proof beyond reasonable doubt at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that order.”

In the instant case, Primor’s allegation that she was detained in the petitioner’s office for eleven (11) days and forced to sign a document that she would not file charges against Tan Tse Kuan, Agensi and Non-Stop is contained in her detailed Sinumpaang Salaysay, which she submitted before the POEA during the hearing conducted on 26 August 2009. During that time, the Hearing Officer had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of Primor. On the other hand, her allegation that she was not paid her salaries during her 4-month stay with her foreign employer is substantiated by the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in a separate case for money claims involving the same parties.[16] In contrast, petitioner’s denial of the allegations against it is not corroborated by any evidence. Petitioner could have easily supported its denial with statements of its employees to the effect that Primor was never detained in its office in Malaysia, never forced to sign a document waiving her right to file a case against Tan Tse Kuan, Agensi and Non-Stop, and was duly paid her salaries.

Under the circumstances, the quantum of evidence required to hold petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and breach of its contractual obligation to a migrant worker has been satisfied. The Court is more inclined to give weight to Primor’s version. The manner by which she narrated the whole incident inspires belief. In this regard, it may be worth to emphasize that only substantial evidence, not necessarily clear and convincing evidence, is required. Moreover, when confronted with conflicting assertions, the rule that “as between a positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail, applies.[17]

In sum, the Secretary of Labor correctly appreciated the evidence upon which the assailed orders were based. Therefore, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the Secretary of Labor on the ground of misappreciation of facts and evidence.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Zalameda and Diy, JJ., concur.


[1] Rollo, pp. 3-18.

[2] Id., pp. 52-60.

[3] Id., pp. 74-76.

[4] Id., pp. 109-110.

[5] Rollo, pp. 103-108.

[6] As quoted in the POEA Order dated 19 June 2012; Rollo, pp. 27-30.

[7] Rollo, pp. 23-31.

[8] Rollo, pp. 52-60.

[9] Supra, at Note 3.

[10] Rollo, pp. 125-131.

[11] Vda. De Bacaling vs. Laguna, 54 SCA 243, p. 251 [1973]; Bacelonia vs. CA, 397 SCRA 286, p. 291 [2003].

[12] Cuison vs. CA, 289 SCRA 159, p. 171 [1998]; Benito vs. COMELEC, 349 SCRA 705, p. 712 [2001].

[13] Republic vs. Cocofed, 372 SCRA 462, p. 493 [2001].

[14] Norkis Trading Corporation vs. Buenavista, G.R. No. 182018, October 10, 2012, 683 SCRA 406, 423; Emcor Incorporated vs. Sienes, G.R. No. 152101, September 8, 2009, 598 SCRA 617, 631-632; and Leonis Navigation Co. Inc. vs. Villamater, supra, note 8, at 192.

[15] G.R. No. 102358 November 19, 1992.

[16] As mentioned in the POEA Order dated 19 June 2012; Rollo, p. 30.

[17] Spouses Manalo vs. Hon. Nieves Roldan-Confesor, in her capacity as Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 102358 November 19, 1992.