LINDAY PALEYAN, FOR HER OWN AND BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, NAMELY:  TERESA, FORTUNATO, VENANCIO AND JOSE, ALL SURNAMED PALEYAN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS, VS. CARLOS BANGKILI AND …

Plaintiffs are the widow and children of Balos
Paleyan, who was killed by defendant Carlos Bangkili.  At the
time of the commission of the offense Carlos Bangkili,
a minor of 19 years, was living with his mother, defendant Victoria Bangkili.  As a result of the death of Balos Paleyan and of the wounding
of another victim, Carlos Bangkili was accused of the
crime of homicide with less serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 898
of the Court of First Instance of Mountain Province.  On November
21, 1960, upon his plea of guilty, he was sentenced accordingly,
but the decision made no pronouncement as to the civil indemnity which should
be paid to the heirs of the deceased.  On
April 3, 1961 the plaintiffs
filed the present action for damages against Carlos Bangkili
and his mother, Victoria Bangkili.

After trial the court a quo rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

“PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby orders the dismissal of
the complaint against the defendant Victoria Bangkili
and renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant
Carlos Bangkili and ordering said defendant, to:

(1)                 
Pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P6,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Balos Paleyan;

(2)                 
Pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P1,000.00 as moral damages;

(3)                 
Pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P500.00 for the amount of expenses incurred;

(4)                 
Pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P500.00 as attorney’s fees; and

(5)                 
Pay the costs.”

In dismissing the complaint against Victoria Bangkili
the trial court held that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code Victoria Bangkili could not be held civilly liable for the criminal
act of her minor son, who was already 19 years of age at the time he committed
the offense; and that Article 2180 of the New Civil Code was not applicable for
it covers only obligations arising from quasi-delicts
and not to those arising from crimes. 
The plaintiffs moved to reconsider the dismissal of the complaint as
against defendant Victoria Bangkili, and upon denial
of the motion instituted the instant appeal.

The judgment as against Carlos Bangkili
is not now questioned.  Neither of the
parties has appealed therefrom.  The liability of the said defendant is
therefore a closed matter.  The only
issue upon which both the appellants and the appellee
have submitted this case is whether or not the latter, as the mother of Carlos
who had him in her custody at the time he committed the offense, should be
adjudged liable with him for the amount which he was sentenced to pay,
considering that he was then a minor of 19 years.

The issue is not of first impression.  It has been resolved in the cases of Exconde vs. Capuno, 101 Phil.
843; Araneta vs. Arreglado,
104 Phil. 524; Fuellas vs. Cadano,
No. L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961; and Salen et al. vs. Balce, 107 Phil.
748.  In this last-mentioned case
the defendant Balce, father of Gumersindo
Balce, a minor of less than 18 years who was living
with him, was sued on his subsidiary liability for the civil indemnity adjudged
in the criminal case for homicide wherein Gumersindo
had been found guilty.  The trial court
dismissed the case, stating that the subsidiary civil liability of the
defendant must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
and not under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code.  In reversing the decision this Court, thru
Mr. Justice Bautista Angelo, held:

“It is true that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code,
a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the
latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or over 9 but under 15
years of age, who acts without discernment, unless it appears that there is no
fault or negligence on his part.  This is
because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law
exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised
Penal Code).  The idea is not to leave
the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person
who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control.  But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment
is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as
to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted.  In that case, resort should be had to the
general law which is our Civil Code.

The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent
portion of which provides:  ‘The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.’ To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case
because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts
and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the
absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or
mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage
caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage
is caused with criminal intent.  Verily,
the void that apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code,
as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or
identical cases.”

While the decision just cited referred to the subsidiary
liability of the father whose son had been sentenced to pay civil indemnity in
the criminal case, the reasons given by this Court in applying Article 2180 of
the Civil Code hold true with greater cogency in this case, where the
allegations in the complaint show that herein appellee
was sued directly under the said provision, in that she “failed and
neglected to exercise the proper care and vigilance over her ward and minor
child and as a consequence of such failure and neglect, the said Carlos Bangkili committed the wrongful act herein complained
of.” Even more to the point is the case of Araneta
vs. Arreglado, supra.  There the minor Dario Arreglado
entered a plea of guilty on a charge of frustrated homicide, but the court
suspended proceedings pursuant to Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code in view
of the fact that he was only 14 years of age. 
A civil suit was thereafter filed by the offended party against the said
accused and his parents for the recovery of damages.  The ruling of the lower court holding the
said parents liable was affirmed, although with some modification as to the
amount awarded.

The appellee here agrees that Article
2180 is applicable in this case, but submits that its applica­tion should be
relaxed, considering that her son, al­though living with her, was already 19
years of age and hence mature enough to have a mind of his own.  This fact is not a legal defense, however,
and does not exempt the appellant from her responsibility as parent and natural
guardian.  Article 2180 does not provide
for any exemption except proof that the defendant parent “observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.” There is no
such proof in this case.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed with
respect to defendant-appellee Victoria Bangkili, and she is hereby adjudged liable solidarily with her co-defendant for the amounts awarded in
said judgment, with costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Dizon, J., took no part.