GERONIMO DE LOS REYES, PETITIONER, VS. ARTEMIO ELEPAÑO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF CALAUAN, LAGUNA, AND MARIA B. CASTRO, RESPONDENTS.

De los Reyes versus Elepaño

The Case

This is a special civil action of certiorari brought by Geronimo de los Reyes against Artemio Elepaño, in his capacity as Justice of the Peace of the Municipality of Calauan, Laguna, and Maria B. Castro. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to stop the justice of the peace from trying an unlawful detainer case against him, on the ground that the justice of the peace court lacks jurisdiction. The case matters because it fixes the rule on when a defendant in a summary action for unlawful detainer can strip the inferior court of its jurisdiction simply by claiming ownership of the land in his answer.

Procedural History

Maria B. Castro filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the justice of the peace court of Calauan, Laguna, where the two parcels of land are located. Geronimo de los Reyes answered, claiming among other things that the justice of the peace court had no power or jurisdiction over the subject matter because the question of title to the lands was necessarily involved, and that another action was pending between the same parties over the same subject matter before the Court of First Instance of Manila. The justice of the peace court refused to dismiss the unlawful detainer case. Thereupon, Geronimo de los Reyes filed this original action of certiorari in the Supreme Court, seeking to prevent the justice of the peace from proceeding with the trial of the unlawful detainer on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction.

Facts

On August 31, 1943, Geronimo de los Reyes, as vendor, and Maria B. Castro, as vendee, entered into a contract entitled Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase, covering two parcels of land in Laguna for the sum of 120,000 pesos. The sale included work animals on the lands, namely, four carabaos and one Australian saddle horse. The deed reserved to the vendor the right to repurchase, to be exercised on or before the expiration of four years from the signing of the agreement, but not before the lapse of two years. In other words, the right of redemption could be exercised at any time between August 31, 1945, and August 31, 1947.

On the same day, the same parties entered into a Contract of Lease, whereby the vendor leased from the vendee the same two parcels of land for four years, at a rental of 7,200 pesos per annum, the rentals for the first two years payable in advance. The lessor acknowledged receipt of the advance rentals covering the period from August 31, 1943, up to and including August 31, 1945.

On September 30, 1947, Maria B. Castro executed an affidavit of consolidation and presented the corresponding owner's duplicate transfer certificates of title in the office of the register of deeds of Laguna. The register of deeds cancelled the old certificates, the originals of which were burned during the war, and issued new transfer certificates of title in the name of Maria B. Castro. On October 24, 1947, Maria B. Castro filed the complaint for unlawful detainer in the justice of the peace court of Calauan, Laguna, claiming violation of the contract of lease in that since August 31, 1945, the defendant had failed to pay the yearly rentals of 7,200 pesos, and that despite demand he refused to leave the premises or pay the back rents. In his answer, Geronimo claimed that the deed of sale with right to repurchase was really a mere mortgage, that the 120,000 pesos involved were all in Japanese military notes, and that the contract of lease was a mere contrivance to represent interest on the loan. He also alleged that he had tendered payment of the principal, that he had consigned the sum of 120,000 pesos with the clerk of court in a case before the Court of First Instance of Manila, and that he had filed another action to take the place of that case after its record was destroyed during the war.

Issues

• Whether or not in an action for unlawful detainer in a justice of the peace court, the defendant can deprive said court of its jurisdiction by filing an answer claiming title to the property involved, or otherwise raising the question of ownership.

Applicable Provisions

The decision refers to section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which defines who is a vendee for purposes of the remedy of forcible entry and detainer, as follows:

Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the purchaser under a contract with a right to repurchase is a vendee within the meaning of said section.

This provision bears on the case because it makes Maria B. Castro, the purchaser under the deed of sale with right to repurchase, a vendee entitled to bring the summary action, which in turn supports the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court over the unlawful detainer complaint.

Ruling

The Court denied the petition. On the sole issue, the Court held that the mere fact that the defendant, in his answer, claims to be the owner of the property from which the plaintiff seeks to eject him, is not sufficient to divest the justice of the peace or the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction in actions for forcible entry and detainer. Were the principle otherwise, the ends of justice would be frustrated by making the efficacy of this kind of action depend upon the defendant in all cases. The Court recognized an exception: the justice of the peace may be divested of jurisdiction when the evidence during the trial in said court shows that the question of title is actually involved and that the defendant's contention, according to said evidence, is meritorious. Much therefore depends upon the merit or lack of merit in the defendant's claim of ownership, to be determined during the trial in the justice of the peace court.

Without prejudging the case, and on the basis only of the pleadings, the Court found that the petitioner had not made out a prima facie case of the merit of his claim of ownership. In favor of Maria B. Castro stood not only the deed of sale with pacto de retro, in which the vendor failed to make the repurchase within the stipulated period, but also the consolidation of title and the issuance of the corresponding transfer certificates of title in her name. The Court applied its earlier ruling that the purchaser under a contract with a right to repurchase is a vendee within the meaning of section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that in an action of forcible entry and detainer, the mere filing of an answer claiming title to the premises would not divest the justice of the peace court of its jurisdiction.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, in an action for unlawful detainer in a justice of the peace or municipal court, the defendant cannot deprive the court of its summary jurisdiction merely by filing an answer claiming title to the property or otherwise raising the question of ownership. Second, the exception arises when the evidence during the trial shows that the question of title is actually involved and that the defendant's contention, according to that evidence, is meritorious. Third, the purchaser under a deed of sale with right to repurchase is a vendee within the meaning of section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and may bring the summary action for forcible entry and detainer. Fourth, the consolidation of title in the vendee's name, following the vendor's failure to repurchase within the stipulated period, strengthens the vendee's position and weakens the vendor's claim of ownership.

Disposition

The petition was denied, with costs, so that Maria B. Castro prevailed and the justice of the peace of Calauan, Laguna, was allowed to proceed with the trial of the unlawful detainer case.

Remember This

The line worth memorizing is that a defendant cannot oust the justice of the peace court of jurisdiction over an unlawful detainer case by the mere filing of an answer claiming title, unless the evidence at trial shows that the question of title is actually involved and that his claim is meritorious. Examiners like to use this case on the jurisdiction of inferior courts in summary actions for forcible entry and detainer, and on the rule that the purchaser under a deed of sale with right to repurchase is a vendee under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.