ABELARDO SUBIDO, AS COM­MISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, AND ALIPIO BUENAVENTURA, AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CIVIL SER­VICE COMMISSION, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SIMEON GOPENGCO, JUDGE, CFI …

Subido versus Gopengco

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Executive Director of the Civil Service Commission against Judge Simeon Gopengco of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to set aside three orders of the trial court that had reinstated Fausto Varela, the Deputy Commissioner of Civil Service, to his former post and later restrained the enforcement of the President's administrative decision against him. The case matters because it fixes the strict standards for a preliminary mandatory injunction against a public officer, and because it teaches that a supervening administrative decision may render a reinstatement order unenforceable.

Procedural History

Varela filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Executive Secretary and the Civil Service officials. The trial court issued an injunctive order on November 16, 1965, and two days later issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing Varela's reinstatement. The petitioners moved to dismiss and to dissolve the writ, but the trial court denied both motions in two orders dated January 25, 1966, and earlier, on January 4, 1966, it enjoined the enforcement of the President's administrative order. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and prohibition. The Supreme Court gave due course and issued its own preliminary injunction restraining enforcement of the disputed orders.

Facts

Fausto Varela was Deputy Commissioner of Civil Service when, on February 21, 1962, the President suspended him on charges of grave misconduct, insubordination, discourtesy, and violation of an administrative order. His suspension was lifted after eighty-five days, but instead of being returned to his post he was detailed successively to different offices of much lower rank. He continued to receive his salary as Deputy Commissioner throughout.

On November 11, 1965, more than three years after the suspension began, Varela went to court, claiming that the reassignments amounted to demotion and removal without cause and without due process. The trial court issued a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering his reinstatement. On December 21, 1965, the President found Varela guilty of misconduct, insubordination, and presumptuous conduct, and considered him resigned from the service, without prejudice to retirement and leave benefits and to appointment to another position of equivalent rank. Varela was served a copy on December 27, and the next day Buenaventura took his oath as Deputy Commissioner in Varela's place.

Varela moved to restrain enforcement of the President's order, and on January 4, 1966 the trial court granted the motion, enjoining the petitioners from enforcing the order and from disturbing Varela in his office. The petitioners' motions for reconsideration and dissolution were denied, prompting this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the injunctive order of November 16, 1965 and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction of November 18, 1965.
• Whether or not the trial court should have dissolved the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction after the promulgation of the President's administrative order finding Varela guilty.

Applicable Provisions

Section 32 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 provides:

SEC. 32. Disciplinary Action. - No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due process: Provided, That a transfer from one position to another without reduction in rank or salary shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service: ...

This provision is the basis of Varela's claim that his detail to lower-ranked offices was a removal without cause, and the Court uses its proviso to test whether the transfer was disciplinary.

Section 35 of the same Act provides:

SEC. 35. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service within the period of sixty (60) days after the date of suspension of the respondent, the respondent shall be reinstated in the service. If the respondent officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his position with full pay for the period of suspension.

This provision defines the exact relief Varela was entitled to after sixty days, and the Court reads it to distinguish reinstatement in the service from restoration to the former position.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court gravely abused its discretion. A mandatory injunction is the exception rather than the rule, and the applicant must show a clear legal right whose violation is so recent as to make vindication urgent. The Court took as its text the settled rule that such a writ is generally improper before final hearing, save in cases of extreme urgency, a very clear right, a willful and unlawful invasion of a continuing injury, and where the writ reestablishes a preexisting relation recently and arbitrarily interrupted. Varela showed no such clear right. His detail was merely temporary, done to clear the atmosphere of animosity in the Commission, and he continued to receive his salary as Deputy Commissioner. More importantly, Section 35 provides that a suspended employee must be reinstated in the service, and only if finally exonerated must he be restored to his position with full pay. Nor was there urgency: Varela was suspended in February 1962, reinstated in September of that year, and went to court only in November 1965.

On the second issue, the Court held that the writ should have been dissolved after the promulgation of the President's administrative order. The premise of the writ was that Varela's detail was a virtual removal without cause, and the administrative case proceeded to judgment without interruption from the court. The Court likened the situation to City of Butuan versus Ortiz, where a supervening decision of the Civil Service Commissioner barred execution of a judgment ordering reinstatement. The Court explained that a supervening cause is a superior cause that supersedes the basis of the judgment and makes its execution untenable. Although the President's order was not yet final because a motion for reconsideration was pending, decisions of this nature may be executed even before finality, since public interest would be jeopardized if the Government were forced to retain in its service an employee adjudged unfit, without prejudice to reinstatement with backpay upon exoneration.

Doctrine

A preliminary mandatory injunction is the exception rather than the rule. It may issue only where the applicant shows a clear legal right, recently and willfully violated, and an extreme urgency that cannot await final hearing. Under Section 35 of the Civil Service Act of 1959, an employee whose administrative case is not decided within sixty days is reinstated in the service, but restoration to his former position with full pay is reserved for one finally exonerated. A supervening administrative decision finding the employee guilty supersedes the basis of a reinstatement order and renders it unenforceable, and such a decision may be executed pending a motion for reconsideration in the interest of public service.

Disposition

The petition was granted, and the Supreme Court set aside the orders of November 16, 1965, January 4, 1966, and January 25, 1966, and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction of November 18, 1965, without pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a mandatory injunction is the exception rather than the rule, and that a supervening administrative decision supersedes the basis of a reinstatement order. Examiners use this case on provisional remedies against public officers and on the distinction between reinstatement in the service and restoration to position under the Civil Service Act.