GUADALUPE J. VDA. DE UCANG, FOR HERSELF AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, NAMELY, ALBERT, BERNARDETTE, CAROLYN, DAVIDSON, EDGAR, FERDINAND, AND GRACE, ALL SURNAMED UCANG, PET…

Saturnino Ucang
was a field worker of respondent Philippine Packing Corporation since July 7, 1950 until his death on November 6, 1971.  His duties consisted of weeding, stripping,
planting, fertilizing, harvesting, loading, yarding
and spraying the pineapple field — a strenuous manual labor which he assumed
for 21 years (p. 56, rec.).

On November 4, 1971,
Ucang applied for a vacation leave with pay which was
approved by respondent company’s Personnel Department from the aforestated date until December 2, 1971 (p. 57, rec.).

While still on vacation, or specifically on November 6, 1971, Ucang
unfortunately suffered a heart attack. 
He died at the company-owned Phillips
Memorial Hospital
on the same day (pp. 9-10, rec.).

On August 9, 1973,
Chief Referee Ildefonso G. Agbuya
of the Department of Labor’s Regional Office No. XI in Cagayan
de Oro City rendered a verdict, the more important
part of which reads:

“In this particular case, respondent presented
witnesses on the aspect of the nature of employment, the working conditions,
but did not present a medical expert or witness to testify on the compensability
that the cause of death of the deceased could not have been caused directly or
aggravated by the nature of his work. 
On the other hand, claimants, thru counsel, relied mainly on the presumption
of law that death supervening during the period of employment of the late Saturnino Ucang should be presumed
compensable under Sections 2 and 44 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.  After considering the facts of the case,
particularly the length of service that the deceased had rendered with the
respondent-company, Philippine Packing Corporation, the nature of his work, he
being exposed to the heat of the sun and rain in open field, led us to the
conclusion that the death of the deceased must have been aggravated by the
nature of his work.  It is now unquestionable
that once the illness supervenes at the time of the employment, there is a rebuttable presumption that such illness arose out of the
employment or was at least aggravated by such employment.  As aptly ruled by the Supreme Court on the
following cases, the claimants are relieved from the burden of proving
causation where the illness is shown to have arisen in the course of employment
(Magalona vs. WCC & NASSCO, L-21849, December 11,
1967).  Further, under the law, as presently
amended, it is not required that the employment be sole factor in the growth,
development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimants the
benefits provided for, but it is enough that his employment had contributed,
even if a small category, to the development of the disease.  It has been repeatedly held that under the
Workmen’s Compensation Law, it is not necessary for a claimant to carry the
burden of proof to establish his case to the point of demonstration.  It is sufficient to show that the hypothesis
on which the basis of his claim is provable (Abana et
al. vs. Quisumbing, L-23489, March 27, 1968) and also
in the case of General Shipping Company versus WCC, L-14936, July 30, 1960, ‘Heart Failure/Attack’
was declared as compensable.  In the light of the above-mentioned rulings of the Supreme Court,
the above-entitled claim is hereby considered compensable x x”
(pp. 13-14, rec.; underlining supplied).

Seasonably, respondent company moved for reconsideration of the
above-said decision, but said motion was denied by the Chief Referee in an
order dated October 19, 1973.

On review, however, respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission
reversed the aforestated verdict, holding in part:

“The main issue to be resolved is not whether the respondent
has timely controverted the instant claim or not but
whether or not there existed the relation of employer and employee
between the respondent and the deceased at the time of the latter’s heart
attack which resulted in his death on November 6, 1971.  The answer is in the negative.  This is so, because at the time of said heart
attack the deceased was on vacation leave with pay.  So that he was not doing any work at that
time that would redound to the interest of his employer, the respondent
herein.  In other words, there was a
suspension of employer-employee relationship between the respondent and the
deceased on that fatal day.  Under the
circumstances, there is no obligation for the respondent to file the notice of controversion required in Section 45 of the Act, for in the
absence of employer-employee relationship no claim for workmen’s compensation
would prosper (A.L. Amsen Transportation Co., Inc.
vs. UCC, et al., L-20219, September 28, 1954). 
Hence, the Acting Chief Referee committed a reversible
error in granting death compensation to the claimants” (p. 10, rec.).

Hence, the present appeal.

As respondents intimated, resolution of the case on review hinges
on the answer to the issue of whether the employer-employee relationship
between a laborer and the company wherein he works is suspended when the former
is accorded by the latter a vacation leave with pay.

WE rule in the negative.

Employer-employee relationship is not suspended when an employee
is given a vacation leave with pay.  That
the employee on vacation leave with pay is accorded his regular compensation,
attests to said employee’s continuously rendering
regular service, in line with the settled principle that the basis of
remuneration is actual work rendered (Philippine Air Lines Employees
Association vs. Philippine Air Lines, L-31341 & L-31343, March 31, 1976, 70
SCRA 244, 252).

Moreover, WE had occasion to rule that

“The purpose of a vacation leave is to afford the laborer a
chance to get much needed rest to replenish his worn out energies and to
acquire a new vitality to enable him to effectively perform his duties, not
merely to give him additional salary or bounty” (Cuajao
vs. Chua Lo Tan, L-16298, Sept. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 136, 138 citing Sun Ripe Coconut
Products, Inc. vs. National Labor Union, L-7964, 51 O.G., 5133-5137; Philippine
Air Lines, Inc. vs. Balanguit, et al., 53 O.G., 8549;
Tanguiling, et al. vs. Theo H. Davies & Co.,
L-9144, May 30, 1959, 105 Phil. 1342, 1343).

From the aforequoted ruling, it is
clear that the rationale behind the grant of vacation leave to an employee is
to enable the employee to have some rest and to re-invigorate himself so that
he would be more efficient and productive in his work.  This is a situation akin to that of workers
who are engaged in a lawful strike and are, thus, not actually rendering work,
and yet their “relationship as employees with their employer is not
severed or dissolved” (Elizalde Rope Factory,
Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, L-15163, Feb. 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 512, 516).

That employer-employee relationship is not severed nor suspended
when the employee is on vacation leave also finds support in American
jurisprudence.

Thus, it was held that

“(I)n its ordinary sense, the word ‘vacation’ suggests a
temporary status, implying continued service, and a ‘vacation’ is not
the end of employment” (Pa. In re Dauber, 30 A 2d 214,
216, 151; Pa. Super. 293 – Mattey vs.
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 63 A. 2d 429, 431, 164 Pa. Super 36.; underscoring supplied).

As such “when the employee is on vacation and receiving
compensation by way of vacation pay, such employee, although not actually
working is deemed not to be unemployed within the meaning of the law”
(Conn.  – Kelly vs.
Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 72 A. 2d 54, 136 Conn. 482).

WHEREFORE, THE APPEALED DECISION OF RESPONDENT WORKMEN’S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION SHOULD BE, AS IT IS HEREBY, SET ASIDE AND RESPONDENT
PHILIPPINE PACKING CORPORATION IS HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY:

1.  THE CLAIMANT WIDOW, MRS. GUADALUPE VDA. DE UCANG, AND HER SIX MINOR CHILDREN

(A)  THE AMOUNT OF SIX THOUSAND PESOS [P6,000.00] AS DEATH COMPENSATION; AND

(B)  TWO HUNDRED PESOS [P200.00] AS BURIAL
EXPENSES;

2.  ATTORNEY’S FEES EQUIVALENT TO 10% OF THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT RECOVERABLE BY THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED;

3.  THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION THE
AMOUNT OF SIXTY-ONE [P61.00] PESOS AS ADMINISTRATIVE FEE PURSUANT TO SECTION 55
OF THE ACT; AND

4.  THE COSTS.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Antonio, Muñoz Palma, and
Martin, JJ., concur.