HERACLEO VILLACIN, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF CADIZ, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE FRANCISCO ARELLANO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL AND MANUE…

Villacín versus Arellano

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, brought by Heracleo Villacín, the Municipal Mayor of Cadiz, Negros Occidental, against Judge Francisco Arellano of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and Manuel Solivio. Villacín asks the Supreme Court to annul two orders of the respondent judge: the order of July 6, 1957, directing him to reinstate Solivio as Chief of Police of Cadiz with back salaries, and the order of July 20, 1957, directing him to reinstate Solivio once more after Villacín had suspended him. The case matters because it fixes the limits of a mayor's power of suspension over the chief of police under Republic Act 557, and because it teaches when a person who was not a party to a case may nonetheless ask for execution of the judgment.

Procedural History

The story begins with a mandamus case filed by Jose Agapuyan in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, seeking reinstatement as Chief of Police of Cadiz. The trial court decided in favor of Agapuyan, and Mayor Joaquin Ledesma appealed. Pending appeal, the trial court ordered execution, and Agapuyan replaced Solivio in the post. Mayor Ledesma came to the Supreme Court on certiorari and mandamus, and the Supreme Court set aside the order of execution, ordered Agapuyan to vacate the post and restore it to Solivio, and held that Agapuyan's action for reinstatement was barred. The appeal on the merits later reached the Supreme Court, which reversed the trial court, dismissed Agapuyan's petition for mandamus, and held that his removal was warranted.

Solivio then moved in the Supreme Court for execution of the decision in his favor. The Supreme Court resolved that Solivio may resort to the Court of First Instance. Solivio did so, and the trial court issued an order of execution. After several orders and a reconsideration, Judge Arellano issued the order of July 6, 1957, directing Villacín to restore Solivio to the post within twenty-four hours under pain of arrest. Villacín complied on July 9, 1957, but the next day he suspended Solivio. On Solivio's motion, Judge Arellano issued the order of July 20, 1957, directing Villacín to reinstate Solivio once more, without prejudice to the administrative charges. Villacín then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.

Facts

Jose Agapuyan was removed as Chief of Police of Cadiz in 1946. Manuel Solivio, a qualified civil service eligible, was appointed Chief of Police in his place in 1947 and later received a salary promotion. Agapuyan accepted employment in the Bureau of Forestry, and only in 1954 did he sue for reinstatement. The trial court decided in his favor and ordered execution pending appeal, so Solivio had to give way. The Supreme Court set aside that execution and ordered Agapuyan to restore the post to Solivio, and later dismissed Agapuyan's petition for mandamus on the merits.

Because Mayor Ledesma, the winning party, was no longer mayor, and because Villacín, the new mayor, sided with Agapuyan and even tried to withdraw the appeal, it was Solivio who sought execution. Acting on the trial court's order, Villacín reinstated Solivio on July 9, 1957. On that same day, Villacín ordered Solivio to investigate cattle rustling and illegal slaughter of carabaos. Solivio asked to finish the inventory of the office properties first and noted that he had no firearm. The next day, July 10, 1957, Villacín suspended Solivio for alleged unlawful disobedience and dereliction of duty, and filed administrative charges against him before the Municipal Council.

Solivio moved for contempt, and Judge Arellano ordered Villacín to reinstate Solivio once more, without prejudice to the administrative charges. Villacín sought reconsideration, failed, and filed this petition, arguing that Solivio had no standing because he was not a party to the earlier cases, that the orders were directed against the wrong party, and that the order of July 20, 1957 deprived him of his power of suspension under Republic Act 557.

Issues

• Whether or not Solivio, though not a party to the earlier cases, had the right to move for and obtain the order of execution reinstating him.
• Whether or not the order of July 6, 1957 was void because it was directed against Villacín, who was not a party to the earlier cases.
• Whether or not Villacín abused his discretion in suspending Solivio on July 10, 1957, after having reinstated him under pain of arrest the day before.

Applicable Provisions

Republic Act 557, the law governing the suspension of chiefs of police, is the provision discussed by the Court. The decision refers to it as vesting in the municipal mayor the power to suspend the chief of police upon charges filed with the municipal council. The Court describes the power in these terms:

There is no question that under the said Republic Act No. 557, the respondent municipal mayor is empowered to suspend chief of police Solivio because of the charges filed either by him or by any other person with the municipal council.

This provision bears on the case because Villacín invokes it as the source of his power to suspend Solivio, and the Court must decide whether that power was exercised properly.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Solivio had the right to seek execution. As a rule, only the party in whose favor a case is decided may ask for execution. But under the peculiar circumstances, Ledesma, the winning party, was no longer mayor and could not ask for execution, while Villacín, the incumbent, was against Solivio and in favor of Agapuyan. The only person logically called upon to ask for execution was Solivio himself, for although technically not a party, he was the person directly benefited by the decision. Moreover, when Solivio moved in the Supreme Court for execution and was told that he may resort to the Court of First Instance, the Court practically acknowledged and recognized his right to ask for execution.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the argument that the order was directed against the wrong party. Villacín was the incumbent mayor, the officer charged by law with the duty to reinstate, and his refusal to obey the order was a defiance of the judgment of the Supreme Court.

On the third issue, the Court held that while Villacín normally had the right to suspend under Republic Act 557, his suspension of Solivio on July 10, 1957, after he had been compelled under pain of arrest to reinstate him the day before, was a manifest defiance of the judgment of the Supreme Court and of the order of Judge Arellano, and a clear abuse of authority. The charges filed on the same day of the suspension, indefinite as to date, and the charge of disobedience committed within so short a time, led the Court to conclude that the suspension smacked of harassment and persecution. The Court quoted with approval the observation of Judge Arellano that the power to suspend is discretionary and not mandatory, and that the mayor should have abstained from suspending Solivio under the circumstances.

Doctrine

First, the power of a municipal mayor to suspend the chief of police under Republic Act 557 is discretionary, not mandatory. It must be exercised in good faith and not as a means of defying or circumventing a final judgment of the courts. A suspension effected immediately after a compelled reinstatement, upon charges that appear to be harassment, is a clear abuse of authority.

Second, the right to ask for execution of a judgment belongs as a rule to the party in whose favor it was rendered. But where that party can no longer act, and the person directly benefited by the decision is the only one logically called upon to seek execution, that person may ask for it, especially where the court itself has recognized that right.

Third, the dignity and majesty of judicial power cannot be made a mockery by the acts of persons vested with authority. Orders of reinstatement issued under pain of arrest must be respected, and a public officer who complies in form but defeats the judgment in substance acts in defiance of the courts.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari and prohibition was denied, with costs against Villacín, so that the orders of Judge Arellano directing the reinstatement of Solivio stand.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: the power to suspend is discretionary, and a suspension made immediately after a compelled reinstatement, upon charges that smack of harassment, is a clear abuse of authority and a defiance of the judgment of the Supreme Court. Examiners use this case to test the limits of the mayor's suspension power under Republic Act 557 and the rule on who may ask for execution of a judgment when the nominal winning party can no longer act.