MARA, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ACE LUMBER CO., INC., RESPONDENTS.

This review of a decision of the Court of Appeals involves the
vexed question whether a party who files a motion to reconsider on the last day
of the period allotted by the Rules may still validly take further steps to
protect his interest the day after receiving the notice of denial of his
motion.

Ace Lumber Co. Inc., had resorted to the Court of Appeals against
an adverse decision of the court of first instance.  Its appeal (docketed as CA-G. R. No. 3637-R)
was dismissed by the appellate court for failure to submit its printed record
on appeal in due time.  The resolution of
dismissal, dated 9 March 1966,
was received by the appellant on 22
March 1966.  Fifteen days
later, on 6 April 1966, the appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the Court of Appeals denied it by a resolution received by movant
on 9 April.  The very next day, appellant
filed a second motion for reconsideration, with leave of the court, and the
latter, after considering the motion, granted it and reinstated the appeal.

The appellee, Mara, Inc., contending
that the second motion had been filed on the sixteenth day, asked the court to
declare the original dismissal of the appeal to have become final and executory.  The Court
of Appeals declined to do so, and the appellee,
unsuccessful in its attempts to induce said court to alter its position, came
to US on certiorari, charging abuse of discretion.

The question at issue had been considered and decided by this
Supreme Court in the case of Lloren vs. de Veyra, 4 S.C.R.A. 637, promulgated on 28 March 1962.  There an appeal was rejected as out of time
on the ground that, counting the total time elapsed between notice of the
decision and the filing of the appeal notice, record and bond, less the time
when the motion of new trial had been pending, the difference showed that the
appeal was late by one day.  The
appellant, on the other hand, contended that since he filed the motion to
reconsider on the fifteenth day,^[1]
the latter should not be counted, because it had not fully elapsed; hence,
appellant argued he was entitled to one more day to perfect his appeal.  This Court then ruled:

“After a mature deliberation, where the members of the Court
delved once more into the methods of computation discussed in the cases
mentioned by counsel for respondent, the Court resolved not to follow the
ruling in either of them and to adhere strictly to the rule of computation
embodied in Rule 28 of our rules.  The
idea that prevailed is that since petitioner Lloren
filed his motion for reconsideration on the 15th day of the period within which
he may perfect his appeal, that day should be excluded so that when he received
copy of the order denying his motion for reconsideration he had still 1 day
within which to perfect his appeal.  This
period of one day should be computed again in accordance with the rule above
cited by excluding the day of receipt and including the next day, which in this
case is 17 April 1958.  Hence, the Court
concluded that the appeal interposed by petitioner Lloren
was still within the reglementary period.”

The above ruling was embodied in the second paragraph of section
3, Rule 41, of the Revised Rules of 1964, that reads:

“SEC. 3.  How appeal
is taken.  – – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – – – -.

“But where such
a motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period
herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in
which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.”

Petitioner argues that
the Lloren doctrine and section 3 of Rule 41
apply only to the computation of periods for appeal, and not to the fixing of
the finality of other orders of dismissal. 
Nothing would be gained, however, by changing the rule, and much
confusion would be avoided by applying a uniform method of computing periods
under circumstances similar to the Lloren case, where
motions that stop the running of peremptory periods are filed on the last day
thereof.  After all, in both the Lloren case and the one before us, the question posed is
the same:  whether the judgment, or the
order dismissing the appeal, had acquired finality.

Petitioner points out
that by section 1, Rule 54, of the old Rules of Court, regarding motions for
rehearing or reconsideration, the appellate court was expressly granted (in the
last clause of said section) discretion to admit second motions for
reconsideration if filed “within two days from notice of the order denying
the first motion”; and that the Revised Rule 52 on the same subject
eliminated such saving proviso.  We
attach no im­portance to this feature, for the provision quoted had to be
eliminated as plainly incompatible with the doctrine of the Lloren
case that had been incorporated in Revised Rule 41.  The suppression, therefore, did not import a
departure from the basic doctrine.

WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of certiorari is
denied.  Costs against petitioner Mara,
Inc.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., did not take part.

^[1]
The appeal was from a municipal court decision, appealable
within 15 days only.