REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. BARTOLOME LIM AND WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COM­MISSION, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review of the order dated February 9, 1970 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission (in RO4-114879) and its reso­lution dated April 23,
1970, dismissing for lack of jurisdiction a petition for relief, filed with the
Commission by the Solicitor General (representing the petitioner Republic of
the Philippines), from a final and executory
letter-award of a referee of the Commission granting compensation benefits to
the herein respondent Bartolome Lim.

On December 2, 1969 acting chief referee Atanacio
Mardo of the Regional Office 4 in Manila, pursuant to
endorsements of the Office of the Solicitor General that it “will not
controvert the claim” of the respondent Lim, a district engineer employed
with the Bureau of Public Highways, adjudicated in favor of the latter the
following benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (hereinafter referred
to as the WCA), to wit:

(a)  P4,099.95 as “reimbursement of medical
expenses” under section 13 of the WCA;

(b)  P2,076.90 for incapacity for labor under
section 14 of the WCA; and

(c)  P6,000.23 for permanent partial disability
under section 18 of the WCA.

Items (b) and (c) above were, in the same
letter-award, reduced to P6,000 as this latter sum is the maximum disability
benefit allowed under the WCA.

The foregoing award became final and executory
on January 3, 1970, after
the Solicitor General failed, within the extended period granted to him, to
file any motion for reconsideration or appeal or petition for review with the
Commission.

On January 30, 1970 the Solicitor General filed with the Com­mission
a petition for relief under section 1, Rule 381^[1]
of the Rules of Court, seeking (a) the setting aside of that portion of the
award adjudicating the sum of P6,000.23 in favor of Lim; and (b) the reduction
of the sum of P4,099.95 as reimbursement of medical expenses.  The Solicitor General alleged:

“4.  That petitioner’s failure to perfect its
appeal from the said letter-award is due to excu­sable negligence, as shown by
the following facts:

“(a)  The undersigned Solicitor to whom this case is
assigned went on vacation leave to replenish his worn out energies from December 22, 1969 to January 4, 1970;

“(b)  Upon his resumption of work on January 5,
1970, he found a big heap of papers that were received while he was on leave
pertaining to a great majority of the no less than 429 active assorted cases he
was then handling;

“(c)  In his zeal to read and act upon those papers,
he overlooked the instant case, the records of which he kept in his cabinet
before he went on leave;

“(d)  However, when he got through with said papers
as well as the 20 new assorted cases assigned to him since his return to the
office on January 5, 1970, he took a look at his old cases and discovered that
in the meantime the period for perfecting an appeal from the letter-award had
already expired, hence, the instant petition for relief under Rule 38, Rules of
Court.”

On February 9, 1970
the Commission, through one of its com­missioners, issued an order dismissing
the mentioned petition “for the reason that matters of this nature fall
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Office.”

On March 13, 1970
the Solicitor General filed a motion for recon­sideration of the foregoing
order on the ground that the Commission has jurisdiction to entertain the
petition for relief —

“. . . because the Regional Office
which rendered the award is analogous to an inferior court and the Work­men’s
Compensation Commission, to a Court of First Instance, and considering that the
Rules of Court as a whole are suppletory to the Rules
of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission (Sec. 1, Rule 23, Rules of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission), Rule 38 of the Rules of Court applies to
the said petition for relief in a suppletory
character because the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission did not in
particular provide for the procedure to be taken in petitions for relief.”

On April 23, 1970
the Commission en banc approved a resolution denying the said
motion, for the following reasons:

“We do not the least doubt the fact that the Sup­reme Court
had impliedly recognized the authority of the Commission to pass upon the merit
of a petition for relief from judgment rendered by the referee.  But that was true under the old set-up or
under Republic Act 772, when the Workmen’s Compensation Commis­sion was an
independent body vested by law with the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide workmen’s compensation claims. 
Unlike today, where the Workmen’s Compensation Commission is but an
adjunct of the Bureau of Workmen’s Compensation and performs appellate
functions.  Hence, the cited ruling of
the Supreme Court [in Republic vs. Cesario de Leon,
G.R. No. L-9868, June 28, 1957;
54 O.G. No. 3, pp. 663-668] does not apply.

“Our consistent policy to refrain from taking an original
action on a petition for relief from judgment rendered by the regional office
is not without reason.  In fact, said
policy was aimed at giving more emphasis on the line that divides the powers of
the Commission and the regional offices, with the end in view of avoiding one
office unduly exercising the powers and functions belonging to the other and
vice-versa.  Such purpose could easily be
reduced to naught if we ever concede to and accept the view expressed by the
respondent that this Commission, and not the regional office, has the original
jurisdiction to entertain a peti­tion for relief from judgment.  Why is it so? 
Because under the Rules of Court, when the Court of First Ins­tance
finds the ground relied on by the petitioner in a petition for relief from
judgment rendered by the inferior court to be meritorious, it is by law
authorized to set aside the decision from which relief is sought and pro­ceed
with the trial or hearing of the case as if the same had been regularly brought
up by appeal.  (Section 7, Rule 38, Rules
of Court).  This kind of procedure is
legally allowable in the Court of First Instance because said court has both
the appellate power to review the decision of the inferior court and the power
to hear and try de novo cases originally falling within the juris­diction
of said inferior court.  This latter power
of the Court of First Instance is not shared by the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission for what the law (Act 3428, as amended by RA 4119) and the Rules (of
the WCC) had seen fit to grant it, is only the power to review.  It can­not originally hear and decide the
claim should it come out, after hearing the petition for relief from judgment,
that the ground relied on by the petitioner is meritorious.”

In due time, the Solicitor General filed the present petition for
review, based on the same grounds alleged in the mentioned motion for
reconsideration.

The position adopted by the Commission which, in essence, is that
since it cannot originally hear and decide a workmen’s compen­sation case it does
not have any jurisdiction to take cognizance of a petition for relief from a
judgment of a referee, finds no adequate leverage in either the statutes or the
decisions of this Court.

The WCA, as amended by R.A. 4119, did vest in the referee
original jurisdiction over all workmen’s compensation cases (secs. 7 and 48, WCA), and did provide that the Commission
shall have the power to review the decisions and awards of a referee.  However, the Commission, under the new
arrangement and division of powers brought about by R.A. 4119 between it and
the referees, did not thereby lose its authority and jurisdiction to grant
relief from an assailed award or decision of a referee.  Under the WCA (even after its amendment by R.A.
4119), the Commission retained the power and authority granted to it by the
WCA, as amended by R.A. 772, to make its own factual findings relative to a
controversy before it.  Section 47 of the
WCA thus provides:

“SEC. 47.  General
powers and duties.– The Commissioner shall have full power and authority:

“(a)  To take charge of the administration of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act.

“(b)  To hear and determine all claims for com­pensation
under this Act in the manner herein pro­vided; to require and order medical
service for injured employees as provided herein; to approve and fix attor­ney’s
fees and claims for medical services; to excuse failure to give notice either
of injury, sickness or death of an employee; to approve agreements, make,
modify or rescind awards, and make findings of fact and rulings of law;
to determine the time for payment of compensation and order reimbursements of
employers for amounts advanced; to assess penalties, compute awards, and
compromise actions for the collection of awards; to require and order physical
examinations of injured em­ployees; and to exercise such other powers as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act. . . .” (italics
ours)

In addition, section 49 of the WCA
provides, inter alia:

“SEC. 49.  Procedure.  – Any dispute or contro­versy concerning
compensation under this Act shall be submitted to the Commissioner as provided
herein.

“Hearing shall be held by the Commissioner upon his own motion
or upon the application of any party inte­rested therein.  He shall cause reasonable notice of such hearing
to be given to each party interested, in service upon him personally or mailing
a copy thereof to him at his last known post office address.  Such hearing may be adjourned from time to
time in the discretion of the Com­missioner and may be heard at such place or
places as he shall designate.  All
parties in interest shall have the right to be present at any hearing in person
or by counsel or by any other agent, or representative, to present such
testimony as may be pertinent to the controversy before the Commissioner and to
cross-examine the witnesses against them.”

Contrary then to the impression of the Commission that it merely
sits passively to review the decisions and awards of a referee, the foregoing
provisions of the WCA clearly empower it to actively and directly inform itself
on the particulars of any con­troversy or compensation claim pending before
it.  Its functions, therefore, are not
merely that of simply reading the evidence already on record.  As an active participant in the broad process
of deter­mining the viability in law of a compensation claim, the Commission,
in the absence of a specific rule to the contrary, performs, in this respect, a
function not substantially different in scope and nature from that of a court
of first instance.  Since the Rules of
Court apply to workmen’s compensation cases in a suppletory
manner, the Commission, in a proper case, may grant relief from a judg­ment
rendered by a referee under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.  This authority of the Commission, which has
been recognized in several cases decided by this Court,^[2]
was not abrogated by R.A. 4119 when this amended the WCA on June 20, 1964.

But while this Court recognizes the authority of the Com­mission
to grant relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, it is also
quite clear that the grounds adduced by the petitioner in the case at bar do
not constitute excusable negligence.

A copy of the award in question was received by the solicitor
assigned to the case on December 4,
1969.  He had, therefore,
until December 19, 1969
within which to file a petition for review with the Commission.  This period was, upon his request, extended
for 15 days from December 19, 1969,
or to January 3, 1970.  The said solicitor, however, went on leave
from December 22, 1969 to January 5, 1970.  In failing to take the necessary and
appropriate precautions required by the circumstances, which resulted in his
being unable to take an appeal from the said award of the referee, the said
solicitor has only himself to blame.

Moreover, it must be observed that the claim of the respondent
Lim was never controverted by the Solicitor General
who, in point of fact, even unmistakably and explicitly represented to the
referee that the Government was not contesting the said claim.  The petitioner is thus deemed to have waived
or renounced, by operation of law, its right to question the validity or
reasonableness of the respondent Lim’s claim for compensation under the WCA.^[3]

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby denied.  No pro­nouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., did not take part.

^[1]
“Section 1.  Petition to Court of
First instance for relief from judgment of inferior court.– When a judgment
is rendered by an inferior court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud,
accident, mistake or excu­sable negligence, has been unjustly deprived of a
hearing therein, or has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a
petition in the Court of First Instance of the province in which the original
judgment was ren­dered, praying that such judgment be set aside and the case
tried upon its merits.”

^[2]
Republic vs. De Leon,
G.R. No. L-9868, June 28, 1957;
Buenaflor vs. De Leon,
G.R. No. L-7583, May 25, 1955,
97 Phil. 78; Fuentes vs. Binamira, G.R. No. L-14965,
August 31, 1961, 2 SCRA
1133; and Filipino Pipe & Foundry Corp. vs. W.C.C., G.R. No. L-20381,
December 24, 1963, 9 SCRA
721.

^[3] Talisay-Silay Co., Inc. vs. W.C.C., G.R. No. L-22096,
September 29, 1967, 21 SCRA
371, and cases cited therein.