G. R. No. L-15927. April 29, 1963
VICENTE MARTELINO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. MAXIMO ESTRELLA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF MAKATI, RESPONDENT.
REGALA, J.:
Rizal dismissing the petition of Vicente Martelino for prohibition with
preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 4502.
The facts are undisputed. On April 1, 1956, the
Municipal Council of Makati, Rizal, by Resolution No. 94, approved the
application of Vicente Martelino to reopen the Tropical Night Spot
cabaret in Constancia street of said municipality.[1] Pursuant thereto, the Mayor of Makati issued the corresponding permit to said applicant.
Under date of January 22,1957, the Executive Secretary, through the
Provincial Governor of Rizal, sent a communication to the mayor,
informing him that according to the records in his (Secretary’s)
office, there were two buildings within 200 meters from the cabaret,
which were being rented for school purposes, and which made the
operation of said amusement place violative of Republic Act No. 1224.
The mayor was thus enjoined to revoke the permit he had issued.
Replying to the communication of the Executive
Secretary, the mayor asked for reconsideration of the order, alleging
that according to an investigation conducted by a committee created by
the municipal council of Makati, the classroom annex which used to be
near the site of the cabaret had already been transferred to a far away
barrio.
Subsequently, however, the governor of Rizal again
addressed a letter to the mayor stating that according to a survey
conducted by his office, the cabaret in question is, located 191.50
meters from the F. Benitez Elementary School Annex, 37.30 from a
Catholic chapel and 178 meters from a chapel of the Iglesia ni Kristo.
Likewise, the mayor was enjoined to comply with the directive of the
Executive Secretary.
Accordingly, the mayor sent a letter to Martelino,
ordering him to close the cabaret in question. But instead of
complying, Martelino, on April 2, 1957 filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction praying that the mayor’s order of closure be declared null
and void for having been issued without or in excess of authority or
with grave abuse of discretion, and that the mayor be ordered to
refrain from enforcing said order. As prayed for, a preliminary writ
was issued before trial.
The Court of First Instance found, that, although
there was no school within 200 meters from the questioned cabaret,
there were two chapels therein. Said court, therefore, dismissed the
petition and dissolved the preliminary injunction, holding that the
establishment of petioher’s cabaret is in violation of Republic Act No.
1224.
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but
that court certified the case to Us, finding no factual question
involved. The certification, however, contains a very clear recital of
the facts.
The provision of law that meets interpretation is
Section 1 of Republic Act 938, as amended by Republic Acts 979 and
1224, which reads:
“Section 1. The Municipal or City board or council of each, chartered
city and the municipal council of each municipal district shall have
the power to regulate or prohibit by ordinance the establishment,
maintenance and operation of nightclubs, cabarets, dancing schools,
pavilions, cockpits, bards, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools,
and other similar places of amusement within its territorial
jurisdiction: Provided, however, That no such places of amusement
mentioned therein shall be established, maintained and/or operated
within a radius of two hundred lineal meters in the case of night clubs, cabarets,
pavilions, or other similar places, and fifty lineal meters in case of
dancing schools, bars, saloons, billiard pools, except cockpit the
distance of which shall be left to the discretion of the municipal or
city board or council, from any public building, schools, hospitals and
churches,* * *.” (Italics supplied.)
The
only issue in this appeal is whether or not the two chapels, which are
located within a radius of 200 meters to the cabaret in question may be
considered churches within the meaning of the above quoted section of
the law.
Petitioner argues that Republic Act 1224
speaks of “churches” and not “chapels,” and following, the principle of
statutory construction—expresio unius est exclusio alterius, the word “churches” should not be taken to include chapels. Petitioner further states that there is a sharp
difference between church and chapel.
We do not agree with petitioner.
As appearing in Webster’s Third International Dictionary, “chapel” is defined as follows:vee
“1. (a) small house or subordinate place of worship; A Christian sanctuary other than a parish or cathedral church. (b) a church subordinate to and dependent on the principal parish church to which it is supplement of some kind. “2. (a) a building or portion of a building or institution (as a place hospital, prison, college) set apart for private devotions and often also for private religious services. (b) a room or recess in a church that often contains an altar and is separately dedicated and that is designed especially for meditation and prayer but is sometimes used for small religious services.
* * * *
We
believe that when the law speaks of “churches” it includes all places
suited to regular religious worship. In 7 Words and Phrases 199, it is
described as a “place where persons regularly assemble for worship.”
(citing Stubbs vs. Texas Liquor Control Board, Tex. Cir. Appl,
166 S.W. 2d. 178, 180.),
There is no question that a chapel is also a place of worship, but, of
course, there are chapels where religious services are not held
regularly, as in Webster’s definition 2 a) and (b)
above stated. Undoubtedly, these kinds of chapel, where there is no
regularity in the holding of religious services, would not fall under
the category of churches as contemplated in the law.
The
two chapels in question are, as found by both tho Court of First
Instance and the Court of Appeals, intended for the holding regularly
of religious services. It appears that the Iglesia ni Kristo chapel,
although alleged to be located on borrowed lot, has its own pastor and
services are held there regularly until a permanent one is built. The
Catholic chapel, on the other hand, although formerly only a sort of camalig
in 1947, has been improved since then by the townspeople and has now a
galvanized iron roofing, wood sidings and cement foundations. Before
1954, the people, every now and then, used to invite the parish priast
of the town to hold mass there. Beginning that year, however, thru the
initiative of members of the Catholic Action, mass has been celebrated
there every Sunday and on special occasions.
The above
descriptions reveal no serious differences between the chapels in
question from a church. In fact, they are churches; only that they may
be smaller than, or subordinate to, a principal church. The essential
characteristic of a church, as already explained, is the devotion of
the place to religious services held with regularity, and not the size
of the building or of the congregation that assembles therein. The fact
that these two buildings in question are called “chapel” in no way
alters the case (See Delgado, et al. vs. Koque, et al., G. R. No. L-8260, May 27, 1955.).
In the Delgado, et al. vs. Roque, et al. case, supra,
this Court has held that the so-called chapel of the Seventh Day
Adventist in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, which is located near a proposed
cockpit, is considered a “church” within the meaning of the law
involved in this case.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
[1]
Reopening of the same Tropical Night Spot was also denied by the
decision of this Court in Provincial Governor of Rizal, et al. vs.
Hon. Demetrio Encarnacion, et al., G. R. No. L-7282. Nov. 29, 1954, for
the reason that it stand less than 500 meters from public schools. (The
distance, as now provided in law, as amended is 200 meters.)