G.R. No. L-25134. October 30, 1969
THE CITY OF BACOLOD, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
BARREDO, J.:
An appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in its Civil Case No. 7355, ordering the
San Miguel Brewery, Inc. to pay to the City of Bacolod
the sum of P36,519.10, representing surcharges on certain fees which, under
existing ordinances of the City of Bacolod, the San
Miguel Brewery should have paid quarterly to the treasurer of the said city for
and/or during the period from July, 1959 to December, 1962, but which were paid only on April 23, 1963.
On February 17,
1949, the City Council of Bacolod passed Ordinance
No. 66, series of 1949 imposing upon “any person, firm or corporation
engaged in the manufacture of bottling
of coca cola, pepsi cola, tru
orange, lemonade, and other soft drinks within the jurisdiction of the City of Bacolod, x x x
a fee of ONE TWENTY-FOURTH (1/24) of a centavo for every bottle thereof”,
plus “a surcharge of 2% every month, but in no case to exceed 24% for one
whole year”, upon “such local manuÂfacturers or bottlers
above-mentioned who will be delinÂquent on any amount of fees due” under
the ordinance.
In 1959, this ordinance
was amended by Ordinance No. 150, series of 1959, by increasing the fee to
“one-eight (1/8) of a centavo for every bottle thereof”. In other words, the fee was increased from
P0.01 to P0.03 per case of soft drinks. Appellant refused to pay the additional fee
and challenged the validity of the whole ordinance.
Under date of March
23, 1960, appellee sued appelÂlant in Civil Case No. 5693 of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, with
the corresponding Complaint alleging, inter alia:
“3. –
That the defendant, Manager of the San Miguel Brewery, Bacolod Coca Cola Plant, Bacolod
Branch since the approval of Ordinance No. 66, series of 1949 as amended by
Ordinance No. 150, Series of 1959, which took effect on July 1, 1959, only paid
to the plaintiff herein the P0.01 bottÂling tax per case of soft drinks thereby
refusing to pay the bottling tax per
case of soft drinks which amounted to P26,306.54 at P0.02 per case of soft
drinks such as coca cola and tru orange manufactured
or bottled by said company as per statement submitted by the Assistant City
Treasurer of Bacolod City herewith attached as Annex
‘C’ of this comÂplaint;”
and
praying
“x x x that
judgment be rendered for the plaintiff:
“(a) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff
the bottling taxes of P0.03 per case of soft drinks as provided for in Section
1, Ordinance No. 66, Series of 1949, as amended by Ordinance No. 150, Series of
1959, as well as the sum of P26,306.54 representing unpaid bottling taxes due
with legal rate of interest thereon from the date of the filing of this
complaint until complete payment thereof; x x x costs, etc.”
In due time, appellant filed its answer. This was followed by a stipulation of facts
between the parties, whereupon, the court rendered judgment on November 12, 1960, with the
following dispositive portion:
“WHEREFORE, San Miguel Brewery, Inc. is ordered to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P26,306.54 and the tax at the rate of three centavos per
case levied in Ordinance No. 66 and 150 from March, 1960, and thereafter. Costs against the defendant.”
Appellant appealed from the said decision to this Court where it
pressed the question of the invalidity of the above-mentioned taxing
ordinances. In that appeal (G. R. No.
18290), however, this Court affirmed the decision appealed from and upheld the
constitutionality of the questioned ordinances and the authority of the appellee
to enact the same. For reasons not
extant in the
record, it was already after this decision had become final when appellee moved for the reconsideration thereof, praying
that the same be amended so as to include the penalties and surcharges provided
for in the ordinances. Naturally, the
said motion was denied, for the reason that “the decision is already final
and may not be amended”. When
execution was had before the lower court, the appellee again sought the inclusion of the
surcharges referred to; and once again the move was frustrated by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which denied the motion, as follows:
“Acting upon the motion dated October 24, 1963, filed by the
Assistant City Fiscal, Raymundo Rallos,
counsel for the plaintiff, and the opposition thereto filed by attorneys for
the defendants dated November 9, 1963, as well as the reply to the opposition of counsel for the defendants dated December
5, 1963, taking into consideration that the decision of this Court as affirmed
by the Supreme Court does not
specifically mention the alleged
surcharges claimed by the plaintiff-appellee, the
Court hereby resolves to deny, as it hereby denies, the aforesaid motion, for
not being meritorious.”
Failing thus in its attempt
to collect the surcharges provided for in the ordinances in question, appellee
filed a second action (Civil Case No. 7355) to collect the said surcharges.
Under date of July 10, 1964, it filed the corresponding complaint before
the same Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
alleging, inter alia that:
“6. That soon after the decision of the Honorable
Supreme Court affirmÂing the decision of the Hon. Court, the defendant
herein on April 23, 1963 paid
to the City of Bacolod, the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR PESOS and TWENTY CENTAVOS (P156,924.20) as
taxes from July, 1959 to December, 1962 in compliance with the provision of
Section 1, Ordinance No. 66, Series of 1949, as amended by Ordinance No. 150,
Series of 1959, which corresponds to the taxes due under said section in the amount of P0.03 per case of soft drinks
manufactured by the defendant, but refused and still continued refusing to pay
the surcharge as provided for under Section 4 of Ordinance No. 66, Series of
1949, as amended by Ordinance No. 150, Series of 1959, which reads as
follows:
‘Sec. 4. – A surcharge of 2%
every month, but in no case to exceed 24% for one whole year, shall be imposed
on such local manufacturer or bottlers above mentioned who will be delinquent on any amount
of fees under the ordinance.â
which up to now amounted to THIRTY SIX
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINETEEN
PESOS AND TEN CENTAVOS (P36,519.10), as shown
by the certified statement of the office of the City Treasurer of Bacolod City herewith attached as Annex âE’ and made an
integral part of this complaint;
“7. That the said interest and/or penalties to the said bottling taxes which defendant refused to pay have
long been overdue;”
and again praying
“x x
x that judgment be rendered for the plaintiff:
â(a) Ordering the defendant to pay the penalty and/or interest therein
Section 4 of Ordinance No. 66, Series of 1949, as amended by Ordinance No. 150,
Series of 1959 the total amount of THIRTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINETEEN
PESOS and TEN CENTAVOS (P36,519.10), representing the surcharges from August
1959 to December, 1962, inclusive, and
the 24% penalty computed as of June 30, 1964, from the amount of P152,162.90, with legal
rate of interest thereon from the date of the filing of this complaint until complete payment thereof;â plus costs, etc.â
On July 24,
1964, appellant
filed a motion to dismiss
the case on the grounds that: (1) the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment, and (2) a party may
not institute more than one suit for a
single cause of action. This
motion was denied by the court a quo in its order dated August 22, 1964; so
appellant filed its answer wherein it substantially reiterated, as affirmative defenses, the above-mentioned grounds of its motion to dismiss.
Thereafter, the parties submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings, whereupon, the court rendered
judgment on March 11, 1965 with the following dispositive
portion:
“IN VIEW THEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant San MiÂguel Brewery, Inc. to pay to the plainÂtiff the sum of
P36,519.10 representing the surcharges as provided in section 4 of Ordinance
66, series of 1949 of the City of Bacolod. No costs.”
Appellants moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied,
hence, the instant appeal.
Appellant has only one
assignment of error, to wit:
“THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT LIABLE TO THE APPELLEE FOR THE SUM OF P36,519.10
REPRESENTÂING SURCHARGES AS PROVIDED IN TAX ORÂDINANCE NO. 66, SERIES OF 1949,
AS AÂMENDED, OF THE CITY OF BACOLOD.”
Under this, it argues that the action of appellee
canÂnot be maintained because (1) a party may not institute more than one suit
for a single cause of action; and (2) appelÂlee’s
action for recovery of the surcharges in question is barred by prior judgment.
We find appellant’s position essentially correct. There is no question that appellee split up its
cause of action when it filed the first complaint on March 23, 1960, seeking
the recovery of only the bottling taxes or charges plus legal interest, without
mentioning in any manner the surcharges.
The rule on the matter is clear.
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court of 1940 which were
still in force then provided:
“Sec. 3. Splitting a cause of actÂion, forbidden. – A single cause of action cannot be split up
into two or more parts so as to be made the subject of different complaints.
“Sec. 4. Effect of
splitting. – If separate complaints were
brought for different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the
others, and a judgment upon the merits in either is available as a bar in the
others.”
Indeed, this rule against the splitting up of a cause of action is an old one. In fact, it preceded the Rules of Court or any statutory
provision. In Bachrach
Motor Co., Inc. vs. Icarañgal,
et al.,[1]
this Court already explained its
meaning, origin and purpose thus:
“But, even if we have no such sectÂion 708 of our Code of Civil Procedure, or section 59 of the
Insolvency Law, we have still the rule against splitting a single cause of
action. This rule, though not contained
in any statutory provision, has been applied by this court in all appropriate
cases. Thus, in Santos vs. Moir (36 Phil. 350, 339), we said: ‘It is well recognized
that a party cannot split a single cause of action into parts and sue on each
part separately. A complaint for the recovery of
personal property with damages for detention states a single cause of action
which cannot be divided into an action for
possession and one for damages; and if
suit is brought for possession
only a subsequent action cannot be
maintained to recover the damages resulting from the unlawful detention.’ In Rubio de Larena vs. Villanueva (53 Phil. 923, 927), we
reiterated the rule by stating that ‘x
x x a party will not be permitted to split up
a single cause of action and
make it the basis for several suits’ and
that when a lease provides for the payment of the
rent in separate installments, each installment constitutes an independent cause of action, but when, at the time
the complaint is filed, there are several
installments due, all of them constitute a single cause of action and
should be included in a single complaint , and if some of them are not so
included, they are barred. The same
doctrine is stated, in Lavarro vs. Labitoria (54 Phil.
788), wherein we said that ‘a party will not be permitted to split up a single
cause of action and make it a basis for several suits’ and that a claim for
partition of real property as well as for improvements constitutes a single
cause of action, and a complaint for partition alone bars a subsequent
complaint for the improvements. And in
Blossom & Co. vs. Manila Gas Corporation (55 Phil. 226, 240), we held that
‘as a general rule a contract to do several things at several times is
divisible in its nature, so as to
authorize successive actions; and a judgment recovered for a single breach of a
continuing contract or covenant is no bar to a suit for a subsequent breach
thereof. But where the covenant or
contract is entire, and the breach total, there can be only one action, and
plaintiff must therein recover all his damages.’
“The rule against splitting a single cause of action is
intended ‘to prevent repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to
the same subject of controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary
vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits.’ (1
C. J., 1107) It comes from that old maxim nemo
debet bis vexare pro
una et eadem causa (no
man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause). (Ex parte Lange, 18. Wall. 163, 168; 21 Law. ed.,
872.; also U.S.
vs. Throckmorton, 98 U.S.
61; 25 Law. ed., 93.) And it developed, certainly not as an original legal
right of the defendant, but as an interposition of courts upon principles of
public policy to prevent inconvenience and hardship incident to repeated and
unnecessary litigations. (1 C. J.,
1107).”
In the light of these precedents, it cannot be denied that
appellant’s failure to pay the bottling charges or taxes and the surcharges for
delinquency in the payment thereof constitutes but one single cause of action
which under the above rule can be the subject of only one complaint, under pain
of either of them being barred if not included in the same complaint with the
other. The error of appellee
springs from a misconception or a vague comprehension of the elements of a
cause of action. The classical
definition of a cause of action is that it is “a delict
or wrong by which the rights of the plaintiff are violated by the
defendant.” Its elements may be generally stated to be (1) a right existÂing
in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a corresponding obligaÂtion on the part of the
defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission of the plaintiff
which constitutes a violation of the plaintiff’s right which defendant had the
duty to respect. For purposes, however,
of the rule against splitting up of a cause of action, a clearer understanding
can be achieved, if together with these elements, the right to relief is
considered.
In the last analysis, a cause of action is basically an act or an
omission or several acts or omissions. A
sinÂgle act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct
legal obligations. This happens, for
example, when a passenger of a comÂmon carrier, such as a taxi, is injured in a
collision thereÂof with another vehicle due to the negligence of the respective
drivers of both vehicles. In such a
case, several rights of the passenger are violated, inter alia, (1) the right to be safe from the negligent
acts of either or both the drivers under the law on culpa-aquiliana
or quasi-delict; (2) the right to be safe from
criminal negligence of the said drivers under the penal laws; and (3) the right
to be safely conductÂed to his destination under the contract of carriage and
the law covering the same, not counting anymore the provisions of Article 33 of
the Civil Code. The violation of each of
these rights is a cause of action in itself.
Hence, such a passenger has at least three causes of action arising from
the same act. On the other hand, it can
happen also that several acts or omissions may violate only one right, in which
case, there would be only one cause of action.
Again, the violation of a single right may give rise to more than one
relief. In other words, for a single
cause of action or violation of a right, the plaintiff may be entitled to several
reliefs. It is
the filing of separate complaints for these several reliefs
that constitutes splitting up of the cause of action. This is what is prohibited by the rule.
In the case at bar, when appellant failed and refused to pay the
difference in bottling charges from July 1, 1959, such act of appellant in
violation of the right of appellee to be paid said
charges in full under the Ordinance, was one single cause of action, but under
the Ordinance, appellee became entitled, as a result
of such non-payment, to two reliefs, namely: (1) the recovery of the balance of the basic
charges; and (2) the payment of the corresponding surcharges, the latter being
merely a consequence of the failure to pay the former. Stated differently, the obligation of
appellant to pay the surcharges arose from the violation by said appellant of
the same right of appellee from which the obligation
to pay the basic charges also arose.
Upon these facts, it is obvious that appellee
has filed separate complaints for each of two reliefs
related to the same single cause of action, thereby splitting up the said cause
of action.
The trial court held that inasmuch as there was no demand in the
complaint in the first case for the payment of the surcharges, unlike in the
case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Blas
Gutierrez, et al., G. R. No. L-13819, May
25, 1960, wherein there was such a demand, there is no bar by
prior judgment as to said surcharges, the same not having been “raised as
an issue or cause of action in Civil Case No. 5693.” This holding is erroneous.
Section 4 of Rule 2, above-quoted, is unmistakably clear as to the effect
of the splitting up of a cause of action. It
says, “if separate complaints are brought for different parts (reliefs) of a single cause of action, the filing of the
first (complaint) may be pleaded in abatement of the others, and a judgment
upon the merits in either is available as a bar in the others.” In other
words, whenever a plaintiff has filed more than one complaint for the same
violation of a right, the filing of the first complaint on any of the reliefs born of the said violation constitutes a bar to any action on any
of the other possible reliefs arising from the same
violation, whether the first action is still pending, in which event, the defense to the
subsequent complaint would be litis pendentia, or it has already been finally terminated,
in which case, the defense would be res adjudicata.[2]
Indeed, litis pendentia
and res adjudicata, on the one hand, and splitting up a cause of action on the other, are not separate and distinct defenses,
since either of the former is by law
only the result or effect of the latter, or, better said, the sanction for or behind it.
It thus results that the
judgment of the lower court must be, as it is hereby, reversed and the complaint of appellee
is dismissed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
[1]
68 Phil., 287, 292-293.
[2]
The corresponding provision in the Revised Rules of 1964 expresses these points
more specifically. Section 4 of Rule 2
provides:
“If two or more complaints are brought for different
parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in
abatement of the other or others, in accordance with section 1 (e), Rule 16,
(on pendency of another action) and a judgment upon
the merits in any one is available
as a bar in the others.” altho the writer of
this opinion feels that a happier wording would be:
“A single cause of action cannot be the subject of more
than one complaint.”