G.R. No. L-47489. June 18, 1987
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EULOGIO MANAAY, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In an Information that was filed by the Assistant Fiscal in the
then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal,
the accused-appellant Eulogio S. Manaay
was charged of the crime of rape. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 18600.
The said crime was allegedly committed in this manner:
“That on or about the 22nd day of May, 1968, in the
municipality of San Juan, proÂvince of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
Marina Pacaoncis, against her will and consent. Contrary to law.”[1]
Together with the above-quoted information another one was filed
charging the accused-appellant of a second crime of rape which was allegedly
perpetrated on the same complainant, this time on June 27, 1968. This
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 18601.
Upon arraignment, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty on
both charges of rape. Trial on the
merits ensued and, thereafter, a decision was rendered by the trial court
convicting the appellant of the crime as charged in Criminal Case No.
18600. However, the appellant was
acquitted in Criminal Case No. 18601.
The dispositve portion of the trial court’s
Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 18600, the accused is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and is sentenced to life
imprisonment and to pay the costs.
In Criminal Case No. 18601, for failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is acquitted of the crime of rape with costs de
oficio.”
Not satisfied therewith, the appellant interposed this appeal
alleging that the trial court committed the following errors:
“I
THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON THE TESTIMONY OF
THE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS FRAUGHT WITH SERIOUS DOUBT, AND THEREFORE, CLEARLY
APPEARS TO BE INCREDIBLE AND UNBELIEVABLE.
II
THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED AS PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE
WERE INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN SUCH CONVICTION.
The opposing parties presented conflicting versions of the facts
material to the case. In the appealed
decision, the version of the prosecution is related as follows, which is
substantially borne by the records –
“The prosecution version was established primarily through the
testimony of the complainant Marina Pacaonsis, an 18
year old girl. She testified that on March 22, 1968, she was employed as a
maid in the household of the accused located at 175 P.
Benito Street, San Juan, Rizal. At about 2:30 o’clock in the afternoon on May 22, 1968, while she was ironing
clothes, the accused asked her to bring a glass of water inside his room. After entering the room which was on the
second floor of the house, and handing over the glass of water, the accused suddenly
locked the room and ordered the complainant to sit on his bed. Complying with the order, the complainant
asked the accused why she was being made to do so.
But instead of replying, the accused quickly embraced the complainant
and began to unbutton the front portion of her blouse and skirt. Sensing that the accused was up to something
bad, the complainant parÂried his hands prompting the accused, who was then in
brief underwear, to slap her on the face.
As a result, the complainant fell on the bed and immediately the accused
boxed her on the left and right upper arms.
In the struggle that ensued, the accused was able to partly unbutton the
blouse of the complainant which he raised up to her shoulders. In addition, the accused delivered a hard
blow on the pit of her stomach while she was lying on the bed. Because of the pain she suffered and beÂcause
of the superior force exerted by the accused, the complainant was unable to
fight back and could only shout for help to Domingo, the houseboy, who was then
the only one inside the house. Due to
fear, however, Domingo failed to resÂpond and the accused continued slapping
and removing the clothes of the complaiÂnant.
At that time, the wife of the accused was attending a party together
with her children.
After the complainant was hit on the stomach and disrobed, except
for her bra, she began to feel dizzy.
While about to faint or lose consciousness, she felt pain on her private
part when the accused inÂserted his organ.
After the lapse of what she thought was several minutes, and after
regaining fully her consciousness, the comÂplainant felt her whole body
throbbing with pain and discovered that her private part was bloody. At the corner of the room, she saw the
accused trying to put on his underÂwear.
When the complainant stood up, got her clothes and put them on and when
she was about to leave the room, the accused talked to her briefly. He threatened to kill her if she would reveal
to anybody what happened on that fateful afternoon, Since she was too scared to
say anything, the complainant, however, simply went downstairs where she cried
her heart out and fixed her clothes.
On the following day, after she was raped, the accused continued to
order the complainant to do some chores in the house. But he never stopped threatening her as he
even went to the extent of saying that he would shoot her should she leave the
house. In fact, the complainant learned
later on that the accused had even asked the houseboy to keep watch over her so
that she could not leave the house without any companions. Despite what had happened, the complainant,
however, continued working in the house of the accused.”
According to the complainant, she was again abused by the
accused-appellant on June 27, 1968. She also testified on the story behind this
second alleged rape.
The trial court’s narration of facts continues, thus:
“xxx. On the following
morning, on June 28, 1968,
she, then cried and comÂplained to the wife of the accused reporting to her
what had occurred. She showed her bloody
panty to her but Mrs. Manaay, who was afraid of the
accused, merely gave her a bottle of medicine to take which was bitter in
taste. She also requested the
complainant not to tell her children what had happened.
On the following day, on June
29, 1968, the
complainant asked a neighbor to get in touch with Lita,
her friend, so she could fetch her. On
the afternoon of that day, Lita and her sister,
together with Lorna, arrived at the house and handed to the complainant a
telegram which was to be delivered to the accused. The telegram was a message from her parents
from the Visayas asking her to come home. But when the complainant handed the telegram
to the accused, the latter tore it into pieces and said that the complainant
was just a nuisance to him. The accused
became particularly angry when the complainant asked permission to leave and he
tried to box Lita who came to fetch her. Eventually, the comÂplainant, together with Lita and her compaÂnions, were able to leave the house and
on the way out, the complainant narrated to her companions, who cried with her,
the ordeal she went through. For about
one week, the complainant stayed in Lita’s house
until her aunt, Trinidad Amorante, came and fetched
her. Since then she had lived with her
aunt.
On September 1, 1968,
the complainant submitted herself to a medico-legal examiÂnation at the Manila
Police Department. The findings of Dr.
Mariano B. Lara, the Medico Legal Officer, were as follows:
‘(1) Complainant subject is
a regularÂly developed and nourished female Filipino of about the stated age of
17 years (alleÂgedly born on 14
January 1951) 4 ft., 10 inches tall and 110 lbs. in weight.
(2) The mental condition
is sane and normal, and she appears candid.
(3) There are no physical
injuries found on the body.
(4) The breasts are
regularly deveÂloped, compatible with her physique, the left one slightly
bigger than the right, but as yet shows no signs of present or past pregnancy.
(5) The abdomen is regular
to slightÂly obese, compatible with her physique, and also presents no signs of
past or present pregnancy as yet.
(6) Genital (private
parts) findings, seen during her lying down delivery posiÂtion reveals a
moderately wide hymen opening into the vagina, freely admitting the adult
examining forefinger with indentation likeÂly a healed tear in the hymen posteriorly
through which opening, is visible bulging down towards the orifice, the lower
anterior vaginal wall – these features being of a non-virgin; the vaginal canal contains some muco-purulent
material.
(7) Microscopic
examination of the muco-purulent material obtained
from the vagina, after staining, shows
many epiÂthelial cells, some to many pus cells, many extraneous bacterial
organisms, but there are no spermatozoa or gonococci found.
(8) She alleges that her
last mensÂtruation occurred on 14-19 August 1968.
OPINION: The factual findings of moderately wide hymen
opening into the vagina, freely admitting that adult examining foreÂfinger,
thru which is visibly bulging the anterior lower vaginal wall with an indentaÂtion
in the posterior hymen likely a prior tear, in the private parts of complainant
MARINA PACAONSIS, 17 years as identified, are signs or indicia typical of
non-virginal state resulting from prior intercourse. They are compatible with her averment of sex
intercourse consumated upon her allegedly by the
defendant sometime about 22 May 1968,
under what she claims, forcible acts. As
yet she is not pregnant.’ (Exhibit A)”
On the other hand, the
appellant testified that he was an account executive in Caltex, Philippines until his retirement in 1973 and that his
daily schedule required him to leave his house at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning and come back no earlier than
5:00
o’clock in the
afternoon.[2] The appellant insisted that he could not
have had carnal relations with the complainant in the afternoon of May 22,
1968 because he was
in his office doing his work, it being an ordinary working day. He alleged that on that day, he went home
from work at about 6:30 o’clock in the evening.[3]
Under his first
assignment of error, the appellant assails the credibility of the complainant’s
testimony. Said testimony is alleÂgedly
fraught with serious doubts and appears to be incredible and unbelievable. The appellant’s arguments in support of this
position revolved around the allegation that the sexual act between him and the
complainant was voluntary rather than forced.
According to the
appellant, the complainant contradicted herÂself when during her direct examination
she testified that she became “unconscious” after being rained with
body blows, while during her cross-examination she made it appear that she was
at least partly aware of what was happening to her. The trial court characterized her condition as
being “dizzy”. In addition,
the appellant contends that if the complainant wanted to avoid having sexual
intercourse, she could have done any of the following acts:
“1. She was then at
liberty to open the room and run out (since the door could be opened from the
inside);
2. She could put-up
adequate resistance until her dress and panty were torn out because then her
condition was just ‘dizzy’, not unconscious;
3. She could have
shouted at the top of her voice until somebody or a neighbor could come to her
rescue.”[4]
These arguments are not
fatal to the cause nor destructive of the credibility of the complainant.
It is obvious that the
complainant was weakened by what she underwent.
Imagine being slapped several times, being rained with fistblows on various parts of her body, and of course, the coup
d’grace, being
hit solidly hard on the pit of her stomach.[5] This experience rendered the complainant
very helpless and submissive to the appellant’s lustful desire. Understandably, the complainant, who was only
4 feet 10 inches tall and weighed around 110 pounds, could not offer much
resistance.
The complainant was most
probably just at a loss as to the correct term to describe her condition during
her direct examination. However, she
ably corrected and explained, much to our satisfaction, her earlier declaration
during her cross-examination. In the disÂputed
Decision, the trial court put it this way:
“It is true that during her direct examination, the
complainant testified that after having been hit on the stomach she became
unconscious and regained her consciousness only after the lapse of ten (10)
minutes. However, this particular
portion of the testimony was sufficiently explained by the complainant during
her cross-examination. According to her,
when she testified that she became unconscious, what she really meant was that
she became very dizzy most probably because of the traumatic experience she was
then underÂgoing.”[6]
With respect to the
appellant’s suggestions earlier enumerated as to the possible courses of action
that the complainant should have taken, suffice it to quote some portions from
the complainant’s testiÂmony on cross-examination to give a clear picture of
what she went through, to wit:
“‘Q. When you arrived in
his room, what was the position of the accused, Mr. Manaay?
A. He was lying on his bed in his underÂwear, your Honor.
Q. Now, did he x x x remove his
underwear when you were inside his room bringing a glass of water?
“’A. When I brought the glass
of water, and placed it on top of the table, he asked me to sit on the bed but
he was still wearing his underwear, your Honor.
Q. Did you sit on the bed?
A. Yes, your Honor, I followed him because he was my employer, your
Honor.
x x x x
x x x
x x
Q. When you were seated on the bed, what did the accused do to you?
A. He did
like this to me. (Witness demonstrating
an embracing gesture). And I tried to
move away from him, your Honor.
Q. Were you able to wriggle yourself away from him when he embraced
you?
A. While I was trying to free myself away from him, he held me
here. (Witness pointing to her right
wrist). And he pulled me and in so
doing, I fell face downward on the bed, your Honor.
Q. And when you were on the
bed face downÂward after pulling you, what did the accused, Mr. Manaay, do to you?
A. I stood up, your Honor,
but he also held me here, (Witness pointing to the front portion of her dress).
Q. And what did you do?
A. I told him ‘don’t’.
I was afraid to fight him back because he was already hurting me, your
Honor.
Q. When he was pulling your
dress, according to you, and you were on the bed, have you seen the private
organ or the sexual organ of the accused, Mr. Manaay?
A. He had already removed his underwear but I did not look at his
private parts.
Q. Why did you not look at his private parts?
A. I did not look because I
did not see it fit to look at it, ‘Nadudumihan ako‘.
x x x x x
x x
x x
“‘COURT
Q. And when he pulled you
down, what happened when he pulled you?
A. I was lying face downward
on the bed, your Honor.
Q. Did you lay face up?
A. I tried to get up, your
Honor, quickly but Mr. Manaay held me here. (Witness pointing to the back of her neck).
Q. Then what happened to
you?
A. I tried to struggle,
your Honor, but Mr. Manaay delivered karate blows on
me and he even slapped me on the face.
(Witness pointing to her upper arm and to her face).
Q. After doing that to you,
what happened to you?
A. I just cried, your
Honor, because I could no longer fight him back.
Q. Is that all what happened
to you?
A. He even threatened me,
your Honor, he had a long gun.”‘[7]
It is very apparent that the complainant was forced, intimiÂdated and
threatened by the appellant. The overwhelming
force employed by the appellant and the resulting pain and weakness that the
complainant suffered caused the cessation of any struggle initially
attendant. At this stage, all that the
complainant could do was to shout for help to the houseboy, who was the only
one inside the house. No response, however, came from the
latter. Any gallant intention was
crushed by fear.
The appellant further contends under this assigned error that the
complainant could have immediately reported the matter to the police and/or
submitted herself to physical examination.
But she did not. Also, the appellant says that the
complainant’s panty was never torn during the alleged rape, therefore, the
carnal knowledge was mutually consented upon.
These contentions lack merit.
The complainant’s failure
to immediately report the matter to the proper authorities or submit herself to
medical examination was due to excessive feeling of anxiety and agitation
caused by the thought of the proximity of danger with the appellant having made
serious threats of killing her. Indeed
she had all the reasons to believe and be afraid that such threats were not
empty ones for she personally knew that the appellant possessed a gun.[8] Above all, the complainant “was a
simple girl who studied up to second year high school, who went to Manila in search of work to earn a living.”[9] It was her first time to be in this city and
she had only stayed here for about three months. She knew no one except her friend, Lorna, who
introduced and recommended her to the appellant.[10] This is a true picture of an innocent girl.
Meanwhile, the
appellant’s allegation that the complainant’s panty was not torn is belied by
the following testimonial evidence, on direct examination –
“‘Q. What happened to
your panty?
A. The first time he raped
me, my panty was torn and he even told me to throw it away because it was
stained with blood. It was during the
first time he raped me, Sir.’
x x x x x x x x x
Q. Where was your panty at that time?
A. He pulled it, your Honor,
that was why it was torn.
Q. That was the first time
you were raped?
A. Yes, your Honor.’”[11]
On cross-examination –
“‘Q. So you wish to
impress to this Honorable Court that during the first incident when the accused
was trying to remove your panty and you were holding on to your panty, your
panty was not torn in the first incident?
A. The garter of my panty
was detached from the place where it was sewed, sir. (Ibid., p. 30)”[12]
In the second assignment
of error, the appellant questions the sufficiency of the evidence presented by
the prosecution. He claims that in order to sustain a conviction for the crime
of rape, the prosecution must offer the following evidence:
“1) The Medical
Certificate of complainant as a result of the alleged karate blows as testified
to by her alleged(ly) inflicted by the accused Mana-ay;
2) The most valued
garment of a woman, covering her most precious posÂsession, vagina, i.e., her
PANTY.”[13]
The appellant is of the opinion
that the prosecution should have
presented a medical certificate to attest to the alleged fact that the
complainant really sustained contusions, abrasions or hemaÂtoma
because of the beating she received. Another thing, the appellant claims that it
is indispensable that the torn panty of the complainant be presented in
evidence to establish the fact of violence or force that was employed,
otherwise, the sexual act must have been done with mutual consent. It is the appellant’s theory that without
these considerations, the evidence is insufficient.
This view finds no basis either in law or in jurisprudence.
A medical examination is not an indispensable element in the
prosecution for the crime of rape, because it all depends upon the evidence
offered and as long as such evidence convinces the court, a conviction therefor is proper.[14]
Nevertheless, the prosecution in this case actually submitted a medical
certificate as evidence to the trial court.
It was prepared, attested to, and duly affirmed on testimony by the
medico-legal officer. The findings
therein with regards to the condition of the complainant’s sexual organ fully
corroborated the theory of the prosecution.
It was not possible to submit another medical certificate as to the
marks that the comÂplainant sustained since she was only able to submit herself
to a medical examination on September
1, 1968, or about three months after the rape was committed, the
time she was able to leave the house of the appellant.
The non-presentation of the torn panty of the complainant is not
fatal to the case of the prosecution.[15]
It is not at all indispensable. In
consonance with the preceding discussion, a conÂviction depends upon the
persuasiveness of the totality of the evidence offered, not on a single piece
of evidence.
The complainant was subjected to a thorough and gruelling cross-examination by two alternating defense
counsels for about two years and four months.
She never broke down nor faltered, proof of tenacious courage borne of sheer determination to bring
justice to her unfortunate plight.
After a careful examination
of the evidence on record, We find the complainant’s testimony to be very
consistent, precise and firm, devoid of any material contradictions. She hurdled the intensive interrogation that
she encountered with complete answers and plauÂsible explanations. Her overall credibility remained unshaken.
The complainant
positively identified the appellant as the author of the heinous crime
perpetrated upon her. On the other hand,
the appellant’s defense was a mere alibi that he was in his office when the supposed
incident occurred. He did not adduce
evidence to the effect that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission or that the prosecution witnesses had improper motive to testify
against him, two basic courses of action so that the defense of alibi may
prosper.[16] Alternatively, the appellant could have
established the fact that it was impossible for him to be the one who committed
the crime, as for example, if he was heavily sedated while the offense was
being committed.
Accordingly, We find no
cogent reason to reverse the conviction of the appellant. The appellant is, moreover, ordered to
indemnify the complainant in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00)[17] in compliance with the mandate in Articles
100, 104(3), 107 and 345(1) of the Revised Penal Code.[18]
WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the civil
indemnity, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects,
with costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, (Chairman), Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
[1]
Information, p. 4, Rollo.
[2]
T.S.N., Oct. 9,
1974, pp. 34-37.
[3]
T.S.N., Nov. 8, 1974, pp. 5-6.
[4]
Appellant’s brief, p. 5.
[5]
T.S.N., Dec. 22, 1969, pp
18-24; May 12, 1970, pp.
51, 74-75, 83-84.
[6]
Decision, p. 15.
[7]
T.S.N., May 12, 1970, pp. 41-51.
[8]
T.S.N., Dec. 22, 1969, pp.
31-32, 36; May 12, 1970, p.
51.
[9]
Decision, p. 17.
[10]T.S.N.,
Oct.
9, 1974, pp. 5-8.
[11]
T.S.N., May 12, 1970, pp. 52, 54.
[12]
T.S.N., December 14, 1970, p. 30.
[13]
Appellant’s brief, p. 10.
[14]
People vs. Ortega, L-16033, Sept.
29, 1962; People vs. Pielago,
L-42256, Dec. 19, 1985.
[15]
People vs. Balane, L-48319-20, July 25, 1983.
[16]
People vs. Urgel,
L-34851, Feb. 25, 1985.
[17]
People vs. Resano,
L-57738, Oct. 23, 1984.
[18]
People vs. Asturias, L-61126, Jan. 31, 1985.