RAFAEL D. LACUATA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ANTONIO J. M. BAUTISTA, DEPUTY SHERIFF, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, METRO MANILA, RESPONDENT.

In an affidavit-complaint dated October 13, 1993 filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator, complainant Rafael D. Lacuata charged
respondent Antonio J. M. Bautista, Deputy Sheriff in the Office of the Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court of Makati, with grave misconduct and gross
negligence arising from the latter’s failure to implement an alias writ of
execution issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan.^[1]

It appears from the record that on March 20, 1989, Branch 49 of
the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan rendered judgment in favor of
the defendants in Civil Case No. U-4584, entitled “Rafael B. Lacuata vs.
Honor Marketing Corporation and Pedro Repolda.” However, in its decision
of July 31, 1991, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside on appeal the
aforesaid judgment of the trial court. When further elevated to this Court, said reversal by the appellate
court was affirmed in a resolution dated May 13, 1992. Accordingly, after judgment was entered, the
case was remanded to the court a quo for execution.^[2]

On May 10, 1993, the trial court issued an order directing its
Clerk of Court to issue an alias writ of execution, the original writ having
been returned without the judgment account being satisfied. In accordance with said order of the court
below, that alias writ was to be implemented by the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. Subsequently, the task of enforcing said alias writ was assigned to
herein respondent.^[3]

Complainant Rafael D. Lacuata asserts that respondent failed to
execute the alias writ in spite of sufficient opportunity to do so on several
occasions and that, as a consequence thereof, he was deprived of the monetary
judgment adjudged in his favor in the aforementioned civil case. Moreover, complainant alleged that
respondent demanded from him the amount of P2,000.00 purportedly for the
purpose of defraying the expenses to be incurred in the enforcement of the
writ, but that he was able to give respondent the amount of P1,000.00 only.^[4]

Respondent deputy sheriff insists that he had in fact exerted
diligent efforts to implement the alias writ. However, he could not locate the office of Honor Marketing Corporation
or the whereabouts of its manager, one Pedro Repolda. While he admits having received P1,050.00 from complainant, he
justified the same as collectible
legal fees permitted under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.^[5]

Pursuant to the recommendation of Deputy Court Administrator
Juanito A. Bernad, the Court resolved on March 2, 1994 to have the administrative
complaint against respondent referred to Executive Judge Salvador S. Abad
Santos of the Regional Trial Court of Makati for investigation, report, and
recommendation.^[6]
At the investigation, complainant affirmed before Judge Abad Santos his allegations
in the affidavit-complaint. Respondent,
on the other hand, manifested that he was adopting the Comment which he
submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator as his Answer to the
complaint.^[7]

On April 20, 1994, Judge Abad Santos submitted his report of the
investigation he conducted, recommending the dismissal of respondent on the
grounds of grave misconduct and gross negligence prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. The Court
agrees.

Indeed, as found by the investigating judge, the office of Honor
Marketing Corporation is only four blocks away from the regional trial courts
in Makati where respondent holds office. Thus, respondent’s explanation that he had exerted all the efforts that
he could muster to enforce the alias writ
is simply unbelievable. What is worthy
of note is that respondent himself admitted having theretofore gone five times
to the office of the said corporation in Trabajo Street in Makati, as
pinpointed by complainant, but that another company, La Campana de Tabacos, was
allegedly holding office there.^[8]
However, according to the affidavit of Rafael Lacuata, respondent had in fact
been accompanied by said complainant himself to the office of Honor Marketing
Corporation on July 6, 1993. This
renders extremely doubtful respondent’s claim that another company was
occupying the premises and that he could not find the office of defendant
corporation when he went there.^[9]

Respondent also committed a serious
infraction of Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court by demanding directly
from complainant, without the requisite authority of the court, monetary
consideration supposedly to expedite the enforcement of the writ. Surely, respondent ought to have known the
proper procedure to be followed in requesting for expenses from a judgment
creditor. On top of that, considering
the short distance between the offices of the trial courts in Makati and that of Honor Marketing Corporation,
respondent exhibited an atrophied conscience by demanding from complainant the
clearly unreasonable and exorbitant amount of P1,000.00 which he allegedly
spent for the hiring of a jeep in the five trips he reportedly made to enforce
the alias writ, and another P50.00 for food.^[10]

By the very nature of the office which a sheriff holds, as an
officer of the court he should exert every effort and, indeed, consider it his
bounden duty to see to it that the final stage in the litigation process, that
of execution of judgment, is carried out in order to ensure a speedy and
efficient administration of justice.^[11] In
respondent’s case, not only has he been grossly remiss in his duty to enforce a
writ of execution but he has likewise shown a grave disregard of the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court with respect to the collection of legal fees
or expenses to which a sheriff is entitled.

We quote with approval the following observations of the
investigating judge regarding the improper conduct of respondent:

“Respondent’s explanation is untenable. In the first place, the alleged office of
Honor Marketing Corporation is located barely four blocks away from the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, where the respondent reports for work. The proximity of the location of the office
of the defendant company hardly justifies the hiring of an owner jeep for
P200.00 per day for purposes of implementing the writ, and is absurd, to say
the least. Furthermore, respondent, in
demanding and directly receiving the amount of P1,000.00 from the complainant,
had violated Sec. (9) of Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court. Under said provision,
a sheriff must first submit the
estimated cost of expenses for kilometrage and per diems to be incurred by him
to the presiding judge. Upon the
latter’s approval, the amount shall be deposited by the party requiring the
process with the Office of the Clerk of Court, which shall then, upon orders of
the presiding judge, disburse the approved amount to the sheriff for use in the
implementation of the writ. Any excess
must be refunded by the Sheriff to the Office of the Clerk of Court, and any
amount advanced by him, should the disbursed amount be inadequate, must be
reimbursed to him after he submits a proper and itemized accounting of the
expenses incurred in the course of implementing the writ. Under no circumstances can the sheriff
demand and receive any amount of valuable consideration directly from the party
requiring the service. An officer of
the court is charged with the knowledge of the court processes pertaining to
his duties and obligations. He cannot
plead good faith as a defense against charges of grave abuse arising from his
violation of the pertinent Rules of Court.”^[12]

It need only be observed that public service requires the utmost
integrity and the strictest discipline in the conduct of government
employees. As we have repeatedly stated,
in the case of public servants who are in the judiciary, their conduct and
behavior, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be above
suspicion.^[13]
In Tan
vs. Herras,^[14] we held
that the sheriff, an officer of the court upon whom the execution of a final
judgment depends, must be circumspect and proper in his behavior.

Execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the
law. The attention of this Court has
been called to the despicable practice of some officers charged with the
execution of judgments of unjustly enriching themselves at the expense of the
winning litigants who are eager to have the judgment satisfied and the losing
parties who seek to delay execution by all means. This is not only unjust enrichment but a grave disservice to the
administration of justice.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Deputy Sheriff Antonio J.
M. Bautista is hereby DISMISSED for grave misconduct and gross negligence
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Respondent is further ordered to REIMBURSE to complainant
Rafael D. Lacuata the amount of P1,050.00 upon receipt of this resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, 15-17.

^[2]
Ibid., 4-5; Annex
“A”.

^[3]
Ibid., id.; Counsel of
Respondent, 1.

^[4]
Affidavit-Complaint of Complainant, 1-3; Rollo, 15-17.

^[5]
Comment of Respondent, 1-2; Rollo, 2-3.

^[6]
Rollo, 32.

^[7]
Report of Executive Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos, 1.

^[8]
Rollo, 6-7; Annex “B”.

^[9]
Ibid., 16.

^[10]
Ibid., 2, 10-13; Annexes “D” to “H”.

^[11]
Chua vs. Nuestro, A.M. No.
P-88-256, October 11, 1990, 190 SCRA 424.

^[12]
Report of Executive Judge Salvador s. Abad Santos, 1-2.

^[13]
Mirano vs. Saavedra, A.M. No. P-89-383, August 4, 1993, 225 SCRA 77.

^[14]
A.M. No. P-90-404, March 11, 1991, 193
SCRA 1.