IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TESSIE ASTERO, TESSIE ASTERO, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. CHIEF OF POLICE OF DAGUPAN CITY, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

On or about August 18,
1966, Leticia del Pilar, a minor 17 years of age,
filed with the City Court of Dagupan a complaint,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 11037 of said court, charging Lita Mendoza, Susan Dequito,
Susana Soriano and herein petitioner Tessie Astero, with “corruption
of a minor”, in:

“That during and between June 27, 1966 and July 2, 1966 in Dagupan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused
confederating and mutually helping one another, habitually and/or with abuse of
authority or confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously by the use of force, threats and intimidation and by taking
advantage of the undersigned (Leticia del Pilar), a
minor 17 years of age, who was detained at the Mendoza Hotel, Perez Boulevard, Dagupan City, by their confederates, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously promote or facilitate the prostitution or corruption of the
undersigned, to satisfy the lust of several men unknown to her and in order to
profit therefrom, to her damage and prejudice in the
sum of P50,000.00”

After conducting a
preliminary examination, said court issued the corresponding warrant of arrest
and, in compliance therewith, petitioner was, among others, subsequently
apprehended and confined in the City Jail of Dagupan.  On October 7, 1966, she commenced, in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the present
case^[1] for habeas corpus, against the Chief
of Police of Dagupan City, upon the ground that said
complaint is “null and void x x x be­cause”:

“A –  Under the City Charter of Dagupan
City, it is only the City Fiscal who can institute criminal action;

“B –  And, even granting that Leticia del Pilar can institute a criminal action, such is only true
where there is the civil liability involved in the case, which is not so in the
instant case, because –

“1.          Prostitution of
minor is a purely public crime, in which there can not be private offended
party.

“2.          And, even if
Leticia del Pilar were the offended party, her
interest in the civil aspect has been instituted in criminal case No. 11036, a
copy of which is hereto attached, wherein she claimed damages arising out of
the same act.”

After appropriate
proceedings, the court of first instance rendered a decision, dated October 30,
1966, granting the writ prayed for and ordering “the Chief of Police of Dagupan City or any of his officers in charge of the City
Jail x x x to release the petitioner, Tessie
Astero.” Hence, this appeal by the respondent.

The ratio decidendi of said decision is found in the paragraph
immediately preceding its dispositive part, which
reads:

“Under Section 24 of Republic Act 170 (Charter of Dagupan City), the city attorney (Fiscal) ‘shall
investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of laws
and city ordinances and prepare the necessary informations
or make the necessary complaints against the persons accused‘.  The wordings of this provision are clear and
leave no room for interpretation.  Said
section has enjoined the city fiscal to ‘prepare the necessary informations‘ or ‘make the
necessary complaints’ against persons accused of ‘crimes, misdemeanors, and
violations of laws and city ordinances’. 
The crime for which the petitioner was charged is a public crime and not
one of those which may be prosecuted under the law upon the complaint of the
offended party.  Thus, it devolved upon
the city fiscal to file, if the evidence warrants, the complaint or information
for corruption of minor against the petitioner, and this mandatory duty cannot
be delegated to the offended party himself/herself.  Thus, it is the considered opinion of this
court that the said complaint (Criminal Case No. 11037 of the City Court of Dagupan) and all proceedings thereunder
are of no effect inasmuch as the complaint filed by the offended party in that
court is not valid.”

The premise to the effect
that a public crime, such as that of corruption of minors “is not one of
those which may be prosecuted x x x
upon the complaint of the offended party”, is manifestly erro­neous.  Indeed, Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, explicitly provides that “(a)ll criminal
actions must be commenced either by complaint or information x x x.” In fact, as early as U.S. v. Narvas^[2], it was held:

“The Code of Criminal Procedure contains the following:

‘Sec. 2.  All prosecutions
for public offenses shall be in the name of the United States (now Philippines)
against the persons charged with the offenses.

‘Sec. 3.  All public offenses
triable in Courts of First Instance or in courts of
similar jurisdiction, now established or that hereafter may be established, must be prosecuted by complaint
or information.

‘Sec. 4.  A complaint
is a sworn written statement made to a court or magistrate that a person has
been guilty of a designated offense.

‘Sec. 5.  An information is
an accusation in writing charging a person with a public offense, pre­sented
and signed by the promotor fiscal or his deputy and
filed with the clerk of court.’

“Under the provisions of these sections a criminal action or
prosecution may be instituted in the courts specified therein in either one
of two ways.  In the first place it may
be commenced by any person resenting to a court or to a magistrate the complaint above defined.  Such complaint
is the process which begins the action and gives the court or magistrate
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and the subject-matter of the
action.  Where such complaint has been
presented no other or further pleading on the part of the government is
necessary.  The prosecution proceeds
upon the complaint alone.  In the
second place the action may be commenced by the promotor
fiscal by presenting to the court and filing with the clerk thereof the
information defined and set forth in the section above quoted.  In that case such information is the process which
institutes the action and the prosecution proceeds upon it as, the people’s
pleading.  It is the duty of the
fiscal to prosecute the action whether commenced by complaint or information.  This enables him to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecutions by private persons.”^[3]

Again, pursuant to section 2 of said Rule 110:

“Complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with
an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer or other
employee of the government or governmental institution in charge of the
enforcement or execution of the law violated.”

As a consequence, in
People v. Hernandez^[4], this Court used the following language:

“The fact that the information was filed in court on a
complaint by a private individual is of no consequence for the reason that, as
has been held in the case of United States vs. Yu Tuico
(34 Phil., 209), except where the law specifically provides the contrary, a
complaint that a pub­lic crime has been committed can be laid by any competent
person.  x x x.”^[5]

It is true that section
24 of the Charter of Dagupan City (R.A. No. 170)
imposes upon its city attorney the duty to “investigate all charges of
crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of laws and city ordinances” and to
“prepare the necessary informations or make the
necessary complaints against the person accused x x x.” There is every reason to believe that the
conclusion drawn therefrom by His Honor, the trial
Judge, was influenced, to a considerable degree, by a similar provision in the
Charter of the City of Manila, which has been construed to mean that in that
city “criminal complaints may be filed only with the City Fiscal,
who is thereby given, by implication, the exclusive authority to
institute criminal cases in the different courts of said City x x x.“^[6] It should be noted, however, that, in the
language of Sayo v. Chief of Police^[7]:

“Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the
commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of Manila
is not filed with the municipal court or the Court of First Instance of Manila,
because as above stated, the latter do not make or conduct a
preliminary investigation proper.  x x x.”

This view was reiterated by Chief Justice Moran in Espiritu v. De la Rosa^[8],
and quoted with approval, as well as applied to the City of Bacolod, in Montelibano
v. Ferrer.^[9]

Seemingly, the lower court overlooked, however, the fact that,
unlike the courts of Manila and Bacolod, the city
court of Dagupan is explicitly vested with the power
to “conduct preliminary investigation for any offense, without regard to
the limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and bind over any person
charged with such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court.”^[10]
Thus, the legal basis for the exclusive
power of the City Fiscal of Manila or City Attorney of Bacolod
to initiate criminal actions in their respective jurisdictions is wanting in
the case of Dagupan. 
What is more, the express grant to its city court of the authority to conduct
preliminary investigations, necessarily connotes that the City Attorney of Dagupan shares that function with said court, and
that, accordingly, the latter may entertain complaints filed by a person other
than said officer.  Indeed, the
initiation of a criminal action by the City Attorney would imply that he had
conducted the requisite preliminary investigation, so that none would
have to be made by the City Court.

In other words, we can not sustain the alleged sole power of said
officer to institute criminal actions in Dagupan City
without setting at naught or nullifying the authority of the city court, under
section 77 of R.A. No. 170, to conduct preliminary investigations.  It is well settled that the different pro­visions
of a statute should be so construed as to harmonize the same, and that,
“when there are inconsistent provisions in the same statute, the last
in point of time or order of arrangement prevails.^[11]

It is clear, therefore, that the aforementioned complaint filed
by Leticia del Pilar was perfectly valid; that so was
the warrant of arrest issued by the city court, after making the corresponding
preliminary examination; and that, consequently, the apprehension and
confinement of petitioner herein were, likewise, lawful and valid.

It should be noted, also, that the decision appealed from ordered
the release of petitioner herein, without requiring the posting of a bond to
secure her appearance before the appellate court, in violation of Section 20,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, reading:

“A judgment remanding the person detained to the custody of
the officer or person detaining him, shall not be stayed by appeal.  A judgment releasing the person detained
shall not be effective until the officer or person detaining has been given
opportunity to appeal.  An appeal
taken by such officer or person shall stay the order of release, unless
the person detained shall furnish a satisfactory bond in an amount fixed by the court or judge rendering the
judgment.  The bond shall be so
conditioned for the appearance of the person detained before the appellate
court to abide its order in the appeal.”^[12]

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed, and the petitioner ordered re-arrested and re-committed to the
custody of respondent herein, unless a satisfactory bond in an amount to be
fixed by the City Court of Dagupan, shall have been
furnished, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., took no part.

^[1]
Special Proceedings No. 526 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch VIII.

^[2]
14 Phil. 410, 411.

^[3]
Underscoring supplied.

^[4]
59 Phil. 272, 277.

^[5]
Underscoring supplied.

^[6]
Montelibano v. Ferrer, 97 Phil.
228, 233.

^[7]
80 Phil. 859, 869.

^[8]
78 Phil. 827, 830.

^[9]
Supra.

^[10]
Section 77, R.A. No. 170.

^[11]
People v. Laba, L-28022, July 30, 1969; PNB v. Court of Appeals, L-27117, July 30, 1969; State v. City, 109 So.
2d. 368; Town of Homecroft
v. Macbeth, 148 N.E. 2d. 563.

^[12]
Underscoring supplied.