LUDOVICO ESTRADA, ET AL., PETITIONERS VS. THE HON. AMADO S. SANTIAGO, ETC., AND PINDANGAN AGRICULTURAL COMPANY, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Under date of August 2, 1948 the Pindangan Agricultural Co.,
Inc.—hereinafter referred to as the Corporation —filed a complaint with
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, docketed therein as Civil
Case No. 10394, against Ludovico Estrada, Marcelino Cabotaje, Alejandro
Valdez, Sulpicio Sacayanan, Zacarias Cabotaje, Albino Mabalot and
Guillermo Cabotaje, alleging therein that, in relation to a parcel of
agricultural land situated in the barrios of Pindangan and San Pedro
Apartado, Alcala, Pangasinan, bounded on the NE. by the property of the
heirs of Asterio Favis; on the SE; by the provincial boundary line of
Pangasinan and Tarlac; on the NW. by the Agno River; and on the SW. by
the property of Pedro Esguerra and others, the first five defendants
were its tenants on a yearly basis, and the last two were mere
interlopers therein; that all said parties had refused to recognize the
rights of the Corporation over said land. On the basis of these
allegations, the complaint prayed—

“Wherefore, the plaintiff respectfully prays that
upon its filing of a bond with sufficient sureties in such amount’ as
this Honorable Court may fix, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued ex parte against the defendants, their attorneys,
agents, administrators and assigns and other persons acting for and in
their behalf, directing them, until further orders from this Honorable
Court, to refrain from invading the premises of the land described in
paragraph 2 of this complaint or any portion thereof and from
molesting, disturbing or in any wise interfering with plaintiff’s
possession and enjoyment thereof; and, in view of the menacing attitude
of the defendants, to order the Philippine Constabulary to station on
the premises at least three (3) P. C. soldiers to see to it that the
order of the Court is respected and not violated by the said
defendants; and, after trial, judgment be rendered condemning the
defendants to perpetual silence relative to the possession and
enjoyment of the premises aforesaid, recognizing plaintiff’s superior
rights thereto, and declaring the injunction issued against them
permanent; and to condemn the defendants to pay the plaintiff whatever
damages may further be proved against them and the costs of this
action.”

On August 17, 1948 the court, on motion of the Corporation, issued a
writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants—hereinafter
referred to as petitioners.

On October 25, 1948 the Corporation filed an “Amendatory Complaint”
to implead, as defendants, Ponciano Cabotaje and 20 other persons
alleged to be “mere interlopers in the land” who had made common cause
with the original defendants, and prayed that the injunction issued
theretofore be extended to them. Again, on August 15, 1950 the
Corporation filed an “Amended Complaint” to include as defendants the
following public officials in their respective official capacity: Jose
P. Dans, Director of Lands, Placido L. Mapa, Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, and Pedro U. Asensi, District Land Officer, and
Emeterio de los Santos, Marcelo de los Santos, Severo Pascual and
Dionisio Tadeo. The said amended complaint—admitted by the court on
November 7, 1950— prayed for judgment as follows:

“Wherefore, to this Honorable Court plaintiff-Corporation respectfully prays that, after proper proceedings:

“(a)
Judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to give due effect and
implement the decisions of this Hon. Court in Civil Cases Nos. 4969 and
7421 and G. R. Nos. 32343 and 46798 of the Supreme Court mentioned in
paragraphs XLII, XLIII and XLIV hereof and the provisions of law
applicable thereto by giving due course, in accordance with law, to
plaintiff’s LeaseApplication No. 109 mentioned in paragraph XXXIII hereof and Sales Application
of July 9, 1949 (Unnumbered), mentioned in paragraphs XLVIII and XLDC
hereof, and thereafter to recognize and give effect, as provided for in
the laws mentioned, to the preferential right of the
plaintiff-corporation to acquire the said land either by lease or by
purchase as it may consider convenient and necessary;

“(b)
Bender without effect as in violation of the law and the decision of
this Hon. Court the resolutions of the official defendants mentioned in
paragraphs XXXIV, L, LVIII, LIX and LXII hereof, rejecting
plaintiff-corporations Lease Application No. 109 and Sales Application
of July 9, 1949 which exclude plaintiff-corporation from the exercise
of its aforesaid rights; and

“(c) Condemning the defendants
jointly and severally to pay to the plaintiff-corporation, by way of
damages, the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), besides the cost
of this suit;”

The separate motions to dismiss filed by the above named public
officials and by the other defendants having been denied, said public
officials filed their answer in which they denied that the sales
applications filed by their co-defendants were prepared in connivance
with officials of the Bureau of Lands in Dagupan, or that the
provisional permits granted to the same parties by the Director of
Lands was the result of a conspiracy between the District Land Officer
at Dagupan City and the permittees; the truth of the matter being that
the issuance of said permits was based on the merit of the individual
applications filed, determined after proper investigation, and that the
subdivision of the property in question was ordered to expedite its
disposition in favor of deserving occupants. The answer further denied
the Corporation’s claim that the courts had recognized its preferential
right to acquire the land in question, the truth being that the very
court orders and decisions relied upon by the Corporation and attached
to its amended complaint showed that the members of the 93 families who
originally occupied the land were the ones whose preferential right to
acquire it had” been recognized.

On November 6, 1954 the now petitioners filed their own separate
answer denying specifically the allegations of the amended complaint
and alleging positively that they were in lawful and actual occupation
of separate portions of the land in question.

Omitting reference to other proceedings which do not appear to be
absolutely necessary for the purpose of this decision, it appears that
on February 28, 1958 the respondent judge rendered judgment in the case
as follows:

“Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:

“a.
Rendering without effect the various resolutions of the official
defendants mentioned in plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as regards its Lease Application No. 109 and Sales Application of July 9, 1949, as well as all applications filed by and provisional permits
granted to the other defendants covering portions of the land in
controversy, including those whose names appear in Exhibits “1” and
“1-a” of the defendants;

“b. Ordering and directing the
Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to execute forthwith-in favor of the plaintiff corporation
the necessary documents of lease of the land in controversy
for the maximum period allowed by the ‘law and for the annual rental of
P2,946.00, or, if it so desires, the necessary documents of definite sale
of the said land for the total sum of P51,157.23 (which is the bigger
sum of the two sums mentioned herein), in full or in installments as
the Public Land Act permits, at the option of the plaintiff corporation;

“c.
The Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources are hereby ordered and directed to give due course, in
accordance with law, to plaintiff’s Lease Application No. 109 and Sales Application
of July 9, 1949, mentioned in its Amended Complaint, and thereafter to
recognize and give effect, as provided for in the law, to the
preferential right of plaintiff corporation to acquire the said -land
either by lease or by purchase, at its option.

“d.
Condemning the defendants Jose P. Dans, Placido L. Mapa and Pedro U.
Asensi as well as all the other defendants mentioned in plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint dated October 15, 1950, jointly and severally, to pay
to the plaintiff corporation, by way of damages, the sum of F8,000.00,
besides the costs of suit.

“e. Declaring permanent the writ
of preliminary injunction heretofore issued in this case which is
hereby extended to all persons not duly authorized by the plaintiff
corporation to enter into the land in question, their agents, attorneys
and other persons acting in their behalf and in their representative,
and condemning all the said defendants and all such persons acting in
their behalf and for their account to perpetual silence as to
plaintiff’s right of possession and enjoyment of the said land.”

The public officials above named and their codefendants filed
separate notices of appeal in due time. However, on June 13, 1958,
while their appeal was in the process of being perfected, the
Corporation filed a petition for the immediate execution pending appeal
of the provisions of paragraph (e) of the dispositive part of the
decision above quoted, alleging in support thereof that, as found by
the court, most of the defendants were mere interlopers and that there
was a possibility of breach of the peace and order in the area and the
commission of illegal acts on their part. Specifically, the petition of
the Corporation prayed for the following relief:

“Wherefore, to this Honorable Court plaintiff
respectfully prays that an order issue directing the immediate
execution of paragraph (e) of the aforesaid decision of this Honorable
Court dated February 29, 1958, as an addition to and/or in further
implementation of the order of this Honorable Court dated December 26,
1956; and for this purpose, directing that the aforesaid Special
Sheriffs previously appointed with Avelino Aguada as their Chief, with
the assistance of the Philippine Constabulary of Pangasinan and under
the control of and jointly with the Provincial Sheriff of this
province, to execute the same faithfully and effectively such that each
of every one of the defendants, their helpers, agents, attorneys and
other persons acting for and in their behalf, be excluded from the land
in question and prevented from entering the same without the consent of
plaintiff corporation, and from disturbing or in any manner molesting
the possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the land by the plaintiff
corporation or its agents, under penalty of the law and until further
orders of this Court; and that the PC Provincial Commander of
Pangasinan be requested to furnish the necessary aid and assistance to
the said Special Sheriffs in the performance of their duties in such
strength and for such time as may be necessary to enforce the orders of
this Honorable Court.”

In spite of the opposition filed by all the defendants, the
respondent judge issued on June 18, 1958 an order granting the petition
for an immediate partial execution. The motion for reconsideration
filed by the aforesaid defendants, which included an offer of a
supersedeas bond to stay the aforesaid partial execution was denied on
July 28 of the same year. Regarding the offer of a supersede as bond
the respondent judge stated in his order that the offer had come
“rather late because the order in question had already been executed by
the deputy provincial sheriff of this province who was duly appointed
by the Secretary of Justice, in accordance with the returns now forming
part of the records of this case.” (p. 3 of Annex W attached to the
Petition for Certiorari).

Alleging that the orders of June 18 and July 28, 1958 constitute a
denial of their rights in the premises, and were issued with grave
abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction by the respondent
judge, and that they had no appeal, nor any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners filed the
present petition for certiorari praying—

“(a) That a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the
respondent judge Amado S. Santiago, the respondent corporation, the
agents or representatives of the respondent judge and the respondent
corporation, the members of the Philippine Constabulary under the
command of the Provincial Commander of Pangasinan, from enforcing the
decision of Feb. 28, 1958, Orders of June 18 and July 28, 1958 or any
and all subsequent orders until after this Petition for Certiorari be
resolved by this Honorable Court;

“(b) That this petition for Certiorari be given due course and that
respondents be required to file an answer to this Petition for
Certiorari within such time as may be fixed by this Honorable Court;

“(c) That after due hearing, decision be rendered declaring that the
orders of the respondent judge, particularly the Orders of June 18,
1958 and July 28, 1958 and any and all acts of said respondent judge
subsequent to the above orders null and void and
ordering the respondent judge and/or any other judge to desist from
rendering any new orders in the above-mentioned Civil Cases until this
proceedings be finally terminated; and

“(d) That respondent be ordered to pay the costs of this proceedings.”

The petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the respondents and others “from enforcing the decision of 
February 28, 1958, orders of June 18, and July. 28, 1958” was not
resolved before now by Us, one way or the other, because of the fact
stated in the aforesaid order of July 28, 1958 (Annex W attached to the
petition) that the writ of execution had already been carried out even
before that date.

In the meantime the appeal from the decision on the merits rendered
by the respondent judge took its course and was docketed in this Court
as G. R. No. L-14591, decision therein having been rendered by Us on
April 25, 1962. After an extensive review of all the pertinent
proceedings and facts of record, we set aside or reversed the aforesaid
decision.

The only question raised in the present action for certiorari is
whether the order of the respondent judge of June 18, 1958 for the
execution pending appeal of a portion of his decision in Civil Case No.
10394, was issued with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of his
jurisdiction. In view of our decision on the appeal interposed by the
defendants (G. R. No. L-14591), it seems clear that this question must
be answered in the affirmative. Said decision can only mean that the
decision of the respondent judge of February 28, 1958 was erroneous;
that each one of the herein petitioners was in lawful occupancy of a
separate portion of the land described .in the complaint filed by the
Corporation in Civil Case No. 10394; that their right of possession was
by virtue of lawful orders and decisions of the Bureau of Lands and of
the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources rendered after the
interested parties had been given full opportunity to be heard. In the
light of these facts, there could possibly have been no special reason
to justify the execution pending appeal of the aforesaid decision of
the respondent judge, which resulted in prematurely depriving
petitioners of their lawful possession, transferring it to that of the
Corporation which was not entitled to it.

Wherefore, the orders complained of having been issued by the
respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion, the same are hereby
set aside, reserving to herein petitioners whatever right they may have
to obtain restitution of possession and other relief in the main case
or in a separate action. With costs against respondent Corporation.

Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, and Paredes, JJ., concur. Orders set aside.