JOSE B. LINGAD, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANDRES C. AGUILAR, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE SECOND BRANCH OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA; AND JUANITA L. NEPOMUCENO, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that this
Court declare as illegal and null and void all proceedings so far held by
respondent judge in the case denominated as Civil Case No. 3639 of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga and entitled Juanita L. Nepomuceno versus The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga et al. for “Judicial Recount” for being
beyond the jurisdiction of said court and that We prohibit said respondent
judge from further taking any action therein except to dismiss the same.

Herein petitioner Jose B. Lingad and
respondent Juanita L. Nepomuceno were among the
candidates for the office of representative of the first district of Pampanga in the last na­tional elections.  In the course of the canvass of the votes for
said office by the provincial board of canvassers, petitioner objected to the
use of the election returns for the provincial treasurer for a total of one
hundred eleven (111) precincts in the towns of Floridablanca,
Lubao and Sexmoan on the
ground that there were palpable and patent erasures, alterations or tamperings on the faces thereof affecting the number of
votes for the office of representative sufficient to vary the result of the
election and prayed that the board avail itself of other copies of the said returns
which were clean, but said objection and prayer were overruled by the board
which proceeded to include all the questioned copies of the returns in the
canvass.  No proclamation was made,
‘however, because under the procedure agreed upon by the parties and approved
by the Comelec, petitioner appealed to said
body.  At the hearing held before the Comelec on December 19, 1969 where all the parties,
including respondent Nepomuceno, were properly
represented, the Comelec actually examined each and
everyone of the one hundred eleven questioned copies of the returns and, at the
same time, ordered the production of the corresponding copies for the Comelec of the same returns, for purposes of
comparison.  Thereafter and upon
satisfying itself that the questioned copies were indeed “altered, erased
and/or superimposed and the entry of votes for the other candidates are clean,
while the corresponding Comelec copies thereof are
clean and untampered with,” the Comelec directed the board to disregard said entry of votes
for representative in the questioned copies and “in lieu thereof, to use
in its canvass, the entry of votes in the corresponding Comelec
copies of said election returns for candidates Jose B. Lingad
and/or Juanita L. Nepomuceno, etc.” (Annex E, Petition)
In the same order, the Comelec also directed the
board to reconvene on December 26, 1969 for the purpose of recanvassing
the votes and proclaiming the winning candidate for representative unless a
restraining order of this Court were received by said board before 5:00 o’clock
in the afternoon of said date.  On December 22, 1969, respondent Nepomuceno came to this Court challenging the said order of
the Comelec in a petition for certiorari and mandamus
which We denied on December 23, 1969
on the ground that there was no sufficient showing of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Comelec.  (G. R. No. L-31383)

In the meantime, on the same day, December 23, 1969, respondent Nepomuceno
initiated in the respondent Court of First Instance of Pampanga
the herein subject proceeding for judicial recount, with a prayer for
preliminary injunction.  (Civil Case No.
3639) The petition for preliminary injunction was set for hearing on December
24, 1969, and on the latter date, after a summary hearing, respondent judge
issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining and restraining the board of
canvassers from proclaiming anyone of the two candidates (petitioner and
respondent Nepomuceno) for the position of
Congressman of the First District of Pampanga, until
further orders of the Court”. 
(Annex I-1, Petition) Confronted thus by the two conflicting orders of
the Comelec and the respondent court, on December 26,
1969, the board resolved to hold in abeyance action on the Comelec
directive “until such time as the order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is reconsidered, revoked or reversed by the
Supreme Court (or the latter) orders the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the
winning candidate(s)” (Annex J, Petition). 
Upon learning of this resolution and of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by respondent judge, petitioner filed with the Comelec on the same day, December 26, 1969, an urgent
motion to direct the board of canvassers to make a proclamation, insisting that
as no writ of injunction or restraining order had been received from this
Court, which is the only authority that could restrain or overrule the Comelec, it was the duty of the board to make said
proclamation.  (Evidently, notwithstanding
that this Court had already dismissed the petition of respondent Nepomuceno in G. R. No. L-31383, on December 23, 1969, the parties had not yet been
notified of this Court’s resolution.) Acting on said motion, on even date, the Comelec rendered the following resolution:

“This refers to the Urgent Motion filed by candidate Jose B. Lingad today, December 26, 1969, informing the Commission
that the Court of First Instance of Pampanga issued
an order on December 24, 1969, in Civil Case No. 3639, enjoining the provincial
board of canvassers of Pampanga from proclaiming
anyone of the two candidates (Jose B. Lingad or Juanita
L. Nepomuceno) as Congressman-elect of the First
District of Pampanga, which was issued pursuant to
the petition for judicial recount filed therewith by Candidate Nepomuceno.

“Considering that during the hearing of the petitions for
review filed by said Candidate Lingad and Nepomuceno on December 19, 1969, the parties were duly
advised and subsequently relayed to the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga to suspend the proclamation of the winning
candidate for Congressman of the first district of Pampanga
until 5:00 P.M. of December 26, 1969 (Friday), in the absence of any
restraining order from the court, referring to the Supreme Court, which is the
only body that can review the orders or decisions of the Commission on
elections (Sec. 2, Art. X, Constitution) and that the aforesaid December 24,
1969 Order of the Pampanga court amounts to a review
or reversal of the Commission resolution of December 19, 1969 (Maoud v. Comelec, L-28562, April
25, 1968) which said court cannot lawfully do, the Commission RESOLVED to order
the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim the duly elected candidate for
Congressman of the First District of Pampanga after
5:00 o’clock P.M. today, in the absence of any restraining order from the Supreme
Court and to warn that any member of the Provincial Board of Canvassers who
shall violate the orders of the Commission will be suspended and substituted by
Comelec lawyers.” (Annex L, Petition)

In compliance with this resolution, late on December 26, 1969,
the board met and proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected representative of
the first district of Pampanga, (Annex A, Petition;
and on the strength of said proclamation, petitioner took his oath of office on
December 31, 1969, (Annex B, Petition) has already been included in the roster
of Members of the House of Representatives, per certificate of the Secretary of
said House, Dr. I. B. Pareja, (Annex C, Petition) has
been regularly holding office as such since January 2, 1970 and has already
been paid the salary for the period from December 30, 1969 to January 15,
1970.  (Annex C-1, Petition)

Nonetheless, petitioner is now before Us with his petition for certiorari
and prohibition because on the same day that the aforementioned writ of
preliminary injunction was issued, in a separate order, respondent judge also
ordered that petitioner and respondent Nepomuceno
“submit the name of their respective nominee(s) for appointment as
Commissioner(s) who shall do the recounting on January 19, 1970 at 2:00 o’clock
P.M.”, (Annex M, Petition) and notwithstanding the omnibus motion of
petitioner filed with him on January 9, 1970 inviting his attention again to
the “circumstances originally presented to him and of the events which
have intervened following the filing of the Petition, most significant of which
were: (1) the dismissal of respondent Nepomuceno’s
petition for certiorari, etc. filed with this Honorable Supreme Court;
(2) the subsequent proclamation of Petitioner herein as the duly elected
Representative for the First District of Pampanga,
pursuant to a valid resolution of the COMELEC and subsequently sustained by the
Supreme Court; (3) the fact of Petitioner having already taken his oath of
office and his having been duly enrolled as a Member of the House of
Representatives; and (4) the fact that Petitioner, since December 31, 1969 had
already entered upon the duties and lawfully’ assumed the powers appurtenant to
the office of Representative of the First District of Pampanga,
as in fact he has already been assigned a room in the House of  Representatives by the Secretary of the said
House, where he (Petitioner herein) has been regularly holding office since
January 2, 1970 (Please see Xerox copy of Petitioner’s pay check for the period
from December 30, 1969 to January 15, 1970 which is attached hereto and made a
part hereof as Annex “C-1″) -” as well as the precedents laid
down by this Court, principally, in Ong vs. Comelec, L-28415, January 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 241 and Pacis vs. Comelec, L-29026, Sept.
28, 1968, 25 SCRA 377 to the effect that “where election returns have been
tampered with, the remedy is before the Comelec …
and not with the Court of First Instance”, and what is more, the
resolution of this Court of December 23, 1969 dismissing the petition filed by
respondent Nepomuceno, on Jan­uary 14, 1970, (Annex
N, Petition) the respondent judge issued an order the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court is
constrained to invalidate and set aside, as it hereby invalidates and sets
aside, the proclamation of the respondent Jose B. Lingad,
by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga on December 26, 1969, as the duly
elected member of the House of Representatives for the first district of Pampanga.

“The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court
remains in full force and effect.  Let a
copy of this order be furnished the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
another copy to the Secretary of the same house, for their in­formation.

“SO ORDERED.” (Annex P, Petition)

Upon these circumstances, the only legal course open to Us is
obvious and ineludible.  The writs prayed
for must be granted.  It is beyond doubt
that respondent judge is without jurisdiction in the premises.  Worse, his actuations and attitude reflected
in his order of January 12, 1970 border on a disregard, almost an outright
defiance of the constitutional authority of the Comelec
and the rulings clearly laid down by this Court precisely to resolve contro­versies
as those herein involved.  Such posture
of a trial court cannot receive the sanction of this Court.  On the contrary, it deserves, at the very
least, a reiteration of the admonition this Court has already given to lower
courts that “if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the
privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end
to litigation and judicial chaos would result. 
A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of
the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the
integrated judicial system of the nation.”^[1]
Indeed, in the present case, respondent judge went further than to merely
misconstrue, misapply and disregard the rulings of this Court in the cases of Ong, Pacis, Tagoranao
and Villalon,^[2]
he paid no heed at all to the resolution of this Court of December 23, 1969 in
G. R. No. 31383, aforementioned, upholding, in effect, the order of the Comelec directing the provincial board of canvassers to use
the Comelec copies of the returns in question which
was brought to his attention in petitioner’s motion of January 9, 1970, Annex N
of the Petition.  In fact, had respondent
judge done what was incumbent upon him to do in the judicious exercise of his
functions, that is, to inquire as to the status of said G. R. No. L-31383, he
would have easily known that, acting on respondent Nepomuceno’s
motion for reconsideration and amended petition in said case, this Court
promulgated the following resolution, which if respondent judge had only taken
into account, the now questioned proceedings would have been earlier properly
terminated in accordance with law:

“In G. R. No. L-31383, Juanita L. Nepomuceno
vs. The Commission on Elections, et al., the Court resolved to DISMISS the
amended petition and to DENY petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of this Court dismissing the original petition, it appearing that
when petitioner filed the petition for recount with the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga on December 23, 1969, the respondent Commission
had already ruled on the election returns in question, that ‘the entry of votes
for candidate Jose B. Lingad and/or candidate Juanita
Nepomuceno etc. are altered, erased and/or
superimposed …. while the corresponding Comelec
copies thereof are clean and untampered with’,
(resolution of December 19, 1969, Annex L of Amended Petition) which ruling was
within its jurisdiction and not subject to review by the Court of First Instance
even in a petition for recount under Section 163 of the Revised Election Code,
(Ong v. Comelec, et al.,
L-28415, January 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 241). 
There is the added circumstance in this case that by agreement of the
parties, a procedure was adopted by the respondent Commission under which said
Commission was supposed to rule on authenticity of the returns in question on
appeal from any ruling thereon by the Board of Canvassers, subject, to review
only by this court, and there being substantial basis for the ruling of the
Commission herein questioned, this Court will not set the same aside;
furthermore, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for recount on the basis of returns
already found by the Comelec as not authentic.  (Ong v. Comelec, supra).'”

Perhaps, it bears repeating and emphasizing here that the
apparent conflict or concurrence of powers between the Comelec
and the courts of first instance which could arise in the application or
implementation of Section 163 of the Revised Election Code regarding judicial
recount of votes has already been definitely delineated and clarified in the Ong and subsequent decisions aforementioned.  Having in view the purpose of the recount of
votes contemplated in the said provision and precisely to minimize, if not
altogether eliminate, the possibility of proclamation grabs thru the use of
altered and falsified copies of returns, more or less ingeniously made to avoid
detection, coupled with the corresponding tampering of the ballot boxes and the
ballots contained therein, We have declared in the above mentioned cases, the
law (Sec. 163 of the Revised Election Code) to be that whenever any
conflicting, inconsistent, contradictory or discrepant copies of election returns
for the same precincts are extant and are presented or available to the board
of canvassers, it is the board of canvassers, in the first instance, and the Comelec, on appeal, that have the exclusive authority,
subject only to any appropriate remedy before this Court, to determine whether
or not all such copies are authentic and, in the negative case, the board of
canvassers should disregard the non-authentic ones and must base its canvass
only on the authentic ones, and it is only in the affirmative case, that is,
when the board or the Comelec or this Court holds
that the discrepant returns are all authentic that the jurisdiction of the
courts of first instance to conduct judicial recount begins.  Barely a week ago, this Court has even held
that this power of the board and the Comelec cannot
be renounced nor delegated to the courts of first instance.  (Abrigo v. Valley,
L-31374, January 21, 1970.)

To be sure, this view cannot be considered an attempt to
emasculate Section 163, for it is evident from its own provisions that the
basis of the judicial recount should be authentic returns.  The provision reads thus:

“Sec. 163.  When
statements of a precinct are contradictory.- In case it appears to the
provincial board of canvassers that another copy or other authentic copies of
the statement from an election precinct submitted to the board give to a
candidate a different number of votes and the difference affects the result of
the election, the Court of First Instance of the province, upon motion of the
board or of any candidate affected, may proceed to recount the votes cast in
the precinct for the sole purpose of determining which is the true statement or
which is the true result of the count of the votes cast in said precinct for
the office in question.  Notice of such
proceeding shall be given to all candidates affected.  (C. A. 357-358)”

There is nothing in the context or intent
of this provision which excludes the propriety of placing beyond the
jurisdiction of the courts of first instance the power to rule on the authenticity
or genuineness of the different copies of the returns presented to it.  Considering that the element of time is of
the essence in the prompt proclamation of the results of an election, it is
desirable as it is necessary to allocate possible conflict of authority which
may arise from the application of the interrelated provisions of the election
laws laying down the procedure leading to such proclamation, to the end that
the electoral process may operate as an integrated whole with the least loss of
time.  As a rule, it is not promotive of public policy that several officers or
entities should exercise powers concurrently, thereby creating doubts as to the
veracity and correctness of their respective actuations should these differ in
nature or degree, and, of course, also confusion as to which one should
control.  As between the Comelec and its agencies and deputies constitutionally
ordained to administer and execute the election laws, on the one hand, and the
courts of first instance, which under Section 163 are, at best, supposed to act
in conjunction with the board of canvassers only in a semi-administrative
capacity, hardly judicial, on the other, it is Our considered view that the law
contemplates that the authority to inquire into the genuineness of all
questioned copies of election returns should be lodged in the board of
canvassers and the Comelec instead of in the courts
of first instance.  This conclusion is
also consistent with the view that what the courts are called upon to perform
in the so-called judicial recount is the purely mathematical process of
counting the votes and that the assignment of such function to the court is
only to lend needed dignity to the proceedings but not to call for the plenary
exercise of judicial authority.  (Villalon v. Arrieta, supra.)

The circumstances of this case give Us occasion to make the
observation that it is the imperative duty of lawyers and judges, as well,
handling election cases, particularly, to keep themselves abreast of the recent
development of the jurisprudence on the matter, since as a matter of policy,
this Court has in every appropriate case tried to spell out as clearly and
unmistakably, as wisdom and language can make it, that the electoral process is
sacred, being the cornerstone of democracy itself, and that it will not brook
any discoverable attempt to frustrate the popular will, whether this be done
thru the use of ingenious legal maneuvers resulting from the taking advantage
by the unscrupulous and the smart of technicalities in the law or the evidence,
and to achieve these high purposes, this Court has laid down the necessary
guidelines by which the people’s mandate may be effectively discovered and
pursued with the least possible delay, consistently with reason and due
process.  It is no less the
responsibility of the bar as of any other element of our people to adhere to
these guidelines and to help the courts and the administrative authorities
honestly and sincerely in observing them. 
Truth to tell, the posture of counsel for respondent Nepomuceno
in not informing the respondent judge of the proceedings in G. R. No. L-31383
before this Court before and during the hearing on the injunction in question
is far from being commendable, since any avoidable obstruction to the smooth
carrying out of the electoral processes is a disservice to the country, in
general, and to the rule of law, in particular.

To give a semblance of plausibility to his position, counsel for
respondent Nepomuceno argues that while he accepts the
soundness of the Ong doctrine, the same is not
applicable to this case because, according to him, the Comelec
did not care to receive any evidence aliunde
regarding the possible genuineness of the copies in question of the returns for
the provincial treasurer in the one hundred eleven (111) precincts herein
involved and confined itself solely to an ocular comparison of the said copies
with those of the Comelec which appeared to be
clean.  The thrust of counsel’s
contention is that the mere existence of erasures, alterations and superimpositions
is not proof of falsification or illegal tampering.  Counsel’s pose is untenable.  Its flaw lies in that such erasures,
alterations and superimpositions, uninitialed by
those who made them, as they are not in the copies in dispute, are in the
natural course of things prima facie unauthorized, since they do
not coincide with the originals of which they are supposed to be exact carbon
copies, and to impose upon the Comelec the duty to
make further inquiry and to receive evidence aliunde,
it is the better rule that the party claiming legitimacy thereof should present
proof of circumstances which can reasonably lead to such conclusion and not
merely make bare allegations to such effect, as is the case here.  At the oral argument, counsel for respondent Nepomuceno could do no less than admit that up to this late
hour, neither he nor said respondent has creditable evidence of such fact.  In other words, in cases of this character,
it is not enough that the party concerned alleges that the alterations,
erasures and superimpositions are bona fide and legitimate, it is
necessary that sufficient specific reasonable proof of such legitimacy must, at
least, be alleged to exist to warrant further inquiry by the Comelec beyond the ocular comparison of the different
copies of the election returns concerned.

For the rest, it only remains for Us to state that it is indeed
regrettable to witness the spectacle of the Comelec
deliberately ignoring a writ of preliminary injunction issued by a court, such
as the respondent court in this case, but, on the other hand, it is patent here
that the respondent court has gone far beyond the scope of its legitimate
jurisdiction.  Who can blame the Comelec for jealously asserting its constitutional powers
in the premises as against an unauthorized interference by some other body or
officer? After all, Comelec must have had in mind
that any order of a court, amounting to a nullity for want of jurisdiction is
“a dead limb on the judicial tree, which should be lopped off or wholly
disregarded as the circumstances require”, (Anuran vs. Aquino,
38 Phil. 29, 36; Abbain vs. Chua, L-24241, February
26, 1968, 22 SCRA, 748).  As already
stated, had the parties and counsel and respondent judge only taken pains to
know the exact status of the proceedings before Us and the law on the matter,
such an undesirable occurrence could have been easily avoided.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the writs prayed for are
granted.  All proceedings held by
respondent judge in Civil Case No. 3639 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, above-mentioned, are hereby declared to have been
held beyond its jurisdiction and are, therefore, null and void.  Respondent judge is further prohibited from
taking any action in said case except to dismiss the same.  The restraining order heretofore issued in
this case is made permanent.  Costs
against private respondent Nepomuceno.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Teehankee,
and Barredo,
JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

^[1] Peo. et al. v. Vera etc., et al., 65 Phil. 56, 82.

^[2] Ong v. Comelec, supra.,
Pacis v. Comelec, supra.,
Tagoranao v. Comelec,
L-28598, March 12, 1968, 22 SCRA 978 and Villalon v.
Arrieta, L-29177, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 671.