GRACE BAPTIST CHURCH & SCHOOLS, REV. HERBERT HAYES & BRENDA HAYES, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND CYNTHIA IDIO, RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions April 16, 2012 EIGHTH DIVISION ANTONIO-VALENZUELA, J.:


ANTONIO-VALENZUELA, J.:


This is the Petition[1] filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court by Grace Baptist Church & Schools (“petitioner GBC”), Reverend Herbert Hayes (“petitioner Herbert”) and Brenda Hayes (“petitioner Brenda;” collectively, “petitioners”) imputing grave abuse of discretion upon the National Labor Relations Commission (“NLRC”) for issuing the Decision dated 16 April 2012[2] (“assailed Decision”) and the Resolution dated 29 June 2012[3] (“assailed Resolution”) in the suit for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, non-payment of salary/wages, separation pay and damages, docketed as NLRC NCR Case Number 06-0218-11.

The facts are as follows: Cynthia Idio (“private respondent Cynthia”) sued petitioner GBC before the Labor Arbiter.

Private respondent’s Position Paper alleged: private respondent Cynthia was a member of petitioner GBC’s church since the 1980s; petitioner GBC initially employed private respondent Cynthia as monitor, and later she became supervisor of petitioner GBC’s school; aside from her job at petitioner GBC’s school, private respondent Cynthia accepted responsibilities in petitioner GBC’s church (i.e., teaching Sunday school, and joining the Finance Committee), for which she was not remunerated; in June 2010, petitioners Herbert and Brenda, without a written notice or a definite reason, asked private respondent Cynthia to take a sabbatical leave for a period of one or two months; private respondent Cynthia did not receive her salary from the time she was asked to go on a sabbatical leave; in August 2010, private respondent Cynthia asked petitioner Herbert about her status, but petitioner Herbert did not give her a direct answer and asked her to wait indefinitely; private respondent Cynthia, and her husband Delano Idio (“Delano,” Delano was petitioner GBC’s church assistant pastor), scheduled five meetings with petitioner Herbert, but petitioner Herbert cancelled the meetings; in April 2010, private respondent Cynthia was not invited to attend the Educator’s Training for Academy Staff, which was a prerequisite for her performance of her supervisorial duties; on 29 April 2011, petitioners Herbert and Brenda met with private respondent Cynthia and Delano, accused Delano of certain offenses, and told Delano that it was time for Delano to resign; petitioners Herbert and Brenda forced private respondent Cynthia and Delano to sign resignation letters that petitioners Herbert and Brenda had prepared beforehand; on 01 May 2011, petitioner Herbert informed petitioner GBC’s Board of Trustees that his decision to terminate private respondent Cynthia’s employment was final; members of the Board of Trustees asked petitioner Herbert to defer action pending investigation, and to inform the congregation that the Board of Trustees did not participate in private respondent Cynthia’s and Delano’s resignations; but at the meeting held on 06 May 2011, petitioner Herbert announced that private respondent Cynthia’s and Delano’s resignations were with the consent of the Board of Trustees; the congregation executed the Manifesto, stating that petitioner Herbert had lost the congregation’s trust; most members of the Board of Trustees resigned after the meeting on 06 May 2011; there was no ground to terminate private respondent Cynthia’s services; while petitioners Herbert and Brenda intimated that there were irregularities in the finances of petitioner GBC’s church, these irregularities could not be used as grounds to suspend or dismiss private respondent Cynthia because private respondent Cynthia’s position as teacher was a permanent position, and her acceptance of other responsibilities was not a relinquishment or loss of tenure as a faculty member; in the August 2010 meeting, petitioners Herbert and Brenda clarified before the Board of Trustees that no money was missing; private respondent Cynthia was suspended for ten months, from June 2010 until April 2011(when she was forced to resign), in violation of the 30-day limit for suspension; private respondent Cynthia’s suspension was constructive dismissal; private respondent Cynthia should have been given a less punitive penalty; petitioner GBC didn’t give private respondent Cynthia the requisite notice of termination; private respondent Cynthia was entitled to backwages and moral damages.

Petitioners filed the Rejoinder to Complainant’s Position Paper.[4]

The Rejoinder to Complainant’s Position Paper alleged: petitioner GBC did not tell private respondent Cynthia, nor did petitioner GBC make respondent Cynthia believe that there would be remuneration for her Sunday school duties; private respondent Cynthia was remunerated for her services as treasurer of petitioner GBC’s church; private respondent Cynthia belatedly filed reports or failed to submit reports; private respondent Cynthia refused to accept help in the performance of her duties as treasurer, and also refused help from her brother Galuba; petitioner Brenda’s absence in the church services did not hamper petitioner Brenda’s performance of duties as a member of the finance committee; private respondent Cynthia went on paid leave from her teaching duties for many weeks to rectify the books and financial records of petitioner GBC, but still she failed to submit reports; Delano, and not private respondent Cynthia, disbursed payment to the construction workers; private respondent Cynthia was placed on sabbatical leave while petitioner GBC’s books were being restored to order; petitioner GBC’s Board of Trustees agreed on putting private respondent Cynthia on sabbatical leave; in May 2010, petitioner GBC’s Board of Trustees ordered private respondent Cynthia to turnover the books of account of petitioner GBC to Petitioner Brenda, because of the irregularities in private respondent Cynthia’s performance (i.e.: private respondent Cynthia improperly took collections and tithes home, and did not deposit the church money to the bank the next day); it was only when private respondent Cynthia was confronted with anomalies in the payment of Pag-big employee contributions when private respondent Cynthia felt “over-burdened” by her obligations; petitioner GBC paid private respondent Cynthia’s personal loans, Philhealth, and Pag-ibig contributions, until May 2011; private respondent Cynthia took a permanent job and had been working for three weeks outside petitioner GBC; petitioner Herbert informed private respondent Cynthia that no decision had been made because the investigation was still pending; on 12 August 2010, petitioner GBC’s church received a delinquency letter from Pag-ibig about the non-payment of employee contributions amounting to P13,584.03; private respondent Cynthia admitted to failing to pay the Pag-ibig employee contributions, but did not explain how the fund allotted to said expense was used; three meetings between private respondent Cynthia and petitioner Herbert were cancelled because of petitioner Herbert’s hospitalization; private respondent Cynthia never attempted to reconcile with petitioners; the resignation letters were supposed to be confidential, yet private respondent Cynthia and Delano told the other members of the church about them, to gain sympathy; petitioners had substantial basis to lose trust and confidence in private respondent Cynthia; private respondent Cynthia had only herself to blame for the protracted inquiry against her, because she did not defend herself, and did not correct the anomalies in the handling of petitioner GBC’s funds.

Labor Arbiter Monroe C. Tabingan (“LA Tabingan”) issued the Decision dated 29 December 2011, and dismissed the case for lack of merit.

Private respondent Cynthia filed the appeal before the NLRC.

On 16 April 2012, the NLRC issued the assailed Decision. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision read:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, complainant’s appeal is GRANTED. The [D]ecision dated December 29, 2011 of Labor Arbiter Monroe C, [sic] Tabingan is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a NEW ONE is entered declaring complainant to have been illegally suspended and illegally dismissed as a teacher/supervisor. Consequently, respondents are ordered to pay complainant her separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, equivalent to her one (1) month pay for every year of service up to the finality of the decision; and full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, if any, computed from [the] date her salaries and benefits were withheld up to the finality of this decision.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision. On 29 June 2012, the NLRC issued the assailed Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition, with the following assignment of errors:

A.
THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTIOIN WHEN IT CLEARLY MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE REQUIRED BY LAW TO PROVE THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT VOLUNTARILY RESIGNED FROM HER POST.

B.
THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN COMPLETELY AND CAPRICIOUSLY DISREGARDING THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT AGAINST THE GRACE BAPTIST CHURCH and SCHOOLS OF BAGUIO CITY, INC.

C.
ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE GBC AS EMPLOYER COULD BE MADE LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT, FLOUTING WELL-ESTABLISHED JUDICIAL PRECEDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISTREGARDING THE SEPARATE CORPORATE ENTITY OF THE GBC FROM THE LATE REV. HAYES AND PETITIONER HEREIN DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO SHOWING OF BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENTS A QUO NATURAL PERSONS, THE LATE REV. HERBERT F. HAYES AND MS. BRENDA LOU G. HAYES, SO AS TO MAKE THEM PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR GBC’S OBLIGATION.
[6]

The issue is whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Decision and the assailed Resolution.

The Petition[7] answers in the affirmative. The NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Decision and the assailed Resolution.

The Petition thrusts: the NLRC relied upon affidavits of persons who were not present when private respondent Cynthia voluntarily signed her resignation letter; the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded all evidence of private respondent Cynthia’s negligence, malfeasance, and misfeasance, in the handling of petitioner GBC’s finances; as treasurer who handled significant amounts of petitioner GBC’s money and property, private respondent Cynthia held a position of trust and confidence; private respondent Cynthia’s positions of school supervisor and church treasurer cannot be compartmentalized and separated because petitioner GBC espoused a holistic approach to education, religion, and community; private respondent Cynthia’s dereliction of duties as treasurer reflected on her moral fitness to teach in the school; petitioners’ evidence showed that private respondent Cynthia went on long, paid leaves from her teaching duties,to rectify petitioner GBC’s books; there was an on-going controversy regarding the authority to run petitioner GBC, brought by private respondent Cynthia, Delano, and other former members, against petitioner Herbert; private respondent Cynthia’s constant failure to comply with her duties as treasurer became a source of controversy among petitioner GBC’s employees and Board of Trustees; private respondent Cynthia was remiss in her duties (i.e.: she did not pay petitioner GBC’s utility bills on time; she did not remit the loan contributions of petitioner GBC’s employees to proper government agencies), and did not immediately rectify these errors thus petitioner GBC incurred penalties for delayed payments of bills; petitioner Herbert repeatedly asked private respondent Cynthia for updates on petitioner GBC’s finances, but private respondent Cynthia failed to give accounts; petitioner Herbert informed the Board of Trustees of private respondent Cynthia’s behavior; private respondent Cynthia admitted to having failed to pay Pag-ibig employee contributions, explaining that the money was used to pay other obligations; despite the numerous opportunities given private respondent Cynthia to explain her wrongdoings and to rectify petitioner GBC’s financial records, private respondent Cynthia merely stated that she did not personally benefit from petitioner GBC’s funds; private respondent Cynthia was an employee who held a position of trust and confidence, since she was charged with the care and custody of petitioner GBC’s money and property; petitioner GBC’s Board of Trustees decided to have private respondent Cynthia go on a sabbatical leave; private respondent Cynthia’s actions (i.e., private respondent Cynthia did not sufficiently explain the errors and irregularities on petitioner GBC’s finances; private respondent Cynthia did not comply with the directive to turnover petitioner GBC’s records and books; private respondent Cynthia failed to submit weekly financial reports without valid justification; private respondent Cynthia used the money intended for the payment of employee benefits without petitioners’ permission; private respondent Cynthia did not make notes if she made deductions of Tresinia Padila’s loan from her salary, and petitioner GBC’s loan under the name of petitioner Herbert; private respondent Cynthia had to take long leaves from teaching to rectify petitioner GBC’s records; there were numerous checks missing from petitioner GBC’s checkbook (and private respondent Cynthia was in control and possession of the checkbooks); unused money was not re-deposited in the respective source accounts; the beginning balances for 2010 in petitioner GBC’s checking accounts were incorrect; financial statements were missing from the records of the church), constituted serious misconduct, and breach of trust and confidence; the allegations in petitioners’ Position Paper were unanswered and unrebutted; private respondent Cynthia no longer enjoyed petitioner GBC’s trust and confidence; private respondent Cynthia voluntarily resigned her post; private respondent Cynthia, as a former member of petitioner GBC’s church, had to adhere to petitioner GBC’s doctrines and tenets to continue to be in good standing membership; petitioner GBC was a corporation separate and distinct from petitioners Herbert and Brenda; petitioners Herbert and Brenda were only liable together with petitioner GBC if they acted with malice or bad faith; the lack of authorized or just cause to terminate an employee and the failure to observe due process did not mean the corporate officer acted with malice or bad faith; there was no sufficient proof of petitioners Herbert and Brenda’s malice or bad faith.

The Comments[8] (sic) answers in the negative. The NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Decision and the assailed Resolution.

The Comments parries: the LA Tabingan made no finding that private respondent Cynthia signed the resignation letter voluntarily; at the time the affiants executed their statements, they were still members of petitioner GBC’s church (particularly, Aurora Quinones and Ofilia Madigal signed their respective affidavits because petitioner Brenda asked them to do so.); private respondent Cynthia was being compensated as a school teacher or supervisor, and not as treasurer of the church; thus, the argument that the position of supervisor, and the position of treasurer, cannot compartmentalized and separated, had no legal basis; there was no record that private respondent Cynthia failed to perform her duties; the allegations of private respondent Cynthia’s alleged shortcomings were only meant to justify petitioners Herbert and Brenda’s violation of the Labor Code; other than Aurora Quinones’s affidavit, there was no other evidence to show that private respondent Cynthia took extended leaves from her teaching duties to rectify the church books; there was no evidence of private respondent Cynthia’s alleged improper conduct and open disobedience; private respondent Cynthia’s filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, was contrary to petitioners’ claim that private respondent Cynthia voluntarily resigned; private respondent Cynthia’s alleged transgressions against the church cannot be used to justify her dismissal from the school; petitioner GBC’s Board of Trustees denied any participation in the decision to force private respondent Cynthia to take a sabbatical leave without pay; there was no evidence that petitioners gave private respondent Cynthia written notice of the charges against her; malice and bad faith clearly attended petitioners Herbert and Brenda’s decision to order private respondent Cynthia to go on a sabbatical leave without pay, and as such, they should be held liable in their personal capacities.

THE COURT’S RULING
The Court rules in the negative. The NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Decision and the assailed Resolution. There was no legal basis to terminate private respondent Cynthia’s employment.

Article 282 of the Labor Code of the Philippines is applicable. It reads:

Article 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
   
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
   
(c) Fraud and willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
   
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
   
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Petitioners invoke valid termination under Article 282(c) above-quoted, or willful breach of trust on the part of the employee.

Under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, loss of trust and confidence is a just cause for the termination of employment. Article 282(c) provides that an employer may terminate an employment for “fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative.” However, in order for the employer to properly invoke this ground, the employer must satisfy two conditions.[9]

First, the employer must show that the employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. Jurisprudence provides for two classes of positions of trust. The first class consists of managerial employees, or those who by the nature of their position, are entrusted with confidential and delicate matters and from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected.[10] The second class includes “cashiers, auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of [the employer’s] money or property.”[11]

Second, the employer must establish the existence of an act justifying the loss of trust and confidence. To be a valid cause for dismissal, the act that betrays the employer’s trust must be real, i.e., founded on clearly established facts, and the employee’s breach of the trust must be willful, i.e., it was done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse.[12]

The first condition was absent. Respondent Cynthia was neither a managerial employee, nor an employee, who, in the normal and routine exercise of her functions, regularly handle significant amounts of petitioner GBC’s money or property, with respect to school operations. Clearly, as a schoolteacher, respondent Cynthia was not shown to hold a position of trust and confidence.

The second condition was absent. Petitioners failed to establish the existence of an act justifying the loss of trust and confidence in respondent Cynthia. Petitioners alleged that respondent Cynthia was remiss in her duties to handle petitioner GBC’s church’s finances. However, such duties had nothing to do with respondent Cynthia’s performance of her duties as a schoolteacher. In the alternative, petitioners alleged that respondent Cynthia took extended leaves of absence from the school. Such allegation was not substantiated. Petitioners did not adduce evidence to show that respondent Cynthia was willfully failed to attend to her teaching duties.

In sum, petitioners failed to satisfy the above-mentioned conditions, and as such, cannot invoke the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Thus, petitioners illegally dismissed private respondent Cynthia.

In addition, petitioners failed to show that they observed due process in terminating private respondent Cynthia’s employment. The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before termination of employment can be effected: a first written notice that informs the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his or her dismissal is sought, and a second written notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. In considering whether the charge in the first notice is sufficient to warrant dismissal under the second notice, the employer must afford the employee ample opportunity to be heard.[13]

In this case, petitioner GBC did not furnish private respondent Cynthia a first written notice informing her of the acts or omissions for which her dismissal was sought. Petitioner GBC did not give private respondent Cynthia ample opportunity to be heard, as they did not allow private respondent Cynthia to submit any position paper, or to be heard in a proceeding. Finally, there was also no sufficient second written notice. Rather, petitioner GBC merely placed private respondent Cynthia on sabbatical indefinitely, and then petitioner GBC forced private respondent Cynthia to sign a resignation letter that was prepared beforehand.

In conclusion, the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioners guilty of illegally dismissing private respondent Cynthia.

We DISMISS the Petition, and AFFIRM the Decision dated 16 April 2012 and the Resolution dated 29 June 2012, issued by the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR Case Number 06-0218-11.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Lampas Peralta, F.,Chairperson and Cruz, S.C., JJ., concur.


[1] C.A. Rollo, p. 03.

[2] Annex “A,” C.A. Rollo, p. 55.

[3] Annex “B,” C.A. Rollo, p. 68.

[4] Annex “N,” CA Rollo, p. 430.

[5] Supra, at note 02.

[6] Supra, at note 01.

[7] Id..

[8] C.A. Rollo, p. 617.

[9] Baguio Central University v. Gallente, G.R. No. 188267, 02 December 2013.

[10] Id., citing: Baron v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 182299, 22 February 2010; Oasay, Jr. v. Palacio Del Gobernador Condominium Corporation, G.R. No. 194306, 06 February 2012; and Lima Land, Inc. v. Cuevas, G.R. No. 169523, 16 June 2010.

[11] Id., citing: Lopez v. Keppel Bank Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 176800, 05 September 2011.

[12] Id., citing: Philippine Plaza Holdings, Inc. v. Episcope, G.R. No. 192826, 27 February 2013; Bristol Myers Squibb (Phils.), Inc. v. Baban, G.R. No. 167449, 17 December 2008; and Baron v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 182299, 22 February 2010.

[13] Sang-an v. Equator Knights Detective and Security Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 173189, 13 February 2013.