JOSE C. LUCIANO, PETITIONER, VS. MAXIMO ESTRELLA, TEOTIMO GEALOGO, JUSTINO VENTURA, PEDRO ISON, IGNACIO BABASA, BERNARDO NONATO, PROVINCIAL FISCAL B. JOSE CASTILLO, COURT OF FIR…

Original petition for quo warranto,
certiorari, prohibition and
injunction filed with this Court by Jose C. Luciano,
as Acting Mayor of Makati, Rizal,
to forestall the alleged impending usurpation by suspended mayor Maximo Estrella of the position
he is presently occupying; and to question the validity of the orders of the
Court of Appeals granting new trial to the respondents who were convicted in
Criminal Case No. 18821 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
and ordering the remand of the records of said criminal case to the latter
court for further proceedings.

Pertinent to the issue in
this case are the following facts:

On 18 January 1969, Maximo Estrella, Teotimo Gealogo, Justino Ventura, Pedro Ison, Ignacio Babasa, Bernardo Nonato, Eduardo S. Francisco, Cirilo
Delmo, Jose San Mateo, Lutgardo
Ambrosio, Ciriaco Alano, Gualberto San Pedro, Jose
Gutierrez, Franco A. Gutierrez were charged with violation of Sections 3-G and
4-B of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) in an information
reading as follows:

“That on or about July 26, 1967, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Maximo Estrella, then the
Municipal Mayor of Makati, Rizal;
Teotimo Gealogo, Justino Ventura, Pedro Ison, Ignacio Babasa, Bernardo Nonato, then Municipal Councilors of Makati,
Rizal; Eduardo Francisco, then Muni­cipal Treasurer
of Makati, Rizal; Cirilo Delmo, then
Assistant Municipal Treasurer of Makati, Rizal; Lutgardo Ambrosio, then Chief of Traffic Control Bureau, Makati Police Department; Ciriaco Alano,
then confidential Private Secretary to the Municipal Mayor; Gualberto
San Pedro, then Provincial Auditor of the Province of Rizal;
Jose Gutierrez and Franco A. Gutierrez, owner and/or representatives of the JEP
Enterprises, respectively, conspiring, and confederating to­gether, did, then
and there, willfully, unlaw­fully and feloniously, on behalf of the Municipal
Government of Makati, Rizal,
enter into a contract or transaction with the JEP Enterprises, represented by
Jose Gutierrez and Franco A. Gutierrez, for the delivery and installation by
the JEP Enterprises to the Municipal Government of Makati,
Rizal of fifty-nine (59) units of traffic deflectors
valued at ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED AND
TWENTY-SIX PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,426.50) each unit, that thirty-
four (34) units were delivered, installed and paid for by the Municipality of Makati
in favor of the JEP Enterprises in the amount of FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY ONE PESOS (P48,841.00), less ten percent (10%) retention,
which contract or transaction is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
Municipal Gov­ernment of Makati, Rizal,
to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

“That Jose Gutierrez and Franco C. Gutierrez, being the owner,
manager and/or representatives of the JEP Enterprises, being private persons,
did knowingly
induce or cause the above-mentioned public officials and officers to enter into the aforementioned contract or
transaction.”

After due trial, during which the parties presented their respective
documentary and testimonial evidence, the court rendered Judgment on 17 May
1969, finding that the contract for the purchase of 59 units of traffic
deflectors at P1,436.50 per unit, was mani­festly and grossly disadvantageous
to the municipality of Makati, Rizal,
and that it was made possible through a sham bidding and a series of
falsifications participated in by most of the accused.  Thus, accused Mayor Maximo
Estrella, Councilors Teotimo
Gealogo, Justino Ventura,
Pedro Ison, Ignacio Babasa
and Bernardo Nonato, Municipal Treasurer Eduardo
Francisco, Provincial Auditor Gualberto San Pedro,
Chief of Police Jose San Mateo, and Traffic Control Bureau Chief Lutgardo Ambrosio were pronounced
guilty as charged, and each was sentenced to a prison term of 6 years, with
perpetual disqualification to hold public office.  Thereupon, the Provincial Sheriff was ordered
to remove said public officials from office pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act 3019.^[1]
Accused Franco A. Gutierrez, Cirilo Delmo and Ciriaco Alano^[2]
were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. 
On the same day, 17 May 1961,
Mayor Estrella and Councilors Gealogo,
Ventura, Ison,
Babasa and Nonato perfected
their appeal to the Court of Appeals, where the case was docketed as CA-G. R.
No. 10250-CR.

On 28
November 1969,
appellants Estrella, et al., filed in the Court of
Appeals a motion for new trial, based allegedly on newly discovered and
material evidence.  The evidence referred
to consisted of the testimony of Acting Provincial Auditor Conrado
S. Declaro, who allegedly discovered in the
latter part of May, 1969, or after the appealed decision had been promulgated,
that when the contract for the purchase of the deflectors was entered into, the
municipality of Makati, Rizal,
had an overdraft and, therefore, had no funds available to cover such purchase;
and that the contract (Exhibit “E”) does not have the necessary
certification by the municipal treasurer as to the availability of funds therefor.  The motion
for new trial was accompanied by an affidavit of Auditor Declaro
to that effect, and a joint affidavit by appellants stating that they learned
of the state of the municipality’s finances only on 24 July 1969 when so informed by Declaro.

Required by the Court of Appeals to comment on the motion, the
Solicitor General, representing appellee People of
the Philip­pines,
in effect offered no objection to the granting of the motion for new trial,
opining that favorable action thereon would do no violence to judicial
processes.  Consequently, on 31 January
1970, the Court of Appeals, taking note that the circumstances pointed out by
Auditor Declaro were not, and could not have been,
known to the appellants; that the trial judge who rendered the appealed
judgment had already previously granted a new trial to two other accused who
did not appeal (Lutgardo Ambrosio
and Jose San Mateo), and that the subject matter of the prosecution is one of
first im­pression and of serious consequences, granted the motion for new trial
and ordered the remand of the case to the court a quo for new
trial.  Also, at the instance of the
appellants, another resolution was promulgated by the appellate court on 9 February 1970 declaring the order
(granting new trial) final and directing the immediate remanding of the records
of the case to the lower court.  On 13
February 1970, herein petitioner filed the present petition for the purposes
earlier stated; and, as prayed for, this Court issued writs of preliminary
injunction against the Court of Appeals, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Rizal, to restrain enforcement of the disputed orders of
the appellate court, and the holding of new trial.

The petition questions the legality of the grant of a new trial
by the Court of Appeals, as being contrary to law and established
jurisprudence, averring that the alleged newly discovered evidence could have
been discovered even before the decision of the Court of First Instance by
exercise of due diligence; that said evidence is not of such character as would
change the result when taken in connection with the evidence already on
record.  Petitioner further avers that
the motion and grant of new trial and the remand of the records to the court
below before the expiration of the standard 15 days set by the Rules, were part
of a plan to secure a reinstatement of the accused to the positions they
formerly held, and the ouster of petitioner from his post as Acting Mayor of Makati.

Answering the petition, the Solicitor General, on 23 February
1970, sided with the petitioner and pleaded that there was no showing that the
alleged newly discovered evidence sought to be presented will be likely change
the result of the case; that the facts and circumstances surround­ing the
contract entered into by appellants-movants for the
supply of traffic deflector mirrors, such as the fact that they were shown to
be grossly overpriced and totally useless for the purpose for which they were
acquired, that the law on public bidding was not followed, the accused’s undue haste in pushing the transaction through,
the paying of the voucher before it was signed by the treasurer, the failure of
the accused to see the deflectors themselves, and the appropriation of money
for the purchase before the award was made, show the guilt of the accused
despite the averred nullity of the contract of purchase without the treasurer’s previous certificate of availability of
funds.  The Solicitor General
further pleaded that for a violation of Section 3 (g) of the Anti-Graft Law
(Republic Act No. 3019) it is not
necessary that the contract therein mentioned be perfectly valid and binding, so long as the
transaction entered into in behalf of the Government be manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous.  He prayed that the
Court of Appeals’ order for new trial be vacated.

Private respondents Estrella, Gealogo, et al., denied any intent to reassume their
offices unless authorized by the courts; pleaded that they filed a motion for
their reinstatement in the Court of First Instance, on 14 February 1970, only
to stop speculations that they would take over their respective offices without
judicial authorization; and that the petition had no cause of action for quo
warranto and petitioner had no personality
whatsoever to object to the motion for new trial, not being a party to the
criminal case wherein it was granted; that petitioner is not the offended party
in said criminal case, nor could he question or appeal from the grant of new
trial, since the fiscal and the Solicitor General are the ones authorized to
represent the People, and these had not opposed the new trial.  They further alleged that the court of
Appeals’ order for new trial and for the immediate entry thereof were proper
and legal, the People having favorably endorsed the new trial.  As special defenses, they claimed that the
petitioner had neither personality to institute the proceedings nor has any
cause of action; that only the People of the Philippines
could do so; that the grant of new trial has become final and executory; and that certiorari
and prohibition are not a substitute for timely appeal.

We consider it unnecessary, at present, for brevity’s sake, to
render an opinion on the question of petitioner Luciano’s
personality to institute these proceedings in view of the Solicitor General’s
answer to the petition, practically adopting the latter and praying for the
vacating of the questioned resolutions
of the Court of Appeals, granting the motion for new trial of private
respondents Estrella, et al., and remanding the
records to the court of origin without awaiting the expiration of the normal
period of 15 days prescribed by the Rules for the finality of said orders.  Said answer on behalf of the Republic is and should
be treated as its own petition for certiorari.  The Solicitor General, in representation of
the Re­public, the prosecutor
and complainant in Criminal Case No. 18821 of Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
has unquestionable per­sonality to assail the grant of new trial therein.  This the other respondents concede.  It is
no objection to the application for a prerogative writ that the Solicitor General had previously
expressed no objection to the res­pondents’
motion for new trial, as filed in the Court of Appeals, for nothing bars
the Solicitor General from changing opinion upon a more detailed and thorough
consideration of the facts and the law; and, anyway, it is a well known and settled rule in our jurisdiction that the
Republic or its government, is usually not
estopped by mistake or error on the part of
its officials or agents.^[3] Moreover, the correctness, validity and
legality of a grant of new trial in a criminal case do not depend upon the
consent of the parties thereto, but
upon the grant being made conformably to the prescriptions of the Rules of
Court and the applicable jurisprudence.

Neither is the action taken by the Solicitor General in this case
barred by the lack of a seasonable appeal or of an apposite motion to
reconsider the questioned resolutions of the Court of Appeals.  In so far as they vacated the judgment of
conviction rendered by the court of origin and decreed a new trial, said orders
resolved no questions with finality; they were in fact interlocutory, and,
therefore were not independently appealable (Rule 41,
section 2; Rule 122, section 1, Revised Rules of Court).  This Court has ruled that a grant of new
trial is not appealable since it is not a final
judgment.^[4]
As to the non-filing of a motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
itself foreclosed this remedy by ordering the remand of the records to the
court of origin even before the 15-day period for finality had expired.

Finally, in People vs. Bocar (97
Phil. 398), this Court upheld as proper the filing of a certiorari and prohibition case to question a trial court’s order granting a
motion for new trial.  Explaining the
action taken by this Court, we said in that case:

“To avoid any misapprehension and to explain why we
entertained the present petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction over an order granting a motion for
new trial, it should be stated that in civil cases the granting of a new trial
is considered a mere interlocutory order not subject to appeal or special civil
action.  The reason is that the party
dissatisfied with the order granting new trial may, after judgment, appeal from
the same and include in his appeal the supposed error committed in the issuance
of the interlocutory order.  However, in
a criminal case like the present, that theory or procedure of appeal in due
time may not be practical or satisfac­tory for the reason that at the
conclusion of the new trial, the trial court deciding the case anew, may acquit
the defendant and thereafter the prosecution would have no more opportunity of
bringing before the appellate court the question of the legality or illegality
of the order granting a new trial because the defendant acquitted may plead
double jeopardy.” (Cas. cit. at page 414).

We now proceed to the
main issue in these proceedings:  was the
grant of a new trial for allegedly newly
discovered evidence granted improvidently and in grave abuse of
discretion?

We answer the question in
the affirmative, because the action of the Court of Appeals was not in
conformity with the applicable provisions of Rule 124, in connection with Rule
121 and Rule 53.

By Section 13 of Rule
124,

“SEC. 13.  Motion for
new trial.  — At any time after the
appeal from the lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of the
appellate court convicting the accused becomes final, the latter may move for a
new trial on the ground of newly dis­covered evidence material to his defense,
the motion to conform to the provisions of section 3, Rule 121.”

The motion for new trial
of respondents Estrella, et al., accused in the court
below is anchored on Section 2 (b) of Rule 121, i.e., that new and material
evidence has been discovered which (1) the defendant could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial; and
(2) which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.

Now, it will be recalled
that the proffered new evidence consisted of the testimony of auditor Conrado Declaro, substantially to
the effect that after testifying at the trial in the court of origin he
discovered for the first time that the Municipality of Makati
had an overdraft and, therefore, did not have the necessary funds to cover such
purchase; that upon examination of the contract itself, it was found to be
without the necessary certification of the municipal treasurer regarding availability
of funds therefor; that the execution of the contract
without such certificate of the municipal treasurer renders the contract null
and void, pursuant to Sections 607 and 608 of the Revised Administrative Code;
that the foregoing information was relayed by Declaro
to respondents only in July, 1969, or after the promulgation of the decision in
the criminal case and the said respondents had perfected their appeal to the
Court of Appeals.

Measured against the
recognized standards on newly-discovered evidence, the above testimony
of the auditor clearly falls short of the requirement for the holding of a new
trial.

First, because for the
purposes of the Rules, Declaro’s detection of the sad
condition of the municipality’s finances can hardly be called a newly-discovered
fact.  The financial position of the
municipality in 1967 is a matter that the then incumbent Provincial Auditor of Rizal and Municipal Treasurer of Makati,
who were accused together with the herein respondents in Criminal Case No.
18821, should have known all along and could have presented during the hearing
of the case.  In fact, it was stated in Declaro’s affidavit, attached to the motion for new trial,
“that actually the Municipal Treasurer used trust funds of the
municipality to partially pay” (Affidavit, paragraph 5) for the articles
initially delivered (P43,956.90, for the 34 units delivered, at
P1,436.50 each less 10% retention),^[5] thereby indicating that said municipal
official was actually aware of the lack of available and uncommitted
funds to cover the purchase.  That must
even be the reason why he did not certify that there were available funds for
the purpose:  because he knew that there
were none.  And it is unconceivable that
the other accused did not discover this fact at the time.  Besides, it may be pointed out that for the
duration of the criminal case, i.e., from 18 January 1969 when the information was filed in court up
to 17 May 1969
when the decision was rendered, respondents were occupying their respective
positions as mayor and councilors of the municipality of Makati.  They
could have obtained with facility the information about the financial condition
of the municipal government when the questioned contract was entered into had
they wanted to.  This, how­ever, they
failed to do, and nothing appears in the records to explain such failure.  In one case,^[6] not even the detention of the accused was considered sufficient justification for his failure to present the
alleged new testimonies, this Court reasoning that he could have secured and
presented the “new” witnesses during the original trial, through his
relatives and friends, or through compulsory process.  As it is, the evidence now relied upon by the
respondents Estrella, et al., amounts to no more than
forgotten proof, the belated uncovering of which would not justify an order to conduct a new trial.^[7]

Second, herein respondent
municipal officials were charged with violation of Republic Act 3019 under its
Section 3(g), or specifically, for having entered, on behalf of the
government, into a contract or transaction manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government.  It is not at all difficult to see that to
determine the culpability of the accused under such provision, it need
only be established that the accused is
a public officer; that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of
the government; and that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to that government.  In
other words, the act treated thereunder partakes of
the nature of a malum prohibitum;
it is the commission of that act
as defined by the law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines
whether or not the provision has been violated. 
And this construction would be in consonance with the announced
purpose for which Republic Act 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of
certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting graft
or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.^[8]
Note that the law does not merely contemplate repression of acts that are unlawful
or corrupt per se, but even of those that may lead to or result
in graft and corruption.  Thus, to
require for conviction under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act that the
validity of the contract or transaction be first proved would be to enervate,
if not defeat, the intention of the Act. 
For what would prevent the officials from entering into those kinds of
transactions against which Republic Act 3019 is directed, and then deliberately omit the observance of
certain formalities just to provide a convenient
leeway to avoid the clutches of the law in the event of discovery and
consequent prosecution?  In the present
case, assuming arguendo
that the absence of certification by the municipal treasurer as to
availability of covering funds would materially affect the validity of the
contract, that matter would be immaterial to the determination of respondents’
liability under Republic Act 3019; so that the discovery of such fact would not
constitute a proper ground to support a motion for the reopening and retrial of
the case.

But the improvidence of the action taken by the Court of Appeals
goes further than the disregard of the specific requirements that newly
discovered evidence should meet to justify granting a new trial.  It goes deeper.  Section 17 of Rule 124, provides that –

“SEC. 17.  Application
of certain rules in civil to criminal cases.  — ­The provisions of Rules 46 to 56 relating
to pro­cedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original as
well as appealed civil cases shall, in so far as they are applicable and not in­consistent
with the provisions of this rule, be applied to criminal cases.”

One of the rules thus made applicable to criminal cases is Rule
53, Section 2 of which requires that in granting or refusing a new trial
“the Court of Appeals shall consider the new evidence together
with that adduced in the Court below” (emphasis supplied).  The purpose is clearly to have the new
evidence weighed in conjunction with the old, in order to ascertain whether the new proofs tendered
would probably change the result, as required by Section 2(b) of Rule 121.  Nowhere in the questioned resolution does it
appear that both the “new” and the “old” evidence were considered
jointly.  In fact, the Court of Appeals
could not then have done so, for the petitioner avers, and it is not denied,
that when the motion for new trial was filed, the testimony of the witnesses at
the original trial was not yet transcribed.

With these violations of the Rules of Court thus made patent, we
have no alternative but to conclude that the grant of the motion for new trial
by the Court of Appeals was made,
not only in error, but with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.  We are left with no
alternative but to disavow and set aside the actuations of the Appeals
Court.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and the order of
the Court of Appeals granting a new trial for newly discovered evidence in its
Case CA-G. R. No. 10250-CR, as well as its order remanding the records of the
case to the court of origin, are hereby revoked and set aside.  The Court of Appeals is consequently
instructed to recall and proceed with said criminal case until its termination
in con­formity with the applicable law and rules of court.

The preliminary writs of
injunction heretofore issued are made permanent.

SO ORDERED.  Costs
against private respondents Estrella, Gealogo, Ventura,
Ison, Babasa and Nonato to be paid by them jointly and severally in favor of
the Republic
of the Philippines.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.

Villamor, J., abstains.

^[1]
Vide Luciano vs. Provincial Governor, L-30306,
29 June 1969, 28 SCRA 517.

^[2]
In the copy of the trial court’s decision submitted to this Court, there was no
mention of Jose Gutierrez, one of the accused in the case (Annex “B”,
Petition).

^[3]
United Christian Missionary Society vs. SSS, L-26712-16, 27 December
1969, 30 SCRA 982; Rodriguez, Inc. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue,
L-23041, 31 July 1969, 28 SCRA 1199; Republic vs. PLDT Co., L-18841, 27
January 1969, 26 SCRA 620; Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, L-11499, 29 April 1961, 1 SCRA 1166.

^[4]
Veloso vs. Pacheco, 1 Phil. 271; Herman vs.
Crossfield, 7 Phil. 261.

^[5]
Annex D, page 64, Rollo.

^[6]
People vs. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398.

^[7]
People vs. Evaristo,
L-14520, 26 February 1965,
13 SCRA 172; People vs. Penesa, supra; also Suva vs. Corpus, L-18397, 29
November 1962, 6 SCRA 699; Sy Ha vs. Galang, L-18513, 27 April
1963, 7 SCRA 797; Necesito vs. Paras,
L-10605, 11 September 1958.

^[8]
Section 1, Republic Act 3019.

Clean

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