CENTRO ESCOLAR UNIVERSITY, PETITIONER, VS. CALIXTO WANDAGA, SEGUNDO CRUZ, FRANCIS DAO-AS, EMI­LIANO PISEW, MARIA NAVARRO, VICTOR MARTINEZ, ELPIDIO RIVERA, DANIEL ORTIGUERO, CESA…

On May 17, 1965,
eight janitors and one janitress filed a petition in the Court of Industrial
Relations against Centro Escolar University
for recovery of over­time compensation, illegal deduction and underpayment,
with reinstatement.^[1]

Alleged in their complaint, among others, were the following:

They were employed by Centro
Escolar University
as janitors and janitress as far back as 1962,^[2]
until Feb­ruary 27, 1965,
when the University discriminatorily dismissed them without notice and
cause.  As they refused to accept their
separation pay or sign a separation agree­ment, their pay was sent to them by
registered mail, which amounts they are willing to return to the University.

They also averred that they worked 13 hours from Mon­day to
Saturday, 7 hours during Sundays and holidays, without extra compensation; that
illegal deductions of P12.00 were made against three of them;^[3]
that they were paid below the minimum wage fixed by law^[4]
and that the University refused payment of their claims.

Moving to dismiss, Centro Escolar
University claimed that the Court of Industrial Relations had no jurisdic­tion
over claims under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, the Mini­mum Wage Law and refund of
illegal deductions for the rea­son that though reinstatement was being asked,
the same was not sufficient in the absence of any allegation of un­fair labor
practice or proof of the existence of a-labor dispute.  Also, it was alleged that a claim was earlier
filed by the petitioners before Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of
Labor for the same amounts,^[5]
thereby war­ranting the dismissal of the present case on the ground of pendency of another action.

On August 26, 1965, the Court of Industrial Relations declared
that it had jurisdiction in claims of this nature where the employer-employee
relationship is still existing or is sought to be reestablished (as when
there is a prayer for reinstatement) as well as over cases involving money
claims which otherwise would not fall within its authority, when it appears
that the principal causes of action fall squarely under its jurisdiction or
where such other claims are mere incidents to a principal cause of action
falling under its jurisdiction.  As
regards the alleged pendency of another action, the
court noted that since the complaint before the Department of Labor did not ask
for reinstate­ment the rule of pendency of another
action for the same cause, does not apply.

After denial of its motion for reconsideration by the Court of
Industrial Relations en banc, the University filed with Us this
special civil action for certiorari with pre­liminary injunction, contending
that appeal in due time is not an adequate remedy, and seeking to enjoin the
Court of Industrial Relations from further proceeding with the case.

This case revolves on two issues: First, whether the Court of
Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over claims for overtime work (Eight-Hour
Labor Law), and for under­payment and refund for illegal deductions (Minimum Wage
Law), there being a claim for reinstatement; and second, whether the case
should be dismissed due to the pendency of another
action for the same cause.

As to the first point, the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations under statutes and in the light of jurisprudence extends
only to cases involving: (a) labor dis­putes affecting an industry which is
indispensable to the national interest and so certified by the President to the
Court (Section 10, Republic Act 875); (b) controversies about the minimum wage
under the Minimum Wage Law (Repu­blic Act 602); (c) controversies regarding
hours of employ­ment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act 444) and
(d) cases involving unfair labor practice (Sec. 5/a7, Republic Act 875).  And in order that such disputes and
controversies may fall under the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations, the employer-employee relation­ship between the parties must exist
or, if it had been ter­minated, the employee must seek reinstatement.  When such relationship has ceased and the
employee does not seek re­instatement, all such claims become merely money
claims that fall within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.^[6]

The foregoing has been the rule as far back as 1959.^[7]
Aware that there have been some cases whose import could lead to a contrary
interpretation, along petitioner’s line of reasoning, this Court, through Mr.
Justice Sanchez^[8]
ex­pressly declared the above to be the prevailing rule, leav­ing no doubt as
to the proper interpretation of the laws concerned.

Applying this norm to the present case, the principal claims
being pressed here fall under the Minimum Wage Law and the Eight-Hour Labor
Law, and are coupled with the prayer for reinstatement.  They therefore fall squarely within the Industrial
Court’s jurisdiction.  And, in line with the rule against splitting
a cause of action, the other claims arising out of or incidental to the princi­pal
ones are also properly cognizable by the same court.^[9]

With regard to petitioner’s arguments on pendency
of another “action’ in Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor,
let it be restated that such regional offices do not have jurisdiction over
such money claims of laborers under the Minimum Wage Law and Eight-Hour Labor
Law, be­cause Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, particularly Section 25, which
purported to grant it such jurisdiction, is null and void.^[10]
The Department of Labor through its re­gional offices has jurisdiction only
over money claims under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.^[11]
There can therefore be no bar due to the pendency of
another action.

WHEREFORE, the petition herein is hereby denied and
respondent Court is declared with jurisdiction over its Case No. 2084-V and the
parties are hereby enjoined to pro­ceed further in said case.  Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., (Acting C.J.), Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz
Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Case No. 2084-V.

^[2]
Six starting in February 1962, one in June 1962, one in June 1963, and another
in August 1963.

^[3]
Two for 36 months and one for 8 months.

^[4]
The difference claimed by each was alleged in the complaint, with a total claim
of about P1,159.00.

^[5]
RO4 Case No. 05874.

^[6] Sy Huan v. Bautista,
L-16115, Aug. 29, 1961; Campos
v. MRR, L-17905, May 25, 1962;
Gracela v. El Colegio
del Hospicio de San Jose,
L-15152, Jan. 31, 1963.

^[7] Monares v. CNS Enterprises, L-11749, May 29, 1959.

^[8]
Bay View Hotel, Inc. v. Manila Hotels’ Union,
L-21803, Dec. 17, 1966.

^[9]
Serrano v. CIR, L-19562, May
23, 1963; Bay View Hotel, Inc. v. Manila Hotels’ Union,
supra.

^[10]
Gomez v. Fookien Times, L-17916, Apr. 30,
1963; Villa­fuerte v. Marfil,
L-17775, Feb. 28, 1963; Andan v. Secretary of
Labor, L-18556, Mar. 29, 1963, Halili v. Huganas,
L-17776, Apr. 30, 1964.

^[11]
Chung v. Abaday, L-20315, June 30, 1964.