PILIPINAS BANK, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUSTICE SOCORRO TIRONA-LIWAG, RESPONDENT.

The verified administrative complaint filed by Pilipinas Bank
charges respondent Socorro Tirona-Liwag, retired Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals and formerly the Presiding Judge of Branch 143, Regional Trial Court
of Makati, with gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious misconduct and
knowingly rendering unjust orders and/or decision relative to Civil Case No.
5260, entitled “Rustica I. Tan, et al. v. Pilipinas Bank”, for
damages with injunction.

On September 28, 1983, Rustica Tan assisted by her husband
Dionisio Tan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati a complaint for damages
with injunction against petitioner Pilipinas Bank to stop an extra-judicial
foreclosure of a lot located at Parañaque, Metro Manila.  The complaint prayed among others:

x x x              x x x                 x
x x

“(c) After trial on the merits, judgment be rendered ordering the defendant; to pay unto the
plaintiffs P2,000,000.00
as moral /actual damages, P50,000,00 as exemplary damages and P100,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, plus costs; (Anne “B”, Petition)

x x x              x x x                 x
x x

The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 5260, was raffled to Branch
143 presided by Judge Zoilo Aguinaldo.

On October 21, 1983, Pilipinas Bank filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint with damages but thus was denied by Judge Aguinaldo with damages but
this was denied by Judge Aguinaldo in his order dated April 25, 1985.  Atty. Rodolfo Vega, the defendant’s counsel
received a copy of the order denying the motion to dismiss on May 15, 1985.

On July 15, 1985, the plaintiffs filed a motion to declare
defendant in default for failure to file an answer within the reglementary
period.  In the same motion, the
plaintiffs asked the court that they be required to submit their evidence ex
parte. (Annex “D”, Petition)

On July 31, 1985,
the Pilipinas Bank filed an “Opposition To Declare Defendant In Default” (Annex
“1”, Answer).  At the same time then, it
filed a “Motion To Admit Answer” (Annex “E”, Petition) with the answer attached
thereto, a copy of which was allegedly furnished to Atty. Lumen Policarpio, the
plaintiffs’ counsel, (Annex “F”, Petition) The defendant alleged that
its counsel, Atty. Rodolfo L. Vega had resigned and that there was no one who
could prepare the necessary answer since it was Atty. Vega who had full and
adequate knowledge of the case; and that it was only recently that the
undersigned counsel, Atty. Danilo M. Gutierrez, and the defendant’s duly
authorized collection representative were able to confer with Atty. Vega about
the case and the latter agreed to render assistance in the active and immediate
prosecution of the case.

On October 14, 1985, Judge Aguinaldo issued an order declaring
the defendant in default; denying the defendant’s motion to admit answer and
directing the plaintiffs to present their Evidence on October 23, 1985.  In the order, Judge Aguinaldo noted that
“Atty. Rodolfo L. Vega, the counsel of the defendant, received a copy of
the order of the court dated April 25, 1985, denying the defendant’s motion to
dismiss but Atty. Vega and the defendant did not do anything within the period
required by the Rules of Court for the defendant to file its answer.  Atty. Rodolfo L. Vega never filed any motion
in court asking that he be allowed to withdraw as counsel of the defendant and
so even as of this date, he can still be considered the counsel on record of
the defendant.”  (Anne
“2”, Answer)

On October 23, 1985, the plaintiffs presented their evidence
ex-parte pursuant to the default order.

On November 15, 1985, Atty. Godofredo Bernardino filed a notice
of appearance as counsel for the plaintiffs in view of Atty. Lumen Policarpio’s
withdrawal as counsel effective October 8. 1985. (Annex “3”, Answer)

On March 6, 1986, the plaintiffs’ counsel filed an urgent motion
to submit additional evidence which was granted by the court in an order dated
March 13, 1986.

On March 14, 1986,
the plaintiffs presented additional evidence to establish that the total
damages sustained by them on account of the acts of the defendant amounts to
P11,474, 554.00.

On August 13, 1986, the defendant filed a motion for
reconsideration of the October 14, 1985 order alleging: 1) that it never
received a copy of the plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendant in default; 2)
that it also did not receive a copy of the October 14, 1985 order; and 3) that
it was only thru defendant’s investigative work that it learned of the foregoing
developments.  The motion was signed by
Atty. Danilo M. Gutierrez as counsel.

On September 10, 1986, Atty. Ramon P. Gutierrez filed an entry of
appearance as new counsel of the plaintiffs with the conformity of Rustica
Tan.  The new counsel then filed an opposition
to the defendant’s motion for reconsideration to which a reply was filed by the
defendant on September 23, 1986.

On October 21, 1986, Judge Aguinaldo issued an order setting
aside the default order and admitting the defendant’s answer.  The order also stated x x x However, the
evidence already presented by the plaintiff shall remain as part of the record
of this case and the defendant is granted the right to cross-examine the
plaintiff Rustica I. Tan whose testimony has already been received.”

On August 24, 1987 after the termination of the cross-examination
of plaintiff Rustica Tan, the court, now presided by the respondent then Judge
Socorro Tirona-Liwag issued an order directing Atty. Rodolfo L. Vega who had
reappeared as counsel for the defendant to furnish the counsel for the
plaintiffs a copy of the answer within five days.  In the same order, the hearing of the case
was set on October 7, 1987.

On November 9, 1987, Judge Liwag issued another order stating
therein that:

When the case was called for hearing today, counsel for the
defendant failed to appear despite due notice. 
Counsel for the plaintiffs manifested that defendant’s counsel has
failed up to the present time to furnish him a copy of the answer as directed
in the Order of August 24, 1987 and prayed that said answer be stricken off the
record; that defendant be declared in default and that plaintiff be allowed to
present her last witness in an ex-parte proceedings.  The aforesaid verbal motion is submitted for
resolution.

In the meantime, let the presentation of evidence in this case be
reset to December 15, 1987 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.” (Anne
“W”, Petition)

On December 9, 1987, Atty. Vega, as counsel of the defendant
filed a “Manifestation with Motion for Postponement” stating therein
that he erroneously sent a copy of the defendant’s answer to Atty. Lumen
Policarpio, the plaintiffs’ former counsel but “x x x is now attaching herewith
xerox copy of his Answer to Atty. Gutierrez, the present counsel actually
handling the case for his disposition.” Atty. Vega also asked that the
case be reset on January 19, 1988.

The hearing was reset to March 16, 1988.  Notice was received by the defendant’s
counsel on February 7, 1986.

On March 16, 1988, however, the defendant’s counsel failed to
appear during the scheduled hearing.  The
plaintiffs’ counsel manifested that he had not received a copy of the
defendant’s answer in violation of the order dated August 24, 1987.  Upon these grounds, Judge Liwag, in an order
of the same date, granted the motion of the plaintiffs submitted during the
hearing held on November 9, 1987, and directed that the answer be stricken off
the record; declared the defendant in default; and allowed the plaintiffs to
present further evidence ex-parte.  In
the same order; Judge Liwag said:

“After the testimony of plaintiff DIONISIO C. TAN, upon
request, plaintiff’s counsel is given a period of ten (10) days from today
within which to file a Written Formal Offer of Evidence and, from receipt of
the resolution thereof, he is given a period of fifteen (15) days within which
to file his memorandum.  Thereafter, this
case is deemed submitted for resolution.” (Annex “P”, Petition).

Defendant’s counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Vega received a copy of the
order on April 5, 1988.  (Annex
“5”, Answer)

On April 16, 1988, Atty. Vega filed a motion for reconsideration
of the March 16, 1900 order stating that in his manifestation with motion for
postponement dated December 8, 1987, he attached therein Annex “A”
which is a covering letter dated August 25, 1987 sent to Atty. Lumen Policarpio
whom he thought to be still the plaintiff’s counsel.  Judge Liwag, however, who disputes this
allegation, denied the motion on the ground that the records show that the
referred Annex “A” is a copy of the answer and not the covering
letter to Atty. Policarpio.  Furthermore,
Atty. Vega submitted that failure to furnish a copy of the answer to the
adverse party is not a ground for the declaration of the defendant in
default.  (Annex “Q”,
Petition).

On July 14, 1988, Atty. Vega filed a manifestation with
supplemental motion for reconsideration reiterating therein that the failure to
furnish a copy of the answer to the plaintiffs is not a ground for its declaration
in default and the same should not be considered fatal to the cause of the
defendant since it had already previously participated in the trial of the
case.  (Annex “R”, Petition)

On November 25. 1988, Judge Liwag issued an order denying the
defendant’s motions.  The order stated:

“As cited for in the aforesaid Rule a defendant who files his
answer in court but fails to serve a copy, thereof upon the adverse party may
validly be declared in default (Sec. 1, Rule 18, Rules of Court, citing the
case of Gonzales v. Francisco, 49 Phil. 747)

Furthermore, the defendant herein was given a considerable length
of time within which to correct this defect considering the manifestation of
its counsel that the answer was erroneously sent to the wrong counsel (par. 4,
Motion for Reconsideration).  However,
instead of correcting this error, defendant’s counsel merely attached a copy of
its answer to its Manifestation with Motion for Postponement dated December 8
1987 and the instant Motion for Reconsideration as annexes thereto, without any
showing that copy of the same answer was actually received by plaintiff’s
counsel.’

As a matter of fact, the motions under consideration do not contain
any specific allegation concerning service of the aforesaid answer upon the
plaintiff’s counsel and merely insisted that non-service of defendant’s answer
to plaintiff is not a ground for declaring defendant in default (par. 3,
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration).” (Annex “S”,
Petition).

The defendant’s, counsel received a copy of this order on
December 21, 1988.

On September 14, 1989, Atty. Vega filed a manifestation and
motion stating therein that a similar case covering the property, subject
matter of the case was filed by plaintiff Rustica Tan against the defendant
with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas which has already been decided and
was in fact already sold in an auction sale making the case moot and academic
and it should be dismissed on the ground of “res judicata.”

On September 18, 1989, Judge Liwag denied the motion stating that
the defendant has not regained its standing in court since the said defendant
has not applied for the lifting of the default order.  The manifestation and motion was ordered
expunged from and/or stricken off the records of the case. (Annex “7”,
Answer)

On September 21, 19B9, Judge Liwag rendered a decision in favor
of the plaintiffs.  The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs
and against the defendant, making the injunction heretofore issued PERMANENT
and declaring the foreclosure and resultant sale of plaintiffs’ property
situated at Bo. La Huerta, Parañaque, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. S-90717 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, NULL
and VOID, and of no force and effect whatsoever.

Further, defendant is ordered –

1.            To pay plaintiff
the sum of P13,574,554.00 for and as actual or compensatory damages;

2.            To pay plaintiff the sum of
P500,000.00 as moral damages and the further sum of P300,000.00 as exemplary
damages;

3.            To pay the sum
of P100,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and

4.            To pay the costs
of suit.

However, since the awarded damages to plaintiffs exceed the claim
in the Complaint, the filing fees corresponding to the increased award shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment award and no payment by execution or
otherwise may be made to the plaintiffs without first paying the amount of such
filing fees to the Clerk of Court.” (Annex “T”, Petition)

On September 29, 1989, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
execution pending appeal (Annex “U”, Petition).  An opposition to the motion was filed by the
defendant.

On October 6, 1989, Atty. Vega for the defendant filed a motion
for new trial to which the plaintiffs filed an opposition.

On October 10, 1989,
after hearing, Judge Liwag granted the motion for execution pending appeal
based on “good reasons” cited therein and upon posting of the
corresponding bond in the amount of the total judgment award of P14,474,554.00.

On October 17, 1909, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated motion
to strike and motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.

On October 26, 1909, Judge Liwag resolved the aforesaid
motions.  She granted the plaintiffs’
consolidated motions and ordered the defendant’s motion for new trial stricken
off the records.  Judge Liwag also issued
a writ of execution to enforce the decision.

The writ of execution was, however, not enforced in view of the
restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals on October 31, 1989.  The restraining order was issued in the
petition for certiorari with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order filed by complainant Pilipinas Bank questioning the decision
of Judge Liwag in Civil Case No. 5260.

On July 9, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
granting the petition.  The decision
dated September 21, 1989 in Civil Case No. 5260 was set aside and annulled and
the case ordered remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits.  Moreover, the writ of preliminary injunction
issued on November 24, 1989 was made permanent.

The Tan spouses, then filed before us a petition for certiorari to review the appellate
court’s decision.

In a resolution dated September 5, 1990, we denied the petition for
failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that, the respondent court had
committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment.

The complainant bank asks for the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine.  It states that
the orders and decision of the respondent speak for themselves in the light of
the surrounding circumstances and that former Justice Liwag should be
disciplined accordingly.

The complainant centers its charges on the judgment by default
and the award of exorbitant damages much greater than the prayer in the
complaint.  Partiality, serious
misconduct, and rendering of unjust orders are charged because of the denial by
Judge Liwag of all attempts by the bank to regain its standing in court.

The complainant points out that the former Judge had already set
aside the default order and admitted the answer which formed part of the
records of the case.  It was not,
therefore, proper for Judge Liwag to again declare the bank in default simply because
a copy of the answer was not served on the plaintiffs’ counsel.

The respondent states that the former Judge properly declared the
bank in default on October 14, 1985.  She
explains that this order was reconsidered on October 21, 1986 through a
misrepresentation by the bank’s counsel. 
The bank had argued on August
13, 1985 that it had never received a copy of the plaintiffs’
“Motion to Declare Defendant in Default.” The truth is that earlier
on July 31, 1985, the bank
had already filed its apposition to the motion to declare it in default.

The reconsideration of the order of default allowed the
plaintiffs’ evidence to remain in the records but gave the bank the right to
cross-examine the witnesses whose evidence had been received.

On November 7, 1986, Atty. Vega who had supposedly withdrawn from
the case reappeared and asked to cross-examine Tan.  The cross-examination was scheduled for
December 12, 1986.  Because of various
incidents, it was not until August 24, 1987 that Tan was cross-examined.  The bank’s counsel did not show up on November
9, 1987 during another scheduled hearing.

At this point, the plaintiffs’ counsel stated that the order to
furnish him with a copy of the answer had not been obeyed.  He moved to have the answer stricken off, to
have the defendant declared in default, and to present his last witness in
ex-parte proceedings.

The case was reset to December 9, 1907. The bank’s counsel asked
for a postponement during this hearing. 
He also alleged that he had erroneously given the copy of the answer to
the Tan’s former counsel and was now furnishing a copy to the present counsel.

The hearings were reset to March 16, 1988.  On this date, the bank’s counsel again failed
to show up.  The counsel of the Tans
informed the court that while he received a copy of the bank’s manifestation,
there was no copy of an answer attached to it.

Obviously fed up with the improper tactics of the defendant bank
and its lawyers, Judge Liwag granted the plaintiffs motion.  The answer earlier admitted by Judge
Aguinaldo was stricken off the record; the defendant bank was declared in
default; and the plaintiff was allowed to present further evidence ex-parte.

Insofar as the default order is concerned, we see no partiality,
serious misconduct, or rendering of unjust order in its promulgation.  The situation could have been better handled
and a more correct order issued with the same effect as a blanket grant of a
motion to declare defendant in default. 
However, we see no basis for imposing disciplinary measures on this
score alone.

The complaint was filed on September 28, 1983.  As late as March 16, 1988, the bank had not
complied with the elementary requirement of filing the answer on time and
properly and with sincerity and candor furnishing the plaintiffs’ counsel with
a copy.

As early as August 21, 1984, the plaintiffs had already moved to
declare the bank’s counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Vega in contempt for violating the
court’s order of injunction. Vega’s answer was that his motion to dismiss had
not been resolved yet.  Inspite of the
injunction, the disputed property was extra-judicially foreclosed and sold.

The respondent Judge had reason to believe that the justification
given for the bank’s opposition to the motion to declare defendant in default
was less than candid.  It was alleged
that Atty. Rodolfo L. Vega had recently resigned as counsel and had not been
replaced.  Yet, this same Atty. Vega
would later resurface in full control of all the bank’s moves and
pleadings.  The bank’s counsel
“Attorneys Vega, Gutierrez, Fernandez, and Associates” had not withdrawn
their appearance was Atty. Danilo M. Gutierrez.

It was also Judge Liwag’s finding that her predecessor lifted the
default order because of a misrepresentation by the bank’s counsel.  The behaviour of the bank’s counsel in
subsequent proceedings and the long delay in the resolution of the case
eventually led to the questioned judgment.

The second ground for the charges against former Justice Liwag
lies in the award of P14,474,554.00 for actual compensatory, moral, and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees when the prayer in the complaint was for
only P2,150,000.00.

This is a more serious charge because the big award was the
result of default proceedings.

It was error on the part of Judge Liwag to award damages more
than what was prayed for in the complaint. 
As cited by the appellate court, Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court is very explicit in that a judgment against the party in default shall
not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for.

These errors, notwithstanding, we find no merit in the
complainant’s submission that the principle of res ipsa loquitur which
was our basis in disciplining errant Judges should be applicable in the instant
case.  (See People v. Valenzuela, 135
SCRA 712 [1985]; Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Romillo, Jr., 142 SCRA 262
[1986]; Prudential Bank v. Castro, 142 SCRA 223 [1986]; and Consolidated Bank
and Trust Corporation v. Capistrano, 159 SCRA 47 [1988]):

“In these res ipsa loquitur resolutions, there was on
the face of the assailed decisions, an inexplicable grave error bereft of any
redeeming feature, a patent railroading of a case to bring about an unjust
decision, or a manifestly deliberate intent to wreak an injustice against a
hapless party.  The facts themselves,
previously proven or admitted, were of such a character as to give rise to a
strong inference that evil intent was present. 
Such intent, in short, was clearly deducible from what was already of
record.  The res ipsa loquitur
doctrine does not except or dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on
which the inference of evil intent is based. 
It merely expresses the clearly sound and reasonable conclusion that
when such facts are admitted or are already shown by the record, and no credible
explanation that would negative the strong inference of evil intent is
forthcoming, no further hearing to establish them to support a judgment as to
the culpability of a respondent is necessary.

Thus, when asked to explain the clearly gross ignorance of law or
the grave misconduct irresistibly reflecting on their integrity, the respondent
Judges were completely unable to give
any credible explanation or to raise reasonable doubt, which have justified a
more lenient judgment of their conduct” (In Re: Petition for Dismissal
from Service and/or Disbarment of Judge Baltazar Dizon, 173 SCRA 719)

The facts of this case negate any improper or evil motive and
malice on the part of Judge Liwag in issuing the orders as well as the decision
in Civil Case No. 5260.

First, the record clearly shows that Judge Liwag never issued the
orders in deliberate haste to railroad the case in favor of the plaintiffs and
to the prejudice of the defendant, the complainant bank herein.  The complainant’s counsel was given all the opportunities
to traverse the motions.  Judge Liwag
scheduled and re-scheduled the hearings of the case.  However, Atty. Rodolfo L. Vega, counsel of
the complainant bank was always absent during the scheduled hearings.  Despite notice In fact, it was only after
more than eight months from receipt of the November 25, 1988 order, which
denied the complainant’s motion for reconsideration of the orders declaring the
complainant in default, specifically on September 14, 1989, when Atty. Vega
filed a manifestation and motion alleging that the case had become moot and
academic and should be dismissed on the ground of res judicata.

Second, the orders were issued after deliberation and
consideration of all pleadings filed by the parties.  The orders were not issued without rhyme or
reason.  The orders clearly reveal all
the antecedent facts as regards the subject matter of the orders and the
justifications for such orders.  Judge
Liwag issued the questioned orders in apparent good faith without any proof or
showing of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration.  In the case of Consolidated Bank and
Trust. Corporation v. Capistrano. supra, we ruled that:

“x x x [G]ood faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper consideration are sufficient defenses protecting a judicial officer
charged with, ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from
being held accountable for errors of judgment, on the premise that no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration of
justice can be infallible.  The respondent
Judge’s claim of belief in the legal soundness of his orders would have been
more plausible were it not for his perceptibly persistent refusal, despite the
opportunity afforded by several occasions, to hear the merits of the defenses
of complainant Solidbank and its co-defendants in their motions to dismiss and
answer, and the grossly excessive and unconscionable amounts of damages he
adjudged against said defendants despite their preclusion from any
participation in the trial.” (at p. 56)

As regards the award of more than the amount prayed for in the
complaint, the record discloses that in the order dated October 21, 1986,
wherein Judge Aguinaldo lifted the order of default against the complainant
bank, it was specifically stated therein that “x x x the evidence
presented by the plaintiff shall remain part of the records of this cats and
the defendant is granted the right to cross-examine the plaintiff Rustica Tan
whose testimony has already been received.” Earlier, or on March 14, 1986, the plaintiffs presented
evidence to establish that the total damages sustained by them on account of
the acts of the complainant amounted to P11,474.554.00.  The claim was supported by both testimonial
and documentary evidence.  When the
default order was lifted, the complaint was given the chance to
cross-examine Rustica Tan on August 24, 1987.  However, the defendant’s counsel in the
course of his cross-examination did not question the amount of damages which
was more than what the complaint prayed for as testified by Rustica Tan.  The evidence was allowed to stay in the
records since the defendant did not file any motion to strike off that portion
of the plaintiffs’ evidence.  It was not,
therefore, the usual judgment by default because the bank was allowed to and,
in fact, did cross-examine the plaintiffs’ witness.  Judge Liwag explains:

“The respondent felt that Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, did not apply to the situation where the parties found themselves, after
considering all the proceedings that transpired before the then Judge Zoilo
Aguinaldo and before the respondent herself. 
Her perception of the said section viewed in relation with Section 1 of
the same Rule is that it applies only to the ordinary defaulting defendant – a
defendant who received summons and thereafter failed or refused to answer,
allowing the claimant/plaintiff to take a default judgment against him,
confident that nothing can be recovered against him except those prayed in the
complaint.  The situation is simple and
the proceedings required is uncomplicated and relatively easy.  Sections 1 and 5 of Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court unmistakably apply.

What transpired, however, in this case, presented several difficult
situations, the treatment of which, she believed, would be inadequate if
Section 5, Rule 18 is made. to apply in all its simplicity.  Regrettably, it is now this failure to take
the path of least, resistance that brings her to this sorry affair.”
(Rollo, p. 197)

Third, the complainant bank itself appears to have entertained some
doubts that Judge Liwag may have had reasons under the circumstances in issuing
the questioned orders because it filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
a complaint against its then counsel, Atty. Rodolfo L. Vega for damages as
regards his lapses in Civil Case No. 5260. 
The complaint states:

x x x              x x x                 x
x x

“8. That in the aforesaid Civil Case No. 5260 entitled
‘Rustica L. Tan v. Pilipinas Bank’, defendant Rodolfo L. Vega appeared as
counsel for Pilipinas Bank.

9. That defendant was grossly negligent in handling the case when:

a.       He failed to file an
Answer to the Complaint despite lapse of two (2) months and sixteen (16) days
from the reglementary period;

b.       After having moved
for reconsideration, defendant Vega failed to attend the hearings of Civil Case
No. 5260 and did not furnish Rustica Tan’s counsel a copy of the Answer
resulting in plaintiff Pilipinas Bank being declared in default, and Rustica
Tan presenting evidence ex-parte, a photocopy of said Order is herewith
attached, and made integral part hereof and marked Annex “C”.

“10.   Notwithstanding
the default order and the denial of defendant Vega’s motion for
reconsideration, defendants did nothing to protect the rights and interests of
plaintiff Bank.  Defendants did not even
bother to inform plaintiff of the default order and the case status.  (Complaint, Annex “4”, p. 3)

We view the orders of Judge Liwag in ‘he light of the bank’s
exasperation with its own counsels

To get a fuller view of the circumstances of
this complaint and ascertain whether the writ of execution (which,
incidentally, was never implemented because of Court of Appeal’s action) may
have been a “midnight” decision, we directed the Court Administrator
to look into this aspect of the case.

Judge Liwag learned of her appointment to the Court of Appeals on
October 23, 1989.  In an effort to clear
her desk of pending case, she acted on this following:

“1)     Research and Service Realty, Inc. v. Elsa
Isidro – CC #10895

2)      PCIB
v. Pick-Up Fresh Farms, Inc. – CC #15144

3)      Intercity
v. Chiongbian – CC #88-07

4)      Guanson
v. Chartered Construction – CC #14355

5)      People
v. Loreta Go – Crim. Cases #7902–7904

6)      Custodio
v. Liwanag-Buan – CC #16880

7)      Normita
Pine v. Esteban Fine – CC #88-763

8)      PCIB
v. Lino CC # 18762

9)      In
re Marco Condes – Sp- Proc. #M-12185

10)    Tan
v. Pilipinas Bank – CC #5260.” (Rollo, p. 200)

The order granting the motion for execution pending appeal was
issued on October 10, 1989.  The order to
strike off the motion for new trial and to issue a writ of execution was
promulgated on October 26, 1989.

The Branch Clerk of Court issued the writ
itself on October 27, 1989.  Judge Liwag
took her oath of office as Justice of the Court, of Appeals on October 30,
1989.  The complainant’s case does not
appear to have been singled out for exclusive action and neither was the
execution granted “a few hours” before Judge Liwag took her oath of
office.  We accord to her the presumption
of duty having been performed in ,a regular manner.

And finally, former Justice Liwag states it is what she
considered her best efforts are found wanting by the Supreme Court then she
tenders her incorrect apologies for the lapses or errors she might have
committed and assures us that they were not done with malice or intent to cause
injustice to anyone.

The Court finds the complaint for gross ignorance of the law,
partiality, serious misconduct, and knowingly rendering unjust orders and
decision unsubstantiated and without sufficient basis.  However, the Court also finds that Judge
Liwag should have acted in a more professionally competent manner to obviate
the appearance or suspicion of misconduct in the issuance of orders awarding
huge sums of money against defaulting or recalcitrant parties.  If she were still on the bench, she would
have been reprimanded and warned to be more careful in the scrupulous
observance of the rules.  Since she has
retired, the above observations suffice.

WHEREFORE, the Court
hereby clears former Appellate Justice Socorro Tirona-Liwag of the charges
filed against her and orders the complaint DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., see separate opinion.

Feleciano, J., on leave.