SIMEON MANDAC, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. EUSTAQUIO GUMARAD AND REGINO LAGUNDINO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint. Appellant claims that
the lower court erred (1) in not declaring defendants in default and
(2) in sustaining defendants’ plea of res judicata.

As to the first alleged error, the record, shows that defendants
were served with summons on June 10, 1947, and immediately thereafter
they wrote to Atty. Irineo Ranjo, soliciting his legal services, but
were informed subsequently that the said attorney had already been
appointed judge of first instance. On receipt of this information on
June 21, 1947, defendants immediately engaged the services of their
present attorneys, who on that same day filed a motion in court, asking
for an extension of 15 days for presenting defendants1 answer to the
complaint, alleging that they needed more time to familiarize
themselves with the facts of the case in view of plaintiff’s reference
to three previous cases whose records were supposed to be voluminous.
The motion was set for hearing on the same day with notice to plaintiff
sent by ordinary mail, and on the same day was granted by the court.
This extension gave defendants until July 10, 1947, for filing an
answer. On July 2, 1947, attorneys for defendants entered their formal
appearance in court and at the same time presented a motion for the
dismissal of the case on the ground of res judicata.
Plaintiff on his part, on the same day asked that defendants be
declared in default, which motion he reiterated on July 10, 1947. The
record on appeal does not show that the motion to declare defendants in
default has been specifically acted upon, but the same must be deemed
to have been impliedly denied in the decision dismissing the complaint.

It appearing that the motion to dismiss was filed before the
expiration of the period for filing defendants’ answer as extended by
the court, there was no legal reason for declaring defendants in
default. Appellant, however, contends that the lower court should not
have entertained the motion for extension on the ground that it was
anomalous in that it was filed before their attorneys had entered their
formal appearance and that it did not comply with the Rules because it
did not give the opposing party three days’ notice by registered mail,
is nothing to this contention. There is no rule requiring a mere motion
for extension of time to be preceded by the entry of formal appearance;
and as to the alleged lack of proper notice, the Rules do net require
notices of this kind to be forwarded by registered mail, and while
section 4 of Rule 26 requires three days1 notice to the other party
before a motion could be heard, the same section provides that the
court “for good cause may hear a motion on shorter notice, especially
on matters which the court may dispose of on its own motion.”
Considering the nature of the motion and its urgency, we don’t think
the lower court made a bad use of its discretion in hearing it on
shorter notice than that ordinarily required. In any event, it does not
appear that plaintiff has in any way been prejudiced by the granting of
the motion.

With reference to the second specification of error, it would appear that the lower court, in sustaining the plea of res judicata,
took judicial notice of its own records in certain civil cases, and
from those records, the material portions of which have been elevated
here, we find that this is the fourth of a series of cases instituted
by plaintiff against the same defendants concerning the same piece of
land. The first was Civil Case No. 4102, filed in January, 1937. Its
purpose was to have plaintiff declared owner of the land in question
and to have defendants enjoined from entering the same and adjudged to
pay indemnity for its fruits. That case was decided adversely against
plaintiff. The trial court did not only absolve defendants from the complaint; it also condemned plaintiff to pay damages to one of the
defendants. The decision was confirmed by the Court of Appeals in
March, 1944, and has already become final. The next case (Civil Case
No. 6) was filed in October, 1945. It was instituted for the same
purpose as the first one, but with the added allegation that the
decision in the first case had been procured through defendants’ false
allegations. This second case was dismissed in February, 1946, on the
ground of res judicata, and the dismissal has already become
final. The third case (civil case No. 231} was filed some time after
the dismissal of the second case, and its purpose was to make
defendants pay damages for the fruits they had taken from the land in
reliance upon the decision rendered in the first case (No. 4102),
which, according to plaintiff, had been obtained through defendants1
false allegations and false and irrelevant evidence. This third case
was likewise dismissed by the lower court on the ground of res judicata,
and the dismissal has already become final. Not to be daunted by these
repeated setbacks, plaintiff brought the present action for damages
alleged to have been suffered by him as a result of the decision
rendered in the first case (No. 4102), which, so he claims again, has
been procured through false allegations and proof. It is obvious that
all of the four cases hinge on the question of ownership over the land
in controversy and its fruits. That question has already been
definitely and conclusively decided in the first case. But plaintiff
has sought to reopen it in the three subsequent cases on the ground
that the said decision has been procured through allegations and proof
that were sham.

Whether defendants’ allegations and proof in that first case were
false or not was a matter necessarily in issue in that case, a question
which had to be passed upon in evaluating defendants’ claim to the land
and its fruits in opposition to that of plaintiff. That issue was
definitely adjudicated when both the Court of First Instance and the
Court of Appeals gave faith to defendants’ allegations and evidence and
upheld their claim to the land and its fruits. Such being the case, it
cannot again be ventilated in another suit in the guise of a different
cause of action. As was said in the case of Paz vs. Inandan (42 Off. Gaz., 714; 75 Phil., 608),

“La tendencia de la jurisprudencia es ampliar mas
bien que restrlngir la doctrina de cosa juzgada, sobre el fundamento de
que taiito el interes publico como el privado exigen que cesen los
litigios, requiriendose a las partes que utilicen de una vez para
siempre los recursos y remedios que les competen, dentro del mismo
juicio. Una parte no puede, por el hecho de cambiar la forma de una
accion o adoptar un metodo distinto de presentar el asunto, eludir la
aplicacion del principio de que la misma causa de accion no se
liquidara dos veces entre las mismas partes o sus causantes.”

Of particular application to the present case is also the following from Freeman’s standard work on judgments:

“Suits for Obtaining Judgments by Fraud. Conspiracy or Perjury.—The
settled policy of the law forbidding that a matter once adjudicated
shall be again drawn in issue while the former adjudication remains in
force does not permit the prosecution of an action for obtaining a
judgment by false and fraudulent practices, or by false and forged
evidence. Neither can a party against whom judgment has been recovered
sustain an action against his adversary and the witness for damages
occasioned by their conspiring together and procuring a judgment by
fraud or perjury, as long as the judgment remains in force and
unreversed; because the charges made in the second action are
conclusively negativated by the former adjudication.” (Freeman on
Judgments, Vol. 2, 5th ed. par. 782)

To the contention that the judgment in Civil Case No. 4102 is void
as contrary to what was alleged and proved in that case, the answer is
that, the said judgment having already become final, it is now too late
to raise any question as to its correctness in view of the provisions
of Rule 39, Section 44(b), according to which “a final
judgment or order on the merits, rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, is conclusive in
a subsequent case between the same parties and their successors in
interest litigating upon the same thing and issue, regardless of how
erroneous it may be»w (I Moran, Rules of Court, 705.)

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed,
with treble costs against appellant, it appearing that his action is
not only without merit but also frivolous.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.