LEON DE JESUS ETC., ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. EUSEBIA DE JESUS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Appeal
on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan
dismissing the complaint in its civil case No. 2563.

In the
intestate estate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Melecio de Jesus (Sp. Proc. No. 1960 of the court below), the widow
Ines Alejandrino, administratrix, filed on March 10, 1948 an inventory
of the estate, including therein Lot No. 931 of the Cadastral Survey of
Hermosa, Bataan, containing an area of 155.9334 hectares and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1044 in the name of the deceased.

Subsequently,
on May 22, 1948, Eusebia de Jesus, the deceased’s sister, filed a
verified claim against the estate for the amount of P7,585.84. This
claim was never heard. Instead, the administratrix Ines Alejandrino,
claimant Eusebia de Jesus, and the heirs of Cirilo de Jesus, another
brother also deceased, entered, on May 24, 1948, into a stipulation of
Facts wherein administratrix Alejandrino recognized that Eusebia de
Jesus and Cirilo de Jesus are co-owners with the deceased Melecio de
Jesus of Lot No. 931, and that said parcel was registered in the sole
name of the deceased only in trust for all the co-owners. On the same
day, administratrix Ines Alejandrino and claimant Eusebia de Jesus
entered into another agreement called “Supplementary Stipulation of
Facts” wherein the latter agreed to waive and renounce her money claim
for P7,585.84 against the estate upon the approval and becoming final
of the aforementioned Stipulation of Facts. Both agreements were, on
the very day of their execution, presented to the court for approval,
on the ground that they “will conserve the family filiation and
attachment and will forestall any litigation between them”; and on the
day following, May 25, 1948, the probate court entered an order
approving both agreements.

Years later, in July, 1955, Ines
Alejandrino was replaced by her son Leon de Jesus in the administration
of the estate of Melecio de Jesus. As such administrator, and joining
as plaintiff his mother, Ines Alejandrino, former administratrix, Leon
de Jesus filed on October 11, 1958 in the lower court the present
action (Civil Case No. 2563), seeking to annul the stipulations entered
by the former administratrix Ines Alejandrino with the defendants
Eusebia de Jesus and the heirs of Cirilo de Jesus on May 24, 1948, on
the theory that they are null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the probate court to act on them, as well as for lack of the
requisite notices to all the interested parties, specifically the heirs
of the deceased Melecio de Jesus. Defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint, claiming res judicata and prescription, and on
December 16, 1958, the trial court sustained the motion and ordered the
dismissal of the complaint. From this order, the plaintiffs appealed to
this Court.

The principal issue here is whether or not the
stipulations in question are void and ineffective, either for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the probate court to act on them, or for
lack of notice of their approval to the heirs of the deceased.

On
the question of jurisdiction, we think the probate court had
jurisdiction to act on and approve of the stipulations in question, not
only as an incident to its power to exclude any property from the
inventory of the estate of the deceased, but under section 9, Rule 90,
Rules of Court, which permits the probate court, whoever the deceased
in his lifetime held real property in trust for another person, to
authorise the executor or administrator to deed such property to the
person or persons for whose use and benefit it was so held. There being
no controversy between the former administratrix and, the defendants
that the latter and the deceased Melecio de Jesus own the lot in
question in common and that it was registered in the deceased’s name
only in trust for all the co-owners, there was no need to file a
separate action in an ordinary court to establish the common ownership
of the parties over said property, and the probate court could approve,
as it did approve, the agreement wherein in the parties expressly
recognized their common ownership of the property in question and the
trust character of the exclusive title held by the deceased over the
same, especially since the parties themselves state that such agreement
was entered into in order to forestall future litigation between them
and to foster family relations, and in addition, the defendant Eusebia
de Jesus had agreed, in consideration of the court’s approval of said
agreement, to waive a money claim against the estate, so that court
approval of said agreement would really redound to the benefit of the
estate and the heirs.

Section 9, Rule 90, however, provides
that authority can be given by the probate court to the administrator
to convey property held in trust by the deceased to the beneficiaries
of the trust only “after notice given as required in the last preceding section”; i.e., that “no
such conveyance shall be authorized until notice of the application for
that purpose has been given personally or by mail to all. persons
interested, and such further notice has been given, by publication or
otherwise, as the court deems proper” (sec 8, Rule 90). This rule
makes it mandatory that notice be served on the heirs and other
interested persons of the application for approval of any conveyance of
property held in trust by the deceased, and where no such notice is
given, the order authorizing the conveyance, & well as the
conveyance itself, is completely void.^[1]
Here, plaintiffs claim that no such notice was given the heirs of tie
deceased Meledo de Jesus of the petition for approval of the
stipulations in question, and it is quite probable that the claim is
true, because said heirs were all minors when the proceedings in
question took place. It would have been necessary, therefore, to
appoint a guardian ad litem for them before they could be
validly served said notice, yet the records here do hot show that such
appointment of guardian was obtained. In fact, any such appointment
appears improbable, considering that the stipulations in question were
approved the very next day following their execution and submission for
approval. It must be observed that in 1948, before the promulgation of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, parents as such were not the legal
representatives of their children before the courts and could not
dispose of their property without judicial authorization (Palet vs. Aldecoa & Co., 15 Phil. 232; Siman vs. Leus, 37 Phil. 969; Rosario vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil. 140).

As
this question of notice would ultimately decide the validity or
invalidity of the entire proceedings in the probate court leading to
the approval of the contested stipulations, plaintiffs-appellants
should be given the opportunity to prove their claim that no such
notice was given them. If proved, the claim would likewise dispose of
the defense of prescription put up by defendants in their motion to
dismiss for an action to set aside completely void proceedings is
imprescriptible and can hot be barred by lapse of time.

As
for the ruling of the trial court that the present administrator Leon
de Jesus is estopped from questioning the agreements, voluntarily
entered into by the former administratrix Ines. Alejandrino, suffice it
to repeat what we said in the recent case of Boñaga vs. Soler, Supra, that:

“a decedent’s representative is not estopped to Question the validity of his own void cleed purporting to convey land (Chase vs. Cartwright, 22 Am. St. Rep. 207, and cases cited; Mocks vs.
Olpherts, 25 L. Ed. (U.S.) 735; 21 Am. Jur. 756, s. 667); and if this
be true of the administrator as to his own acts, a fortiori, his
successor can not be estopped to question the acts of his predecessor
that are not conformable to law (cf. Walker vs. Portland Savings Bank, LRA 1915 E, p. 840; 21 Am. Jur. p. 820, s. 785.)”

The
appealed order dismissing the complaint is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the court below for answer and trial on the merits. Costs
against defendants-appellees

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.

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^[1] The effect of lack of notice
under sections 9 and 8, Rule 90, should be the same as the effect of
lack of notice under section 4 of the same rule, involving a sale of
the whole or part of the real or personal estate of the deceased
whenever that is beneficial te the heirs, devises, legatees, and other
interested persons, which lack of notice renders the authority and
conveyance completely void (Estate of Gamboa vs. Fioranza, 12 Phil. 191; Areilla vs. David, 77 Phil. 718; Gabriel vs. Encarnacion, 94 Phil., 917; 50 Off. Gaz., (6) 2440; Boñaga vs. Soler, 112 Phil., 651; 58 Off., Gaz., (52)-8637).