A.M. No. P-98-1265. June 29, 1998
SEVERIANA GACHO, COMPLAINANT, VS. DIOSCORO A. FUENTES, JR. DEPUTY SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20, CEBU CITY, RESPONDENT.
PER CURIAM:
Severiana Gacho dated February 4, 1997, addressed to the Honorable
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, charging Dioscoro
A. Fuentes, Jr., Sheriff IV of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, with grave dishonesty allegedly committed as follows:
“Sometime after I was awarded as a winning bidder of the 25
[l]ots sold at public auction in Civil Case No. CEB-14498 entitled
“Fermina O. Consunji, et al vs. Leopolda Cecilio” and on the execution
of the Certificate of Sale on December 2, 1996 in my favor for
P1,700,000.00, the aforenamed [s]heriff fraudulently demanded from me
10% of the said amount or the sum of P170,000.00 as an alleged sheriff’s
fee for which I issued Manager’s Check No. 006513 in the said amount,
dated December 2, 1996; that for the said amount, I was not issued an
official receipt and much less even [a] provisional receipt; that what
is worst is the fact that said [s]heriff has been avoiding my presence;
that I finally verified recently with the Office of the Clerk of Court
as to the payment of the sheriff’s fee and there I found out that the
sheriff’s fee for the value of P1,700,000.00 is only P34,080.00; that it
was only after the discovery of his anomaly that subject sheriff paid
the sheriff’s fee of P34,080.00 belatedly; and that subject sheriff had
twice requested me for time within which to return the excess of
P135,920.00 but had consistently failed to return the said excess
even up to the present indicative of his misappropriation thereof.”[1]
On February 17, 1997 complainant filed an affidavit of desistance,[2]
praying that the complaint be
withdrawn since she had already received a manager’s check in
the amount of P135,920 representing the excess of the sheriff’s fee, and
that she
had come to terms with respondent.
On March 11, 1997, Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis
(now a member of the Court of Appeals) indorsed the letter-complaint and
the
subsequent affidavit of desistance to Executive Judge Priscila
S. Agana, RTC, Branch 24, Cebu City, for the purpose of determining if
there
still existed reasonable ground to proceed administratively against
respondent sheriff.[3]
In a second indorsement letter[4]addressed
to Judge Galicano Arriesgado, Judge Agana stated that she
could not act on the complaint with impartiality, because she
had made a prejudgment thereon before it was referred to her by the
Office of the
Court Administrator. Hence, Judge Arriesgado himself conducted
an inquiry. He subpoenaed the complainant and the respondent and advised
them to
bring witnesses and to obtain the assistance of counsel. In
compliance therewith, Complainant Severina Gacho appeared with her
counsel, Atty.
Basilio E. Duaban, while Respondent Dioscoro Fuentes, Jr. was
assisted by Atty. Oliveros Kintanar. Both parties gave their respective
testimonies, which were summarized by Judge Arriesgado as follows:
“During the clarificatory examination, Mrs. Severina Gacho, 78
years old, widow, businesswoman and residing at Sabellano St., Pleasant
Homes, Cebu City, declared that she had filed a sworn
letter-complaint addressed to the Honorable Executive Judge, RTC, Cebu
City dated
February 4, 1997. She identified her signature on the
letter-complaint. The letter complaint was filed because as a winner in
the bidding
for P1.7 [m]illion, she was made to pay 10% thereof as
sheriff’s fee for P170,000.00 without any receipt as the payment was
only through [a]
manager’s check of Monte de Piedad with the sheriff, Jun
Fuentes, as payee. The manager of the bank handed to the sheriff the
manager’s
check and the same was encashed by him. As he was not
issued any receipt, she went to RTC Br. 20 where respondent sheriff is
assigned. She
went to Atty. Joaquino, the [c]lerk of [c]ourt, and she
was told that the sheriff’s fee was not P170,000.00 but only P34,080.00.
The amount
of P135,920.00 was returned to her by Sheriff Fuentes.
Confronted with the Affidavit of Desistance executed by her on February
17, 1997, she
declared that she was prompted to execute it as Mr.
Fuentes pleaded to her that he would just pay the amount and she was
asked to pity him
because he ha[d] four (4) children and a wife. He might be
ousted from his work. The amount was paid to her after the execution of
her
affidavit. With her execution of the affidavit, she had no
more intention to pursue the case against him for as long as he would
not do it
again. She had executed the affidavit voluntarily, without
being coerced or intimidated in any manner whatsoever.Respondent was presented as the only witness for himself. He
declared that he [was] 43 years old, married and a resident of Talo-ot,
Argao,
Cebu and presently Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Cebu City. He was a deputy sheriff for about three (3) years.
He [knew]
Severiana Gacho, a lone bidder in a bidding conducted by
him in a sale of execution. She was known to him for 3 months before the
bidding.
After the bidding, he informed Mrs. Gacho that being the
highest bidder and not being a party to the case, she ha[d] to pay him
the sum of
P1,700,000.00 as her bid price and an amount corresponding
to the payments due to the government and somebody close to her who
were termed
as “ahente sa mga yuta”, real estate brokers for the sum
of P170,000.00 or ten percent (10%) of P1,700,000.00 because this would
be the
amount due the government. He issued to Mrs. Gacho a
Certificate of Sale.It was further testified by respondent that the sum of
P170,000.00 really went to the government. After deducting the amount of
P34,800[5] representing the
government commission under Rule 141, Rules of Court, capital gains tax
and
documentary stamps were to be paid to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Another amount was also to be paid to the Register of
Deeds for the
registration of the certificate of sale. He did not issue
any receipt to complainant in the amount of P1,700.000.00 and the
P170,000.00
because there were 2 checks which she gave through the
manager of the bank both in the name of respondent. He admitted that the
amount
actually payable [was] only P34,080.00 and not
P170,000.00. The amount of P135,020.00 [was] an excess amount from
P170,000.00 after
deducting P34,080.00 paid to the Office of the Clerk of
Court but it did not necessarily mean that the excess amount went to his
pocket. He
returned the P135,020.00 to her to pay the capital gains
tax with the BIR and to pay the registration fees with the Register of
Deeds.Mr. Fuentes also declared that he did not receive a formal
complaint against him. He only received an Affidavit of Desistance
executed by
[C]omplainant Severiana Gacho. The execution of the
affidavit of desistance was upon request of respondent who pleaded to
her that he ha[d]
4 children and a wife.xxx xxx xxx”
Concluding, on the basis of the foregoing, that “the act complained
of [was] an established matter,” Judge Arriesgado explained:
“With the declaration of the complainant and the admission of the
respondent, the fact of the commission of the act complained of is an
established matter. There is however an extenuating
evidence adduced during the whole inquiry[:] the assertion of the
respondent that
although he received P170,000.00 and P34,080.00 was paid
representing the government commission (sheriff’s fee) under Rule 141,
Rules of
Court, yet the sum of P135,920.00 was intended to pay
capital gains tax, [and] documentary stamps to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and
another sum to be paid to the Register of Deeds for the
registration of the Certificate of Sale. Respondent claimed that nothing
of such
amount went to his pocket. Even assuming that what he
declared [was] true, yet as a sheriff, it [was] not proper for him to
receive any
amount of money other than what is termed as sheriff’s fee for
which proper receipt must [have been] issued therefor. He was not
supposed to receive other sums of money as payments of capital gains
tax, documentary stamp tax and registration of documents as this could
be handled by the interested party, the complainant herself. A
government employee must, like Caesar’s wife, appear not only upright,
but above suspicion. A public office is a public trust.”[6]
In a memorandum dated February 11, 1998 addressed to the Chief
Justice, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) agreed with the
findings of
Investigating Judge Arriesgado and recommended that Deputy
Sheriff Dioscoro A. Fuentes be dismissed from the service for grave
dishonesty and
grave misconduct.
The Court agrees with the OCA that the acts of respondent
constitute grave dishonesty and grave misconduct, for which dismissal
from the service
is warranted.
In Flores v. Caniya,[7]
the Court “emphasized time and again that the conduct and behavior of
everyone
connected with an office charged with the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the sheriff and to the lowliest
clerk should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
Respondent sheriff is a court employee. He is thus required to conduct
himself with
propriety and decorum. His actions must be beyond suspicion.”
In this case, the Court finds that the respondent has failed to comply
with the
strict standards required of court employees.
The essential facts of this case are undisputed. The evidence shows
that respondent demanded from complainant the amount of P170,000 as
sheriff’s fees. He received that amount, but issued no
official or provisional receipt therefor. Upon complainant’s inquiry at
the Office of the
Clerk of Court in the said branch, she learned that the
correct amount of sheriff’s fee was only P34,080 and that said sum was
still unpaid at
the time. Respondent transmitted the amount of P34,080 only
after complainant discovered the irregularity. Respondent had earlier
claimed that
the excess of P135,920 was for the payment of capital gains
tax, documentary stamps and registration of the Certificate of Sale; but
the amount
was not used for the said purpose, and it was subsequently
returned to the complainant.
Quite obviously, respondent improperly collected an excessive
amount of money from complainant. In the first place, only the payment
of
sheriff’s fees can be lawfully received by him. Acceptance of
any other amount is improper, even if it were to be applied for lawful
purposes as
herein alleged by respondent. As held in Tan v. Herras,[8]
sheriffs cannot receive gratuities and
voluntary payments from parties in the course of the
performance of their duties. This is inimical to the best interest of
the service, which
would be tainted with suspicion.
Worse, respondent claimed that the excess was for the payment of
tax and other registration fees. It is undisputed, however, that he did
not
tell the complainant at the time that the amount was
to be used also for such purpose; instead, he misrepresented the entire
amount of P170,000
as sheriff’s fees. In the first place, it was not the duty of
the sheriff to pay taxes and other sums to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR)
and the Register of Deeds. In the second place, he knew that
the amount he collected as sheriff’s fees was excessive. This Court has
held that
any sum collected by a court employee in excess of the lawful
fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction which makes
the
respondent liable for grave misconduct and grave dishonesty.[9] In Añonuevo v. Pempeña,[10] the Court held that “[i]t is an abhorrent and anomalous practice for a sheriff to demand fees in excess
of those lawfully allowed.”
Compounding his culpability, respondent did not issue any receipt
for the amount he received in his official capacity, in violation of the
General Auditing and Accounting Rules, which evidently
signified his intent to misappropriate it.[11]
Furthermore, he did not remit the payment of the sheriff’s fees to the
clerk of court; or the capital gains tax or registration fees to the BIR
and the Register of Deeds, respectively.
Respondent failed to give a satisfactory justification for (1)
collecting sheriff’s fees in excess of those prescribed by the Rules,
(2)
misrepresenting the purpose of the amount he demanded, (3)
failing to issue a receipt for the amount he collected, and (4) not
using the amount
for the purported objectives.
Indubitably, respondent is administratively liable for grave
dishonesty and grave misconduct in the discharge of his official duty.
By his
conduct, he violated the yardstick of public service imposed
in Section 1, Article XI of our Constitution: a public office is a
public trust;
public officers and employees must serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency; and they
must at all
times remain accountable to the people.[12]
In addition, he displayed unprofessionalism in the discharge
of his official duty, contrary to the mandate of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,[13] i.e., to perform and discharge their duty with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism,
intelligence and skill, while endeavoring to discourage wrong perceptions of their role as dispensers of justice.
We agree with the OCA that the complainant’s desistance does not
warrant the dismissal of the case. Administrative cases against public
officers
and employees are impressed with public interest, for they
relate to a public office which is a public trust.
[14] The grievance of the complainant against the
respondent relates to his public duty and not to a purely personal
matter; therefore,
the matter transcends the complainant’s personal pique or
pride. The need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in
the government,
its agencies and its instrumentalities demands that
proceedings in such cases should not be made to depend on the whims and
caprices of the
complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein.[15]
After this Court has taken cognizance
of an administrative case, the complaint can no longer be
withdrawn just because the complainant had changed his or her mind. In
any event, this
Court cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant
in a matter which involves its disciplinary authority over all employees
of the
judiciary.[16]
The records indubitably establish respondent’s administrative
liability. For such grave offenses prejudicial to the best interest of
the
service, respondent deserves the penalty of dismissal. As held
by the Court in Punzalan-Santos v. Arquiza:[17]
“At the grassroots of our judicial machinery, sheriffs and deputy
sheriffs are indispensably in close contact with the litigants; hence,
their conduct should be geared towards maintaining the
prestige and integrity of the court, for the image of a court of justice
is
necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the
least and lowest of
its personnel; hence, it becomes the imperative sacred
duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and
standing as a
temple of justice. Respondent’s behavior erodes the
faith and confidence of our people in the administration of justice. He
no longer
deserves to stay in service any longer.”
WHEREFORE, Dioscoro A. Fuentes, Jr., Sheriff IV,
RTC, Branch 20, Cebu City is hereby DISMISSED for grave dishonesty and
grave misconduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with
prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C. J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez Quisumbing, and Purisima,
JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., J., no part due to relationship of Davide to the parties.
[1] Rollo, p. 18.
[2] Rollo, p. 20.
[3] Ibid., p. 17.
[4] Id., p. 16.
[5] This is a typographical error. The correct amount is P34,080.
[6] Report of Judge Arriesgado, June 2, 1997, pp. 1-3; rollo, pp. 7-9.
[7] 256 SCRA 518, April
26, 1996, per curiam; citing Office of the Court Administrator v.
Fuentes, et
al., AM No. RTJ-94-1270, August 23, 1995; Ong v. Meregildo, 233 SCRA
632, July 5, 1994; GVM, Inc. v. De Guzman, 227 SCRA 684, November 11,
1993.
[8] 195 SCRA 1, March 11, 1991, per curiam, cited in Casal v. Concepcion, Jr., 243 SCRA 369, April 6,
1995; Re: Pioquinto Villapana, 229 SCRA 718, February 7, 1994.
[9] Florendo v. Enrile, supra.
[10] 234 SCRA 168, 174, July 18, 1994, per Regalado, J.
[11] Hernandez v. Borja, 242 SCRA 162, March 7, 1995; Flores v. Caniya, supra; Florendo v. Enrile, 239
SCRA 22, December 7, 1994.
[12] Villaraza v. Atienza, 108 SCRA 559, October 30, 1981.
[13] “An Act Establishing
a Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards For Public Officials And
Employees, To
Uphold The Time-Honored Principle Of Public Office Being A
Public Trust, Granting Incentives and Rewards For Exemplary Service,
Enumerating
Prohibited Acts and Transactions And Providing Penalties For
Violation Thereof And For Other Purposes.”
[14] Flores v. Caniya, supra; citing § 1, Art. XI, of the Constitution.
[15] Florendo v. Enrile, supra; Sy v. Academia, 198 SCRA 705, July 3, 1991.
[16] Zamora v. Jumamoy, 238 SCRA 587, December 2, 1994.
[17] 244 SCRA 527, May 31, 1995, per curiam, citing Recto v. Racelis, 70 SCRA 438, April 30, 1976.