WILLIAM GUEVARRA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

The accused-appellant, William Guevarra,
was originally charged with frustrated homicide before the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch IV in Criminal Case No. 77792.  The information was later amended to that of
homicide due to the death of the victim, one Jaime Alvarez, two days after the
incident.  The information reads:

“The undersigned accuses William Guevarra
y Astor of the crime of Homicide, committed as follows:

“That on or about January 1, 1965, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence
upon one Jaime Alvarez y Villaruel, by then and there
stabbing the latter with a kitchen knife on his body thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.” (p. 6, Brief for
Accused- Appellant)

Upon being arraigned, the accused pleaded not guilty.

The evidence for the prosecution revealed that:

 “x x
x at about 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon of January
1, 1965, accused appeared at the residence of the deceased looking for the
latter but did not catch up with him since the accused (sic) was out at that
time.  He was invited by the deceased’s
father to go upstairs who asked him why he was looking for Jaime (deceased) but
accused just left without giving any explanation whatsoever.  Not long thereafter, while victim was walking
along Magdalena near Arguelles
Street, he was seen being chased by three men, one
of whom was the accused William Guevarra.  Jaime fell and while he was lying down with
face upwards, accused hacked him while his other companions stabbed him.  The tallest of the three hacked the victim
three times.  Jaime defended himself
against the three with his bare hands and after managing to stand up, ran
towards O’ Donnel Street,
whereas the accused with his companions ran towards Mayhaligue Street.” (CFI
Decision, pp. 54-55, Brief for Accused-Appellant)

The defense interposed by the accused was self-defense.  The accused testified that at about twelve o’clock in the afternoon of January 1, 1965, his niece, one Myra Roces, reported to him that the previous day, the victim,
together with his friends who were all drunk, entered their dwelling and dragged
her.  After he ate his lunch, the accused
went to the house of the victim in order to report the matter to the latter’s
father.  The victim’s father, however,
did not heed him and branded him a coward. 
After he left the victim’s house he passed by a store at the corner of Arguelles
Street to buy cigarettes.  While waiting for his change, he noticed
through the mirror of the barber shop that the deceased was approaching him
from behind.  At a distance of about three
(3) meters, he faced the deceased who continued to walk towards him.  When he was about to leave the store, the
deceased uttered “Putang ina mo.  Balita ko hinahanting mo raw ako,” addressing the invectives to the accused.  When he was about to answer, the deceased
drew a jungle bolo from his back and tried to hack him.  Appellant parried the first and second
attempts but was hit in his left palm on the third attempt.  At this time, both the accused and the victim
fell in front of a fruit vendor’s store where the accused was able to take hold
of a bladed instrument.  He held the
victim’s left hand holding the jungle bolo under his armpit and using the
bladed instrument he grabbed from the fruit vendor’s stall, he stabbed the
deceased but he could not remember how many times.

On June 10, 1969,
the trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.  The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, finding accused William Guevarra
y Astor GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as charged in
the information, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to indemnify the
heirs of the offended party in the sum of P6,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency in view of the nature of the penalty
imposed, and to pay the costs.

“SO ORDERED.”

(p. 61, Brief for Accused-Appellant)

Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, the accused
appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto
the decision of the trial court on March
18, 1975 (p. 38, Rollo).

On July 31, 1975,
the accused filed the instant petition for review on certiorari with the
following assignment of errors:

“I.       Is not the utterance
of “Putang Ina Mo.  Hinahanting mo raw ako” followed by a series of hacking blows of a bolo
by the victim on the person of the accused, an attack or assault with intent to
kill, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim?

“II.      Is the elopement of
Flora Roces, the niece of the accused with the victim
three years before the incident sufficient ground for respondent Court of
Appeals to conclude that the accused is the unlawful aggressor by the mere fact
that accused went to the house of the victim’s father to report that the victim
together with some companions who were drunk forcibly entered his house and
dragged his niece so that victim may be reprimanded?

“III.     In the face of
victim’s persistent hacking blows of his bolo intended to kill the accused, is
the latter’s act of stabbing the victim in so defending himself reasonable
means of repelling aggression?

“IV.    What weight should be
given to the presumption relied upon by the respondent court in finding that
the accused provoked the conflict in the absence of direct evidence as to who
actually initiated it?” (pp. 6-7,Rollo)

The issue in the instant petition is whether or not the accused
acted in self-defense when he committed the offense.

The three requisites of self-defense as stated in paragraph 1 of
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code are: 
(1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.  The first
requisite is indispensable (Ortega v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 57664, 8 Feb. 1989, 170 SCRA 38).

The first three assigned errors deals with the first requisite in
self-defense:  unlawful aggression.  The accused contends that the deceased was
the unlawful aggressor.  The deceased
allegedly accosted him, uttered invectives at him and gave him a series of
hacking blows with his bolo, all designed to kill him.

The matter of whether or not the deceased was the aggressor is
factual.  It is a settled rule that the trial court is in a better position to
ascertain the facts under the circumstances. 
In the absence of any justifiable reason, this Court is bound to uphold
the findings of the trial.

It cannot be believed that the victim was the unlawful
aggressor.  The trial court found that
the petitioner purposely sought the victim to confront him regarding an affront
committed against his family the day before the incident.  Knowing the victim to be a dangerous police
character, who had been in and out of prison and who is a member of a dreaded
gang, it is improbable that petitioner proceeded to the victim’s place unarmed
and not bent to exact his revenge.

While it maybe that the elopement of accused’s
niece and the deceased three (3) years before the incident happened was so
remote and insufficient to be a cause for the accused to be the aggressor, it
cannot be denied that, taken together with the more recent incident of the
dragging of another niece of the accused by the victim the day before the
incident, a sufficient reason for the accused to harbor ill-feelings against
the deceased existed.  In fact, his ire
was so intense that immediately after he was informed of the dragging incident,
he went to the victim’s house to confront him.

The accused alleged that he did not seek for the victim but that
he only intended to see the victim’s father so that the latter can reprimand
his son.  The trial court however,
refused to believe the accused and We agree.  The trial court said:

“That he went there only to report the matter to the accused’s father is belied by his very statement (Exh. D) which he earlier gave to
the police right after the commission of the offense, the pertinent portion of
which is as follows:

“x x x Pinuntahan ko
nga po ang
bahay ni Jaime, pagkatapus ko makapananghalian
at tanongin ko lang sana
ang dahilan ng ginawa niya
sa amin. x
x x.” (p. 6,
Appendix A, Brief for the Petitioner)

One factor which belies the claim of the accused that he merely
acted in self-defense, is the number of wounds
inflicted upon the victim.  The victim
suffered two (2) hacking wounds and seven (7) stab wounds inflicted by one or
two or more weapons (TSN, March 24, 1966, pp. 7-9).  The nature and number of wounds inflicted by
an assailant [are] constantly and unremittingly considered … important indicia
which disprove a plea of self defense (People v. Ganut,
G.R. No. L-34517, November 2, 1982, 118 SCRA 35, 43; People v. Masangkay, No. 73461, January 25, 1988, 157 SCRA 320 People
v. Merciales, G.R. No. 61961, October 18, 1988, 166
SCRA 436), especially when compared with the wound suffered by the accused
which was but a lone incised wound between his left index and his left thumb (Exh. 3), the gravity of which is not reflected in the
defense evidence.  As observed by the
trial court:

“x x x. If the deceased was really
armed with that jungle bolo (Exh. K) and still
with several other companions at the time he accosted the herein accused, as
testified to by the latter, it was too impossible for the deceased not to have
been able to inflict more injuries and mortal wounds upon the accused
considering the length of time that they had been locked up with one another in
that quarrel.  There is nothing on record
that will show accused to be an expert or master in the art of
self-defense.  If the deceased was armed
and he (accused) originally was not, then the least fate that would have
befallen him would be to sustain injuries worse and more serious that those
suffered by the deceased especially so, when he was alone whereas the deceased
was with several companions.” (Brief for Accused-Appellant, p. 59)

Petitioner also faults respondent court for finding that the
accused provoked the conflict in the absence of direct evidence as to who
actually initiated it.

Even if there were no direct evidence as to who actually
initiated the conflict, petitioner having invoked self-defense, it was
incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the main
ingredient of the defense, i.e., the unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim.  He must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if it
were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused admitted the killing.  (People v. Llamera, G.R. Nos. L-21604-06, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA
48, 57, and the cases cited therein; People vs. Rey,
G.R. No. 80089, April 13, 1989, 172 SCRA 149, 506, See also Ortega v. Sandiganbayan, supra.). The trial court observed that
surprisingly, the defense presented no other witness except the petitioner
himself, to support his theory, more particularly with respect to the unlawful
aggression.

For failure of petitioner to show clearly and convincingly that
there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, no self-defense can be
appreciated in his favor.

The trial court appreciated two (2) mitigating circumstances in
favor of petitioner:  1) sufficient
provocation; and 2) voluntary surrender. 
The court opined that there was sufficient provocation because the
victim, upon seeing the accused, started calling him names and even cursed
him.  There was also voluntary surrender
because when the accused, while being treated for the wound on his left palm,
saw Patrolman Teodoro Pacquing
in the same hospital, he introduced himself to the police officer and went with
the latter to the precinct for investigation. 
What the law considers as mitigating is the voluntary surrender of an
accused before his arrest showing either acknowledgment of the guilt or an
intention to save authorities from trouble and expense that his search and
capture would require (People v. Radomes, G.R. 68421,
March 20, 1986, 141 SCRA 548).

The penalty for homicide prescribed by Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion temporal. 
Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance
attended the commission of the offense, the said penalty shall be lowered by
one (1) degree pursuant to Article 64 paragraph 5 of the same Code, which in
this case, is prision mayor.  This penalty shall be imposed in its medium period
considering that no other modifying circumstances attended the commission of
the offense, the two mitigating circumstances having been already taken into
account in reducing the penalty by one degree lower (Basan
v. People, L-39483, November 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 275). 
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree which is prision correccional
and the maximum of which shall be within the range of the medium period of prision mayor.

The trial court ordered the accused to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the sum of P6,000.00 which should now be
increased to P30,000.00.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS:  (1)
petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years,
four (4) months and (1) day of prision correccional as minimum and eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as maximum,
and (2) the indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the victim is increased to P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.