THE MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. THE PUBLIC UTILITIES EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENT.

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 44 of the Rules of Court
interposed by the petitioner Manila Electric Company against the decision of
July 15, 1946 of the Court of Industrial Relations, which reads as follows:

“Although the practice of the company, according to the manifestations of
counsel for said company, has been to grant one day vacation with pay to every
workingman who had worked for seven consecutive days including Sundays, the
Court considers justified the opposition presented by the workingmen to the
effect that they need Sundays and holidays for the observance of their religion
and for rest. The Court, therefore, orders the respondent company to pay 50% increase for overtime work done on ordinary days and 50 per cent increase
for work done during Sundays and legal holidays irrespective of the number of
days they work during the week.”

The appellant contends that the said decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations is against the provision of section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 444, which
reads as follows:

“No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place or center
of labor shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal
holidays, unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum
of his regular remuneration: Provided, however, That this
prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing some public service
such as supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or providing means of
transportation or communication.”

After a careful consideration of the issue involved in this appeal, we are of
the opinion and so hold that the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations
is erroneous or contrary to the clear and express provision of the above quoted
provisions. The power of the Court to settle industrial disputes between capital
and labor, which include the fixing of wages of employees or laborers, granted
by the general provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, has been
restricted by the above quoted special provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 444,
in the sense that public utilities supplying electricity, gas, power, water, or
providing means of transportation or communication may compel their employees or
laborers to work during, Sundays and legal holidays without paying them an
additional compensation of not less than 25 per cent of their regular
remuneration on said days.

Since the provisions of the above quoted section 4, are plain and unambiguous
and convey a clear and definite meaning, there is no need of resorting to the
rules of statutory interpretation or construction in order to determine the
intention of the Legislature. Said section 1 consists of two parts: the first,
which is the enactment clause, prohibits a person, firm or corporation, business
establishment, or place or center of labor from compelling an employee or
laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays, unless the former pays the
latter an additional sum of at least twenty five per centum of his regular
remuneration; and the second part, which is an exception, exempts public
utilities performing some public service, such as supplying gas, electricity,
power, water or providing means of transportation or communication, from the
prohibition established in the enactment clause. As the appellant is a public
utility that supplies electricity and provides means of transportation to the
public, it is evident that the appellant is exempt from the qualified
prohibition established in the enactment clause, and may compel its employees or
laborers to work during Sundays and legal holidays without paying them said
extra compensation.

To hold that the exception or second part of section 4, Commonwealth Act No.
444, only exempts public utilities mentioned therein from the prohibition to
compel employees or laborers to work during Sundays and legal holidays, but not
from the obligation to pay them an extra or additional compensation for
compelling them to work during those days, is to make the exception meaningless
or a superfluity, that is, an exception to a general rule that does not exist,
because the prohibition in the enactment clause is not an absolute prohibition
to compel a laborer or employee to work during Sundays and legal holidays. The
prohibition to compel a laborer or employee to work during those days is
qualified by the clause “unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty
five per centum of his regular remuneration,” which is inseparable from the
prohibition which they qualify and of which they are a part and parcel. The
second portion of section 1 is in reality an exception and not a proviso
although it is introduced by the word “provided”; and it is elemental that an
exception takes out of an enactment something which would otherwise be a part of
the subject matter of it.

To construe Section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 444, as exempting public
utilities, like the appellant, from the obligation to pay the additional
remuneration required by said section 4 should they compel their employees or
laborers to work on Sundays and legal holidays, would not make such exception a
class legislation, violative of the constitutional guaranty of equal protection
of the laws (Section 1 [1] Art. III of our Constitution). For it is a
well-settled rule in constitutional law that a legislation which affects with
equal force all persons of the same class and not those of another, is not a
class legislation and does not infringe said constitutional guaranty of equal
protection of the laws, if the division into classes is not arbitrary and is
based on differences which are apparent and reasonable. (Magonn vs.
Illinois Trust Savings Bank, 170 N. S., 283, 294; State vs. Garbroski,
111 Iowa, 496; 56 L. R. A., 570.) And it is evident that the division made by
section 4, of Commonwealth Act No. 444, of persons, firms, and corporations into
two classes: one composed of public utilities performing some public service
such as supplying gas, electricity, power, water or providing means of
transportation; and another composed of persons, firms, and corporations which
are not public utilities and do not perform said public services, is not
arbitrary and is based on differences which are apparent and reasonable.

The division is not arbitrary, and the basis thereof is reasonable. Public
utilities exempted from the prohibition set forth in the enactment clause of Section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 444, are required to perform a continuous
service including Sundays and legal holidays to the public, since the public
good so demands, and are not allowed to collect an extra charge for services
performed on those days; while the others are not required to do so and are free
to operate or not their shops, business, or industries on Sundays and legal
holidays. If they operate and compel their laborer to work on those days it is
but just and natural that they should pay an extra compensation to them, because
it is to be presumed that they can make money or business by operating on those
days even if they have to pay such extra remuneration. It would be unfair for
the law to compel public utilities like the appellant to pay an additional or
extra compensation to laborers whom they have to compel to work during Sundays
and legal holidays, in order to perform a continuous service to the public. To
require public utilities performing public service to do so, would be tantamount
to penalize them for performing public service during said days in compliance
with the requirement of the law and public interest.

The conclusion on which the dissenting opinion is based, which is also
substantially the basis of the resolution of the lower court, is that “As to
them [referring to public utilities like the petitioner] Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 444 may be considered as not having been enacted at all. *
* * Therefore, when there is a labor dispute as in the present case, and the
dispute is submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for decision or
settlement, the court is free to provide what it may deem just and more
beneficial to the interested parties, and that freedom to settle and decide the
case certainly includes the power to grant additional compensation to workers
who work on Sundays and holidays. The general power granted by Sections 1, 4,
and 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, are not affected in any way or sense by
section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444.”

This conclusion finds no support in law, reason or logic. It is a well
settled rule of statutory construction adopted by courts of last resort in the
States that if one statute enacts some thing in general terms, and afterwards
another statute is passed on the same subject, which although expressed in
affirmative language introduces special conditions or restrictions, the
subsequent statute will usually be considered as repealing by implication the
former regarding the matter covered by the subsequent act; and more specially so
when the latter act is expressed in negative terms, as where for example it
prohibits a certain thing from being done, or where it declares that a given act
shall be performed in a certain manner and not otherwise. (See Black on
Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed., p. 354, and Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
3d ed., Vol. 1, Section 1922, and cases therein cited.)

In accordance with this rule, the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 103 which
confers upon the Court of Industrial Relations power to settle dispute between
employers and employees in general, including those relating to compulsion of
laborers to work on Sundays and legal holidays and additional compensation for
those working on those days, should be considered as impliedly repealed by
section 4 of Act No. 444, which limits or restricts the minimum of the
additional compensation and specifies the persons, firms or corporation who may
be requered to pay said compensation. That is, that the Court of Industrial
Relations may, under the provision of said section 4, order a person, firm or
corporation or business establishment or place or center of labor who compel an
employee or laborer to work on Sundays and legal holidays, to pay him an
additional compensation of at least 25 per centum of his regular remuneration;
but said court can not require public utilities performing public service
mentioned therein to pay said extra compensation to laborers and employees
required by them to work on Sundays and legal holidays, because the necessity of
public service so requires.

It is evident that the principal purpose of the Legislature in enacting said
section 4, is not only to restrict the general power of the Court of Industrial
Relations granted by Act No. 103, to fix the minimum additional compensation
which an employer may be required to pay a laborer compelled to work on those
days, but principally to exempt public utilities affected with public interest,
from the payment of such additional compensation. If it were the intention of
the lawmakers in enacting Section 4 of Act No. 444 to fix the limit of the
minimum of additional compensation for laborers working on those days, without
exempting the public utilities, that is, leaving intact the general power of the
court to require the said public utilities to pay said additional compensation,
the law would have only provided, in substance, that all employers are
prohibited from compelling their laborers to work on Sundays and legal holidays
without paying them an additional compensation of not less than 50 per cent of
their regular remuneration.

That the intention of the Legislature is to exempt the public utilities under
consideration from the prohibition set forth in the enactment clause of Section
4, Act No. 444, is supported by the provision of section 19 of Act No. 103. As
amended this section provides “that with the exception of employers engaged
in the operation of public services or in the business coupled with a public
interest, employers will not be allowed to engage the services of strike
breakers within fifteen days after the declaration of the strike;” which shows
a contrario sensu that public utilities performing public services are
permitted to engage the services of strike breakers within fifteen days, that
is, immediately upon the declaration of the strike. The same public interest,
the reason of the exception in the above quoted provision, underlies the
exception provided in section 4, of Act No. 444.

Therefore, the ruling of the Court of Industrial Relations quoted in the
first part of this decision appealed from, being contrary to law, is set aside.
So ordered.

Paras, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason,
JJ., concur.

MORAN, C.J.:

I concur in the result.

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PERFECTO, J.:

The petitioner complains against the following judgment of the Court of
Industrial Relations with reference to respondent’s demand for 100 per cent
overtime pay on Sundays and holidays and 50 per cent increase in pay after eight
hours work:

“Although the practice of the Company, according to the manifestations of
counsel for said company, has heen to grant one day vacation with pay to every
workingman who had worked for seven consecutive days including Sundays, the
Court considers justified the opposition presented by the workingmen to the
effect that they need Sundays and holidays for the observance of their religion
and for rest. The Court, therefore, orders the respondent company to pay 50 per
cent increase for overtime work done on ordinary days and 50 per cent increase
for work done during Sundays and legal holidays, irrespective of the number of
days they work during the week.”

The power and jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations to render
said judgment under the authority given by sections 1, 4, and 13 of Commonwealth
Act No. 103, quoted below, cannot be disputed.

“SECTION 1. The Judge: his appointment, qualifications, compensation,
tenure.—There is hereby created a Court of Industrial Relations, which shall
have jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide,
and settle any question, matter, controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or
farm-laborers, and regulate the relation between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of this Act. * * *”

“SEC. 4. Strikes and lockouts.—The Court shall take cognizance for
purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial
or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising
from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or
conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and employees or laborers
and between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of
employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and
such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the
Secretary of Labor, or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and
certified by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealt with by
the Court foi the sake of public interest. In all such cases, the Secretary of
Labor or the party or parties submitting the disputes, shall clearly and
specifically state in writing the questions to be decided. Upon the submission
of such a controversy or question by the Secretary of Labor, his intervention
therein as authorized by law, shall cease.

“The Court shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such
hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute
by amicable agreement. If any agreement as to the whole or any part of the
dispute is arrived at by the parties, a memorandum of its terms shall be made in
writing, signed and acknowledged by the parties thereto before the Judge of the
Court or any official acting in his behalf and authorized to administer oaths or
acknowledgments, or, before a notary public. The memorandum shall be filed in
the office of the Clerk of the Court, and, unless otherwise ordered by the
Court, shall, as between the parties to the agreement, have the same effect as,
and be deemed to be, a decision or award.”

“SEC. 13. Character of the award.—In making an award, order or
decision, under the provisions of section four of this Act, the Court shall not
be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to
the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or
decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient
for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or
agricultural disputes.”

The question raised by petitioner refers to the applicability to the
controversy of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444, which reads as
follows:

“No person, firm or corporation, business establishment or place or center of
labor shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal
holidays, unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five per
centum of his regular remuneration: Provided, however, That
this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing some public
service such as supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or providing means of
transportation or communication.”

Petitioner prayed that the part of the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations of July 15, 1946, relating to demand No. 4 of the respondent Labor
Union, above quoted, and the order of the same court of October 15, 1946,
overruling petitioner’s motion to set aside said part and for a new trial, be
vacated.

As petitioner invokes the authority of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444,
above quoted, the whole controversy in this case hinges upon the interpretation
of said section.

No correct interpretation can be given unless the document in dispute is read
correctly. Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 appears to be composed of two
parts: a general provision and an exception. The main provision is prohibitory
in nature. It says that “no person, firm, or corporation, business establishment
or place or center of labor shall compel employees or laborers to work during
Sundays and legal holidays unless he is paid an additional sum of at least
twenty-five per centum of the regular remuneration.” The exception
excludes from the prohibitory general provision public utilities performing
public service such as supplying gas, electricity, power, water or providing
means of transportation or communication.

It will be seen that section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 divides the
employers into two classes: 1. Those not engaged in public utilities, and 2.
those engaged in public utilities. The first class cannot compel their employees
or laborers to work on Sundays and holidays without giving them an additional
salary or remuneration equivalent to not less than twenty-five per centum
of the basic remuneration. There is no limit as to the time or circumstances
under which the additional compensation is to be paid. Employers engaged in
public utilities are excluded from the prohibition. This means simply that
employers engaged in public utilities may or may not pay the additional
compensation or any additional compensation for compelling their laborers to
work on Sundays and holidays. The exception should not be interpreted as
providing that employers engaged in public utilities cannot be compelled to pay
additional compensation to workers required to work on Sundays and holidays. As
to them, section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 may be considered as not having
been enacted at all. Exception or exemption from a negative or prohibitory legal
provision is not a positive or affirmative provision commanding the excepted or
exempted person to do what is enjoined in the general provision.

The general provision of said section does not work either way with respect
to public utilities. Therefore, when there is a labor dispute as in the present
case, and the dispute is submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for
decision or settlement, the court is free to provide what it may deem just and
more beneficial to the interested parties, and that freedom to settle and decide
the case certainly includes the power to grant additional compensation to
workers who work on Sundays and holidays. The general power granted by Sections
1, 4, and 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, above quoted, are not affected in any
way or sense by section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444.

The right to collect an additional sum of at least twenty-five per
centum of the basic remuneration is guaranteed to all workers and employees
not engaged in public utilities and that right is enforceable not only in the
Court of Industrial Relations but in any other competent court of justice. It
must be remembered that the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is
limited to labor disputes in which a minimum number of laborers are involved.
Under section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444, a single laborer may claim in a
competent ordinary court of justice for the additional compensation provided
therein in case he is compelled to work on Sundays and holidays.

Under the powers granted by Sections 1, 4, and 13 of Commonwealth Act No.
103, the Court of Industrial Relations had and still has perfect power and
authority to make the award with respect to demand No. 4 in the way expressed in
the judgment quoted at the beginning of this opinion. In granting 50 per cent
increase for work or service done on Sundays and legal holidays, the Court of
Industrial Relations undoubtedly had taken into consideration the circumstances
of the case.

Furthermore, it is a fact that Sundays and legal holidays are set aside by
law as days of rest. The life, existence, and happiness of a person do not
depend only on the satisfaction of his physical needs. There are moral,
intellectual and spiritual needs as imperative as the physical ones. Ordinarily,
Sundays and legal holidays are dedicated to reading and instruction so as to
fill the mind with culture or some sort of advancement On those days the laborer
enjoys longer hours in the company of his family. That gives him an opportunity
to satisfy his moral needs. During Sundays and holidays more time is dedicated
to worship and other religious services. That gives a laborer an opportunity to
satisfy his spiritual needs. The deprivation of that opportunity to satisfy
mental, moral, and spiritual needs should not be ignored, and should be properly
compensated.

For all the foregoing, we are of opinion and so we vote, that
the petition should be dismissed.