SC CIRCULAR NO. 38-98, August 11, 1998

IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO 8493 ENTITLED “AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL’ CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT METROPOLITAN …

Circulars August 11, 1998
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SECTION 1. Purpose of Circular.— This
Circular is promulgated for the purpose of implementing the provisions
of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the “Speedy Trial Act
of’1998,” as directed in Section 15 thereof.

SEC. 2. Time Limit for Arraignment and Pre-trial.—
The arraignment, and the pre-trial if the accused pleads not guilty to
the crime charged, shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The
period of the pendency of a motion to quash, or for a bill of
particulars, or other causes justifying suspension of arraignment shall
be excluded.

SEC. 3. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases.—
In all; criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court
shall, after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider the
following:

(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.

If the accused has pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged, he may state whether he interposes a negative or affirmative
defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative
defense may modify the order of trial arid require the accused to prove
such defense by clear and convincing evidence.

SEC. 4. Pre-Trial Agreement.— All agreements
or admissions made or entered into during the pre-trial conference
shall be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and counsel,
otherwise the same shall not be used against the accused. The agreements
in relation to matters referred to’ in Section 3 hereof are. subject to
the approval of the court: Provided, That the agreement on the plea of the accused should, be to a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged.

SEC. 5. Non-appearance at Pre-Trial Conference.—
Where counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the
pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his
lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or
penalties.

SEC. 6. Pre-Trial Order.— After the
pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the
actions taken, the facts stipulated, and the evidence marked. Such order
shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and
control the course of action during the trial, unless modified by the
court to prevent manifest injustice.

Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered,
the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial
which shall commence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
pre-trial order.

SEC. 7. Extended Time Limit.—
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Sections 2 and 6 for the
first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time
limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by
said provision shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second
twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120)
days, and for the third twelve-month period the time limit shall be
eighty (80) days.

SEC. 8. Time Limit for Trial.— In criminal cases
involving persons charged with a crime, except those subject to the Rule
on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos
(PI,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the
court shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the
counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly
or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as
to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed
one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as
otherwise authorized by the Court Administrator pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 30 of the Rules of Court.

SEC. 9. Exclusions.— The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited to the following:

(1) delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of the accused;
(2) delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges against the accused; :
(3) delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;
(4) delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings: Provided, that the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days;
(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition or proceedings relating
to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;
(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial question; and
(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty
(30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is
actually under advisement.

(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness.

For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential
witness shall be considered absent when his whereabouts are unknown
or.his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence An essential
witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are
known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence.

(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.

(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of
the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for
the same offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was
dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to
the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.

(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is
joined for trial with a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired
jurisdiction, or as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion
for separate trial has been granted.

(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance
granted by any court motu proprio or on motion .of either the accused or
his counsel or the prosecution, if the court granted such continuance
on the basis of his findings set forth in the order that the ends of
justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the
public and the accused in a speedy trial.

SEC. 10. Factors for Granting Continuance.—
The following factors, among others, shall De considered by a court in
determining whether to grant a continuance under subparagraph (f) of
Section 9 hereof:

(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance
in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such
proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice; and

(b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so
novel, unusual and complex, due to the number of accused or the nature
of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect
adequate preparation within the periods of time established herein.
No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 9 hereof shall be
granted because of congestion of the court’s calendar, or lack of
diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the
part of the public prosecutor.

SEC. 11. Time Limit Following an Order for New Trial.—
If the accused is to be tried again pursuant to an order of a court for
a new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from
notice of that order, except that the court retrying the case may extend
such period but not to exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from notice
of said order for a new trial if unavailability of witnesses or other
factors make trial within thirty (30) days impractical.

SEC. 12. Public Attorney’s Duties Where Accused is Imprisoned.—
If the public attorney assigned to defend a person charged with a crime
knows that the latter is preventively detained, either because he is
charged with a bailable crime and has no means to post bail, or is
charged with a non-bailable crime, or is serving a term of imprisonment
in any penal institution:

(a) The public attorney shall promptly undertake to
obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a notice to be
served on the person having custody of the prisoner requiring such
person to so advise the prisoner of his right to demand trial.

(b) Upon receipt of that notice, the person having
custody of the prisoner shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge
and of his right to demand trial. If at anytime thereafter the prisoner
informs his custodian that he demands such trial, the latter shall
cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney.

(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain, the presence of the prisoner for trial.

(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner
receives from the public attorney a properly supported request for the
availability of the prisoner for purposes of the trial, the prisoner
shall be made available accordingly.

SEC. 13. Sanctions.— In any case in which private counsel for the accused, the public attorney or the public prosecutor:

(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial
without disclosing the fact that a necessary witness would be
unavailable for trial;

(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he knows is totally
frivolous and without merit;

(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining
continuance which he knows to be false and which is material to the
granting of a continuance; or

(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial
without justification consistent with the provisions hereof, the court
may punish any such counsel, attorney or prosecutor, as follows:

(l) in the case of a counsel privately retained in
connection with the defense of an accused, by imposing a fine not
exceeding twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00);

(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de oficio,
public attorney or public prosecutor a fine not exceeding five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00); and

(3) by denying any defense counsel or public
prosecutor the right to practice before the court considering the case
for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days.

The authority to punish provided for by this section
shall be without prejudice to any appropriate criminal action or any
other sanction authorized under the Rules of Court.

SEC. 14. Remedy Where Accused is Not Brought to Trial Within the Time Limit.—
If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required
by Sections 2 and 6 hereof, as extended by Section 7, the information
may be dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his
right to speedy trial. The accused shall have the burden of proving
such motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward
with the evidence in connection with the exclusion of time under Section
9 hereof. The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double
jeopardy.

Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to
trial shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismiss under this
section.

SEC. 15. Republic Act No. 8493 Not a Bar to Provision on Speedy Trial in the Constitution.—
No provision of Republic Act No. 8493 shall be interpreted as a bar to
any charge of denial of speedy trial as provided by Article 111, Section
14(2), of the 1987 Constitution.

SEC. 16. Effectivity. — This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on September 15, 1998.

August 11, 1998.

 

(SGD.) ANDRES R. NARVASA

 
Court Administrator