A.M. No. P-94-1069. November 09, 1994

JUDGE HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 24, ECHAGUE, ISABELA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JOHN C. RAMOS, DEPUTY SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 24, ECHAGUE, ISABELA, …

Decisions / Signed Resolutions November 9, 1994 SECOND DIVISION REGALADO, J.:
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REGALADO, J.:


This administrative matter arose from an order[1]
issued on March 22, 1994 in Civil Case No. Br. 24-0273 by Judge Henedino P.
Eduarte of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Echague, Isabela, declaring inter
alia

as follows:

“It is therefore clear that the costs of suit as computed by
the Sheriff in the astronomical amount of P29,880.00 is clearly not warranted
by Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Sheriff should not have taken it upon himself to make the computation
of the costs. The costs should have
been filed with the Court for its approval by way of a motion to approve bill
of costs in accordance with Section 8, Rule 143 (sic, should be Rule 142),
Rules of Court. It is clear, therefore,
that the proceedings taken by the sheriff in levying upon the properties of the
plaintiff, selling them at public auction to pay costs, and then executing the
sheriff’s Certificate of Sale are null and void.”

On June 28, 1994, the Office of the Court Administrator also
received a sworn complaint for grave misconduct against the respondent, filed
by Lorenzo Lazaro, the plaintiff in the above-mentioned civil case.[2]

The records show that on May 8, 1991, the trial court rendered a
decision in Civil Case No. Br. 24-0773, penned by Judge Basilio R. Ramiscal,
ordering the plaintiff, Lorenzo Lazaro, to reconvey to the defendant, Free
Gospel Church, the property subject of the suit after the defendant shall have
reimbursed to the plaintiff the sum of P2,505.60 representing the value of said
property, and further requiring the plaintiff to pay the costs of the suit.[3]
After the appeal of the plaintiff was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, the
defendant moved for the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution, which
was granted on November 26, 1992.[4]

Respondent sheriff computed the costs of the suit which he placed
in the amount of P29,880.00.[5] Plaintiff Lazaro failed to pay the costs,
whereupon respondent levied on his properties consisting of two parcels of
land, and subsequently sold them at public auction on January 4, 1993
purportedly to satisfy the costs of suit. The properties were sold to defendant Free Gospel Church, as the highest
bidder in the auction sale, for the amount of P36,000.00. On January 13, 1993, a Sheriff’s Certificate
of Sale was executed in favor of said highest bidder.[6]

The aforesaid order of complainant further states that on the
date of the auction sale, Mrs. Rosario G. Julian, Court Interpreter and
Officer-in-Charge, received P5,000.00 from the plaintiff as payment for costs,
but she claimed that respondent sheriff “got from her the P5,000.00.”
Thereafter, on March 10, 1994, plaintiff filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution and to annul the sheriff’s sale on the ground that “in executing the decision,
the Sheriff disregarded the decision of the Court and excessively computed the
costs in the amount of P29,880.00.”[7]

The trial court annulled the writ of execution and set aside the
sale made by respondent sheriff, holding that “the decision of the court
(in Civil Case No. Br. 24-0273) is clear. There is no money judgment. The
plaintiff is only ordered to reconvey the land in question to the defendant
upon the latter’s reimbursing to the plaintiff P2,505.60. The plaintiff is ordered to pay costs of the
suit.” The order annulling the writ of execution likewise castigated the
unauthorized act of respondent, as set forth in the opening paragraph of this
resolution. It likewise ordered
respondent sheriff to return to the plaintiff the amount of P5,000.00, which he
received from the Officer-in-Charge as costs, within five days from his receipt
of the order.[8]

As directed therein a copy of said order was transmitted to this Court, through the Office of the Court
Administrator, “as a complaint against respondent sheriff Ramos for grave
misconduct,” and was so considered.

In a Second Indorsement dated May 4, 1994,[9]
respondent sheriff, asserted that when the writ of execution was issued by the
lower court, he received from Pastor Alex C. Vivit, a minister of defendant Free
Gospel Church, a list of the costs which it allegedly spent in their
defense. Respondent claimed that he
even did the plaintiff a favor by reducing the original amount in the list from
P39,008.00 to P29,880.00 and, in implementing the writ of execution, he
honestly believed that the costs of suit included other expenses incurred by
the prevailing party, such as expenses for attorney’s fees.

Respondent admitted having received the amount of P5,000.00 paid
by the plaintiff to Mrs. Julian but he contends that he did so “under the
impression that the money shall be used to defray (his) expenses in
implementing the writ of execution.” To support his claim he submitted a
handwritten list of his alleged expenses which, among others, includes transportation
fare and police assistance.

There is evident merit in these excerpts from the findings of the
Office of the Court Administrative, to wit:

“We hold for the Complainant Judge. Rule 142, Section 8 is relevant. It provides:

x x x

“From the aforequoted provision it is clear that respondent Sheriff
overstepped the bounds of his responsibilities when he took it upon himself to
compute the costs of the suit.

“Similarly, we are persuaded that respondent Sheriff violated
Rule 141, Section 9 which provides for the legal fees which sheriffs and other
persons serving processes are legally allowed to receive. When respondent Sheriff received the five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) from the Court Interpreter Mrs. Rosario Julian under
the guise that the same will be used to defray his expenses he should have
known that the amount is way beyond that allowed under the Rules. Having been in the service for a long period
of time already, good faith and lack of malice is not enough reason to
exonerate him, the same being too simplistic and unworthy of credence.

“Equally compelling of respondent Sheriff’s guilt was his act
of returning the money only after having been ordered by the Court to do
so. For his actuations, it is manifest
that respondent Sheriff is liable for misconduct.”[10]

Respondent committed a serious infraction of Section 8, Rule 142
and Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court
when he assumed the power to determine the costs of suit and, later,
appropriated the P5,000.00 for his fees. We can not accept his claim of good faith since he is expected to know
the limits of his authority, having been in the service for twenty-two
years. We have frequently reiterated
that the sheriff or his deputies merely perform ministerial, not discretionary,
functions in the performance of their duties. Sheriffs are supposed to execute orders of the Court strictly to the
letter of the order and the governing law. They are not supposed to decide and interpret for themselves unclear
wordings of the judgment or order.[11]

In this administrative matter, respondent’s only duty was to
implement the writ of execution according to its terms. He was not authorized to determine what
items are included in the phrase “costs of suit,” since Sec. 8,
Rule 142 is very clear and explicit thereon, thus:

“Sec. 8. Costs, how taxed. – In inferior courts,
the costs shall be taxed by the justice of the peace or municipal judge and
included in the judgment. In superior courts, costs shall be taxed by
the clerk of the corresponding court on five days’ written notice given by the
prevailing party to the adverse party. With this notice shall be served a statement of the items of cost
claimed by the prevailing party, verified by his oath or that of his attorney. Objections to the taxation shall
be
made in writing, specifying the items objected to. Either party may appeal to the court from the clerk’s
taxation. The cost shall be inserted in
the judgment if taxed before its entry, and payment thereof shall be enforced
by execution.”
(Emphasis
supplied)

Respondent ought to have known the correct procedure to be
followed in order to ensure proper administration of justice, especially in its
concluding stage. He failed to observe
that degree of dedication to the duties and responsibilities required of him as
a sheriff. He is bound to discharge his
duties with prudence, caution and attention which careful men usually exercise
in the management of their affairs. The
sheriff, an officer of the court upon whom the execution of a final judgment
depends must be circumspect and proper in his behavior. Execution is the fruit and end of the suit
and is the life of the law.[12]

Time and again, we have repeatedly stressed that the conduct and
behavior of every one connected with an office charged with the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the sheriff to the lowest clerk, should be
circumscribed with propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond
suspicion. A public office is a public
trust and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people. The Supreme Court cannot
countenance any act or omission which diminishes or tends to diminish the faith
of the people in the judiciary.[13]

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes on Deputy
Sheriff John C. Ramos a FINE of P2,000.00,
with a STERN WARNING that the
same or similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.


[1]Rollo,
7-10.

[2]
Ibid
., 25.

[3]
Ibid., 7.

[4]
Loc. cit.

[5]
Rollo,
8, 15-16; see also Annex “C”.

[6]
Ibid., 8.

[7]
Loc. cit.

[8]
Rollo, 8-10.

[9]
Ibid., 15-17.

[10] Ibid., 3.

[11]
Young vs. Momblan, A.M. No. P-89-367, January 9, 1992, 205 SCRA 33. See also Rosario, et al. vs. Bascar,
Jr., etc., A.M. No. P-88-255, March 3, 1992, 206 SCRA 678.

[12]
Tan vs. Herras, A.M. No. P-90-404, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 1.

[13]
Sy vs. Academia, et al., A.M. No. P-87-72 and Pardo vs. Academia,
etc., A.M. No. P-90-481, July 3, 1991, 198 SCRA 705. See also Llanes vs. Borja, etc., A.M. No. P­-86-32,
December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 288; De la Cruz, et al. vs. Ricaforte, A.M.
No. P-90-486, July 4, 1991, 198 SCRA 763;