FRANCISCO C. TOBIAS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. CASTRENSE C. VELOSO, JUDGE, CFI OF ILOILO, BR. III & TOMAS C. LUJAN, RESPONDENTS.

Tobias versus Veloso

The Case

This is a petition for review by certiorari brought by Mayor Francisco Tobias against Judge Castrense Veloso of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, and Tomas Lujan. The case began as a petition for mandamus filed by Lujan, the Chief of Police of Cabatuan, Iloilo, to compel the Mayor to approve the voucher for his back salaries during the period of his preventive suspension. The case matters because it draws the line between exoneration and a reprimand, and settles that a reprimanded police officer is not entitled to back salaries, and that mandamus will not lie to compel a mayor to pay what the law does not owe.

Procedural History

Lujan filed a petition for mandamus and damages with a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The trial court, through Judge Veloso, rendered judgment in favor of Lujan, granting the writ of mandamus, ordering the Mayor to pay attorney's fees of 2,000 pesos, and dismissing the Mayor's counterclaim for lack of evidence. The Mayor moved for reconsideration, which was denied. He then interposed this appeal directly to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court initially denied the petition for lack of merit, but upon the Mayor's motion for reconsideration, it resolved to give due course and decided the case on the merits.

Facts

Tomas Lujan was appointed Chief of Police of Cabatuan, Iloilo, on December 1, 1971. On October 19, 1972, Mayor Tobias charged him with Bribery and Corrupt Practices before the National Police Commission, or NAPOLCOM, for allegedly demanding 1,370 pesos for the extrajudicial settlement of a robbery case pending in the municipal court. The Mayor also charged him with Grave Misconduct and Serious Irregularities for the loss through theft of the service pistol issued to him by the municipality. As a consequence, Lujan was suspended from office effective December 20, 1972.

In the Bribery Case, NAPOLCOM ruled on August 9, 1973 that although Lujan was not liable for bribery because his acceptance of the amount was for delivery to the offended party, the act was improper, and it reprimanded him and warned that repetition would invite drastic disciplinary action. In the Grave Misconduct case, he was exonerated on March 9, 1973. NAPOLCOM lifted his suspension on October 2, 1973, and the Mayor administered the reprimand in an executive order approved by the Provincial Board in February 1974.

Upon reporting for duty, Lujan submitted vouchers for back salaries of 2,984 pesos and 42 centavos covering the period of his suspension. The Provincial Auditor opined that the salary could be claimed upon the authority of the Municipal Council. The Municipal Council passed a resolution authorizing payment, but the resolution was not ultimately signed because of the Mayor's intended veto. The Mayor had addressed a formal inquiry to the NAPOLCOM Chairman on whether Lujan was entitled to back salaries given the reprimand. When no action was taken on his request, Lujan filed the mandamus petition. During the pendency of the suit, the Mayor received the reply of the Deputy Executive Commissioner that since Lujan was not exonerated but was ordered reprimanded, he is not entitled to back salaries.

Issues

• Whether or not the Police Act of 1966, rather than the Civil Service Rules, governs the entitlement of a Chief of Police to back salaries during suspension.
• Whether or not a reprimand is a penalty, as distinguished from an exoneration, a warning, or an admonition.
• Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the Mayor to approve the voucher for back salaries.
• Whether or not the award of attorney's fees against the Mayor is tenable.
• Whether or not the dismissal of the counterclaim for the value of the lost service pistol and the administrative fine was proper.

Applicable Provisions

Section 16 of the Police Act of 1966 provides:

Suspension of Members of the Police Force. The respondent shall be entitled to his salary for the period of suspension upon exoneration.

This is the governing rule, and it conditions the payment of back salaries on exoneration, which Lujan did not obtain.

Section 4 of Rule X of the Police Manual provides:

Payment of Salary during the Period of Preventive Suspension. When a member of a city or municipal police force is exonerated by the Police Commission, the respondent member shall be entitled to receive the entire salary he failed to receive during the period of his preventive suspension.

This reiterates that the entire salary during suspension is recoverable only upon exoneration.

Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 12-A provides:

Members of the Police force who have been preventively suspended, shall, upon exoneration, be entitled to immediate reinstatement and payment of the entire salary they failed to receive during the period of suspension.

This confirms the same condition, that payment of the entire salary follows exoneration.

Rule XVIII, Section 4(e) of the Civil Service Rules, relied upon by the trial court, provides:

An admonition or a warning whether given by the Commissioner or the head of Department or agency shall not be considered a penalty.

This rule speaks only of admonition and warning, and does not cover a reprimand, which the Court holds to be a penalty.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Police Act of 1966 governs, since Lujan as Chief of Police comes within its purview. Its Section 16 entitles a suspended member to his salary only upon exoneration.

On the second issue, the Court held that a reprimand is not an exoneration. A warning is the act of putting one on guard against impending danger or penalties, and an admonition is a gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke. Neither is a penalty. A reprimand, however, is of a more severe nature, a public and formal censure or severe reproof administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or a body to which he belongs. It is an administrative penalty, although a slight one, and is the last in the scale of graduated penalties. Since Lujan was reprimanded, and reprimand is a penalty, he is not entitled to back salaries. A suspended member of the police force is entitled to back salaries only upon exoneration or acquittal. The Court rejected as puerile the argument that he was cleared of bribery, since the act for which he was reprimanded was the same act that gave rise to the charge.

On the third issue, the Court held that the Mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to pay back salaries, and that the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ. As chief executive of the municipal government, the Mayor showed prudence in withholding payment until higher administrative authorities had ruled on its legality.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the award of attorney's fees against the Mayor was untenable, since it rested on the erroneous grant of the writ.

On the fifth issue, the Court held that the dismissal of the counterclaim for lack of evidence was belied by the records. The Auditor General found that the loss of the firearm occurred through Lujan's fault or negligence, denied his request for relief, and required him to pay the value of the pistol plus the administrative fine of 40 pesos. The Municipal Treasurer certified the current market price of the pistol at 2,000 pesos. Lujan should therefore pay 2,000 pesos for the lost pistol plus 40 pesos as administrative fine.

Doctrine

A suspended member of the police force is entitled to back salaries during the period of suspension only upon exoneration or acquittal, under Section 16 of the Police Act of 1966 and its implementing rules. A reprimand is an administrative penalty, distinct from a warning or an admonition, which are not penalties under the Civil Service Rules. Because a reprimanded officer is not exonerated, he has no clear legal right to back salaries, and mandamus will not lie to compel their payment. Mandamus lies only to enforce a clear legal right, and it cannot be used to compel a public officer to pay what the law does not authorize.

Disposition

The Court reversed the trial court's judgment granting the writ of mandamus and awarding attorney's fees to Lujan, and ordered Lujan to pay the Municipality of Cabatuan 2,000 pesos for the lost service pistol plus 40 pesos as administrative fine.

Remember This

Memorize the line: back salaries upon suspension are payable only upon exoneration, and a reprimand is a penalty, not an exoneration. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between a reprimand and a warning or admonition, and the requisites of mandamus against a public officer acting to protect public funds.