AUTOMOTIVE PARTS & EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. JOSE B. LINGAD, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND RUBEN F. SANTOS, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, RESPON…

What the Constitution ordains in its avowed principle of the
promotion of social justice^[1]
and the explicit mandate of pro­tection to labor^[2]
was once again given concrete expression in a statute of recent date increasing
the minimum wage.^[3]
Thus, for industrial establishments, a six pesos (P6.00) daily wage is now the
law, a two-peso (P2.00)
increase.^[4]
In view of its explicit language, it would be difficult for a business firm so
minded to escape its operation directly, whether its employees are paid on a
daily or a monthly basis.  Likewise, an
attempt to do so has been forestalled by a provision found in the original
Minimum Wage Law which prohibits an employer from “reducing the wage now
paid to any of his employees in excess of the minimum wage established under
[the Act] or in reducing supple­ments furnished on the date of enactment.”^[5]
In this action for declaratory relief,
petitioner-appellant Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Incorporated,
would seek to construe the above section to enable it to reduce its liability
for its monthly paid employees from P180.00 to P152.00, by paying them at the
rate of six days a week from Monday to Saturday computed at the rate of the
minimum daily wage.

The lower court was not
sympathetic to such a plea.  Hence, this
appeal from its decision.  It ought to
have known better.  No court could
indulge in such an unworthy objective especially when sought to be attained by
advancing arguments of the flimsiest and most insubstantial character.  We affirm.

In the petition for
declaratory relief, the then Secretary of Labor, Jose B. Lingad
and the then Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards, Ruben F. Santos being
named as respondents, appellant Automotive Parts & Equipment Company,
Incorporated alleged that it was duly incorporated on January 5, 1961 and that
from the start of its operation, its employees were paid on a daily and monthly
basis.^[6] It there noted that on April 21, 1965 the
aforesaid amendatory act took effect and that respondents Secretary a Labor and the Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards construed its
provision “in such a way as to require the petitioner to increase the
salaries of all the monthly paid employees of the petitioner to a minimum of
P180.00 (not P152.00) which according to them is the applicable minimum wage
rate for the monthly paid employees of petitioner.”^[7]

After an allegation that
it had already increased the salaries of its monthly paid employees to a
minimum of P152.00 a month, in accordance with its own interpretation of the
act, it sought to justify its refusal to abide by the interpretative bulletin
of re­spondents requiring the increase to a minimum of P180.00 a month for
employees paid on a monthly basis in this wise: 
“That the petitioner believes that Section 19 of Republic Act No.
602 parti­cularly that portion prohibiting the reduction of wages paid to
employees in excess of the minimum wage established in the Act or supplements
theretofore granted to employees only refers and applies to employers in
business prior to and at the time of enactment of said Republic Act No. 602 and
that the prohibition thereof against reduction of supplements as envisioned in
Section 19 of Republic Act No. 602 should not be applied prospectively to
employers coming into existence subsequent to the effective date of said
Republic Act No. 602.  This belief has
not been altered despite the passage of the Amendatory Act namely Republic Act
No. 4180 particularly so because the latter act only amended one section, i.e.,
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 602 and it did not in any way repeal in its
entirety said Republic Act No. 602. 
Furthermore, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 602 has not been reenacted
in the Amendatory Act No. 4180 and for the Bureau of Labor now to construe the
Amendatory Act in such away as to require petitioner to increase, by
compulsion, the salaries of its monthly paid employees to a minimum of P180.00
due to a customary practice of the petitioner in considering unworked Sundays and legal holidays as a paid day, would be
beyond the clear and express provisions of the law and constitutes legislation
by the Bureau of Labor.”^[8]

As noted, the lower court rejected such a contention.  Thus: 
“Section 2 of R.A. No. 4180 provides that ‘Any provision of law
previously enacted on the subject matter of this Act that is in­consistent with
any provision of this Act is hereby repealed.’ Section 19 of R.A. No. 602 not
being inconsistent with R.A. No. 4180 has not been repealed; on the other hand,
the provisions of Section 19 of R.A. No. 602 not being inconsistent with R.A.
No. 4180 were deemed and impliedly reenacted. 
Furthermore, according to Article 1702 of the Civil Code, ‘In case of
doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in
favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.’ This is in conso­nance
with the intention of Congress to protect the minimum wage of laborers.  Both Section 19 of R.A. No. 602 prohibiting
the reduction of supplements granted to employees and the minimum wage of P6.00
a day and R.A. No. 4180 are for the purpose of securing a ‘decent living for
the laborer.’”^[9]
In the dispositive portion of the decision, it was
declared “that Section 19 of R. A. No.
602 is applicable to the petitioner in connection with the enforce­ment of the
provisions of R.A. No. 4180.”^[10]

From such a decision, this appeal was taken to us.  It cannot prosper.  The lower court decided the matter
correctly.  It cannot be reversed.

1.  To state the construction
sought to be fastened on the clear and explicit language of the statute is to
reject it.  It comes into collision with
the constitutional command pursuant to the social justice principle that the
government extend protection to labor. 
On the one hand, appellant would recognize that the increase in minimum
wage was so legislatively decreed.  On
the other, it would impute to the same enactment, without any support in the
statutory language, a means whereby to frustrate in part such commendable
legislative objective.  No such intent
could rightfully be imputed to Congress. 
Moreover, to cast a suspicion that such a form of evasion was
legislative willed may even raise serious constitutional doubts.  For it is un­deniable that every statute,
much more so one arising from a legislative implementation of a constitutional
mandate, must be so construed that no question as to its conformity with what
the fundamental law requires need arise. 
Apparently, appellant is unaware of such a basic postulate, or, if
aware; is not inclined to accord it deference. 
It cannot expect approbation from any court, much less from this
Tribunal.

2.  Even if the plain
legislative purpose so evident on the face of the statute is not to vitalize
and implement what the Constitution enjoins, still there is no escape from an
equally authoritative principle of statutory construction that bars acceptance
on what appellant would foist upon the judiciary as an acceptable
interpretation.  As noted in the recent
case of Sarcos v. Castillo:^[11]
“It is fundamental that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained,
effect should be given to it by the judiciary. 
From Ty Sue v. Hord,
decided in 1909, it has been our constant holding that the choice between
conflicting theories falls on that which best accords with the letter of the
law and with its purpose.  The next year,
in an equally leading decision, United States
v. Toribio, there was a caveat against a construction
that would tend to defeat the pur­pose and object of the legislator.’ Then came
the admonition in Riera v. Palmaroli,
against an application so narrow ‘as to defeat the manifest purpose of the
legislator.’ This was repeated in the latest case, Commissioner of Customs v. Caltex, in almost identical language.”

If the interpretation offered by appellant would be considered
acceptable, then there would be a negation of the above purpose of the
amendatory act increasing the minimum wage law. 
That would be to defeat and frustrate rather than to foster its
policy.  It must be rejected.

3.  The futility of the
appeal is thus apparent.  The first two assigned
errors that the lower court should not have relied on Article 1702 of the Civil
Code, which would require that in case of doubt all labor legislation should be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer and of the
continuing of Section 19 prohibiting any interpretation of the Minimum Wage Law
that would justify the reduction of the wage then paid to any of its employees,
obviously lack merit.

Much less could it be
alleged that the lower court erred in disregarding the clear context of the
above Section 19, particularly the use of the word “now” and the
phrase “furnish on the date of enactment.” What does it provide?  “Nothing in this Act shall deprive an
employee of the right to seek fair wages, shorter working hours and better
working conditions nor justify an employer in violating any other labor law
applicable to his employees, in reducing the wage now paid to any of his
employees in excess of the minimum wage established under this Act, or in
reducing supplements furnished on the date of enactment.”^[12] Appellant thus would have this Court accept
the view that as it began
business after the Minimum Wage Law was enacted in 1951 the above safeguard in
the act that would preclude any evasion thereof becomes nugatory because of the
presence therein of the word “now”, which, for appellant, would have
the effect of limiting its application only to business establishments existing
as of the date of its effectivity on April 6,
1951.  Appellant apparently is in no mood
to pay need to the constitutional command of protection to labor or to assure
that the legislative purpose be attained. 
It would defy common sense.

Nothing is better settled
then that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd or
unreasonable consequence.^[13] That is a principle that goes back to In re Allen^[14] decided on October 29, 1903, where it was held that a literal
interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd
results.  That is a strong argument
against its adoption.^[15] The words of Justice Laurel are particularly
apt.  Thus:  “The fact that the construction placed
upon the statute by the appellants would lead to an absurdity is another argument
for rejecting it * * *.”^[16]

It is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as
to avoid such a deplorable result.  That
has long been a judicial function.^[17]
A literal reading of a legislative act which could be thus characterized is to
be avoided if the language thereof can be given a reasonable application
consistent with the legislative purpose.^[18]
In the apt language of Frankfurter: 
“A decent respect for the policy of Congress must save us from
imputing to it a
self-defeating, if not disingenuous purpose.”^[19]
Certainly, we must reject a construction that at best amounts to a
manifestation of verbal ingenuity but hardly satisfies the test of rationality
on which law must be based.

4.  It would not be easy to
imagine an interpretation more clearly designed to circumvent the statute or
more transparent.  It did not require the
lower court too much effort to see through the scheme.  It decided as it ought to having respect for
the clear statutory purpose.  We cannot
reverse it.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of March 30,
1966 is affirmed.  With costs against
appellant Automotive Parts & Equipment Company Incorporated.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, Teehankee, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Art. II, Sec. 5, Constitution.

^[2]
Art. XIV, Sec. 6, Ibid.

^[3]
Republic Act No. 4180, An Act Amending Republic Act No. 602, Otherwise Known as
the Minimum Wage Law by Raising the Minimum Wage for Certain Workers.  This Act took effect on April 21, 1965.

^[4]
Insofar as relevant, Sec. 1 of Republic Act No. 4180 provides:  “Section three of Republic Act Numbered
Six hundred two is hereby amended to read as follows:  ‘Sec. 3. 
Minimum Wage. 
– (a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is
employed by an enterprise other than in agriculture minimum wages of not less
than six pesos a day:  Provided, That this Act shall not apply to any retail or service
enterprise that regularly employs not more than five employees; or mining
enterprises; (b) Every employer who operates a farm enterprise shall pay to
each of his employees, who is engaged in agriculture, minimum wages at the rate
prescribed in Section forty-two of Republic Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred
forty-four; (c) Effective on the first of July, nineteen hundred and sixty-five
the minimum wage rates for employees in the government service shall be as follows:  for national government laborers and workers,
six pesos a day; for provinces and cities, first and second class, six pesos a
day; third and fourth class, five pesos a day; and for all other classes the
minimum wage shall be fixed by the respective provinces and cities as their
finances may permit, provided the same shall not be less than four pesos; for
first and second class municipalities, six pesos a day; for third and fourth
class municipalities, five pesos a day; and for all other class of
municipalities the minimum wage shall be fixed by the respective municipalities
as their finances may permit, provided that the same shall not be less than
four pesos.”

^[5]
Sec. 19 of the Minimum Wage Law reads in full: 
“Relations to other labor laws and practices.  – Nothing in this Act shall deprive an
employee of the right to seek fair wages, shorter working hours and better
working conditions nor justify an employer in violating any other labor law
applicable to his employees, in reducing the wage now paid to any of his
employees in excess of the minimum wage established under this Act, or in
reducing supplements furnished on the date of enactment.”

^[6]
Record on Appeal, Petition, pars. 3
& 4.

^[7]
Ibid, pars. 7 & 10.

^[8]
Ibid, par. 12.

^[9]
Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 44.

^[10]
Ibid, pp. 44-45.

^[11]
Sarcos v. Castillo, 26 SCRA 853, 859-860
(1969).

^[12]
Sec. 19, Republic Act No. 602 (1951).

^[13]
Cf. Yrostorza v.
Republic, 83 Phil. 727 (1949).

^[14]
2 Phil. 630.  Cf. Ledesma
v. Pictain, 79 Phil. 95 (1947) and Pritchard v.
Republic, 81 Phil. 244 (1948).

^[15]
Chartered Bank v. Imperial and
National Bank, 48 Phil. 931 (1921).

^[16]
Director of Lands v. Abaja, 63 Phil. 559, 565 (1936).  Cf. People v. De
Guzman, 90 Phil. 132 (1951).

^[17]
Cf. Armstrong Paint and Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 US 315 (1938).

^[18]
Cf. Haggar Co.
v. Helvering, 308 US 389 (1940).

^[19]
Cf. Nardone v. United
States, 308 US
338, 341 (1939).