NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. IGNACIO VALERA, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS

Respondents, except the Sheriff and Hearing Officer, filed a claim for
unpaid wages against petitioner and the Central Surety and Insurance
Company before Regional ffice No. 8, Department of Labor, in Davao City
(LSV-3). As petitioner did not appear at the first hearing held before
the Hearing Officer, respondents were allowed to present their
evidence, and on October 20, 1957 an award was made in their favor
requiring petitioner to pay them the total sum of P17,683.10. This
award, however, was set aside upon petitioner’s motion, thru Atty.
Dominguez, and the case was set for hearing on January 8, 1958. On that
date, one Mr. Marquez, an engineer in the employ of petitioner,
presented to the Hearing Officer a message received from his employer
asking for the postponement of the hearing, but the postponement was
denied, the hearing was held, and thereafter a similar award in favor
of the claimants was made.

It appears that on November 21,
1957—more than a month prior to the date set for the second hearing
(January 8, 1957)—the Corporate Counsel filed a verified motion to set
aside the first award dated October 20, 1957 upon the ground that
petitioner had not been duly notified of the hearing. On December 6 of
the same year the Hearing Officer issued an order refraining from
acting thereon upon the ground that the award aforesaid had already
been set aside. Inasmuch as in spite of the appearance and motion of
the Corporate Counsel, he was not served with notice of the hearing set
for January 8, 1958, he filed a verified motion on January 17 to set
aside the proceedings had, including the second award made. The Hearing
Officer denied this motion on February 24, 1958. Although the motion
for reconsideration filed by the Corporate Counsel was still pending
resolution, the now respondents must have instituted the corresponding
court proceedings for the execution of the award made in their favor
because a writ of execution was issued and the respondents sheriff and
deputy sheriff levied on some personal properties belonging to
petitioner and advertised them for sale on May 26, 1958. For this
reason petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu the
present action for prohibition, with a petition for a writ of
preliminary injunction. On May 26, 1958 said court, through the Hon.
Amador Gomez, issued an order finding the verified petition for
prohibition sufficient in form and substance to justify giving to it
due course, and required respondents named therein to filed their
answer within ten days from notice, and two days later the same court
also granted the petition for preliminary injunction against the
respondents sheriff and deputy sheriff, to prevent the sale of the
personal properties levied upon.

Instead of an answer,
respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition upon the following
grounds: (1) that the petition did not state any cause of action; (2)
that the decision complained of had become final and executory and
could not be stayed; (3) that the action was a collateral remedy not
sanctioned by law; (4) that petitioner had not exhausted all remedies
allowed by law; and (5) that the action was dilatory.

Petitioner
opposed the above mentioned motion to dismiss, but after a hearing held
thereon, without the presentation of any evidence, the court, in its
order of August 5, 1958, dismissed the case and set aside the writ of
preliminary injunction theretofore issued. The motions for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner took the present appeal.

The
first assignment of error made in petitioner’s brief to this effect:
“The lower court erred in dismissing petitioner’s petition for
prohibition based on respondents’ motion to dismiss filed pursuant to
Section 1 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court” is decisive of this case.

The
lower court dismissed the case relying on the following grounds; that
the award of January 6, 1958 having been made after due notice of
hearing had been served on the parties, the Hearing Officer had
jurisdiction not only over the subject matter but also upon the
National Power Corporation; that because the latter had been notified
through Atty. Dominguez, it was unnecessary to serve another notice on
the Corporate Counsel; that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
dated May 24, 1958 was proforma, as it merely repeated the reasons
already relied upon in a previous motion to set aside the proceedings
of January 8, 1958; that petitioner had not exhausted the
administrative remedies available to it; and finally, that prohibition
is not the proper remedy because the Hearing Officer who made the award
had acted within his jurisdiction and did not commit any abuse of
discretion.

Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court, provides that
the provisions of the preceding rules shall apply in special civil
actions provided they are not inconsistent with, or may serve to
supplement the provisions of the rules relating to such special civil
actions. It cannot be denied, therefore, that Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court applies to the present action for prohibition and that
respondents’ motion to dismiss should have been based upon one or any
number of the grounds enumerated in Section 1 of said rule.

The
only ground invoked in the motion to dismiss under consideration that
falls within the purview of Rule 8 is respondents’ contention that the
facts stated in the verified petition for prohibition do not constitute
a valid cause of action. The others do not. It is, therefore, improper
to consider them as grounds upon which to dismiss the action without a
hearing on the merits.

Regarding the sufficiency of the
allegations of the verified petition for prohibition to state a cause
of action, we believe with the Hon. Amador E. Gomez who issued the
orders giving due course to said petition and providing for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, “that the said verified
petition was sufficient in form and substance to justify it being given
due course for ultimate determination on the merits”. But even assuming
the contrary—as apparently was the opinion of the Hon. Macapanton Abbas
who issued the order subject of the present appeal—still we believe
that His Honor should have given petitioner an opportunity to amend its
petition, instead of dismissing the case.

Wherefore, the
order appealed from dated August 5, 1958, is hereby reversed and this
case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in
consonance with this decision. Without costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angela, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, and De Leon, JJ., concur.