G.R. No. L-22625. April 27, 1967
FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. COMPAÑIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS, AND/OR MANILA PORT SERVICE AND/OR MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, DEFENDANTS-APPELL…
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 54284, dismissing, for lack of
jurisdiction, the complaint of the plaintiff-appellant Fireman’s Fund Insurance
Company against the Manila Port Service and Manila Railroad Company, as alternative defendants with Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas.
On 15 May 1962, the International General Electric Co., U.S.A., of which the Compañia General de Tabacos de
Filipinas was the agent in the Philippines, shipped at the port of New York
fifteen (15) cartons on board
the ocean vessel “Susan Maersk“. The shipment, valued at $1,722.19 was
consigned to the order of the First National City Bank of New
York, Manila,
with arrival notice to the General Electric Company (P. I.) and was insured by
the plaintiff Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company against loss or damage.
On 17 June 1962,
the vessel arrived in Manila,
unloaded its cargo and allegedly delivered the cartons, 2 of them in bad
order, to the arrastre operator, the defendant Manila Port Service, a
subsidiary of the Manila Railroad
Company. In turn, the Manila Port
Service delivered the goods to the consignee but short
of one (1) carton, with a value of $390,72 (Case No. 6652) while another one
was short of contents, with a value of $9.84 (Case No. 218).
The consignee filed formal claims with the carrier’s agent, Compañia General de Tabacos de
Filipinas, with the arrastre operator, Manila Port
Service and with the insurer, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (through its agent,
E.E. Elser, Inc.) for the insured value of the
loss. The carrier rejected the claim on
the ground that it had discharged the shipment complete from the vessel;
however, it sent a communication on 4
October 1962 to the consignee, advising that Case No. 6652
“was discharged against clean tally sheet #6353” and that the claim
should be referred to the arrastre operator and the
underwriters. The carrier requested that
the consignee’s claim be amended on Case No. 218 only; but the consignee did
not heed the requested amendment. On the
part of the arrastre operator, it contended that one
case was not landed, and refused to pay.
The plaintiff-insurer, through E.E. Elser,
Inc., paid the claim at the dollar-peso conversion rate in the sum of P1,898.66.
On 17 June 1963, the plaintiff, as subrogee
to all rights of recovery in connection with the loss that it had insured and
paid, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
carrier and the arrastre operator as alternative
defendants, claiming that it was uncertain as to which of them is liable for
the lost cargoes.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision dismissing the
complaint against the Manila Port Service and Manila Railroad Company for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action as against said
defendants; but sentenced the defendant Compañia General
de Tabacos de Filipinas to pay the plaintiff the sum
of P38.25, with interest.
Not satisfied with the decision, the plaintiff interposed the present
direct appeal.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Court of First
Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
insofar as the defendants Manila Port Service and Manila Railroad Company are
concerned and considering that the amount demanded in the complaint is only P1,898.66, considering that these defendants were joined as
alternative defendants with a carrier of goods by sea, the Compañia
General de Tabacos de Filipinas.
We agree with plaintiff-appellant that the Court below erred in
dismissing its action against defendants Manila Port Service and the Manila
Railroad Company. Not only because
Section 13 of Rule 3 permits it, in case of uncertainty, to sue several defendants in the alternative, but also because Section 5, Rule
2 of the Rules of Court permits a joinder of causes
of action in the alternative, or otherwise, if said causes of action arise out
of the same contract, transaction or relation between the same parties. Furthermore, the second paragraph of the last
cited provision prescribes that in the cases aforementioned –
“the action
shall be filed in the inferior court unless any of the causes joined
falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in which case it
shall be filed in the latter court.”
(Emphasis supplied).
The provision of our Rules of Court accords with the American
rule:
“Constitutions and statutory
provisions conferring jurisdiction on the inferior courts of demands below
certain amounts do not forbid determination of said demands in the superior
court where they are connected with larger claims or with type of demand solely
within the jurisdiction of the superior court.” (21 C.J.S., p. 81.)
The Court below admitted that the action for damages to Case No.
218 was within its jurisdiction since it involved an issue in admiralty;
wherefore, it must be held to have likewise acquired jurisdiction over the
other cause of action alternatively joined thereto.
Nor is the suit filed by plaintiff in the Court of First Instance
without precedent in this country. The
same issue, on practically identical facts, was posed in Switzerland General
Insurance Co., Ltd. vs. Java Pacific and Hoegh Lines
and the Manila Railroad Company, G.R. No. L-21760, decided on 30 April 1966. After referring to section
5, Rule 2, jam. cit., this Court observed:
“As may be seen, the instance case comes within the purview of
the rule above-quoted for therein it is postulated that a party may in one
pleading state in the alternative as many causes of action as he may have
against an opposing party if they arise from the same transaction with the
particularity that the case may be filed in the court of first instance if any
of said causes of action falls exclusively within its jurisdiction. This is precisely what was done in this
particular case. Because of the
uncertainty of the place where the disappearance of the shipment occurred,
plaintiff brought the case in the alternative before the court of first
instance upon the theory that it may have occurred while the shipment was in
transit or while in the custody of the arrastre
operator.
“This case also finds support in International Harvester
Company of the Philippines
v. Aragon, et
al., 84 Phil. 363. In said case, the complaint was filed in
the municipal court against both the shipping company as agent of the vessel on
which the shipment was loaded and the Manila Railroad Company, Inc. as
alternative defendants, seeking to recover the sum of P200.00 as value of the
undelivered goods, it being uncertain whether said cargo was lost at sea or
while in storage at the Port of Manila.
In affirming the dismissal of the case this Court stated that the municipal
court had no jurisdiction over the same because it is predicated on the
contract of carriage by sea which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the court of first instance. And
reasoning by analogy, we may say that the instant case also falls exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila upon the
theory that the loss or disappearance of a portion of the shipment may have
taken place during the voyage and hence it involves a maritime case which falls
within the original jurisdiction of said court. The fact that the amount sought to be
collected is less than its jurisdictional limit is of no moment, because the
cause of action being indivisible, covering as it does laws on ordinary as
well as maritime contract, such jurisdictional limitation as to amount must
yield to the greater jurisdiction of the court as to subject matter for reasons
of expediency and convenience.”
The foregoing ruling was reiterated in Rizal Surety
vs. Manila Railroad Co., G.R. No. L-20875, 30 April 1966, and in Insurance Company of North
America vs. United States Lines Company,
G.R. No. L-21021, decided on 27
May 1966.
To be sure, the Court below declared that the consignee or its
successor in interest could have easily verified the disclaimer of the agents
of the vessel
as to the loss of case No. 6652, “by asking for the particular
cargo receipt which had been signed by the arrastre
contractor and would therefore be binding upon it.” This would only
be true on the assumption that the cargo receipt was authentic, and in view of the denials of the arrastre operator that it had received case No. 6652, or
that the same had been landed, the consignee was not in a position to be
certain that the receipt was genuine, or that the arrastre
operator would recognize its authenticity.
The plaintiff’s uncertainty, therefore, remained and justified it in
suing both the carrier and the arrastre operator in
the alternative as authorized by the
Rules of Court.
And, it appearing that the Manila Port Service has had no opportunity
to submit its own evidence as to its receipt of case No. 6652, a rehearing of
the case is in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed
and set aside, and the Court of First Instance is directed to overrule the
motion to dismiss of the defendants Manila Railroad Company and Manila Port
Service, and to proceed further with the case in conformity with this
decision. Costs against the defendants
above named.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
and Castro, JJ.,
concur.