DELFIN LIM, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. JUDGE PEDRO CALLEJO, JR., AS JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF BALABAC, PALAWAN, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance
of Palawan dated September 27, 1966, dismissing the
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by the herein
appellant, Delfin Lim, against the herein appellee,
Judge Pedro Callejo, Jr., as Municipal Judge of Balabac, Palawan, and holding the
cash bond posted by Lim (in connection with his application for preliminary
injunction) answerable for whatever damages Judge Callejo
may claim.

On April
12, 1966, a
complaint for Illegal Possession of Dynamite and Blasting Caps was filed
against Delfin Lim and two others before the
Municipal Court of Balabac, Palawan, presided by Judge Pedro Callejo,
Jr.  The complaint was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 225.  The arraignment
and trial of the case was set for May 30, 1966, but upon motions of the accused, the same
was reset for several times, the last of which was for September
8, 1966.

Before the accused could
be actually arraigned, the counsel for Delfin Lim, on
September 2, 1966, sent a telegram to Judge Callejo which
read:

“Judge Callejo

Balabac, Palawan

Delfin Lim filed complaint against you
Department Justice Praying disqualify yourself Criminal Case 225 People versus Delfin Lim et al

Attorney Flores”

On September
5, 1966, Judge Callejo issued an order denying the telegraphic request for
his disqualification, to wit:

“ORDER

“Before this Court is a telegraphic motion of the Attorney for
the accused herein, praying for the disqualification of the Presiding Judge of
this Court on the ground that accused Delfin Lim had
filed a complaint against him with the Department of Justice.

“The Presiding Judge of this Court has not, up to the present,
been officially notified of any such complaint. 
Neither had said Attorney apprised him of same previously.  It can be safely assumed, therefore, that
said complaint was filed after the institution of the above-entitled case.

“The filing of a complaint against a judge is not one of the
grounds for disqualification under Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.  However, it could be made a ground under the
second paragraph thereof.

“If said complaint had been filed prior to the institution of
the above-entitled case, this Court could, perhaps, inhibit himself from trying
and deciding this case.  But to do so in
a case where same was filed subsequently, would set a dangerous precedent
whereby a litigant could obstruct the administration of justice by filing
complaints, however frivolous, against any judge from whom he could not be
assured of a favorable judgment.

“As a matter of fact, the filing of complaints of this nature
would rather be regarded as intended to obstruct, impede and degrade the
administration of justice and/or embarrass, harass or intimidate the Presiding
Judge, unless the contrary is proven.

“WHEREFORE, said telegraphic motion is hereby denied.”

On September
7, 1966, Delfin Lim filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction against Judge Callejo, in his official
capacity as Municipal Judge of Balabac, Palawan, praying that the judge be ordered to desist
from trying Criminal Case No. 225.  On September
7, 1966, the Court
of First Instance of Palawan issued a writ of
preliminary injunction after Lim had posted a bond to answer for whatever
damages the judge may sustain by reason of the issuance of said writ.

On September 12, 1966,
Judge Callejo, through the Provincial Fiscal, filed a
motion with the Court of First Instance of Palawan
praying for the dismissal of the petition for prohibition on the grounds:  (1) that the petition did not state a
sufficient cause of action; (2) that the petition is not the proper remedy; and
(3) that the petition is premature.  At
the scheduled hearing of the motion to dismiss, neither the petitioner nor his
counsel appeared.  On September 27, 1966, the court issued
an order dismissing the petition for prohibition and holding petitioner’s cash
bond answerable for whatever damages the respondent may claim, to wit:

“ORDER

“Finding the motion to dismiss filed by the Provincial Fiscal,
for the reasons stated therein to be meritorious and well-taken, the same is
hereby granted.

“The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed, costs against
the petitioner.  The cash bond posted by the
petitioner for his application for preliminary injunction deposited in the
office of the Provincial Treasurer of Palawan
under Official Receipt No. J-9491268 dated September 8, 1966 is hereby held to answer for whatever
damages the respondent may claim.

“SO ORDERED. “

From the above-quoted
order, Lim appealed to this Court raising the following issues:  (1) whether or not the Court of First
Instance of Palawan erred in dismissing the petition for
prohibition; and (2) whether or not said court erred in holding
petitioner’s cash bond answerable for whatever
damages the respondent judge may claim.

Section 2, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 2. PETITION
FOR PROHIBITION. – When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial are
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant to desist from further proceeding in the action or
matter specified therein.

“The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of
the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.”

It is clear from the foregoing that two requisites must concur in
order that prohibition may lie to restrain the respondent judge from proceeding
with Criminal Case No. 225, namely:  (1)
that he gravely abused his discretion in denying the telegraphic motion for
disqualification; and (2) that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against said order of
denial.  Neither of these two requisites
is present in the case at bar. 
Consequently, the Court of First Instance of Palawan
correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition.

The ground relied upon by petitioner-appellant Lim in seeking the
disqualification of Judge Callejo to try the criminal
case was the alleged filing by
the former against the latter of an administrative case with the then
Department of Justice.  Assuming, arguendo, that an administrative case had indeed
been filed by Lim against Judge Callejo, the same
could not by itself constitute a ground for the disqualification.  Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court
provides:

“SECTION 1. DISQUALIFICATION
OF JUDGES. ? No
judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he
is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the
rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court
where his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

“A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.”

The first paragraph of the above-quoted provision enumerates the
five grounds which per se disqualify a judge or judicial officer
from sitting in a case, namely:  (1) when
he or his wife or child is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise; (2) when he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, computed according to the
rules of civil law; (3) when he is related to counsel within the fourth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, computed according to the rules of civil law; (4)
when he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel; and (5)
when he has presided in any inferior court where his ruling or decision is the
subject of review.  Present any of said
grounds, the judge or judicial officer has to disqualify himself from sitting
in the case unless a written consent is signed by all the parties in interest
and entered upon the record. 
Significantly, the ground relied upon by Lim in seeking the
disqualification of Judge Callejo, i.e., the filing
by the former against the latter of an administrative case, is not one of the
five enu­merated grounds which disqualify a judge from sitting in a case.  Thus, Judge Callejo
was under no legal compulsion to disqualify himself from sitting in Criminal
Case No. 225.

Whether or not the filing by an accused of an administrative
complaint against Judge Callejo should be considered
as a “just or valid reason” for him to disqualify himself from trying
and deciding the criminal case under the second paragraph of Sec. 1, Rule 137
of the Rules of Court, would depend on the “exercise of his sound discretion”.  In his order of September 5, 1968, Judge Callejo
ruled in the negative.  Lim assails this
ruling as a grave abuse of discretion. 
We cannot agree.  On the contrary,
We concur with the following observation of Judge Callejo in his assailed order:

“If said complaint had been filed prior to the institution of
the above-entitled case, this Court could, perhaps, inhibit himself from trying
and deciding this case.  But to do so in
a case where same was filed subsequently, would set a dangerous precedent whereby a
litigant could obstruct the administration of justice by filing complaints, however frivolous, against any
judge from whom he could not be assured a favorable judgment”
(Underscoring supplied.)

Indeed, a contrary ruling would be
fraught with dangerous implications.  For
to grant the same could be taken to mean that the mere filing by a party in a
case of ANY administrative complaint against the judge pre­siding in the
case constitutes “just or valid reason” for said judge to disqualify
himself from trying and deciding the said case. 
In such a case the wheels of justice will come to an abrupt halt.

Aside from the fact that Judge Callejo
did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in refusing to disqualify himself, Lim was not entitled to the remedy of prohibition
because of Sec. 2, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court which reads:

“SECTION 2. OBJECTION THAT JUDGE DISQUALIFIED,
HOW MADE AND EFFECT. – If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from
sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency
may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the
ground therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the
question of his disqualification.  His
decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in
the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his
decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the
case.” (Underscoring supplied.)

In the brief filed for
the respondent-appellee by then Solicitor General and
Assistant Solicitor General, now Associate Justices of this Court, Antonio P. Barredo and Pacifico P. de
Castro, respectively, Solicitor Federico V. Sian,
Provincial Fiscal Zoilo Alviar
and Atty. Romeo J. Callejo (private counsel of
respondent-appellee), the case of “Nacionalista Party v. Vera” (85 Phil. 126, 128) was
cited.  It was there ruled that –

“Under this provision, the party seeking the disqualification
of a judge or a judicial officer must, in writing, file with said official his
objection, stating the grounds therefor, and if the
objection is denied, the remedy is an appeal to be taken after final judgment
is rendered in the case.  For this
reason, the petition for prohibition is improper.”

In the
more recent case of “Paredes v. Gopengco” (G. R. No. L-23710, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 688), this Court, through Mr.
Justice Teehankee, held:

“x x
x Where, however, it is the accused in a
criminal case who seeks the disqualification of the trial judge, the general
restriction provided in the rule against appeal or stay of the proceedings when
the judge denies the motion and rules in favor of his own competency would
apply, as it does in civil cases.  In
such case, the accused, in the event of his conviction, could raise the
correctness of the judge’s ruling on his non-disqualification with his appeal
from the decision on the merits; and were he to be acquitted, he would have no
cause for complaint against the Judge’s acquittal verdict and ruling of
non-disqualification of himself from trying the case and rendering such
verdict.”

Finding no error in the dismissal of the petition for
prohibition, the only issue left for resolution concerns that portion of the
assailed order which held that the cash bond posted by Lim shall be answerable
for whatever damages Judge Callejo may claim.

Judge Callejo was made respondent in
the special civil action for prohibition in his official capacity as judge of
the Municipal Court of Balabac and not as a private person.  Consequently,
any damage or expense incurred by him in connection with the case would be official in nature and for which no fund of private origin has to
answer.  Thus, such portion of the
appealed order which held the
cash bond posted by Lim answerable for whatever
damages Judge Callejo may claim should be set aside.

Respondent contends that the petitioner is estopped
from claiming not that the
former is not entitled to damages from the bond because the latter had
deposited the same with full knowledge that it would be made to answer for
whatever damages the judge may suffer by reason of a wrongful issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction.  This
contention is untenable since the posting of said bond should not have been
ordered in the
first place, as no private person would be prejudiced by the preliminary
injunction.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed
insofar as it dismissed the petition for prohibition but is reversed insofar as it held the cash bond
posted by the petitioner answerable for whatever damages the respondent judge
may claim.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernandez, Concepcion, Jr., and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., (Acting Chairman), see brief concurrence.